Bahman Baktiari:

Thank you very much. I think after the last panel, we may have a much more calm panel here, because we will have much more agreement than disagreement.

I was asked to give a presentation about developments in Iran and how the changes inside Iran will have long-term impact on the region and the prospects of democratization inside Iran. In these lectures, I usually begin the presentation by asking the people who invite me to give that talk whether they're asking the right question, because in many ways Iran is a fascinating case study today in terms of every issue that is confronting us – by us I mean Americans and the region. You have debate over the role of religion in politics. You have debate over the role of the clerics and their involvement in politics. You have debate over the role of the youth and how much they are involved in democratization in Iran. You also have debate about the role of women – the winners of the Nobel Peace Prize now, how important Shirin Ebadi has been to the movement in Iran. So, here's a country that ironically began in 1979 with an Islamic revolution and became the beginning of a faith, an Islamic resurgence, an Islamic movement around the region – today, it's bringing back the same questions that we're tackling that have a lot to do with Islam being out of politics.

So, you have to understand, first of all, that in Iran, what is happening inside Iran, a democratic movement inside Iran, did not begin in 1979. Our conceptual problem with understanding developments in Iran is the beginning of the year that we pick for analyzing developments in Iran. I've argued in other writings that to understand Iran better, we have to look at 1906, at the beginning of the reform movement in Iran. And look at the 1906 Constitutional Revolution in Iran that brought about all these issues that we are talking about happening inside Iran.

It's interesting that in Iran today they have the parliament building, which has been restructured and built a new building, and they're moving to this building shortly. In the front of the building, inside, is a huge sign that says, "1906-2006: Hundredth Anniversary of the Iranian Parliament." That sign right there, with all the clerics, everyone sitting in the parliament, they have to stare at that date. What happened in 1906 and what is happening today with the 100th anniversary of the Iranian parliament?

Here is what happened, in three ways that we can understand Iran better. First, we have to understand changes in Iranian society separately, compartmentalized, from changes in Iranian political structures. Understanding the changes in Iranian society will help us understand better the impact of those changes it is having on government today.

In the second part, we have to understand the dynamics of factional politics in Iran, how it's impacting the current government and institutions in Iran. Factional politics may have been leading Iran into gridlock, into policy paralysis, but there has been positive impacts of the factional politics in Iran, that I will refer to, that has helped in terms of the reform movement that is coming.

Finally, I will briefly address the impact of Iraq and developments in the region on Iranian society as a whole and the Iranian government, because what Iran will do in the next few years will become very important in terms of its long-term role in the region.

In the democratic politics of Iran that began in 1906, we have several forces in Iran that have been struggling for domination in the Iranian political scene. The clerics emerging in 1906 were split into two groups. One group of clerics argued for the divine right of the king, argued for no constitutionalism, and anyone who argued for individual rights was automatically attacked as being "not according to Islam." There was a second group of clerics in 1906 that called for a constitution in Iran and talked about how important the debate is over the individual rights versus divine rights. This debate continued all the way to 1925, the rise of Reza Shah Pahlavi, who again brought the secularization project inside Iran, and moved to 1941, when Iran was occupied by Western powers.

So, we had this phase of a struggle in Iran that was retarded in 1925, with occupational forces in 1941, and then it came back again in the early 1950s with the democratic government of Mossadegh – the same forces emerged again. The clerics who were on one side, nationalist-secularist on the other side. In this element obviously, the nationalist-secularist became victorious and clerics lost. But again, as we see it in 1963, later on with Khomeini, the clerics made a comeback.

So, you see this up and down in Iranian politics today. What is happening in Iran today really is the secondary role of the clerics: the clerics now, in terms of their influence, have been relegated to a secondary role. What we have, I would argue, is a combination of religious-nationalist, national identity that is emerging in Iran. People are more and more interested in development of faith as a belief system, not as a political ideology. Here the role of the clerics will become critical. I will address it in the question and answer if you have any questions on it.

So, in terms of societal changes in Iran, I would argue that we are seeing a gradual secularization from below. A gradual secularization from below is taking place in Iran. More and more the youth, the young, are turning away from religion. They're turning away from religion not as a faith-based action, but turning away from religion as a politicized religion.

It's very interesting to note that in September 1999, a little play in Iran brought a huge reaction from all the clerics and the Iranian authorities. In September 1999, a second-year student [Ali Abbas Nemati] wrote a play about the coming of the Mahdi. Shi'ites, as you know, believe in the arrival of the Messiah, the 12th Imam, at a time of injustice, a time of war. This student, a second-year student at a vocational school, very unknown, wrote a little play. The play started with this. The Mahdi is beginning to come. There is going to be an advent of Mahdi. The Messiah is showing up in Iran. There is a lot of injustice around the country, but the Messiah, once he arrives in Tehran, in Iran, according to the play, nobody shows up to greet him.

The play moves on to explain what is happening in the country of these Muslims, that all these injustices – suddenly, the Mahdi shows up, and nobody's there to greet him. So, the Mahdi, in the play, playing the role of this individual, says, "Maybe I have arrived at the wrong time – I should have come earlier." The writer of this play goes on and elaborates on this play, saying, "No, you have come exactly at the right time, because right now justice can be restored, but we have other things that we need to do. We don't have enough time to come and greet you." So, the Mahdi asks in the play, "What is keeping you so busy that you cannot perform your religious duty?" And the student in the play says, "We have to take an entrance exam for the university. We are very busy with studying for it. If you had come after the entrance exam, maybe we would have been able to greet you."

I mention this play from September 1999 because the Supreme Leader of the country was outraged. Clerics around the country called for a death sentence for this individual. The Tehran bazaar, a major source of economic activity, shut down in the protest the following day. There was all these calls for execution of this person who wrote this play. More important, if you notice, the Minister of Islamic Guidance, who was a liberal – Mohajerani, who was known for being a liberal – even he called for punishment of this person.

So, what was it about this play in September 1999 that brought such a huge reaction in the country among every group that was in power, all factions? It was really a reflection of what's happening in Iranian society in 1999. It's a reflection of how individuals, the young, are becoming more and more atomized, more and more interested in material interests, not so much in religious interests anymore. More and more, collective identity is moving toward individual identity. Issues of practical concerns, like taking an entrance exam. Not being able to show up for the Mahdi may be a big major issue for the clerics, but for the young it's very practical.

Most important and most threatening to the leaders in Iran was the author of the play, who was a former Revolutionary Guard. He fought in the war, he was a veteran of the Islamic Republic Revolutionary Guard. So, how do you go and punish a person like that without causing a huge reaction among the young? So, obviously the regime tried to shut down the whole debate and not pursue what was happening.

