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Ali Richi: I like to speak standing. That has nothing to do with being short. First, I would like to thank the organizers and the sponsors of this event. I also like to acknowledge some people here. I like to acknowledge my colleague Secretary Mohamed Siala, one of the most prominent Libyan diplomats. It is always nice to see Ambassador David Mack and Ambassador Chuck Cecil, good friends of mine. I also like to acknowledge our chargé d’affaires, Ambassador Aujali, who has been doing a splendid job for his country.

I will do two things. I will talk about -- since a part of the Libyan and the West and African relationship has to do with issues relating to immigration -- this falls under my ministry, so I will talk about that a little bit. Then I will say a few things about the bilateral relationship between the US and Libya. I will speak at times as a Libyan official and at other times as academic. And I will leave it up to you to decide which one of the two. If it is too good to be said by a Libyan official, then that is the academic; otherwise, it is the Libyan official.

As you know, Libya is a very small country. It has about 5½ million people. We are a poor country in spite of the myth that Libya is a rich country. We are not a great industrial nation, nor are we agricultural nation. We have very limited natural resources. We have no water and only 4 percent of our land is arable. We are surrounded by other countries - good neighbors of ours - who, unfortunately, suffer from poverty, civil wars and what have you. So Libya has a national interest to make sure that there is an area of prosperity and stability in the region.

In addition to that national interest I cannot say small countries do not have strategic interests but, still, they have national interests. It became very, very obvious why do we have to be active in promoting peace and prosperity in Africa, especially in the [indiscernible] after that large wave of illegal immigrants.
As I said, our resources are very, very limited. Our market, if we had it at all, can hardly accommodate our own young people. And most of these people who come to make a living ended up kind of engaged in illicit economical activities, not because they are morally inferior but there is no jobs for them to be had. And that caused so many problems that were alien to the culture and the economy of the country.

In addition to this, this wave of illegal immigrants caused us problems with our neighbors to the north, the Europeans. They basically thought that we have sort of look-the-other-way policy to cause them some problems. And I want to assure you that this is not the policy of Libya. We have no interest in telling people and our neighbors that, “If you want to make it to Europe then you are welcome to cross Libya,” because we know very well that out of every thousand illegal immigrants who are trying to make it to Europe, maybe one or two of them will be successful and the others end up staying in Libya. So we have a real interest in development in Africa.

We also know we cannot do it alone and we need partners who would also have the same interest in a stable and a prosperous Africa. And we cannot find a better partner than the US. Libya, traditionally -- our means of making a living in the past was through transit, commerce. That is long before the oil. The caravan roads -- our testimony that this is how we made our living in the past and that we have an organic relationship in the rest of Africa. And we have a national vital interest in that.
Our security depends on it and we are willing partners to anyone who trusts us enough and to provide us with the know-how, with the institutional and managerial structures that we need. I want to take this opportunity to invite, whether it is the private sector or the US government, to come up with the proposals how can we together build up a serious and practical partnership.

There are three ways, of course, to stem this tide of illegal immigration. One of them, of course, is the security measures. Those are necessary but not sufficient. I mean, of course, you have to have security measures. If not because of them a million people will be coming to the US every day. But at the end of the day, they are not going to be sufficient. There is, of course, a vision of development. Now, there are so many people -- because of experiences of the past they say, “Development in Africa -- Africa is a basket case and forget it. I mean, you will never be able to do that.”

Well, I mean, there are a lot of problems. Of course, we know that without the rule of law there would be no development. Without sort of transparency in institutions and so on, there will be no development. But we cannot just kind of dwell on the reasons why development is difficult. We have to start somewhere. With our limited means, whether it is major or minor or what have you, we are doing more than our share. We are building up roads, digging up wells, building up hospitals because it serves our interest. And we are blamed for it by our people because they think that our tree kind of feeds the others. But we know that it is much cheaper for us; it makes more sense for us to engage in those developments.
There is, of course, a midway. Development is a very long-range policy. Between the security measures and economical development, there should be sort of aid programs. We do not mean aid programs that you take money and you give them to the fat cats of African countries; we have a very, very bad experience with that. But if there are serious and manageable aid programs to provide those who are less fortunate of at least food and medicine that will give them a reason to stay where they are. They do not have to go to Europe. They do not have to go anywhere until development programs bear fruit.

