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Charles O. Cecil: Thank you, David. The topic of our panel, “Libya’s Relations with Africa and the West,” is quite large. When David asked me if I would participate and chair it, I said, “David that’s quite a broad topic. I am not sure I know how to tackle it.” He said, “Do not worry, Chuck. You will know what to say.” It reminded me of my years at Berkeley. I was at Berkeley during the time of the Free Speech Movement, the time of great political and social unrest in the early ‘60s; a very politically-engaged campus. I entered the Foreign Service back when they were still taking Berkeley graduates at that time.

But then my fraternity -- I had a good friend who attended the Pacific School of Religion, which is adjacent to the Berkeley Campus. And as you know, probably, fraternities keep what are called exam files. After an exam, if you can bring the exam, you do and you put it in the file for your future friends and fraternity brothers. If you cannot bring it, then you make the best notes you can and put those in the file as soon as you can so that in coming semesters and years your colleagues can benefit from what you can tell them about the exam.

My friend was taking a course in Old Testament analysis. He looked in the file and he discovered to his pleasure that for the last 12 years, the professor had asked the same question in the final exam. The question always had to do with the Kings of Judah and the events of their reign and their importance in the Old Testament. So he studied The Kings of Judah backwards and forward. He read the text very carefully; he knew it well.

On the exam day the professor passed out the exam and it was a new question. Well, the question was, “Distinguish between the major and minor prophets.” My friend was totally at a loss. He had not studied the major and minor prophets. He did not know quite what to do but time was passing and you do have to write something and suddenly he had an inspiration, so he begun to write. He wrote, “God forbid that I should distinguish between the major and minor prophets, but the Kings of Judah are as follows.”
So with that introduction, I think each of us can take the topic and do our best to try to stimulate your thoughts. I will mention my panelists now and as their turn arrives, I will give you more detail about each of them.

But on my immediate left, the Rector of Nasser University in Tripoli, Dr. Ibrahim Aboukhazam. To his left, certainly a scholar of Libyan Affairs that everyone who deals with Libya turns to at one time or another, Dr. Ronald Bruce St. John, a scholar and prolific writer. To his left, Dr. Bashir al-Kout, from the political science department at Al-Fattah University in Tripoli and head of research and studies at the Green Book society. And to his left, Dr. Daniel Yergin of Cambridge Energy Research Associates, a consulting and a research firm internationally known. And I will say more about each of these gentlemen in turn.

As for myself, let me begin with a mandatory disclaimer. I am no longer on the US government payroll, so anything I say today represents my own views; certainly, I do not represent the US government in any fashion any longer. I served in Tripoli from November of 2006 until July of 2007 as chargé as David mentioned, just a week short of eight months. I have always felt that any Foreign Service officer’s knowledge has a very short half-life and that we should always be somewhat circumspect in talking about previous assignments as if things were still the way we left them. So I will caveat most of my remarks by saying “during my time there,” especially in a country like Libya, which is changing so fast; we all should be cautious in saying that something we learned in the past still applies today.

But I will confine my remarks to three areas. First, I will say something brief about Libya’s historic roots in Africa. I will mention two of the institutions that are important instruments of Libyan policy, that is, the organization called SIN-SAD, the Sahel-Saharan Community of States; secondly, the World Islamic Call Society. Then after that I will share a few impressions from my time in Tripoli concerning our bilateral relationship.
I think it is important to know - and I learned this quickly after my arrival in Tripoli - that Mouamer Qaddafi’s interest in Africa is not simply a default reaction to his failure to achieve success with his views inside Arab circles. There are long-standing Libyan ties to sub-Saharan Africa; these ties predate the arrival of the Arabs in North Africa. There are families in Hadamas, a Saharan oasis town that had members resident both in Tripoli and in the major cities of the Sahel, south of the desert.
Trade had a very political character since most of the consumables that were taken south from the Mediterranean coast were for the consumption by the royalty living in the Sahelian States - the states of Bornu and Kano and Zaria and Kaduna and so on, all across this Sahelian belt. These were primarily textiles, tea and sugar; things that only the wealthy could afford. But from the very beginning, the trade had a distinct political component. Kings of Bornu and other Sahelian kingdoms or chiefdoms, whatever we choose to call them, married their daughters to North African merchants from Tripoli and elsewhere. Slaves, as well as gold, were an important component of the trans-Saharan trade.
In the 14th century, when Ibn Batuta was returning to Morocco, his caravan had 600 women slaves and the majority from the area of south of Lake Chad. The Swedish Council in Tripoli during that Karamanli period, which ended in 1835, reported that 2500 slaves per year reached Tripoli from the sub-Saharan regions and the Ottomans encouraged this trade. The inter-mixing of Arab, Berber and African societies can be seen throughout Libya to this very day.
The trans-Saharan trade remained important to Tripoli’s commercial life into the early 1900’s. In 1912, the British opened the railway between the Lagos and Kano and that produced a dramatic increase in trade trough the southern ports and a dramatic fall-off in trans-Saharan trade. But the cultural and historic influences are still there.

So Mouamer Qaddafi’s interest in sub-Saharan Africa has these deep historical roots. His shift of focus from the Arab world to sub-Saharan Africa does not seem that unusual to Libyans; they understand it. Today on the streets of Tripoli, the hundreds, even thousands, of Africans seeking work are the modern manifestation of this historic flow of population from the south. And it is not only men seeking work but women, as well, because many African women come to the Mediterranean and work as nannies or maids or in other similar positions.