Now, we look at this play that came in September 1999. Three months before that there was a student uprising that the regime crushed in July 1999. Prior to that, you had all these setbacks for the young and the student movement, about how Khatami, as a reformist cleric, is not addressing their needs. So, you will see within the greater society at large, students who are the vanguard of the movement are becoming secularized now. They have no faith in what is happening in the religious authorities, in terms of the power they may have. That's a good example to look at the changes in Iranian society from 1906, when no one dared to question religion and the religious authority, to today, that you have former Revolutionary Guards actually questioning the religious authority.

Another important development that tells us this long-term curve that is taking place is the Iranian movies. If one looks at all the Persian films made since the revolution and how much they have become a source of success, and what are the themes of those films that are produced inside Iran, and how they reflect certain changes that are taking place in Iranian society – first of all you notice that there's always a struggle of a young kid trying to make up, trying to work harder to make enough money to support a family.

You will see a girl who is going around the town trying to make sure the money she has to buy fish does not get overspent, because otherwise, if that money gets overspent, she's going to come home, everybody's going to get upset that she spent too much money. The people ask her in the film [The White Balloon, written by Abbas Kiarostami, directed by Ja’far Panahi, 1996], "So, what does your father do?" She says, "My father has two jobs. One job, he works for this company monitoring electricity. The second job, my mother told me not to tell you what it is." In terms of the director of the film, he's telling you that her father is doing a job to make a living that is not very dignified, is not very important to express in terms of society. So, Persian films are really expressing this element of materialism that is taking hold, how much the struggle between the young and the old is completely transformed into this issue of making a living, and how your family – the dignity of your family – is now becoming very important vis-à-vis religiosity.

Another good film, A Taste of Cherry [written and directed by Abbas Kiarostami, 1997], shows this war veteran who is stuck in this hill road, going up and down on the hill, contemplating suicide. Here it is an important issue: why would somebody who fought in a war for Islam, for the Islamic Republic, today be so unhappy that he would contemplate suicide? So, he keeps going up and down on the hill, talking to different people who keep asking him, "What is it in life that hurts you?" He doesn't mention anything unusual. He says, "I have not been able to get married. If I had got married, I cannot bring enough money to my home." So, the reasons that he's contemplating suicide – and the film is putting it together – is really the frustration that is taking place with Islamic rulers in the country who have pushed young people into the war: now, after the war there are all these reflections about, what was the meaning of that war? How did that war affect us, in terms of the situation that is taking place?

Finally, most of the films made about the Iran-Iraq War – it's very interesting in Iran – talk about heroes in individual terms. Films about the war never talk about the reasons for Iran fighting the war, never talk about Ayatollah Khomeini – which is really interesting. Most of the films on the Iran-Iraq War never show the face of Ayatollah Khomeini. It's very interesting that every room in the government building that you go, there are three pictures: Khomeini in the middle, Khatami on the left, Khameini on the right – if that has any meaning to it.

But in that sense, in the films made about the war, Khomeini's picture is never shown. It's always an individual struggle, this individual who has gone to the war front not knowing what awaited him, and he just went there because he was encouraged by the local mosque to go. When he arrived there, there was nobody to greet him. He had to figure out his own way. Who is the enemy? Who is not the enemy? All these issues begin to come clear.

So, I think these dynamics in Iranian society today first began with the religion and politics and clerical issues in 1906, now has been overtaken by greater societal challenges that have called for secularization from below. This is a very discouraging sign for the ruling clerics in Iran, because most of the polls in Iran show that there's less religiosity on the part of the Iranian youth, less politicized, more frustration without a vision, completely anarchic, and no direction where they're going. So, in one poll conducted by the city of Tehran, it showed that 84% of high school students in Iran never pray, never fasted, and do not follow any kind of Islamic rituals. In another poll they asked them, "Would you take a pilgrimage or travel to the West?" 80% said they'd travel to the West.

These are important issues, because you have to think about how the transformation of what is happening in Iran from below is taking hold and is impacting itself on the Iranian political structure. So, the factional politics in Iran have ironically encouraged this type of debate, because once they had factions in Iranian politics, you had space for criticism. Just because Rafsanjani did not get along with the former Prime Minister Mousavi, there was space for debate. He supported the newspaper to criticize the other one, the other one started a newspaper to criticize this one. So, the factional politics in a way opened space in Iran.

So, Iranian political structure, contrary to what is believed in the US and Washington, is a very anarchical – I would explain it as organized chaos. It's not in any way that you can have the Supreme Leader from the top order “X-Y-Z” and it will be happening the next day. The Supreme Leader is just as vulnerable to different institutions below him, informal networks around him, that if he will go ahead and order something which is not accepted by greater conservative clerics around him, he will risk being removed. Many people do not realize that in the Assembly of Experts, which is in charge of monitoring the leadership or the Supreme Leader, a two-thirds vote of that Assembly of Experts can remove the Supreme Leader. And who are those people in the Assembly of Experts? All the conservative clerics who continuously monitor whether this man is keeping in line with what is in his job description.

So, factional politics in Iran has somehow accelerated this societal development. These factions who have fought have created a situation that is policy gridlock – there is obviously policy gridlock – but it is a dynamic society. So, you have this ironic situation in Iran, which is very fascinating. The society is very dynamic, very moving, lot of changes – but you have a government which is gridlocked in policy. All these differences are filtered out through newspapers, through NGOs, and all the structures of society that each faction has put together.

I strongly recommend the United Nations development report of 1999 called Human Development in Iran, which was published by UNDP [available online at http://www.undp.org.ir/governance.htm]. It gives you excellent indices about the growth of civil society, economic growth, how Iranian society as a whole has gone on a parallel development track separate from the government. The government somehow has remained frozen. The society keeps moving on.

I always encourage – when you think about it, Iranians are very good in making fun of the titles people have and institutions they create. These days, one of the most talked about jokes in Iran is the title of a council headed by Rafsanjani. It is called Expediency Council, but yet every ruling that this council has issued has been inexpedient, not in the interest of Islam. So, in Iraq and Iran, they make a joke of this thing and say, we have all these organizations, this council called the Expediency Council, but the last thing they're concerned about is expediency. They never rule on anything which is in the interest of Islam.

So, it is reflected in this element that institutions, un-elected, as much as we think they're powerful in the West, they have influence – they don't have influence. They're just cut into this paralysis that other elected institutions are.

Here it goes back to my final argument, that developments outside Iran since the beginning of 1979 have continuously picked up in such a way that has not allowed the ruling establishment in Iran to develop a clear policy. So, in 1979, after the revolution, there was a hostage crisis until 1981. In 1981, there was a war with Iraq until 1988. After 1988, Ayatollah Khomeini dies. They didn't think about the transformation. In 1989, there's a fatwa on Salman Rushdie. 1990, there's a war with Kuwait that took place. 1991, when the war ends with Kuwait, Iran moves toward electing Rafsanjani. There's an embargo. There's sanctions that are coming about.