But without a market economy, without the private sector - especially the energy sector, which is now showing some potential in Sudan and Chad - without them sort of living up to their social responsibilities - and the American industry has a brilliant record of living up to those responsibilities - I do not think that we can get anywhere. So that is one of the reasons why we have a keen interest in Africa. That is why we are willing partners to anyone who is willing to help us to engage in development programs of African countries.

Libya is the gate to Africa. We do have a very educated manpower. We cultivated so much political influence, which we are willing to use as an instrument of peace and stability and prosperity in the continent. We would very much like to see real, concrete proposals in this regard. So that takes care of the first part of my talk.
I want to say a few things in the light of what has been said about Libyan-American relationships. I think that they are going well, in spite of the naysayers. We came a long way. Those of us who tried very, very hard to get to this point know very well how far did we get up to here. People tend to forget how bad things were between the two countries. For God’s sake, I mean, unfortunately, there is even a kind of military [sounds like] of actions and so on between the two countries. But I think that we are doing quite well.
There are a few issues that I would like to say why they are difficult to resolve. But they will be resolved. I’m not going to rain in the parade; I think that we are coming to an understanding. I will take just two cases, just so that you know where the Libyan side is coming from. And in the same way there are people who think that there is no politics in Libya. There is politics in Libya. But there are people who have different points of views; there are people who would call a person like me an American boy who is pushing the American interests. And there are people here also who would not want anything to do with Libya.

So things are not as easy. There is politics and things take time sometimes, when there is inertia or resistance. But let’s take the case of Mugraby [phonetic] for example. Now, Libyans, even the man on the street, find it very difficult to understand why when a deal is done and an agreement is reached, then the other side sort of legally reneged in the deal. Now, it is not the money. As you know, there is asymmetry of power between Libya and the US. And that asymmetry of power creates asymmetry of security. Absolutely, there is nothing that Libya can do which will lead to destabilizing the American system or the American government.

But the opposite is not true. The thing is that the American administration do with goodwill, with no bad intentions, may be interpreted differently there because there is asymmetry of security or insecurity, which I would like very much people to be aware of whenever they at least not advance the proposals but talk about them. Now, the remaining payments were kind of contingent on certain conditions. I do not want to go into the details of it.
Now, every time the Libyan side said, “Look, I mean you do have the legal right to that. But that is politics.” Now, that creates insecurity. “What? Okay, I kind of accommodate you this time because we want a good relationship and the State Department had been very, very good to Libya and so on.” But what guarantee do we have that this is not going to happen? What security we would have that the next deal will stick? So there is this psychological matter that I hope people kind of pay attention to.

Something mentioned about Libya reneging in its commitment on getting rid of the WMDs; that is not true. That is not true at all. Libya got rid of the WMDs not because of commitment to anybody else; because it is in the best national interest of Libya to get rid of them. They serve no purpose. They are too costly. They may cause even more dangers. The policy of deterrence in the past proved to be wrong and there was a strategic shift on that. So the commitment was made to the Libyan people that we are getting rid of the WMDs, and there is no reneging.

The mustard gas -- it is just a matter of who is going to pick up the cost of getting rid of them. And there are no unaccounted-for uranium quantities; they are all accounted for. We just do not want to throw them in the sea. If anybody has the money to buy them, we will sell them. So there is none of that. Libya’s commitment to disarmament when it comes to the WMD is an absolute and final because it serves our interest. I want to make that very, very clear.

I would also like to acknowledge a very good old friend of mine, Mister Alib Zaku [phonetic] who is sitting there, a very principled and prudent defender of human rights. In the area of human rights I agree we have a long way to go. We would very much like to listen when others sort of advise us. We are all working hard to improve our record in that area. But I think that whenever we talk about human rights -- and people should talk about human rights and should remind others that it is in their best interest to respect the human rights and the rule of law and what have you. But it should be in a principled and a prudent way so people would trust each other and would listen to each other.

Unfortunately, there is still lack of mutual trust. I think there are some elements within Libya who still think that because of all this, because of sometimes little, insignificant things -- an American diplomat talks to a Libyan or whatever. For example, I thought that it was crazy not to allow Ambassador Cecil to work at the university. Why [indiscernible] he was going to mobilize the students to overthrow the government? He was going to tell them that there are scholarships and opportunities and so on.
But because of that element of insecurity that we have to work very, very hard on -- I thought that was crazy when he told me that. We had a very nice lunch and I did not know that. He told me that they did not allow him to go into the university. Why? I cannot understand that. But there are people who think differently. They are on certain agencies different from ours. And sometimes we agree; sometimes we do not agree. I -- sort of not coming here, engaging in polemics, or putting the blame on anyone.
But the US, my adopted country, is the greatest experiment in the history of mankind. It has shown throughout 200 years that it is capable and willing, as Obama said, to perfect its union. I hope that it would perfect its union when it deals with small countries and people who are more eager and willing to have a friendly, cooperative relationship. It has an obligation to the Libyan generation. So you have -- every now and then cut us some slack. We earned it; we deserve it. Thank you very much.