The current Libyan government has two principal institutions to exercise and seek to expand its influence in sub-Saharan Africa. The first I mentioned, SIN-SAD -- the name comes from the first two letters of the Arabic alphabet, which designate the words for Sahel and Sahara, usually in English translated as the Community of Sahel-Saharan States. This is an organization founded in February 1998 by Libya, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger and the Sudan. Its purpose was to form a framework for integration and complimentarity; to strengthen peace, security, stability to achieve global economic and social development.

It sought to do this by promoting investment in agriculture, industrial, social, energy fields. It set itself up to facilitate the free movement of people and capital goods and services among the member nations. And the organization has since expanded to, now, a membership of 25. During my time in Tripoli at one of the periodic conferences, the Comoros Islands became the 25th member. So you can see that the membership of the organization has greatly expanded from the initial six.

An example of SIN-SAD’s involvement in political affairs was an agreement signed in February of 2007 that I witnessed when the representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council were summoned by the Leader to his tent in Sirte where he presided over the signing of a Peace Accord between the President of the Central African Republic and a rebel group. This is an excellent example of Libya’s positive influence in trying to moderate conflicts and bring internal disputes in neighboring countries to some positive resolution. Another example took place on October of 2007 after my departure when Libya mediated another settlement between the central government of Chad and some rebel groups.

There is also a kind of hidden agenda to SIN-SAD. Libya uses it as a vehicle for marshaling support for Libya’s positions before meetings of the African Union. It is quite common that SIN-SAD will meet first and then after a few weeks or, at most, a couple of months, the African Union summit will take place.
One of the African ambassadors of the original member states expressed to me some frustration during my time there over the gradual loss of focus on the immediate neighbors of Libya. My friend felt that the organization was not producing the economic results that the original founding members had hoped for and that unless it could find a way to renew its focus and to produce material economic benefits for the member states, that those members might loose interest. He said unless Libya is willing to pay all of the operating expenses, it could very well be faced with a situation where the member states cease to pay their annual dues.
And I think he put his finger on the most important point. Economic benefits are the tangible glue that holds SIN-SAD together. So long as economic benefits flow from membership, it will probably continue. But if they should weaken, then its utility might be called into further question.

The World Islamic Call Society is the other organization I would like to draw your attention to. Founded in 1972, this is Mouamer Qaddafi and Libya’s vehicle for promoting moderate Islam in the world. It consists of 250 establishments and organizations from 80 different countries. In Tripoli the World Islamic Call Society maintains a University for non-Arab students. Enrollment in the university is usually about a thousand in number. It starts with a two-year training program in the Arabic language followed by four years of academic instruction, which also includes training the students in an occupation, a skill, so that when they finished their studies and go back to their home countries, they will also have a way to make a living and not just be dependent upon the religious establishments in their home countries.

Enrollment in Tripoli is limited to non-Arabs because the Libyans wisely realized that if they allowed Arabs to attend as well, then the non-Arabs, most of whom are African, would have a disadvantage because of the language. So Mouamer Qaddafi, I think, has realized the value of education and of the positive benefits that flow from having students in your country doing what you can to give them a positive experience and then sending them back to their home countries. There are also campuses in Damascus and Beirut where Arabs are allowed to attend. And there is a campus in Dakar, Senegal as well. But this is a significant effort to create goodwill for Libya by providing a free education.

The World Islamic Call Society has a long record of interfaith dialogues with the World Council of Churches, with the Vatican and with other world religious groups. It promulgates a tolerant form of Islam, Libya’s vehicle, in effect, for combating Wahhabi Islam, which Libya regards as a fundamentalist version of the faith that is inimical to Libya’s own national interest. It is the kind of organization we should want to support since it does seek to promote a tolerant form of Islam. I am not sure that they would be interested in our support but in any case we do share some similar objectives.

Now I’ll say just a word about the bilateral relationship as I saw it during my eight months in Tripoli. I came away last July concluding that Libya, in fact, seems rather ambivalent about its attitude towards the United States. It is clear that they want US technology, not only petroleum technology but also communications, which they sorely need. However, it is not always easy for Americans to get the visas to enter Libya. And whereas the National Oil Company helps the petroleum-producing countries to obtain their visas, the National Oil Company does nothing for the oil services companies, the Halliburtons, the Slumbergers, whose role is extremely important.

And I know that some of these oil services companies have given up hiring Americans to work in Libya because of the difficulty in getting their visas so that they can freely come and go. It is a bit difficult to understand why Libya does not see that it is in its own interest to offer all the facilitation possible to bring in people who have the knowledge and the technology that is needed to develop Libya’s resources.

Another example that troubled me during my time was our inability to get visas, again, for entry of the Foreign Service officer resident in Cairo responsible for overseeing our science cooperation programs. This officer had visits scheduled in January, February and March of 2007 and each of those visits was cancelled because of our inability to get a visa for the officer. And when the officer from Cairo could not come, then the officials from Washington also did not come. So again, a case difficult to explain why Libya did not want to proceed quickly to develop these relationships. We, in fact, were clearly more anxious to put meat on the bone, so to speak, to develop these agreements in the field of scientific cooperation than the Libyan government seemed to be.
In March of 2007, Mouamer Qaddafi made a public speech to the parents of Libyan students. In that speech, he cautioned the parents not to send their children to the United States or the United Kingdom for higher education. He said, “If you do that, they will be recruited as agents to work for those foreign governments and 50 percent of them will come back to Libya to work against our own national interests.” When the leader of a country makes such a public speech, it does put a certain damper on attempts to encourage Libyans to come to the United States for education. Again, hard to understand why a country that can benefit so much from western technology does not try to facilitate that process.
It seems clear to me that the Libyans, at least, at times, do want a high-level dialogue with us. Nevertheless, when we proposed our new ambassador in January of 2007, we had to wait five and a half months. We were anxious to move ahead but for whatever reason, the Libyan government delayed in responding. And then once we received their positive response, we then ran into difficulties here in our own Congress. And those remain to be dealt with.
Senior American leaders came to Tripoli during my time and were not able to see the leader. Andrew Natsios, who at the time he came, was the most senior American official to come did not see the Leader in March of 2007. Congressman Mike Rogers came; he was not able to see the Leader. John Negroponte came in April; he was not able to see the Leader. We began to see a pattern developing and wondered why this inability to carry on the dialogue at the highest level that we thought the Libyans desired.