If one looks at this pattern for the past 20-25 years, Iranian government has been simply a government of conflict management, not a government of initiating policy. Every day, every year, they continuously have to manage one way or another a conflict that is taking place. Frequently we don't remember that Iran has sea and land boundaries with 15 countries in the region. Simply the regional office of the Foreign Ministry has to deal with 15 countries. The Caspian Sea – they have all kinds of problems about the regime change. In the Persian Gulf, they have to deal with the Gulf Cooperation Council. Now they have the United States on both sides, Afghanistan and Iraq. In many ways, it consumes all the energy and all the thinking the government could have in addressing the societal problems that it's having.

So, I will end by saying the impact of the conflict in Iraq will be in two ways, and it will have societal impact in a different way and governmental impact in a different way. The societal impact of the conflict in Iraq, I believe, will bring a closer interaction between the Shi'ite community in Iraq and the Iranians. In many ways, it will go back to the pre-Islamic period. Opening of connections between Shi'ite Iraq and Iranian Shi'ites will benefit that element of exchange, the element of interaction, pilgrimage, that was taking place. So, overall, I think without Saddam Hussein this development will take off.

Which way it will have an impact on? I'm of the opinion that Iranian clerics, who are much more enlightened, have gone through this experience, will probably have more impact on Iraqi Shi'a clerics. Iraqi Shi'a clerics today are very conservative. They're similar to what Iranian clerics were in 1979. Iranian clerics today, we have [Hojjatoleslam Mohsen] Khadivar, we have Ayatollah [Ali] Montazeri, who is a very high-ranking person – these people take very progressive positions on many issues. I think it will have this reverse impact in Iraq. Iraqi Shi'a will gradually be captivated toward Iranian enlightened clerics inside Iran, not the other way around.

Governmentally speaking, it will be a major challenge for the United States and Iran to manage the problems in Iraq. The Iranian government wants to cooperate with the US The United States is not popular in Iraq. So, how do you cooperate with the United States occupation of Iraq when that occupation is not popular, and then within your own society there are all these dynamics moving between the Shi'ites in Iraq, Shi'ites in Iran, that call for greater merger?

Here the Iranian government will be placed in a difficult situation. The closer it cooperates with the US government, it will lose the legitimacy in the eyes of the Shi'ites in Iraq. More and more they could connect with their Shi'ite brethren in Iran to challenge the Iranian policy toward that. The less it cooperates with Iraq, it will bring about US pressure on it on nuclear issues, on other issues, and it will continuously be brought under pressure by the United States to do.

So, just like everything else, again Iran is moving toward a direction that its government is more and more caught between how to address Iranian society needs, how to guarantee the national interests of Iran in the region, without alienating the United States, which they do not want to do anymore because of all the economic assistance they need from Europe and others. So, this dilemma will continue, I believe, and the way the Iranian government will solve its relations with the United States will have a big impact on the Iraq-Iran relationship.

Thank you very much.

Mark Habeeb:

Thank you, Dr. Baktiari.

Zeyno Baran is director of international security and energy programs at the Nixon Center here in Washington.

Zeyno Baran:

Thank you very much. I'm actually just back from Turkey, came back yesterday afternoon, after having had similar sets of discussions with different parts of the government, which included the military, the parliament and the academic community. So, I'm actually very excited to come and bring to you part of the discussion that is taking place in Turkey. Then I hope that in some of the Q&A session we can get more into the specifics that I will mention.

It often happens that because of Turkey's position, people who look at the Middle Eastern region don't always look at Turkey. People who cover Europe also don't look at Turkey. It's often a side issue. So, I just want to remind you of the unique position Turkey has geographically, bordering the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans, the Black Sea region and the Eastern Mediterranean. These are most of the volatile areas for world security and stability. Because of Turkey's location, it is also at the heart of, I think, the Bush Administration's vision and commitment to bringing stability and democracy to the greater Middle East, which includes this region plus Central Asia, in my limited definition. I know other people have described the greater Middle East even in broader terms.

Unfortunately I missed part of the discussion yesterday and I've heard that there was some pessimism, but I will bring much more optimism, especially from the Turkish perspective. I do believe that even in Turkey and in the US, Europe and other parts of the Middle East, many people tend to think that the Bush Administration is extremely naïve when it talks about democracy in the greater Middle East. But I actually welcome this vision, because it's important to come up with a grand vision, with a bold vision, because otherwise we can't really come up with creative solutions. I was able to listen to Aaron Miller's speech yesterday, which was extremely inspirational. So, I would like to continue in that spirit.

My starting point and key point is, Turkey does not have to choose between Europe or the US, between Christian or the Muslim world, East or West or North or South. Its strength in fact comes from being at the heart of several cultures and civilizations, and its tolerance and acceptance of differences. It has tremendous potential and geopolitically is extremely well-situated to play a historic role of reducing conflicts and hatred and promoting tolerance and acceptance. Sharing the basic values of democracy and free-market economy as the rest of the Western countries, I argue that Turkey is the living proof against the clash of civilizations.

Turkey will celebrate its 80th anniversary of the foundation of the democratic, secular republic this October 29. Clearly in its 80 years of history, Turkey has faced many internal and external challenges, including problems of religious extremism, ethnic conflict, human rights violations, shortage of democracy, as well as economic and political turmoil. I think given all that, Turkey has made excellent progress and is now approaching a historic turning point in its future.

The upcoming NATO summit that will be held in June 2004 in Istanbul is going to be a very important event. The summit will bring the two sides of the Atlantic closer, and holding it in Turkey has important symbolism. Poland was a pivotal country in its region and was at the heart of the last round of NATO expansion. Turkey is a pivotal country for its region and will be at the heart of the next round. The summit will take place just about a month after the OIC summit, which will also be held in Turkey, and maybe for some people most importantly, the Eurovision Song Contest will also be taking place in Istanbul.

The NATO summit will also bring President Bush for the first time to Turkey. I'm hoping that the spirit of Istanbul can catch all the participants, and Turkey will start to be seen by the European allies as an integral part of Europe. This is important not just for Turkey, but also for Europe's own future, for the historic reconciliation of Christians and Muslims, Europe and Asia, East and West. If Turkey succeeds in implementing the reforms it has managed to pass so far and Europe raises the bar and does not give a date for accession talks to start, expected to be December 2004, I think after 20 years of pursuing the European dream and vision, Turks may react irrationally. We can get into what kind of irrational actions that could be in the discussion.

Talking about the greater Middle East, I think Turkey can be extremely helpful in the Caucasus and Central Asia. That is where its value is, and as we speak the Turkish prime minister is having his tour in Central Asia, visiting Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. As I said before, the Bush Administration has made a generational commitment to democratization and liberalization over the greater Middle East. This vision considers weak or failing states as serious security risks, as they can easily become terrorist breeding grounds. While Afghanistan and Iraq are now clearly top of the agenda, anchoring Central Asia and the Caucasus into the Euro-Atlantic alliance is and needs to remain a major US goal for the foreseeable future.