Herman Cohen: Thank you, Professor, very much. The mention of conspiracy theories and lack of trust between us reminds me of my first conversation with the Leader in 1996. And he said –- I’m sure he would not mind my revealing this bit of conversation; he said to me, “You have been in government for so many years. You have recently retired. Tell me, Mister Cohen, why does the CIA destabilize countries all over the world?” So I must have gotten a shot of adrenaline or something and I said, “Leader, we are a superpower. That is what we do.” So I thought he was going to shoot me there but it worked out pretty well.
Now, I want to introduce one of our most experienced Africanists in the United States. He has a long experience as a practitioner, as a scholar, and I think I’m the only one in this town who has been working on African affairs longer than he. But he is really one of our great experts. I want to introduce Doctor Stephen Morrison, who is head of African Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

He has experience in the legislative branch as a professional staff member in the House of Representatives working on African Affairs there. He was with the State Department in the policy planning staff as the Chief of African Analysis there. I think he is one of our top guys. So he knows the whole history of US-Libyan relations and how we have interfaced in Africa. So I will turn the floor over to Doctor Morrison.

Stephen Morrison: Thank you, Hank. Thank you for that kind introduction. I want to thank Wendy Chamberlin and Dave Mack and J.F. Holton [phonetic] for welcoming us here today. I also want to thank the Libyan delegation for the chance to visit with you here. This has really been a terrific opportunity.
I have prepared just a few remarks around the whole question of reflections from here on Libyan foreign policy and African conflicts. So that is really what I’m trying to reflect on. The first point is that there is just much that we do not know. I think we have to begin from a position of significant humility. I think, also, the broad outlines and strategy of Libyan foreign policy towards Africa is simply not stated in any very clear or explicit manner. So we begin from that point.

I believe also that as a matter of habit, much of the way that Libyan influence has brought to bear in African conflict settings and elsewhere -- its preferred mode of diplomacy is behind the scenes and a strategy that builds on long-standing solidarity ties, some of which are getting to be rather old. But that means that much of what actually goes on is not necessarily in the headlines or being actively reported. It sort of limits in some ways what observers like myself might want to say.

There was a question earlier this morning around the Libyan capacity in terms of what its diplomatic capacity is to execute. Well, that brings up the question that, historically, in the last couple of decades the approach to Africa has been highly personalized in terms of the preferences of the Leader. As Hank pointed out, during the earlier period there were a number of legacy issues, periods in which there was lots of clandestine activity, lots of erratic actions undertaken.

It was oftentimes a money-driven and an anti-Western orientation that dominated. Much of that has been cast off but the legacy issues are still present. And they are still present when you look, for instance, at the ongoing trial of Charles Taylor in The Hague, where there is the remaining potential for damaging disclosures coming forward out of that.

What are some of the other legacy issues? The Libyan leadership beginning in ’99 took a very strong claim to reform the OAU in creation of the African Union. I sense there is a very strong sense of pride and ownership in the creation of the AU, the African Union. It was a particular vision that dominated what the Libyan effort was intending to achieve. It was a pan-Africanist unitary vision versus a vision that was at the same time being promoted by Obasanjo and Mbeki and others, which was much more focused on peer review, human rights, democratic norms, modeling this after something more closely resembling the EU.

Today, many of those earlier leaders are at the end of their careers or have passed out of power. You can make the case that in terms of broad context in Africa today that we are at a bit of a pause and a moment in terms of leadership within the continent. Some of the figures who dominated in this last period are fading or have already faded. And the question there is: What is the leadership role that the Libyans will strike in this period? We see some evidence of where that might move. The sort of alignment with Jacob Zuma and Dos Santos recently; some of the consultations that have happened there may suggest some trend lines.

I think that it is fair to say that Libya, because of its historical links and its established legacy within Africa and its continued emergence as a petro power, will continue to be very focused and very influential. How that focus and influence is used is what is quite unclear.