I was denied permission to set foot on Libyan University campuses with my Public Affairs Officer. We made several requests to do this. We wanted to explain to the Libyan academic world and to the Ministry of Education what we could do to facilitate the teaching of English. We wanted to explain to them our Fulbright scholarship program. We offered to speak to classes of Libyans learning English to give them exposure to an American accent. We were denied, as I say, permission to set foot on the campuses.
The Leader’s son, who receives the most media exposure, spoke last October of the desire to promote the tourism sector. A large contract with a British firm was signed to draw up a master plan. Some weeks later, Libya reinstituted the requirement to have an Arabic translation of your passport data before entry into Libya would be allowed. Shortly after that it was announced that visitors must have $1,000 in cash with them before they would be permitted to enter the country. Twice during my time, cruise liners came to Tripoli and the American passengers were not allowed off the ship even to participate in group visits to Leptis Magna or Sabratha or those sights most commonly visited by tourists.

On the other hand, we have an extremely satisfying and fruitful cooperative relationship, exchanging information relating to the identifying of Islamic fundamentalists working against the interests of both countries. It is an excellent example of how we work together in support of our mutual interests. So perhaps when you are on the center of things as we thought we were in Tripoli, dealing day-to-day with these issues, maybe we lose sight of the long-term trends or maybe they get distorted. That is why meetings like today are so important, allowing us to step back, hear the observations and analysis of other knowledgeable commentators and to take stock from a fresh view point. It helps us see how far we have come and where we need to go.

So I will turn now to my colleagues for additional light that they can shed on these issues. Let me turn first to Dr. Ibrahim Aboukhazam. Dr. Aboukhazam is the Rector of Nasser University. He is a former Assistant Secretary General of the General People’s Congress from 1985 to 1991. He was Minister of Education from 1991 to 1993. He was Libyan Ambassador in Baghdad from 1995 to 2003. He has many publications to his credit on Constitutional Law topics and he is an excellent observer of the US-Libyan relationship. Dr. Aboukhazam.

Dr. Ibrahim Aboukhazam [As translated from Arabic]: In the name of God, good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I would like first to express my thanks to the organizers of this seminar, the Middle East Institute and the International Center for the Green Book Studies. I would like also to express my happiness, we in the Libyan delegation, to be here. I would like to at least express myself that I am really happy to be here in this seminar, which we hope will support the Libyan-American relations as the Director of the MEI and as Dr. Merudon had been said, “We believe that to develop relations among countries that depends on the ability to enter into dialogue.”

The fact is that the experience in the Libyan-American relations, in particular, has emphasized the importance of dialogue in international relations. And we in Libya cite this example for advocacy to reinforce policies of dialogue, the relations between Libya and the United States where they were completely lacking. But those [indiscernible] of dialogue have actually gone a very long way. Even though his Excellency the Ambassador expressed a few difficulties and hardships but, still, the relations are back to normal and as an Ambassador also makes me in a position sometimes I felt better about things.

This is perhaps the nature of diplomatic work. I used to say to a number of visitors to Libya -- intellectuals who visited us in the International Green Book Center -- I used to say to them that the policies of dialogue will enable you to use this podium in Libya. Therefore, we truly believe in dialogue and we think it is the proper way to develop relations among countries.
Ladies and gentlemen, I was requested to speak in this seminar about Libya, Africa and the West. I do not speak in any official capacity. I am a dean of a University. I do not think I really express an official point of view but I am not far off from the Libyan official point of view. And I think I can observe it, can observe these relations and their proper means and objectives. Libya has a coherent vision, a clear vision of Africa first, and it has a global vision and it should be understood that Libya -- although Libya is a small country but it has a leadership. Hopefully, we will be able to make contact with the Leader today.
The leadership is very cognizant of the movement of history, the dialectics of history, the international conflicts. Mouamer El Qaddafi -- not as he used to be described in the Western media -- he is not a dictator; he is a philosopher who understands fully the global situation.

Libya’s vision of Africa aims to achieve two things: stability and development. Stability and development, these are the cornerstones. Libya knows fully that its interests are to be found in the stability and development of Africa. There are many objectives for the Libyan policy, but those factors -stability and development - are the important cornerstones. Libya believes that it cannot live in peace even from a national point of view if it is surrounded by tension, regional conflicts. And Libya cannot live peacefully if it lives in a sea of poverty that surrounds it. And if the world -- Europe has its own fears from immigrants. Libya is a wealthy state and situated in Africa surrounded by poor countries; it definitely feels these threats more intensely.

Libyan policy really has an interest in supporting stability in Africa and development in Africa. Stability and development are not just slogans but a practical policy. And it is the essence of the Libyan discourse towards the other, especially our neighbor, Europe. On all previous occasions, Libya has always emphasized that it is in the interest of Europe and in the interest of the world that we support development in Africa as a solution to all threats and dangers.