So, what roles do I see for Turkey in the greater Middle East? First of all, I'd like to mention briefly energy. US policy, that started with the Clinton Administration and continues with the Bush Administration, has been promoting the East-West energy corridor, bringing oil and gas from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia through Turkey into Europe. This East-West corridor has actually succeeded. The pipelines are being constructed and there is great cooperation between the countries of Central Asia, the Caucasus, Turkey, and in addition to institutional cooperation we also see a lot of cooperation at the social level, the NGOs and press. When we talk about cooperation, it is intelligence sharing, counter-terrorism efforts, as well as coordination and sharing the same vision of the Euro-Atlantic alliance. And of course in democracy and bringing legitimate governments in office.

A second point is, be a good example. We often talk about promoting democracy into the greater Middle East. Those of you who are sitting here of course know that it's not such an easy thing. You can't just promote or export democracy unless you have people who are on the ground willing to work with you. Here the Turkish government and its foreign minister has been on the record saying very interesting things.

Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül gave a speech last summer in Tehran which is very interesting. But I would like to focus on a few things he said at the recent OIC summit in Malaysia. I know we've all paid attention to the Malaysian speech, but I'd like to quote a few things he said, which is important as far as where the Turkish government, and this particular government, sees itself. Of course, when we're talking about this particular government, it has Muslim roots but so far has been very good in cooperating with the secular democratic establishment of the Turkish Republic.

Foreign Minister Gül said, "To many people, our goals seem like a paradox: a government that was formed by a party known to be based on moral and traditional values was implementing a most spectacular economic and political reform campaign in Turkey, reforms that even astonished the liberals at home. But there was nothing to be surprised about. We had put in front of us a mission to accomplish. We wanted to prove that a Muslim society is capable of changing and renovating itself, attaining contemporary standards while preserving its values, traditions and identity. We acted on the premise that highest contemporary standards of democracy – fundamental freedoms, gender equality, free markets, civil society, transparency, good governance, rule of law and rational use of resources – were universal expectations. We believe that Turkish people and other Muslim nations fully deserve to have these expectations met. Muslim societies have the necessary historical background and moral and spiritual strength to adapt themselves to modernity. We believe that encouraging political participating, increasing transparency and accountability will make regimes stronger in the long run. The result would be self-confident and cohesive societies which have an interest in peace and harmony." He also warned against anti-Semitism in his speech. I consider this set of quotes very important in terms of where Turkey and this particular administration is going.

A third area where Turkey is important is of course as a key ally of Israel. We have two democracies in the Middle East, and Turkey and Israel are cooperating very closely with the US Especially when there is a rise of anti-Semitism, not only in the greater Middle East but also in Europe, Turkey's role and commitment to tolerance and working with different civilizations is extremely important.

Fourth area. Many jihadists and anti-American groups have been using and will continue to use the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Quoting Aaron Miller's statement yesterday, I think the issue has to be settled based on "balance of interests." I thought that was a very wise comment. It's very worrisome that the mutual self-destruction, as he mentioned, can go on until there is one winner and one loser. We cannot afford to see that. Turkey has to be more active here, and it can be.

A fifth area is promoting tolerant Islam. This is an area, again if we look at the wider Middle East, especially in Central Asia, where there is unfortunately a rise of anti-American, anti-Semitic, radical Islamist ideology. Extremist Islamic groups also cooperate with other anti-American groups. They even include Marxist-Leninist and radical rightist groups with anti-American ideologies. They tend to be best-organized and best-funded networks. These extremist Islamic groups have financial resources and weapons and an ability, unfortunately, to communicate with the silent majority among Muslims, to convert them gradually into American enemies.

Since the war is waged mainly against the US and its allies, the United States needs to work with traditional Muslims all over the world to develop a grand strategy to defeat the enemies of peace, tolerance and freedom. With September 11, I think the post-Cold War era ended and what's called possibly the War of Ideologies era started. Turkey can be potentially a very important ally.

The Turkish example is also important in understanding the tension between trying to create a modern and open democratic system and dealing with the threat of fundamentalist and militant Islamic political ideology. It is noteworthy that in Turkey mainstream Islamic movements have not been radicalized, despite periodic clampdowns. Unlike many other countries with majority Muslim populations, Turks were never ruled by foreign powers and did not need to turn to Islam as a political ideology. A lot of Arab countries fighting against colonial powers used Islam, but when Turks waged their war of their own liberation at the end of the First World War they kept Islam out of politics. This might be an important lesson for other countries to consider.

A sixth point that I'd like to mention is the importance of secularism, promoting secularism as much as promoting tolerant Islam. You can't ignore one or the other. Promoting Islam in any form without the constitutional safety net is going to leave a lot of the countries with Muslim populations, I believe, very vulnerable. The Turkish model or example, which would mean strengthening secular and democratic regimes, coupled with vigilance and constitutional and institutional safeguards, as well as good governance and socioeconomic development, should be considered seriously. Sometime over the last year or so, we've seen in the West and especially in the US a trend to possibly weaken the secular establishment in Turkey. That I would argue is extremely dangerous, and we can get into that in the discussion.

When Turkey's founder, Kemal Atatürk, brought secularism, he actually decided to do that after building a committee together and asking the question whether women could be given equal rights under sharia. After getting the answer that at that point, that women would not be able to get the same kind of rights, he basically said, and I'm just paraphrasing now, that a country where half of its population is chained cannot rise to fulfill its potential. The role of women and his understanding that the reason unfortunately – and I'm sure this is going to be an ongoing discussion – of the Islamic and Muslim countries falling behind the Western societies, because of the particular interpretations of Islam possibly, led Turkey to reach out and embrace secularism. This is an ongoing policy and a very important aspect of the Turkish democracy.

The big question we all have is whether Turkey is going to be able to fulfill this potential, this historic role that I've outlined. It of course depends on Turkey's internal developments, but also on external developments and how the US works with Turkey. So, far the US administration, the media, the academics, I don't think have quite understood the changes taking place in Turkey. Turkey also has difficulty understanding the US vision. The US has been pretty terrible in communicating what it wants to do. I believe the administration wants to do, as I said, the Stability and Democracy in the Middle East, and they're genuine. But if we consider the US as an empire at this point, and we can discuss that too, I think the US is a pretty bad empire, because empires usually pay attention and care about the people that they have influence over, that they like them. But the US has not really reached out and has not bothered to communicate its message.