In the period leading up to the resolution of the Lockerbie case, it was commonly sort of asserted that the intensification of the Libyans’ interest in Africa was really a way of demonstrating their ability to build alliances against isolation, to build access against isolation. Well, that begs the question now of is this intense interest in Africa going to be sustained into this period now, several years after that. The answer is not entirely clear, although I tend to lean in the direction that, in fact, we will see a strong, continued interest; it is just uncertain as to how it will play through.

Second main point I wanted to make is that Africa has changed dramatically in the last few years. I will explain what I mean in terms of the major changes that have happened. What I do not understand is whether or not in the internal deliberations around Libyan foreign policy strategies towards Africa, whether there is a full recognition of what this means. Let me give you a couple of examples.

Since the late ‘90s, when UN peacekeeping in Africa almost bottomed out altogether and the continent was in a terrible state of instability and rampant warfare, since that period many of the long and chronic wars in which Libya had a hand are gone, are over. And UN peacekeeping has been restored as a major factor in the continent. The whole focus upon building African peacekeeping capacity has become a dominant theme, certainly in the United States foreign policy and French and British foreign policy, and now in the Chinese approach.

Second point is that the environment within Africa has become much more highly competed [sound like] when you look at the presence of the Chinese and the Malaysians and the Indians. We also see a debate today that did not exist before around the whole question of democratic norms versus autocracy. Some of it is being triggered by what we have seen in electoral outcomes recently in Ethiopia, Uganda, Nigeria, Kenya, today in Zimbabwe; some of it around the question of the entry of China and China’s expansive influence.
Libya has not really played in that debate. It has not played in that debate. It has not played yet much in the discussion around carrying forward the creation of African peacekeeping capacity and using the UN and multilateral agencies. My sense is that the government of Libya remains very ambiguous, or ambivalent, about the way the UN operates and around forces like U4, the European force that is coming in on the Chad-Sudanese border.

Let me just say a few words about influence within the immediate neighborhood, which I think is where most of Libya’s interest remains focused, and that is West Africa and that is the Horn. We see first on the Horn the Sudan piece. There has been reference made to the willingness by the Libyans to be helpful in opening humanitarian corridors into Darfur a few years ago. That earned kudos; it was an important measure.

A reference has been made to the effort last fall to convene the armed rebel entities from -- opposition entities from Darfur. That effort had an embarrassing outcome in the sense that most of the non-signatories refused to attend. It indicated, interestingly, that Libyan influence, by contrast with past patterns that Libyans had been able to summon in the midst of crisis within Darfur, the different parties and elders and actually convene them and have some impact in terms of forging compromises that the conflict within Darfur had reached a different point, where groups that did not want to be put under that kind of pressure simply stood outside and boycotted.

On the question of Chad and Sudan, the play that was made six weeks ago upon N’Djamena by the rebel groups coming with support from Darfur, making their play upon N’Djamena, that was stopped right near the point of success. It was stopped by the combination of, really, French and Libyan intervention. The question now is can the Libyans’ dual access to both N’Djamena and Khartoum be used constructively to draw down the cross border tit-for-tat warfare that fuels conflict in both Darfur and in Chad? Can Libyans rein in the Eritreans in terms of mischief and arms trafficking into Darfur? Can it rein in some of the flows that emanate from Chad?
When you look at Somalia the same question presents itself. Somalia is in a wretched condition. It is in wretched condition with extensive defiance of UN Security Council arms embargo; well-financed, elaborate schemes. To what degree can Libyan influence be brought to bear to try and rein in the kind of mischief that Eritrea and others are engaged in in stoking that conflict?
On counterterrorism, I think the Libyans got it right early on in identifying the threat that existed in what is now the AQIM. I think the Libyans are correct when they say, “We told you that this threat existed, and then it took a while before you could recognize the full magnitude of that.”

That threat extends to Mauritania and Mali. It is one that the United States has now taken up in terms of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism program. There is tension and opposition between the Americans and Libyans around this but there is a unity of purpose, I think, in terms of perspective on what the threat is.
Long-term, there are some trends within the region of West Africa that I think the Libyans will inevitably have to contend with. The demographic projections in Africa where we are going to see an estimated 1.3 billion people in the 2020- 2025 timeframe -- that is only going to feed the kind of trans-Sahara migration patterns and putting ever more intense pressure upon the migrant states and those channels.