Libya believes that stability and development cannot be achieved, you know, in the present African scene. The current African scene consists of small countries, torn countries unable to advance, unable to develop. Libya, cognizant of this global world that we live in, of the larger spaces -- you in the United States constitute a very large space and you have other important area -- fields of influence. Europe has unified itself; Europe is now a giant, another giant, and it opens up constantly. Even Asia looks movements towards larger entities.

Libya raises the slogan that Africa must be unified and that there has to be an African sphere of influence, which would make a part of the international scene. Libya has led Africa to interact with Europe. Unfortunately, European countries used to deal with Africa as a whole; you know, they used to deal with them as national entities - Africa with France, with U.K., with China. This situation is not really acceptable from the Libyan point of view. Africa should deal with the others as a unified sphere or area. We think it is in the interest of the world that Africa should be dealt with as a unified entity. This is Libya’s view of Africa.
How do others look at Africa? This seminar says “Libya, Africa and the West.” Frankly, I put a circle around the word “West.” What does the term “West” mean? We do not believe that the West should deal with Africa and in our belief there is no West until this moment. We look at Europe as an entity; the United States as an entity. Japan -- to some extent it is considered western at least in a certain sense. It is important that we should actually examine this term. In the United States, in particular, we advise that we should seriously examine the term “West” in dealing with Africa. Perhaps, it is not in the interest of the United States. This is something left [indiscernible] to put itself as far as Africa is concerned in the same boat with other countries.
Frankly, I tell you that Africa has doubts about Europe as countries, as states and as a union. There is a great deal of doubt, suspicion. The main reason for that is that European countries have not discarded themselves from their colonial views. I say this to you sincerely and I would like you to examine this. The European countries still look on Africa as zones of influence. There are many practices, which make Africa suspicious of European countries. There are many facts. You must have followed the trafficking in children in Chad that was practiced by civil society organizations in France - child trafficking. You must have followed the Bulgarian nurses’ case in Libya. Other facts, other forms of wronging Africa and wronging of Islam in Europe. There is really a state of doubt, suspicion on the part of Africa of various [sounds like] relations [sounds like] towards Europe.
We believe that the United States of America must have its own vision towards Africa. If the United States wanted to be acceptable to Africa, we hope that the United States of America would not bear, would not suffer from the negative European heritage vis-à-vis Africa.

Others, ladies and gentlemen, may have their own views and visions of Africa. China has its own vision. India has its own vision. These are ascending partners in the global order. All these ascending powers now look to Africa, the United States of America. We in Africa considered US -- we considered US a newcomer despite the American and African relations. But the previous years have witnessed a lot of increasing American interests in Africa. We believe that since the end of World War II, the American interest in Africa has not been as intense as it is now.
During the Cold War era, not a single American president visited Africa and Africa was only a minor area of interest in the American agenda. Today, there is a clear interest on the part of the United States. Most of the American presidents now visit Africa; foreign ministers go to visit Africa, the concerned ministers. We know that America has its interests in Africa and this is legitimate. Nobody would object to that as long as America should have its own vision of Africa.

I believe, ladies and gentlemen, as I said from the beginning - and I was asked to be brief - Libya has its own vision. It believes in stability and development and it will certainly cooperate with all who share its view of stability and development. Naturally, it will be against any other policies, which do not share this view. And we are in constant dialogue, with others - Europe, Latin America, China. But we hope that we will hold a constant dialogue with the United States of America so that Africa would be a common denominator between the two countries, rather than a factor for misunderstanding and political contradictions.
This is, in brief, Libya’s view, Libya’s vision of Africa. This is all that I could express in this short time. Thank you.

Charles O. Cecil: Dr. Aboukhazam. Now we will turn to Dr. Ronald Bruce St. John. Dr. St. John is an independent scholar. He has served as a consultant to the Associated Press, the New York Times, National Geographic, the 20/20 program (ABC-TV)and, from time to time, the Department of State. His book, Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife, is one of the two books I relied on most, not far from my desk at any time when I went to Libya. He is about to produce a follow-up work, Libya: From Colony to Jamahiriya, which will come out in July from One World Publications, Oxford, England.

Another very useful reference is his historical dictionary of Libya, which is now in its fourth edition; I recommend it to anyone doing serious work on Libya. In the meantime, when he is not writing books, he is a prolific contributor to the academic journals. His article in the Middle East Journal, in the winter issue 2008, “The Changing Libyan Economy: Causes and Consequences,” is the best most recent survey of the current state of the Libyan economy.
He has also recently published in the Journal of North African Studies an article titled “Redefining the Libyan Revolution: The Changing Ideology of Mouamer El Qaddafi.” And coming out soon in Middle East Policy, an article titled “Libya and the United States: A Faustian Pact?” This will be on the issue coming out any day now - Middle East Policy. So, Dr. St. John, with your usual conciseness, may I ask you to proceed?

Ronald Bruce St. John: Thank you, Ambassador Cecil. I first visited Libya in 1977 and have been researching and writing on the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since that time. When I was asked to speak today, I was asked to limit my remarks to 10 minutes; it is very difficult to distill three decades down into 10 minutes. Fortunately, Ambassador Cecil has helped me because the first thing I wanted to do is just review some of the new stuff coming out, which he has done a good job of doing for me. I always try to do that, particularly when we have colleagues from abroad as we do today with many friends and colleagues from Libya, as well as many of you in the audience who are not in the academic world and, as a result, do not have ready access to some of the academic journals.

The article that Ambassador Cecil mentioned in the Middle East journal is available here; they are selling recent copies of the journal. The two other articles he has mentioned, which I’m going to really draw on for my prepared remarks -- one, the article “Redefining the Libyan Revolution: The Changing Ideology of Mouamer El Qaddafi” was published in the Journal of North African Studies. It is not a high-volume journal; it is not readily available. If anyone wants a copy of that article and does not have access, please give me your card and I will send it to you electronically. And the same thing for the article “Libya and the United States: A Faustian Pact?” which should be on the newsstands this week in the latest issue of Middle East Policy.