This is also something that we are seeing in Iraq. In relations with Iraq and how the US has maintained its dialogue with Turkey, I can appreciate sitting in Washington that of course for the Bush Administration Turkey is an afterthought. The Bush Administration has an election to win and an Iraq that needs to be stabilized, and Turkey's concerns and how the dynamics are developing in Turkey vis-à-vis US policy of initially asking for Turkish troops and then now putting Turks at sort of a long waiting timetable, with an unclear result whether Turkish peacekeepers are going to be welcomed or not in Iraq, is really not leading in a good direction.

Just to bring one final thought for conclusion. As I said, I was in Turkey having meetings with different parts of the government. One often thinks that maybe this sort of Islamic tendency of this government would want Turks not to cooperate with the US in Iraq, but the Turkish government voted, even without waiting for the UN, to send peacekeepers in Iraq. This is happening at a time when most Turks, and in discussions with even the military people, the traditional close allies of the US, are still considering Iraq as an illegitimate war and leading to tension between Kurds and Turks, which is extremely dangerous, and also as I mentioned leading to anti-Semitism in a country like Turkey, which we never had such tendencies.

Thank you very much.

Mark Habeeb:

Thank you.

Our next speaker, Yitzhak Reiter, is chairman of the Institute for Israeli-Arab Studies at the Van Leer Institute in Jerusalem, and also a fellow of the Harry S. Truman Institute of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

Yitzhak Reiter:

Thank you. It's both a pleasure and honor for me to speak here today, affiliated with the Middle East Institute as well as with the Hebrew University. I was asked to reveal the situation of Democracy and Stability in the region where I am coming from, three small, not important at all communities -- you never read about them in the front pages: Israel, Palestine and Jordan. I'm not sure that the Palestinians and Jordanians are happy that I represent this region today. I'm also not sure that the current Israeli administration is so happy. I will make an attempt to reveal to you my scholarly understanding of Democracy and Stability in our region, regardless of my national extraction or political conviction.

I will start by saying that I think when we speak about Democracy and Stability, particularly in the Middle East, we are in need of definitions. After being a few weeks here in Washington, I understand that for Americans “democracy” means Democracy. Namely, the American style of Democracy, or broadly speaking, the Western style of Democracy. Whereas in the rest of the world, there are some other models of democracy. There is liberal democracy, confessional democracy, ethnic democracy, many other variations and configurations of democratic settings.

Do we mean, when we speak about democracy, do we mean free elections? Well, there are free elections in Israel. Are we satisfied with them? Not always. There are more or less free elections in Jordan. Is this meaning democracy? Not exactly, as I will elaborate later on. We also have experienced a kind of election in the Palestinian community after the Oslo agreement. Does this mean democracy? Not exactly.

Does democracy mean the ability of people to change the administration, a government reshuffle? In this regard, many of the Arab countries who have elections, who have a parliament functioning, we almost cannot see the ability of the people to change the regime or to change the government. In the case of Israel, since 1977, from the first upheaval or turnout, or what is called in Hebrew Ma’Hapakh [“upheaval” in The Jerusalem Post, a phrase coined especially for the Likud victory in 1977 - Editor] when the Likud came to power we noticed reshuffle again and again of governments. Does it mean stability? Not exactly. Most of these governments did not end their tenure, and they had to run the elections months or a year before it officially should be handled.

In terms of minority rights, does democracy mean human rights and minority rights? The situation in the Arab World is well known – I'm not going to dwell on it – but in the case of Israel, minority rights are violated. This is not exactly a perfect democracy. This is one of the disadvantages of the Israeli democracy or one of the main disadvantages of the Israeli democracy that we witness nowadays.

In terms of stability in the Arab World, autocracies tend to be more stable or happen to show more stable performance. Take a look at Jordan, for example. King Hussein managed to govern Jordan for 45 years, though many predicted that he will not end his tenure when he was 18 years old when he came to the throne. Many other countries are showing very firmly stable situation in terms of keeping the current regime, the current elites, in rule. We also notice in the last years that presidents tend to inherit [sic] their tenure to princes, which means making their sons successors and tending to change a kind of republic to a monarchy without calling or naming it exactly as a monarchy. Why do they do this? Because they are very much interested in stability. They would like to keep the regime, the current political agenda, of every particular state in power.

As a student of the Middle East, let me just open the discussion to the broader debate of, can Arab Middle Eastern states democratize? Let me use Jordan, a country next to my constituency, that I would like to use as an example, because I believe that Jordan is one of the Arab countries which shows a certain extent of more liberal kind of regime than many other Arab countries. If we study the case of Jordan we can understand maybe and conclude better regarding the other Arab states.

Jordan had between 1957 and 1989. It was run by martial law. In 1989, bread riots took place in the southern part of the country, where there was a struggle of the regime, the tribal society, which really concerned for the first time and challenged the Hashemite kingdom, the Hashemite regime. King Hussein had to opt for more "glasnost" – to open the society to conduct more liberal practices in Jordan. It was followed by a series of steps taken in the Jordanian polity, elections to a parliament. We have in Jordan a two-house parliament – election law, law of election in which parties were legalized after 32 years that parties were prevented – press, new weeklies and monthlies who represent oppositional groups and oppositional parties, which were flourishing during this period of 1989 and on.

King Hussein succeeded in developing what I would call a liberal autocracy that I believe fits Jordan more than a Western-style democracy – a liberal autocracy in which the monarch serves as a kind of – you called it before a conflict manager – I like this term. He is to balance between the conflicting constituencies of Palestinians, Transjordanians, other minorities, this and that interest groups. Even in some cases serve as a kind of state controller, an ombudsman, or for those who are familiar with Arabic, the wahi al-mazâlim, the ruler [to] who[m] every citizen can go and make a complaint or submit an application to express his problem and get it treated by the administration.

However, shortly after the process of democratization began in Jordan, following a national charter which was overwhelmingly accepted, the king retreated from democracy. The new election law was enacted according to which one man, one vote – meaning that mechanism of diminishing the role of the Islamic groups was implemented. The explanation for this retreat was that he had to do it because of the peace with Israel. Well, in so maintaining, those who said this explanation admit that non-democratic methods are used in order to preserve the current political agenda of the regime, which is strategic peace with Israel – and as you well know, to incline to the West, particularly to the US, because Jordan is a small country with no natural resources, and he has to be assisted financially by foreign funds.

In this sense, a Western-style democracy in Jordan, complete participation of the people in the decision-making, means that Jordan will be shifted to something else – not to the Hashemite monarchy that we know today, but to the opposite political agenda, which means no normalization with Israel, which means different relations with the West, and many other things that are just opposing the current political agenda of the Hashemite monarchy. King Hussein therefore adopted not a democracy but kind of more liberalism instead of democracy, more compassion toward the society. If in this sense we put Jordan, if we try to evaluate Jordan on a scale in which on one hand we have autocracy, on the other hand we have democracy. I would put Jordan somewhere in the middle of this scale.

