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The US committed vast human and material resources to a venture in Iraq, which will have profound effects on US interests in the wider Middle East and beyond. For that reason, and because Turkey has paid a heavy price for US mistakes in Iraq, my prepared remarks will focus on the outlook for US policy toward that country. But I should emphasize that there is more to US policy in the region, and we need to address some of these other issues on their merits. They include: the Arab-Israeli peace process, conflict between the US and Iran, and the demonstration with regard to Libya that diplomacy can work better than military threats. During the question period, I will try to respond to whatever is on your mind.

Among many other very important cultural and academic interests in the region, the Middle East is also the region upon which our global economy depends for major energy resources. In that sense it is vital for our national security and the focus of many strategic problems. This is not some idea dreamed up in the U.S. State Department or the Pentagon or the Middle East Institute. It is a hard fact of geology and the reality of international trade.

Finally, countries in the Middle East are both victims of and sources for international terrorism. Just as the US is not isolated from the effects of disrupting oil production in the Arabian Peninsula, we too are not isolated from the suffering, anger and hatred that drive international terrorism. Dealing with terrorism will often require the use of military force, but military force by itself will not begin to solve problems that must be addressed within a much wider framework of diplomacy and international cooperation.

President Bush has stated that human freedom and the spread of democracy will advance US interests and protect the American people against terrorist threats. In the long run – the very long run – he may be right. But permit me to express some skepticism about this idealistic view of the world. Full disclosure: forty years ago, as a young Foreign Service officer, I might have agreed with the President. But the stars in my eyes at age 24 when I was a Fulbright scholar in Cairo have grown dim, just as my hair has grown thin. Now I am a cynical veteran of four decades of practical experience in the mean neighborhoods of the Middle East and North Africa. My view of foreign policy is much closer to that of my mentor Henry Kissinger or my favorite Commander in Chief George Herbert Walker Bush than it is to Woodrow Wilson or George W. Bush.

For many, the words of the President’s 2005 inaugural address are inspiring: “It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.” Wait a minute. Orderly political reform is desirable, but we should not oversell the trappings of democracy the way the Bush Administration oversold the Iraq war. It is not self-evident that freely elected parliaments in Arab countries or Iran will be friendly to either the United States or the values we hold dear. It is not clear that democratic governments in Palestine, Syria and Lebanon will be as ready to reach peace with Israel, as were the unelected autocrats of Egypt and Jordan – Anwar Sadat and King Hussein. Turkey’s stable democratic institutions resulted from a long period of evolution and involved many setbacks. Moreover, I doubt that the spread of popular democracy in the form of free elections will always work to our benefit in the war against terrorism. It is awkward for the Bush Administration, but some of the most responsive allies in that effort have been autocratic regimes like those of Russia, Uzbekistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Indeed, the Bush Administration often seems to have two policies – one rhetorical and another molded by harsh realities on the ground. Pakistan is perhaps the most notable case. In the summer of 2001, US-Pakistani relations were at a low point. Yet in its first term, the Bush Administration named Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally, and within a few months of the stirring words in the President’s inaugural address Secretary of State Rice visited Pakistan and announced that we were lifting the embargo on the sale of F-16 jet fighter aircraft. This had nothing to do with any imagined progress in terms of democratic reforms and everything to do with Pakistan’s role in the war against terrorism and the détente in Pakistan’s relations with India.

The US must be honest about the reasons why the message we think we are sending to the rest of the world often sounds arrogant and based on double standards. Too often, the governments and non-government elites of other countries find that we preach without listening to their concerns. They perceive that we have a fixed agenda for political change, which does not fit their history or culture. They may believe that US aid abroad, as in Iraq, largely benefits US corporations rather than the recipient countries.

Moreover, there is a profound cultural disconnect based on differences of public psychology. As a people, Americans are endowed with energy, impatience and the basic confidence that all problems can be solved. Based on their past history, the peoples of the Middle East are endowed with reflection, caution and fear of chaos. While we see reform and democracy as critical requirements for attacking radicalism and terrorism, our friends in the region see undue haste as a prescription for instability and the rise of radicalism. How can we be so sure that the toppling of autocratic regimes in Arab countries will lead to a better outcome than we saw when the Shah of Iran was overthrown in the Islamic Revolution on 1979? In the long term, that historic change may benefit both the Iranian people and the United States, but it is proving to be a very long term indeed.

Iraq reality check

2006 is a fateful year for Iraq and for US policy in the Middle East. It is bringing more personal tragedy to thousands of Iraqis caught up in waves of violence, economic stagnation and crippled services. More American military and civilian personnel are also casualties of this disorder. There is concern turmoil in Iraq could also destabilize Iraq’s neighbors. While 2006 may see Iraqis taking charge of their political destiny and the beginning of Iraq’s economic recovery, and there is hope that a passable Iraqi state may struggle to its feet, it should be clear that these positive outcomes are by no means certain. They will be unattainable without great sacrifices and without greater realism in US policy toward Iraq.

The invasion of Iraq and the toppling of the Saddam regime were the easy part. “Shock and Awe” worked for the world’s unrivaled military power against a second-rate military force greatly eroded by sanctions and demoralized by incompetent and despotic political leadership. The replacement of that leadership and the reconstruction of the Iraqi state have been far harder tasks. None of the easy answers — neither the alluring predictions of Iraqi opposition leaders nor the dazzling analytical confidence of imperial theorists along the banks of the Potomac and the Hudson — have fit the deadly and ambiguous realities which shape the political landscape on the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates.

