
Forty years after the Six Day War, we find a substantial body of literature. It is no wonder, as nearly every piece written on the subject begins with the observation that the war was a “watershed event”. The swift outcome of the war changed the power equation in the region.
If we read history so that we don’t repeat our mistakes and are able apply positive lessons, then how can we profit from the lessons of the Six Day War? What does it mean for the diplomatic practitioner?
To note a few of the positive consequences of the 6 Day War:
· It definitively resolved the question of the durability of the State of Israel. If some had hoped military action could lead to reversal of the 1948 war that created Israel, it was no longer a credible aspiration and all knew that.
· The War marked the beginning of a close and enduring relationship between the United States and Israel that has continued to grow and deepen over the decades.
· Israel entered the 6 Day War with a sense of vulnerability and lack of strategic depth, and emerged with self-confidence in it own demonstrated capabilities.
Let’s hit the pause button on this last point, because I would like to emphasize the importance of the way people feel about events and to focus my comments on one consequence of the ’67 war that I find most compelling.
I believe an important lesson that we collectively did NOT act upon following the stunning Israeli victory in 1967, was that lasting victory cannot be found in the humiliation of a people.
Arab and Palestinian people felt humiliated. They call the war the “setback”.
We can lift the pause button. In the days and weeks following the war, the Israeli public was exuberant and had good reason to be. They had administered a decisive blow to the Arab forces and captured significant land for buffer and negotiated trade.
Still, even among Israeli officials there was an expectation that Israel would not be permitted to keep all of the spoils of war. Based on past experience of the ‘48 and ‘56 wars, the Israelis fully expected the US, Soviets, or UN to insist Israel return the territories occupied during the war.
To preempt big power pressure, the Eshkol government quickly annexed East Jerusalem.
But there was no knock on the door. The nature of the struggle had permanently shifted. Israel was now an occupying power, some would say, without having carefully weighing all that that meant.
Very soon, perhaps too soon for reason to prevail over hurt, Israel made the first land for peace offer.
Introduction of “land for peace” was a significant contribution to diplomacy coming out the ’67 war and remains a key element in Palestinian/Israeli diplomacy today.
So what happened? The flip side of pride is humiliation. The Arab League summit meeting in Khartoum responded with an emphatic rejection.
We know the rest. It was not until five years later, after the 1973 war with Egyptian pride restored, could Sadat make the trip to Jerusalem.
People, even governments, don’t act rationally when humiliated. So is dignity an aspect of reason? And if it is, what can peacemakers do to restore, or bolster the self-esteem of protagonists in the conflict today?
One observation is that the actors threatening Israel today are not the same ones it faced in June 1967 -- and these new groups trace their origin to the Six Day War.
Prior to 1967, Israel faced an existential threat form a powerful alliance of states. Specifically, the greatest challenge came from the Untied Arab Front led by Egypt with Syria and Jordan and supported by the Soviet Union.
Other players in mix were traditional powers in the post World War II state system – the Soviets, Untied Nations, France, UK, and US. Historical analysis of the diplomacy that led up to the Six Day War is a study in the different roles of big state powers.
My point is that the crushing Israeli military victory so humiliated the armies and pride of its State adversaries that the old order of Middle East power relations never reconstituted in the same way. A new era had begun.
Non-state actors grew in importance as active threats to Israel. Provoked by sustained occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinian national movements assumed the mantel as primary sources of resistance.
Terrorist groups like the PFLP, Hezbollah, and PLO dominated the eighties and nineties by staging spectacular terrorist dramas on a global stage.
The Israeli Embassy bombing in Argentina, the hijacking of the Achille Lauro cruise ship, hostage seizures in Beirut, airport bombing in Athens were all new fronts of a war on Israel.
One by one flashing threat code lights from Arab States have gone from red to orange to yellow and green. First Egypt recovered national pride following the 1973 war to make peace with Israel, followed by Jordan. As Dennis has told us, the distance Syria needs to go is measured in meters not miles.
The threat of attack from State sponsored armies was replaced by terrorist groups, some with State support, but not entirely under State control.
Terrorist groups are a difficult adversary to suppress particularly when its members are motivated by religious fervor.
The Six Day War did not create Islamists, or militant Palestinian groups -- but by exposing the weaknesses of Arab States and State armies, the ’67 war provided the context for indignant Muslims to turn to Islam to recover pride.