This was the situation during King Hussein's reign. Abdullah, I believe, Abdullah II accomplished a great deal in regard of liberalism. He attempted, and it was conducted just before the war in Iraq, when the Jordan government and regime was challenged by the opposition, by the professional associations who were sympathetic and expressed their solidarity with Saddam Hussein, with Iraq on the one hand. On the other hand, they were putting pressure on the regime to give permission to conduct rallies and demonstrations against Israel during the Intifada.

At this time Abdullah's government initiated a campaign which was termed "Jordan First," al-urdun awalan. Let us give priority to the interest of the Jordanians before we are looking south to Iraq or west to Palestine or outside to the Arab World. Let us put our interests as the prevailing and most important issue that the population of Jordan has to consider. This was a kind of public education. In other words, the king is saying to his populace, if you succeed in giving priority to our interests, I will open more doors to liberalization and we'll have more democratization. We cannot have democracy if our people are having a different agenda than I, as the monarch, am proposing to you.

This brings me to make the broader conclusion, which is, there is an explanation why we don't witness a higher level of democracy. It's not Islam. It doesn't have to do with Islam. Democracy challenges and threatens the current regimes and the current political agenda of the Arab countries. Had democracy been implemented fully on the Western style in Arab countries, this means mainly two dramatic changes. One is the change of government, change of regime. In the case of Jordan, the slim majority of Palestinians in Jordan, who are now discriminated against in the polity, could take lead in the future. In the other cases in which the regimes represent the young officers or interests of the army, interests of some business communities, would be changed to other communities that more represent the grassroots of the Arab society.

Let me just conclude by saying that those who are fostering to implement a Western model of democracy in the Arab World should take these repercussions into consideration.

Thank you.

Mark Habeeb:

Thank you, Dr. Reiter.

The next speaker is Hussein Shobokshi. He is president of Shobokshi Development and Trading Company in Saudi Arabia and a columnist for several Saudi and Arabic-language newspapers, and also host of a program on Al-Arabiyya satellite television.

Hussein Shobokshi:

Thank you, Mark. To be the 26th speaker on Middle Eastern politics makes me feel like Elizabeth Taylor's eighth husband. I know what I'm supposed to do and I think what I'm supposed to say, but I'm at a total loss how to make it interesting and new. I'm going to give it a try.

I come to you from a very different Middle East and certainly from a very different Saudi Arabia. But I also come to a different America. The Middle East is indeed going through some dramatic changes today, and they're not all attributed to the sad events of the 11th of September.

Allow me to go back to what makes the modern Arab today. The modern Arab today is basically, I think, made up of three different generations. The first one is simply called the generation of independence. It was at the turn of the past century. Noble themes, idealistic movements, getting rid of colonization, the birth of a new Arab identity. The second is the generation of revolution. Revolting against Israel, the Zionist movement – that took a huge toll on that particular population and that particular generation. Destruction of dreams, destruction of leadership– there was a [third] new social identity, resulting in the generation of doubt, which I am a member of today. This generation basically doubts a lot of things – ideas, ideologies, themes. They've been searching for a belonging.

Where will this take us? Allow me to cruise with you a bit in a crystal ball, how I see the makeup of the Arab World in the coming decades. Information was a product of the elite. Censorship was at an all-time high. This is no longer the case today. People are able to seek fatwas, opinions, make friends with whomever they choose basically around the world, everybody they choose around the world. Rights and liberties are being challenged on a daily basis throughout the Arab World. Political participation will increase for women, for children, for men, for youth, for adults, it will increase and it's happening today. Just two days ago Saudi Arabia passed a very interesting law allowing 30 of its schools to experiment with an elected Shura council for these schools. Signs of the times that are changing indeed!

I'd like to think that Islam is a tolerant religion. I believe it very much. I think we can see more of a global Islam in the Arab World. I think Malaysia and Turkey are going to be the models to be molded after. Malaysia certainly in the economic frontier, Turkey in the political arena. A lot of the Arabs still consider Turkey as being a Muslim nation. (Coming from a Saudi, you should expect that [of me].)

Islam will be playing a more global role in the Arab World. We'll be seeing more fatwas coming from non-Arab clerics, from probably Hamza Yusuf in the States, from muftis in France, Malaysia, Turkey again, Iran. The Arab contribution to the fatwas of Islam will lessen, because Islam will start playing its global role, because, frankly, Islam does not come from the caves of Kabul, nor does Christianity come from the alleys of Nashville, nor does Judaism come from certain seats in the Knesset in Tel Aviv.

I was not allowed to enter Oral Roberts University in Tulsa, Oklahoma, in one of the sessions because I had facial hair – funny enough, because I'm not allowed to enter some places in my country because I don't have enough facial hair!

Hatred is a very funny and odd but very dangerous element that is penetrating areas of our society that we didn't even think about. I attended a lecture in a Talmudic school in Brooklyn in 1986. I was petrified of what I heard about the goyim versus the non-goyim. It's the us and them, back in 1986. Little to my surprise, two years later I discovered that Baruch Goldstein attended that school, which was sponsored by Meir Kahane, the Osama bin Laden of his time and of his religion.

Forceful regime changes, yes, I'm all for it – sure, if it's going to get rid of people like Saddam Hussein, who belongs in the garbage bin of history – but let me break the news to you gently: I also think Ariel Sharon belongs there, and some forceful action should be taken against him. Until we achieve the moral balance to address these two at parity, then I'll tell you we do live in a gentler and kinder world. We still don't.

Is the Middle East and the Arab nations in the Middle East ready for serious democratic changes? Yes, they are. Have they been deprived of a lot of liberties and freedoms? Yes, they have. But changes are not forcefully fed. The Arabs still differentiate between neo-con policies and neo-con artists. There's a huge difference between the two.

Saudi Arabia – I'll take my country as an example – has been suffering from an unbelievable surge of intolerant and extreme, probably hateful version of Islam that has been affecting the livelihood of various members of society, not only the government but various members of the Saudi society. The government is realizing that today and it is trying to accommodate the needs and the requests of various sectors – the liberals, the islamists – and I use islamists here with a soft [lower-case] "i" – there are people who don't adhere necessarily to this version of Islam in Saudi Arabia as well. They realize they are being hijacked to a very hateful destination.

There are major reforms being undertaken today, things that were unheard of ten years ago. Economic reform is being talked about seriously and there are new laws that have been introduced. Political reform – electoral political reform, mind you – is being discussed and hopefully within a year we'll see the results of that. We'll see how serious it is. The level of participation – dialogues are being opened up with various members of society. Yes, we do have Shi'a, we do have Ismailis, we do have Sufis. Yes, we do have women, we do have children! These were mysteries and secrets ten years ago. All of them will participate in this important national dialogue in Saudi Arabia – not via satellite stations abroad, not via secret messages – on the ground in Saudi Arabia. Important things are happening in the country, and I'm hopeful. But there's much more that needs to be done: that's obvious.

