Research & Publications: Energy

This essay provides a brief overview of Iran’s relations with Southeast Asian nations during the sanctions period, looks at the initial results of President Rouhani’s October 2016 visit to the region, and considers the prospects for the further expansion of these ties.

In the face of economic challenges and geopolitical shifts, Oman is investing in its strategic partnership with India to diversify Muscat’s web of international allies.

Despite a history of distrust, Iran and Russia are forging stronger commercial and political bonds due to sanctions, upheaval in global energy markets, and the deteriorating security situation in Syria.

In this week's Monday Briefing, MEI experts Gonul Tol, Daniel Serwer, and Jean-François Seznec provide analysis on recent and upcoming events including the Turkish intervention in Syria, and next month's OPEC meeting in Algeria.

Asian markets account for roughly 75% of Iran’s crude oil exports. Reuters reported that Iran’s June 2016 sales to its four major Asian oil customers—China, Japan, India and South Korea—were 47.1% higher than a year ago. This infographic illustrates that Iran is on track to reclaim the share of the Asian oil market that it had lost due to sanctions.

Iran's return to the world economy will include the development of its most prized gas resource—the South Pars field—which it shares with Qatar. The implications could be increased competition between the two states, or an improvement in relations to ensure responsible dual management of the shared field.

This essay briefly examines Malaysia’s past experience dealing with jihadist activities and profiles four Malaysian foreign fighters from the current period. The central argument is that, even though Malaysians constitute a relatively small number of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria, they pose a major problem for Malaysia and other Southeast Asian countries and are a complicating factor in the conflicts in which they are involved.

China's One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative does not provide an equal opportunity for all states, and, in the case of the Gulf, it is Iran that will likely benefit over all others. The states of the G.C.C. also factor into Beijing’s plan, just not to the same degree―and that is the problem. Yet, as this essay shows, using OBOR and existing comparative advantages will allow the states of the G.C.C. to balance Iran’s potential windfall.