The focus now upon climate change, environmental stewardship, better management of water -- those trends are all heightened and ones in which the Libyans know a lot and live with those challenges in a significant way. We also see, day-in and day-out, rising evidence around the rising global food costs, scarcities, and the spread of malnutrition into urban settings, including in the Maghreb, in Egypt, and elsewhere and a struggle to begin to look at that. Libya has a role to play there, too.

Let me close with just some comments about Libya’s presence on the UN Security Council. Its early days, so far, Libya’s role there has been predominantly very pragmatic. It is a big opportunity for leadership on matters that relate directly to Africa. Eritrea and Ethiopia, the peacekeeping operation there is in a phased-down [sounds like] period. It is a delicate one; it is one that could backfire. It is one in which the voice of Libya on the Security Council will matter.

Somalia is being revisited now as that crisis worsens. And people are rethinking the question of how to move beyond the African Union into something that might allow the retreat of the Ethiopian forces and the installation of some sort of negotiating process in the form of security. As I said a moment ago, the time for mischief is gone. The time for constructive engagement on this is very much forward.
In Darfur, the UNAMID deployment of the AU-UN hybrid force, the 26,000 person force, is proving to continue to be quite problematic but it is essential to stabilizing Darfur and it is one in which Libyan influence can be applied. In mid-April, on April 17th, during the South African presidency, there will be a day dedicated to a discussion of Africa and peacekeeping in the Security Council. This is a very promising development. It is one in which I hope we will see some expressions come forward by the foreign minister or whatever senior official from Tripoli chooses to come and participate. I think I will close there. Thank you very much.

Herman Cohen: Thank you, Steve. Our fourth speaker will be Professor Miloud L. Mehadabi, who is the director of International Affairs at the Green Book Centre. He is also professor of international law and human rights at El-Fatah University and the former dean of the School of Law. He has also been the director of the legal department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and he has also held other positions in other government departments. Professor?

Miloud L. Mehadabi: I’m sorry. I would like to speak in Arabic; then you have the chance to use the technology.
[Note: The following is the English translation of the speaker’s original Arabic presentation]

-- is the human rights and civil wars in Africa. I will be brief. What is the image that Africa has today? On the one side from the point of view of human rights - civil wars; differences inside the national state, which have led to people -- casualties, wounded, handicapped. Also, it has led to the phenomenon of refugees in Africa. It is the continent with the largest number of refugees all over the world. There are displaced persons; there are people -- the immigrants who cross the borders.

The conditions in Africa are the highest rate of endemic [sounds like] diseases exists in Africa. Malnutrition shows -- all international reports show that the situation in Africa is more than dangerous.

The child labor, corruption, financial, administrative, trafficking in children and women by even some peacekeeping missions, poor education, poor health services; really, worse than the minimum acceptable for human beings.

If we wish to speak about human rights, the human rights are really important for men in the abstract, whether in the south, whether in the north, whether in poor or rich countries. It should be understood in the abstract. But I think, without wishing to go into academic details that we all agree on human rights as a concept. Nobody can deny the importance of human rights. However, the content, the priorities may differ. This makes us argue that the possibility for cooperation between countries which raise the banner of human rights -- this should not be confined to political rights, to forming trade unions, parties, the freedom of the press. These are rights that we must pay attention to the right to education, the right to health, the right to stability.

Furthermore, it is not true that human rights are a Western concept. The human rights as a concept has been contributed to by the American Revolution, the French Revolution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but it has also been known by other societies, perhaps to a lesser degree. But scientifically speaking, we cannot say that the human rights started with this revolution or with that revolution or with this civilization or with that civilization. Therefore, I feel that there is a lack of credibility in raising the banner of human rights. It can be used for political agendas, for economic blackmailing, to achieve certain gains. But really, in many cases, it has not been adopted to defend human rights all over the world.

The position of human rights in Africa needs coordination between Libya and United States. In this respect, I would like to point out that one of the advantages of the movement of history for the United States is that the US has never been an imperialist, a colonizing state in Africa. Therefore, its interference, or its intervention, rather, with the human rights may have greater credibility than the interventions by the old colonial countries.

The point that I would like to point out, also, is that the historical experience in dealings with the colonial states needs time so that the brutal traces of the past would disappear -- the right of peoples to self-determination. What can yield positive results to the American convention in the subject of human rights together with Libya is that the United States of America was among the first countries, the first states which defended the right of peoples to their self-determination. This is something that Libya and US have in common because the US declared that many, many decades ago.