It really bothers me that we keep referring to Israel as the only democracy in the Middle East. I very much appreciate the Turkish model versus the Israeli model, because Turkey does not come out and say that Turkey is an exclusively Muslim state. You can't proclaim to be a democracy and say you're exclusively Jewish or Muslim or Christian state. There's a conflict of interest. It's an oxymoron.

The model that we have to think of is a classical model all over the world – participatory elections. Does that exist in Muslim states? Of course. I'd like to think that we do come from a religion that brought to us six women heads of state in the last century alone. Islam is a generous religion. We just need to apply it properly.

I will go out on a limb here and remind myself of a quote by Rumsfeld, when he referred to Europe as “old” and “new.” I also do think there are old Arabs and new Arabs. Political and economic excitement are not coming from traditional powerhouses in the Arab World: Saudi Arabia or Egypt or Syria, or even Lebanon. They're coming from Jordan, Tunisia, Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE, to name but a few, and, I should also mention, Morocco. These are countries that were willing to challenge the paradigm, introduce new and gutsy and sometimes painful decisions. I think they will reap a lot of benefits in the very short term, and they are certainly making a case to be followed for their neighboring Arab countries as well. It is sad that we, at one stage, looked up to maybe European countries to emulate, but now even Africa – and I use the word "even" here with a lot of qualifications – but Africa has even surpassed a lot of the Arab countries in terms of political participation, even in some cases economic development.

I do go back to the Saudi challenge on the ground to deal with the extremist and fundamentalist elements in that society, the militant ones at any rate. The Saudi government has arrested a lot of cells, destroyed some of them, arrested others, and confiscated weapons. But there's much more to be done on the intellectual level as well.

Dialogues need to be opened. Freedom of press needs to be sustained. Participation from various members of society needs to be at an equal level. The government does realize that now. I think I've heard the messages loud and clear. I heard the reference yesterday to walking the walk and talking the talk. Well, in the case of the Arab World unfortunately it's just crawling the crawl and babbling the babble: we are not even sure where we are yet with the walk and the talk.

I go back again to the Palestinian-Israeli issue. There's a lot of questions that Israel and Israel only can address and answer. What kind of peace does it want with the Arabs? Does it want to rely on its 300 nuclear warheads as a deterrent? I wonder, what will that do to the demographic realities on the ground, when in 2010 Arabs will outnumber Jews in Israel itself. Peace needs to be established with Israel? The Arabs have made sincere offers, I think, starting from Sadat up to the initiative by [Crown] Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, but what was the reply?

Any fantasy that I have heard here this morning that Arafat and Hamas destroyed and are solely responsible for the destruction of the peace process is baloney, frankly. Let's not forget that Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by the same group that is in power today in Israel. Let's not forget that. Israel has also been kidnapped, I think, by radical “Jewish-ists” – if there's such a thing as “Islam-ists,” then “Jewish-ists.”

People who have taken over policymaking and foreign policy in Israel, in a very shortsighted, ideologically religious-based message. We cannot afford more violence in the Middle East. We are all responsible to change, correct where we are today.

I've been hearing a lot of successful stories in Saudi Arabia and in the States of the separation of twins. The Arabs need to separate themselves from oppression, and I'm hoping the US government can separate itself from bias. I don't think the Arabs feel that America can be an honest broker as far as Middle East policy is concerned. They've given up on that. But they have not given up on the American institutions to affect the conscience of America. I don't think they've given up on that: I wouldn't be here today if I was thinking that way.

Please consider that “Islamophobia” is a direct cousin of anti-Semitism. Statements like what I've heard from a top US general in the army about Islam should not be allowed, based on moral grounds: America should not allow that. That's simply against the foundation of this great country and I don't think the Founding Fathers would even agree to that.

The Arabs have a lot to say to you. I think you should listen to them, hear them out. They have a message. They're serious. But most of all, be fair! The Arabs are hearing the music of freedom and democracy, but they sure don't want any “Dances with Wolfowitz.”

God bless you all, and thank you very much.

Mark Habeeb:

Thank you, Hussein.

Mohammed Wahby is former Egyptian Undersecretary of State for Information and he currently is here in Washington as the bureau chief for Al-Mussawar Magazine.

Mohammed Wahby:

Mr. Shobokshi was complaining about being almost the last speaker: what about me? I will tell you, I wish I could have a joke to revive you all, as most of the American speakers would usually start any address. Egyptians are actually quite good in telling jokes, but they are all very political jokes and are usually actually aimed at even the president himself. Even when Nasser was at the peak of his popularity, before 1967, most of our jokes were aimed at him. We are a people who are known for their sense of humor. But since I am leaving for Egypt tomorrow, I think I'd rather play it safe.

Just a few moments before I came here, a friend of mine called out loud, "Mohammed!" The man next to me almost jumped. I was a bit surprised myself, because I asked all my friends that after 9/11 no one should call me Mohammed, everyone should call me Wahby. Again, playing it safe in this country, not only after 9/11 but also after the episode of the Washington sniper – again, “Mohammed.”

We are talking now today about Democracy and Stability. That friend actually of mine then said, "Mohammed, what are you going to talk about democracy, after the UNDP report?" (the UNDP report compiled and prepared by a group of very distinguished Arab intellectuals with the cooperation of the United States [controversial 2002 and follow-up 2003 reports are available online at http://www.undp.org/rbas/ahdr/]). They have agreed that the Arabs suffer from a deficit of freedom, of knowledge, information, and empowerment of women. He has a point of course.

But let me say a couple of things about this report actually also. Tom Friedman the other day said that 1 million Arabs downloaded this report. Even though 1 million is not much, but if you remember that only 1.6 percent of the Arabs have access to the Internet, you can realize how this report was met. I can also add to what Tom Friedman said, that I know for a fact and have been visiting Egypt and some Arab countries, particularly in the last year very often – for every one who has downloaded this report, eight people actually read it, by having a copy given to them by a friend who actually managed to download it. So, this report is bound to have an incredible impact on the Arab World. There's no question about that.

Some quick observations about Democracy in the Arab World. I think no generalization can be accepted when you speak about the Arab World, insofar as Democracy is concerned. Why? Because there are some countries, like Egypt, which take pride in the fact that they have 6,000 years behind them or 4,000 years behind them. Egypt particularly has had more than 220 years of modernization. Not only that, but it also had a very viable, very dynamic period of democracy – brief as it was, and defective as it was, from 1923 to 1952. This period, brief as it is, produced the greatest Arab thinkers, the greatest Arab writers, the greatest Arab novelists, the greatest Arab dramatists, the greatest singers and musicians, the greatest sculptors, that all the Arabs take pride in until now. It also produced two Nobel Prize winners – one is a novelist [Naguib Mahfouz, 1988] and one is a scientist [Ahmed Zewail, 1999].