They turned to Islam when the state failed to provide justice, and when the UN that could not enforce its own decisions.
Palestinians turned to their religion out of desperation and unhappiness with Israeli authority in the occupied territories.
They turned to Islam out of a sense of helplessness in the face of US solid support for Israel, and, of course, because of the failure of Arab nation states to protect or advance Palestinian interests.
To be sure, the rise of al Qaeda is linked to the campaign to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan and opposition to US presence in Saudi Arabia.
But radical Palestinian Islamists shared the argument with other Islamic militants that defeat is punishment for misplaced trust in the promise of foreign ideologies, be it socialism, democracy, pan-Arab or westernization.
Islam made sense of indignities arising form the war by reducing the conflict to struggle between truth and falsehood.
These observations are not really new, but my purpose is to describe a mindset that makes diplomatic task of conflict resolution and negotiation all the more difficult.
So let me return to the question. What do these consequences of the Six Day War and its aftermath suggest for the diplomatic practitioner today?
What is the starting point when the Palestinian Authority has thin popular support, HAMAS is loaded with political luggage, and the other non-state actors cannot be reliably controlled by either.
What advice would I give to the next President that could help frame a strategy for his/her policy on the Palestinian/Israeli conflict?
First, I’d say the starting point is people. The success of any diplomatic effort will depend on how completely it addresses the aspirations of both the Palestinian and Israeli people and to do that we must meet human needs -- Not as a reward for compliance at the process, but as a starting point.
People want the same thing. They want to protect what they love, their family. They need to feel good about themselves and their situation, and they need the opportunity to earn a livelihood.
Let’s call this approach another type of mommy track. The Israeli mother wants to know that her kids are safe when they stand at a bus stop, or go to school. The Palestinian mother wants no less but needs much more.
The Palestinian mother needs to know that when she is about to deliver her baby, she can get to the clinic without being delayed by checkpoints and blocked by a wall.
She wants to know that her kids can go to school and that a diploma would reasonably lead to a job.
She needs clean water because too many Palestinian families don’t have it. She needs access to markets where she can buy varieties of food to nourish her children and the means to do it.
The current social/economic situation in the Gaza and West Bank today must be addressed not as a reward for peace, but as a prerequisite.
This will not be cheap or easy. Steve Simon of the Council on Foreign Relations estimates the investment needed to address social economic needs in the territories will run into billions of dollars. The United States and international community must be prepared to address this investment.
I would tell the next President that -- yes, she/he needs to work on democracy for the Palestinian people but not a democracy that promises freedom for the simple exchange of a vote.
Genuine democracy makes demands on the individual. People are not free until they commit to a system by making personal investments and accepting obligations.
These obligations include a requirement to abide by a code of conduct, set of laws, tax payments, and to enter into a compact with government. There is no room for allegiances to non-state actors who practice violence.
The challenge for the next President is to identify and encourage Palestinian leaders who will develop institutions in which people can participate. Government bodies in which people can freely invest hope and trust in return for safety, justice and respect.
Economic security and individual responsibility are the building blocks for genuine democracy and the basis of stability.
For many years following the ‘67 war the Palestinian people were disappointed with their leadership who they saw as enriching themselves without delivering either security, or dignity.
The next President needs to coax all parties to the negotiation table, but must assured that the leaders we are dealing with are dedicated to addressing the simple needs of the people, have the courage to demand responsibility from citizens, and the integrity to tell them the truth about what is possible and what is not.
The next President must continue to nurture close ties with Israel, but must also work closely with Israeli leaders on an understanding that they too have an interest and obligation to address the needs of the Palestinian people.
A final word that is as much a comment on Iraq, is that no peoples can ever feel secure or comfortable in lands under occupation by a foreign authority. The presence of foreign forces almost always produces militant resistance fighters. Peace will be found when people feel safe, proud, and trustful.
Ambassador Chamberlin's remarks were delivered to the Washington Institute on Near East Policy June 4, 2007
Wendy J. Chamberlin is President of the Middle East Institute. A 29-year veteran of the US Foreign Service, she was US ambassador to Pakistan and Laos. Before joining MEI, she was Deputy High Commissioner for the UN Human Rights Commissioner.