But again, I know a lot of you do not have access to that kind of a journal. So, again, if you are interested in either one of those articles, give me your card and I will send you an electronic copy. As I suggested, I’m going to spend my precious time just summarizing the two most recent articles I published, beginning with the article on redefining the Libyan ideology or the Libyan revolution. This article is a re-think, a re-look at a subject I first looked at in 1983 when I published an article entitled “The Ideology of Mouamer El Qaddafi.” What I’m trying to do in this article today is look at the ideology of the revolution as it evolved after 1969 and then what has happened since approximately 1985-1990 in terms of the change in direction, emphasis and tone of that revolution.
It should be no surprise, really, that the original ideology of the Libyan revolution was constituted in a very different world order than we have today. So it is not surprising that we see a lot of change. Initially, Libyan leader Qaddafi focused on Arab nationalism, Arab unity, two issue areas that are largely defunct today. He emphasized positive neutrality - it is hard to have positive neutrality when you only have one superpower in the world - and emphasized socialism when today we have very much an effort in many sectors of the Libyan economy to move towards a more free-market-type state.

So I think without spending a lot of time on the issue of ideology, it is clear that almost all aspects of the original ideology of the revolution have evolved and changed with time. The one point I would make is that the glaring exception to this widespread change that I see is in the area of the political system. I see very little change occurring in the political system. The Leader periodically has been very emphatic in terms of seeing no need to change the political system, the system of congresses and committees.

And that is despite the fact that we have some people within the Libyan hierarchy, including his own son, Seif el-Islam el-Qaddafi, who talks about the need to evolve towards a slightly different type of democratic system. I do not see that aspect of the ideology changing. Otherwise, there has been enormous change over the last few years.

The second article that I would try to summarize in just a few minutes is the question of US-Libyan relationship, particularly since Libya of its own free will gave up weapons of mass destruction in December 2003. The genesis of my comments here are, really, a meeting that I participated in Washington last fall in which a group of governmental bodies brought together a couple of Libyan scholars from abroad, as well as myself and a couple of Libyan scholars from the States, and we spent a day talking about Libya. And I have been participating in these kinds of gatherings periodically for a long number of years.

What struck me about this particular one was that at the end of the day, virtually everyone in the audience representing all of the major US governmental bodies involved in Libya seemed to agree that the Libyan-US relationship had basically reached its limits, that both sides had pretty well gotten what they wanted out of the relationship and there was no expectation on the part of the US government that it would evolve very much further, very much faster.
At the time I objected to that conclusion, feeling it was wrong. And it prompted me in the end to put my thoughts down on paper in this article that is just coming out next week in Middle East Policy. In so doing, I framed my thoughts around the infamous comment of Lord Palmerston, the British politician and diplomat, who once observed that nations had no permanent friends or allies; they have only permanent interests. And that led me to think about Libya from the standpoint of what might be considered permanent interests, and I came up with just six in this particular article. Not to say there might not be more, but I think it makes the point that there are, in fact, a lot of issue areas where the United States and Libya have much to gain from working together in the future.
The first and obvious one of hydrocarbons. The World Bank estimates Libyan oil reserves to be in excess of 39 billion barrels, with natural gas reserves totaling over 51 billion cubic feet. Now, other estimates are slightly higher, slightly lower; they’re all directionally about that level.

Since December 2003, Libya has had four rounds of exploration and production sharing agreements. They have awarded contracts to more than two dozen companies in more than a dozen countries. And the feeling is that, eventually, as all of these contracts are executed the current level of oil and natural gas reserves could double or even triple. The significance of that for the United States is not that we buy oil or natural gas from Libya but having that amount of hydrocarbons available on the market makes it a lot easier for the United States to buy their oil and gas from other places.
Secondly, regional politics. My colleague to the right just touched on those so I will not dwell on them. But currently, the United States in the last decade has begun to explore much more aggressively policies in Africa. The Libyan government, since the very beginning of the revolution in September of 1969, has been very active in Africa, often diametrically opposed to policies of the United States. And that remains, to some degree, the case today, although not in all cases as Ambassador Cecil has indicated.
But the point is when you talk about things like AFRICOM, the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership and so forth, these are issues that the Libyan government has a very strong, firm position on. And the United States -- it is in our interest to talk with them and work with them and try to work out solutions to some of these problem areas that make sense to both sides.
A third area of permanent interest is weapons of mass destruction. The Libyans, as I said, by their own free will gave up weapons of mass destruction in December of 2003. As of mid-2007, the Libyan government announced it was backing out of a 2006 contract to destroy remaining mustard gas stocks. Later in the year, it was announced that some 200 barrels of uranium had still not been dismantled and disposed of through the weapons of mass destruction program. So I think weapons of mass destruction remains a policy issue that the United States should be interested in with Libya, both from the standpoint of whatever is left of the old WMD program but, equally important, as Libya looks to get nuclear energy in the future, how that might, in fact, impact on a potential WMD program in the future.

A fourth area is simply the strategic military balance in the area. Both Libya and Great Britain have announced in recent years potential contracts for weapons sales to Libya. The Libyan government, the Libyan Leader in particular, as Ambassador Cecil has already commented on, retains a very strong interest in Saharan and Sahelian affairs. At one point a couple of years ago, he proposed putting together a small mercenary force composed of Tuareg, Tubu and other Saharan peoples and integrating that force into the Libyan armed forces. These are all issues that concern people in the region. And obviously, the United States also has an interest in working these issues and better understanding where the Libyan government is going.