Long-term success may not be out of reach, but it is not guaranteed either. Personally, I do not agree with President Bush that “victory” should be our goal. Success has to be measured in avoiding worse disasters. Success has to be measured in terms of whether we leave Iraq in a manner that does not make a very bad situation worse.

We now know that the Administration’s original vision for Iraq – a model of democracy, free markets, and rapidly growing oil exports that would transform the region (an Arab version of Norway, if you will) – is unattainable. Instead of building utopian sand castles, the US should embrace modest but achievable expectations for Iraq. It is still possible to help Iraqis make their country a better place for their children and a much safer place for Iraq’s neighbors. And it is imperative that we prevent Iraq from becoming the imminent danger to the US that some argued it was at the beginning of the Bush administration.

Viewed another way, a realistic policy needs redlines for really dangerous Iraqi behavior, as distinct from Iraqi behavior that is merely disappointing and annoying. The good news is that has Ambassador Khalilzad and US military commanders have in fact been moving in this direction on the ground, even while the rhetorical exuberance of the President and Vice President remain stuck in the time warp of the immediate post-war euphoria.

The key goals of the emerging, non-rhetorical policy are as follows:

· First: Iraqi cooperation in the war against terrorists bent on violence against Americans and our de-facto allies in the governments of the region. Iraq was a theoretical “safe haven” for such terrorists before we invaded. Now it is much more likely to become one if a working relationship between governments in Washington and Baghdad were to collapse or, worse, if Iraq were to continue its slide into the failed state category.

· Second: Strict Iraqi adherence to UN resolutions prohibiting future efforts to reconstitute weapons of mass destruction or long-range missile programs.

· Third: Assurance that the government in Baghdad or a new government in southern Iraq will not fall under the dominant influence of neighboring Iran.

If the new Iraqi political order fails to cooperate on those three points, they will have crossed redlines that I believe would be intolerable for any US administration. These are not matters for partisan controversy. They are fundamental objectives for US national security.

Without excusing the shortcomings of strategic thinking and policy implementation that bogged us down in the Iraqi quagmire, responsible statecraft requires critics of the Bush Administration to acknowledge that the way we leave Iraq could make matters worse. Worse for Iraqis and laden with future threats to vital US interests and with even greater demands on US resources. In short, a quagmire could become a sinkhole for a battered nation struggling to regain its footing and for efforts to defend against international terrorism and proliferation of really bad weapons.

One of the most dangerous proposals, espoused by a few US political activists and politicians, is the break up of Iraq, as what happened with the former Yugoslavia. While many of Iraq’s Kurds and might initially welcome it by some Iranian leaders, it would be a disaster for most Iraqis, the Kurds included, and for Iraq’s neighbors. It would risk decades of ethnic cleansing and an internal civil war that could easily widen into a regional war. The potential suffering would be immense, and the setback to regional political and economic development could spark off a global recession.

There are no silver bullets or fail-safe parachutes. We only mislead Iraqis and ourselves by placing too much weight on timetables and milestones. The political leaders of the Bush Administration may be slowly learning this reality, long argued by career experts in the military services, intelligence agencies and State Department. Critics of the Administration should also avoid the trap of easy answers.

There is a chance that Iraq can still be stabilized. But without a broad international consensus, US diplomatic and economic influence will be inadequate to help Iraqis with this task. I say this as someone who is a friend of Ambassador Khalilzad. I admire much of what he accomplished in Afghanistan and what he is trying to accomplish in Iraq against long odds. To the diminishing extent that Iraqis will tolerate the role in Iraqi politics of a prominent foreign diplomat, however, it would be better if that person were of another nationality. US leadership from behind the scenes would be more acceptable to Iraqis.

Let me suggest a number of proposals for responsible disengagement from Iraq:

1. Work with either the United Nations or an ad hoc international coalition to set up an Iraqi contact group composed of Iraq’s neighbors and major outside governments prepared to commit themselves to supporting Iraq’s territorial integrity and economic reconstruction. To be truly meaningful, such a group must include Iran and Syria, and the US must be prepared to meet with their representatives in this context on a basis of mutual respect.

2. The contact group should name a respected non-American figure to offer international good offices to Iraqi political leaders. This would support the development of a more inclusive constitutional process and efforts to bring dissident Iraqi groups prepared to renounce the resort to violence into national institutions.

3. At the next conference to encourage donors to Iraq’s economic reconstruction, the US should offer to bring its own assistance program into a multilateral planning process as incentive for greater efforts by other donors. US unilateral approaches to Iraqi development are no more successful than unilateral approaches to reconstructing Iraqi security and political stability. Nor can the US withdraw abruptly from the economic development challenges.

4. Enter into urgent discussions with the Iraqi government to establish benchmarks for the gradual disengagement of US military units from the policing of Iraqi cities and major lines of transportation, as well as the gradual reduction of overall force levels.

5. Agree with the Iraqi government on arrangements for the period in which residual US forces might be requested by the Iraqis to provide training, logistics, air cover and back-up to Iraqi forces attempting to regain control over Iraq’s borders and to deal with armed insurgent groups.

6. Make clear in private and in public that the intention of the US is not to maintain forces in Iraq beyond minimal and mutually agreed levels. At the same time, we should not aim for a precipitous withdrawal that would jeopardize Iraq’s own national security efforts. We will not establish artificial deadlines, but we will insist that Iraq’s security be based on an inclusive political system and not be driven by the desire of now dominant sectarian elements to take revenge against other parts of the Iraqi population.

7. Encourage Iraq to seek the assistance of other governments, especially from the NATO alliance, in providing military training and assistance. To the extent that sovereign Iraqi decisions are compatible with our own interests, we should encourage governments to respond generously to Iraqi security needs.