It's only from the period of 1923 to 1952. That is a proof, a testimony, what Democracy can bring about. Since then, unfortunately, we don't have any towering figure in any of these fields that I mentioned, which can be compared in any way with these towering figures in all the fields I have just mentioned.

But does it mean that we remain static, where we were in 1952, when actually our experiment for Democracy was disrupted? I do not think so. Everywhere in the Arab World now, almost everywhere, there is an expanding area of freedom of expression.

Let me give you an example of how things are developing in Egypt, for instance. We all remember what happened to Ceaucescu. Immediately after that, an editor came out calling for – actually the headline was "Political Freedom or Ceaucescu?" At that time, it was a very terrible time. That newspaper, I think, later even was closed. But now things have changed.

I give you a very dramatic example, actually, which may surprise quite a number of you, how freedom of expression now has really expanded in Egypt. In Egypt there is always a cry, like any other nation – even the United States – for a change. One writer came the other day with an article saying the following: we have been calling for change all the time, but every time we call for a change only the prime minister is changed: it's the time to change the president.

This was totally inconceivable, say, ten years ago, totally inconceivable. The president was someone who was not supposed to be criticized. You can criticize the prime minister, you can call for his resignation; don't call for a change of the president. Nothing has happened to this writer. He's still writing. He's still criticizing. He's doing well, and he has become very popular in Egypt, but no action has been taken against him.

But my question is, is freedom of expression enough? I do not think so, because freedom of expression can be used just to let the steam off. That is a fact. It was used actually by quite a number of rulers in our part of the world. But having said that, also freedom of expression, despite letting the steam off, builds – it builds something which is bound to accumulate and bring about the changes that people – the Democracy that people really aspire to.

I think I have established my credentials with you as a kind of democrat. Now I have to say something about – and don't ever think what I'm going to say is a justification. Let us put whatever I have said in a kind of perspective. You all know what your War Against Terrorism has done to the United States: it has changed the United States dramatically. Can any one of you compare the United States before 9/11 and after the War Against Terrorism, which has not come to an end, to the United States now? I do not think so. Every friend of mine from every political color tells me that this nation now has become more divided than ever. Everybody whom I know, and I have been here for 17 years – I'm a good mixer, like any Egyptian – tells me also that your freedom has been curtailed. There is no longer the same Democracy that everybody – not only here, but also outside – used to take pride in. Some curtailment at least of this democracy has taken place in the United States.

What about Egypt? In my generation, one generation, Egypt fought six wars, not one war. Three of them are Arab-Israeli wars: 1947, 1967, 1973. One of them was a war in which Egypt was attacked not only by Israel but also by two great powers at that time, and that is Great Britain and France, and that was in 1956. That is the fourth war. The fifth war was even more horrendous, as a matter of fact, even though almost nobody remembers it. This was a purely Egyptian-Israeli war. That is the war of attrition that took place for two full years, actually a little bit more, and it was all fought either on Egyptian land or in Egyptian skies. Two years. What about the sixth war that I spoke about? That was the first war to be launched against terrorism anywhere in the world – the first War Against Terrorism, much before you are fighting now your War Against Terrorism. This was started, if I take one landmark or one watershed, that war started in 1981, when President Sadat was murdered by extremist, armed, Muslim fundamentalists. It culminated in 1997, by killing tourists in Luxor in order to scuttle our tourism in Egypt. So, I just wanted to put things in perspective in a way, insofar as this is concerned.

What about the Stability? I talked about Democracy. I for one believe that if Democracy cannot survive without Stability, Stability cannot endure without Democracy – otherwise it stagnates. It does not become Stability: it becomes Stagnation. That is a great danger that many Arab countries actually, including Egypt, is aware of. I'm happy to say that Egypt is very keenly aware of it, to the extent that now quite a number of steps are taking place in order to guard against this Stagnation.

Another important thing actually, that Egypt should not get entangled into any seventh war. This is very important. Otherwise we are going to get again into the vicious circle that we went through before.

How are we going to deal with the situation now in the Middle East, or rather in Egypt generally? You have two things to observe. If today you go straight into elections, saying that elections is the sine qua non for Democracy, you're going to make a big mistake. Why? Frankly speaking, Muslim fundamentalists now hold sway on our streets. So, that will not be very good for Democracy, because we'll have a situation of one vote – one man, one vote, one time, and that's it. So, you will have to prepare a hospitable environment for Democracy. You will have to do that. You will have also to get into real Democracy – and in the case of Egypt, this is not a strange thing for us, it's not an alien thing – you still have to get into a genuine democratic regime or set-up or whatever you call it – gradually. Of course, you cannot have it imposed by any foreign power. There's no question about that. It can be helped by foreign powers. It can be supported by foreign powers in many ways, by strengthening civil institutions, by many ways which quite a number of people here have dealt with – I don't want to deal with it.

Two quick points. Number one, we all remember what happened in the United States also when Hurricane Isabel took place, or even before, when there was a warning against Hurricane Isabel. Everyone was preparing himself or herself for the family and this and that and so on. Hurricane Isabel proved to be even more disastrous than what was expected. I am worried to some extent that there might be a hurricane that I call “Hurricane Uncle Sam” – really, “Hurricane Uncle Sam.” Especially after what happened in Iraq, everybody is thinking now – what is going to take place after the invasion of Iraq by the United States? Who's next? Every other day we hear Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, before the situation in Sudan was coming. We didn't know whether Egypt was included or not because as a matter of fact, those who called for the invasion of Iraq before it was invaded considered Egypt to be the prize. All the others are just stepping stones toward Egypt. I am quoting – the prize – the very same group who urged for the invasion of Iraq.

By the way, I am one writer, one columnist, who has always for the last 13 years been attacking Saddam Hussein and calling for his overthrow. Some of you might have seen me on Jim Lehrer doing the same thing, much before he was overthrown.

But people are worried about this, are really worried. What's going to happen? That introduces an element of uncertainty, and uncertainty is not exactly conducive to Democracy. But at the same time, there is another danger, and that is that this can be used by the rulers, by some rulers in our area, in our region, as an excuse not to go ahead with critical reforms. They will say, “Things are changing. We don't know what's going to happen.” So, it has two aspects.

I end this little speech by referring to another UNDP report just released two days ago. The other one I referred to earlier was released in 2002. This one has been released for 2003 only two days ago. It said the following: that the invasion by the United States – this is a report which has been announced by the United Nations – the invasion by the United States of Iraq, accompanied by attacks against Islam by very important people in the United States, whether religious or political or military, has radicalized the Arab World, has radicalized the Arabs – not only against the United States, but against their own rulers.

Thank you very much.