A fifth issue area, which I will not dwell on is democracy and human rights. Someone, I think, mentioned the Washington Post editorial on Saturday so I’m not going to get into that issue but, obviously, there are concerns inside and outside the United States as to the level of human rights and democracy in Libya today.
A sixth area is the whole area of legal cases pending in US courts against Libya. I have worked very hard in the last year or so to try to identify those; I failed miserably. The State Department finally confirmed last year that there are approximately 15 separate legal cases pending against Libya. And I think most of you have probably seen the report in the press the middle of last week that the Libyan government has made a proposal to the US government, a proposal described by the State Department as very complex and going to require a lot of thinking and talking about to resolve these issues collectively.

But as they stand right now, they are a major impediment to the actual appointment -- not appointment, perhaps, but having a US ambassador in Libya and beginning construction on the necessary secure facility, which will then begin to make some of the visa issues easier. It is hard to say that all in one word.
So I see at least six major buckets of policies that the United States has considerable interests - I would argue, permanent interests - with Libya. And it seems to me like that it is to the benefit of both sides to continue working these issues. The final comment I would make, I guess, again, based on the thought process that I experienced in that most recent meeting with members of the US government regards where we are and where we are trying to go with Libya.

Ronald Neumann, who at the time was Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs back in the year 2000, made a statement before a Senate subcommittee as well as at a meeting at the Middle East Institute -- he made a statement that an improved bilateral relationship with Libya was not an end in itself. And I feel eight years later, there is still a feeling like that in many parts of the United States government - an improved bilateral relationship is not an end in itself.

In my mind, one of the downsides of that kind of relationship and the downsides of the way the United States government has treated Libya since it renounced weapons of mass destruction in December 2003 is that we have never yet begun to treat Libya as a fair and equal partner in the world.

And when Libyan leader Qaddafi and other prominent people in the Libyan government complained, as they had repeatedly since December 2003, that the United States has just not really come through with everything they said they were going to do in the course of the nine months of discussions in London leading up to that historic announcement, I think that a lot of it comes right back down to the fact that, since the Qaddafi regime came to power on September 1969, one thing Libya has been looking for is to be treated as a fair and equal partner with the United States.

And I think the fundamental complaint - and I think there is very much room for that complaint - is that this has still not happened.
If you look at the European side of the equation, European leaders have gone to Libya and met with Libyan leader Qaddafi time and time again. Tony Blair, for example, made two trips. At the end of his last trip, he said that he found Libyan leader Qaddafi to be one of the easiest people in the world to work with, a man who kept his word.

On the United States’ side, we still do not have an ambassador in Tripoli. We still do not have senior people in the administration, including Secretary of State Rice, visiting Libya. And I think all of these things come back to my concept of we have a lot of unfinished business to do in Libya, and I believe much of it falls in the area of permanent interest on the part of the United States. So I’ll stop there. And again, if anyone is interested in getting copies of either one of these articles and does not have access to them any other way, let me know and I would be happy to send you an electronic copy.

Charles O. Cecil: Thank you, Dr. St. John. We will turn now to Dr. Bashir al-Kout. Dr. al-Kout is from the political science department at Al-Fatah University in Tripoli. He is also head of research and studies at the Green Book society. He has a number of publications to his credit dealing with African unity and with African regional organizations, and he has also edited a couple of works along these lines. These are in Arabic and so not easily accessible to most of us, however. Dr. al-Kout’s PhD is from the Arab Institute of the Arab League in Cairo, and he is currently working on a second PhD from Al-Nilain University in Khartoum, Sudan. Dr. al-Kout?

Bashir al-Kout: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I would apologize because I want to present my paper in Arabic. So I’ll give you a few seconds to fit the device.

[Note: The following speech from Bashir al-Kout is the translation of the speaker’s Arabic presentation.]

I will abbreviate it as much as I can. It is about a reading of the Libyan role in settling disputes in the African continent. I believe that role is very important, given that Libya is -- in the past decades in its foreign policy gave the African issue a very important role.

In the beginning, I would like to point out that the African continent is one continent with the most disputes and civil wars. And that is because the way the composition of the African societies -- most of these African societies -- as a composite of different ethnicities and different religions that get into strife and disagreement. And there are some inter-African disputes between African countries, too. We recognize that the African countries in Africa, since its independence in the ‘60s until now, did not succeed in putting a mechanism in solving these disputes and disagreements or prevent any of these disputes.
For over 40 years, the African Union organization could not put forward a mechanism in solving different disputes in the African continent, though in the charter of the African Union in the Article 19 that should -- these disputes should be solved. And there was a protocol put forward to solve these disputes, though this mechanism failed to solve these disputes.

It is noted that Africans rely in -- to solve their disputes on other international organizations - the U.N. and other European countries - in solving these disputes. Also, regional African organizations try to outline a mechanism to solve these disputes. But, in fact, if we exclude ECOWAS, the Economic Council of West Africa -- they managed to solve their problems and that is partly because of the positive role that Nigeria played, which is the largest country in Africa and the largest in West Africa -- played a positive role compared to other African countries.
I can see that there is a role you can rely on to solve these disputes in these regional African organizations. The African Union tried to bypass that difficulty and formed the Council of Security and Peace that reflect the African feelings that security and peace is the most important issue facing Africa. But in my own opinion -- that the African Union is not able to decisively prevent these disputes that occur in Africa for more than one reason. And the main reason is the financial issue; the financing of these peace missions that the African Union is sanctioned to go to dispute areas.