As far as what we have witnessed of civil wars in Africa -- I will not mention so many examples. Take Rwanda and Burundi and the relationship of that war with savage civil wars below the level that any ferocious animals would engage in. The Africans killed each other. But who provides the weapons? Who nourishes these movements? Who keeps quiet and silent about these wars?
Human rights in Africa are an issue, in my opinion, that has to do with the entire humanity, with the issue of freedom. On the other hand, in no way should it be confined to political rights. This would be really a reduction of human rights or reducing human rights to political rights is not enough. There is an economic right; there are personal rights.

I would like to point out briefly to the point that raising the issue of human rights in Africa has not met in my personal opinion -- and I mention this as an academic. It has not really been met with enough attention by the various American administrations. The interest has been strategic, military, economic, but there has never been really an intervention for humanitarian purposes but in order to establish –- not to establish human rights but rather for other purposes.

As an example, the international court and the judicial courts have not been rendered operational, except for political reasons. There are crimes in Darfur more ferocious, more vicious, but no courts have been formed for them. Who stood in favor of apartheid? Who supported the relations with the apartheid regimes? Who provided some states with arms? And providing them with arms, whereas we talk about human violations. I think the beginning of the 21st century, which witnesses the flourishing of human rights -- I really call upon all parties from this podium that the concept of human rights in Africa should be given a more effective role, understanding.

Some colleagues spoke about the possibilities of intervention by African peacekeeping forces, international peacekeeping forces and to deflate conflict. The African state -- I think, ultimately, it is Western colonialism that is responsible for the plight of African states. But this is not to find an excuse. But the Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda and Burundi -- it was not the Africans. The divisions between the Tutsi and the Hutu -- those who divided the Sub-Saharan countries to ethnic minorities, to religious minorities -- it was an arbitrary division.

I believe, as I mentioned, the United States of America was not an imperial state. Therefore, I personally call on the United States to correct the views, which Africans have of the West. I call on the United States to correct that vision.
Human rights do not have to do with political liberation only, the national state, the alliances, the commonwealth, La Francophonie. The African state has to be true to itself to liberate itself economically, to liberate itself from needs. I had the chance –- maybe Mister Cohen knows more about this. I visited some African countries. In a country that exports diamonds, the poverty line is more than 60 percent. Now, can we still talk about human rights in such a context?

The other issue -- the way I understand things the principle set by the United States concerning self-determination may be based on to give African peoples the right to self-determination. These peoples must be entrusted with solving their own problems before internationalizing these problems.

In this respect, I would like to mention the Libyan role. Libya did support liberation movements, did intervene because that was done in a manner that was commensurate with UN principles, the right to self-determination. I believe that Libya’s intervention was to help expel the colonialists. That has been achieved to some extent. But as Mister Morrison has mentioned, Libya works towards the granting of self-determination -- an economic concept: Building roads, building schools, hospitals.

Now, quite frankly and quite transparently, Libya cannot by itself take care of African affairs. It has limited resources. It has relations; it has a vast experience in Africa but that would be -- to take a role all over Africa would be really beyond Libya’s role; not its will, but its capabilities. Its capabilities are limited.
Libya established a fund for combating AIDS but no country, no state has contributed to that anti-AIDS fund. The immunization caravans moved from Libya to Sudan to Rwanda to Burundi. Floods, storms -- I’m afraid that Libya may be exhausted. And once Libya is exhausted lots of positive trends in Libya will be reversed. These humanitarian issues should be adopted by all.

Lastly, concerning Libyan-American relations, I would like to mention an interesting paradox. The first paradox -- that severing the diplomatic relations between Libya and the UN was during Ronald Reagan’s administration. Now, reinstating the diplomatic relations also took place during a Republican administration, the Bush administration. What does that mean? It means that it is possible with a will to communicate that even the most difficult can be achieved.

Those who follow up the literature in the American media during the period of lack of communication between Libya and the US, I think -- although there are people who have more expertise. I never read an article or an essay, which was really antagonistic to Libya as people, as a human power in terms of its history, culture. No, there were never such articles attacking Libya in terms of its dignity or et cetera. No, it was purely a political matter rather than any other thing, which is really a positive way of looking at things.

The last thing -- some would like the relationships to be normalized as soon as possible. I do not think we need to hurry up that much. We had 25 years of problems and of media campaigns, of political differences. Twenty-five years of separation need time. Most of the outstanding files [sounds like] have been solved but we need time. So let us take our time. Thank you.