A good example is Darfur. The African Union could not succeed in establishing peace and security in Darfur. They could not rely on their own resources to settle issues in Darfur, so they seek the help of other countries from outside of Africa in terms of logistical and financial support.
Regarding the Libyan role in settling these disputes, the observer of what happened in the last 10, 15 years, Libya has emerged as playing a very prominent role, represented by the Leader, Qaddafi, to settle these disputes and play the role of a mediator in these wars. Though Libya, before that, in the first two decades of the revolution, was part of some of these disputes, as what happened when Libya supported one faction against the other in Chad and the dispute between Libya and Chad regarding the Ozo region in the southern Libya; also, some other border disputes with Tunisia and Malta and Egypt in 1977.

But except of these four incidents, Libya is trying to play a role since the late ‘80s to the direction of the foreign policy of Libya to preserve security and peace, especially after the proposal of integration of African countries and cooperation. Like some other regional organizations, we should not forget that the African Union is a Libyan project and Libya had played a major role in establishing the African Union and pushing the African Union to play a new phase in the cooperation in African countries and integration.
The ability of Libya to solve these disputes - that is a question. Can the Libyan foreign policy lead to very positive results in settling these disputes in the African continent? In my own opinion, this role is limited to many factors. First of all, Libya is a small country; it is a country, which has a small population, and it is a developing country -- the final [sounds like] analysis. And to solve conflicts we need huge potentials in terms of -- and it needs an active diplomatic machinery; forces on the ground in order to separate the forces; logistical support. All these means are not available in the Libyan role.

Libya does not claim that she can perform this role but she believes that with concerted efforts between all the African actors -- would actually lead ultimately to prevent conflicts in Africa. Also, another factor, which may limit the Libyan role in solving the conflict, is the role of the non-African states. In order to make it clearer, the Libyan initiative concerning the settlement of the conflict in Sudan -- Libya has made an initiative which was accepted by both parties. But the Egyptian role actually confused the situation.

Then, the US intervention, which actually cancelled both initiatives, which has put forward a new initiative that culminated in the Naivasha Agreement. The major powers -- the French role, for example, the European role, in general, all these initiatives and roles could limit the importance of the Libyan role.
Another point concerning the factors, which limit Libya’s role is the Libyan diplomatic apparatus. Although there are many good politicians in this apparatus, although there are many competent people, however, working on such issues needs a lot of professionals, mediators who in my opinion are not available in the Libyan apparatus. The role, basically, is confined to what the leader Mouamer Qaddafi personally takes, thanks to his own personal relations with African leaders and active players.
Another limiting factor of the Libyan role is that the Africans do not sometimes like to resort to a local mediator. For example, they would rather go to the International Court of Justice, to Europe, to the United States.

I hope that I have not spent too much time. But we can summarize the situation that Libya can help in the settlement of conflicts in Africa and can prevent these conflicts. But we have to be realistic. This role can only be successful if we coordinate with the major powers and whose role should not be overlooked in order to achieve independence and respect for Africa. I’m sorry if I took a long time. Thank you very much for your attention.

Charles O. Cecil: Thank you, Dr. al-Kout. We will turn now to Dr. Daniel Yergin, Chairman of Cambridge Energy Research Associates.

Dr. Yergin is an internationally known authority on energy, international politics and economics. He won the Pulitzer Prize for his book, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power. This book was translated into 12 languages and also was the subject of an eight-part PBS-BBC documentary series seen by 20 million people.
A subsequent book titled Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy has in turn been translated into 13 languages and has also served as the basis for a six-hour TV documentary, again, by PBS and the BBC. Dr. Yergin has been named one of 500 most influential people in the United States in the field of foreign policy by the World Affairs Councils of America. Dr. Yergin, it is unfair to squeeze you with time but if there is a possibility of allowing time for questions from the floor, I ask you to do your best. Thank you.

Daniel Yergin: Thank you very much. Thank you. I’m pleased to be part of this panel. I want to thank the Middle East Institute and the sponsors of this session for the opportunity to be part of this. I recognize that we all have an opportunity today to contribute to a dialogue that is actually less than five years old. Dr. Mahdi and Dr. Aboukhazam talked about opening doors. I think it is very important to both our countries and we at Cambridge Energy at CERA are very pleased to have the opportunity to see some of these doors open up.

My objective is to give very briefly a bit of a context in the oil and gas industry for what is happening in Libya and then how Libya fits in and its potential for mutual benefits for both countries. But there is a point I want to emphasize at the beginning, which is that it is very important what has happened in terms of contracts, connection and reconnection in the energy relationship and how important that relationship is. But I think it is important to recognize also that it is an extended relationship. That [inaudible] not only the contracts, but implementation, facilitation, responsiveness, consistency, timeliness, recognition of the value of time - that these all have much to do with determining the value that the industry will ultimately deliver to the nation.

Let me say first a word just about world oil and gas. Ten years ago, oil was US$10 a barrel; today, it is over US$100 a barrel. It is striking how short memories are. When the price of oil goes down to US$100 or US$101 a barrel, people will say, “Boy, the price of oil is really going down.” We would not have said that three months ago. There are many reasons for where prices are. Part of it is, of course, geopolitical; what is unfolding in Basra underlines that. But I think the most important one is, the success is economic. It is the success of the global economy; five years of unprecedented global economic growth. All commodities, including oil, have reflected that.

But there is a second factor that is not as well-recognized but that is very important, and that is the dramatic increases in costs in the oil and gas industry. At CERA, with our parent IHS, we have developed an upstream capital cost index, and it is quite extraordinary. Over the last three years, the cost of developing a new oil and gas field has literally doubled. It would cost twice as much today to begin as it would have three years ago. Shortage of people, equipment, skills - that is true in the United States; it is true in Libya; it is true around the world. And then, there is the pressure in terms of the economic relationship between the states and the companies.

Well, as I said, this primary factor of the strength of the global economy has held true for five years; it is not holding true anymore. We have seen a shift from the impact of the global economy to the weakness of the US economy as a driver of oil prices. That might sound strange but it translates through reduced interest rates, interest rates coming down, a weakening dollar, and oil and other commodities as a hedge against the falling dollar. And the emergence of oil, in particular, as an asset class as investors become more and more important, financial investors in the market who look on oil as an asset class, an allocation class.
We at CERA do see significantly more supplies coming into the system. But we also see delays, postponements, higher costs that will shape the picture. Natural gas, a favored fuel for electric generation -- its importance only grows with the increasing emphasis on climate change but also a need for diversification. One of the fundamental rules of energy security is diversification, and that is in the face of strong demand from Europe, Asia and North America.
Well, this sets a context then for discussion of Libya’s oil and gas sector. As has already been addressed, Libya has a tremendous potential - well, very great potential, I should say - in its hydrocarbon sector. Its location, the quality of its resources give it a competitive advantage both to Europe and to world markets. In the last decades this sector’s progress has basically lagged behind because of the sanction situation, which has now been resolved. Current productive capacity is below 2 million barrels a day. The target of 3 million barrels a day by 2012, I think, you would have to say given where we are today, is ambitious.

I think the international companies feel the need because of the pressures on them to see faster results. We have seen, of course, as already been pointed out, a lot of activity in terms of licensing rounds, the most recent focusing on gas-prone acreage, a number of new discoveries. And yet development does not seem to be moving at the pace that it should. It is partly because of NOC funding; partly because of tight hardware, tight people, resources in the country that has been already mentioned in other contexts. Libya has seen the same pressures that every other country has seen.
It is also because the amount of money, revenues that are now flowing into the treasury; it is the question about how to absorb higher revenues for successful economic development. And in this Libya is very much reflecting the reality of the global industry.
The challenge - and it is by no means easy - is to get the timing right for monetizing the country’s wealth in terms of oil and gas. Too quickly, what do you get? The curse of oil. Too slowly, the opportunities may be wasted. Strong demand, high prices, pressing needs - these things pass. At present, I think it would be clear to say that the investing companies are determined to be optimistic with field development trying to push ahead. We have seen a lot of activity on contracts. But I think it would be clear to everybody who is involved that it is a challenging business environment. We have heard it in some aspects already on this panel.
You may say it is not the responsibility of the state to worry about that but the working business environment is very important because for a country, what this is about is terms and taxes, the revenues that are needed for the development of the nation. National priorities have to come first. But what happens when cost pressures, timing questions, people shortages face the investing companies with tough choices about where to focus? We can, obviously, see that we are in an era of high prices but it is too easy to forget that we are also in an era of high cost. And that forces choices on companies in terms of what directions to go in.
Now, gas development is also a Libyan priority; it is not just for upstream and it is not just for export. There is also an ambitious program underway to supply natural gas by pipe to Libyan cities, and there is much discussion about using that gas for domestic production as well. Well, that all gets you down to what is the real value of the gas. It is a very good question. And you know what? It is not an easy question to answer. It depends on many factors. Key question for Libya, of course, is pipeline versus LNG and what is the right way to integrate into the European markets and how to integrate with world markets, as well as meeting its domestic development needs.

So mindful of the time, I would like to just conclude with a few key overarching points. Understandably, Libya is determined to use its current oil and gas well to transform the economy as a whole and develop the country’s infrastructure. There is an impressive sense of urgency but timing is a problem. It is bound to be a long haul. What will that mean? Well, it means that the energy sector will need to function as the economic and financial motor for years to come. It is very important to make sure that that motor is well-nurtured and well-developed.

It is not easy to get the right balance between IOCs and the NOC, and that is the same in the other energy sectors, too, this disruption from the ups and downs of the global energy business. But I think this key point I want to go back to -- it is not only contracts; it is facilitating decision-making and execution to get things done sooner rather than later. The quality of the decision-making - responsive, consistent, timeliness, the value of time - these will do much to answer the questions which will determine the value that the industry delivers to the nation. We have got to keep in mind costs.

I think, obviously, there are other fluctuations, too, including those in international relations. And I think this conference and what we have on this panel is an effort to develop that common vocabulary that is needed between the United States and Libya, to have that greater density of public and private sector relationships, to open the doors as has already been discussed. And it is not just about energy but about international relations. There will be continuing progress, but there will be turbulence. It is important to develop the relationships and the dialogue to help manage and shape relationships and address important issues that are constructive for both countries in a time of a lot of change. That is why this forum is so important and timely.

So, last word -- energy goes through cycles. At every point in this cycle people seem to forget it but it does go through cycles. Many people run the risk of forgetting that, lose sight of competitive realities and that this is an industry, the energy industry, that has very long lead times. Even as we have seen these high prices, I would like to argue that the laws of supply and demand have not been abolished but these laws of supply and demand can grind more slowly than one might expect. But grind they will. Great benefits can go to a country that can make decisions efficiently and with consistency that have the processes in place, that thinks about the long term and recognizes the value of time and seeks to ensure stability and competitiveness in the terms it offers investors, and in the effectiveness of implementation and execution.
Those factors, those emphases, the attention to those issues will contribute to the competitive advantage of that country, its people and the economic and social development of that nation through the ups and downs of whatever cycles may lie ahead. Thank you.