Related Resources

There is no doubt to any in this audience that Pakistan is a dangerously unstable country in a volatile region. Nor do any of us dispute the importance of Pakistan’s cooperation to achieve our national goal of counter-terrorism.

It is the next set of questions that clear answers are so elusive in the public and policy discussion. Does a military led government provide the most stable partner for the US in our war on terrorism? Can the US trust the Pakistan army or are too many of its members sympathize with the extremist? Is Musharraf doing all he can to suppress extremism along the border with Afghanistan? What will happen to the nuclear arsenal if a civilian government, or worse, an extremist government takes over Pakistan? Can a stable civilian democracy be restored? Why is the United States so unpopular among the people? In one way or the other, all of the speakers today will be looking at these questions.

None of these questions can be answered easily. My message this morning is a simple one. If the United States has any hope at all of succeeding in our counter terrorism efforts and our goal of assuring stability in this important region, we must take care that our words and actions are seen as supportive rather than intrusive. To avoid this pitfall, we must do a better job in listening and understanding the Pakistani people and their political dynamics.

The current political situation in Pakistan is a delicate one. Pakistan faces a parliamentary and presidential election that will mark a transition from the military rule established eight years ago to a civilian democracy.

The United States is conflicted. It is vital to the US that Pakistani government is strong so that it can maintain tight security over its nuclear arsenal and cooperates in the suppression of extremist along the Afghan border. At the same time, return to a democratically elected civilian government in Pakistan has long been our policy goal.

US analysts tend to believe that Musharraf continuation as President offers the best option for stability. But to continue as President he must he must first be eligible and then get elected as a civilian President. We all know in democracies, there are no guarantees.

I will make four points to define the context of the Pakistani political mood with the approaching parliamentary and presidential elections and then offer a few recommendations for the US-Pakistan relationship.

CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION:

First -- it helps to know how Pakistanis would like to think of themselves. Pakistani civil society is deeply committed to democracy in the tradition of their venerated founding father, Mohammed Ali Jinnah.

Jinnah envisioned a multiethnic, pluralistic, democratic country free from the hegemony of any one group…most particularly the army.

Pakistan’s history of erratic lurches from civilian to military governments doesn’t accord with this self-image, but it does help us to understand the passions of the opposition to a military man a President -- and, most notably, to any suggestion that the United States favors one or two candidates over others.

Pakistani civil society has been bridling at the bit throughout the last eight years of military rule. They basically backed the bloodless military coup in 1999 because of their dissatisfaction with the wholesale corruption of civilian governments. People accepted military order as long as it was moderate and clean…but only temporarily.

Musharraf promised “enlightened moderation” and a quick return to civilian democracy. Patience has worn out, quickened by his heavy-handed sacking of the Supreme Court Justice in March.

But, perhaps more important, Musharraf has lost substantial popular support because of his close association with us. The people see the US as interested only in counter-terrorism in alliance with the Army. Now the civil society will accept nothing less than return to civilian government.

Second: Just as in the US, “all politics is local”, one might say in Pakistan, “all politics is personalities”.

Up until now the Bhuttos – father and daughter-- have come to personify Pakistan Peoples Party or the PPP. The party of Nawas Sharif is called PML-N, N for Nawas. Any discussion of democracy in Pakistan quickly becomes a mind-numbing recitation of coalitions between politicians.

This is significant for what discussions are NOT about. They are not about platforms or delivery on promises of services to the people. It is not about developing and nurturing a new generation of politicians from the ranks of the electorate.

Excessive personification of party politics tends to stunt the promotion of new and fresh political leaders. To the extent the US is perceived as favoring one personality or the other…. like Musharraf and Benazir -- we harm the development of an open process and defeat our own objectives of fostering democracy.

Third – with this in mind, one can understand the dynamics of the so-called negotiations for power sharing between Musharraf and Benazir.

Running a state as a military leader, Musharraf power base was primarily the Army. Now, obligated to run as a civilian leader, Musharraf finds that he does not have an electoral power base. His party, the PML-Q is too weak to guarantee his election, although his powerful political advisors within the PML-Q tell him otherwise. The fact is, Musharraf needs to ally with a larger party or parties with a sizeable regional base, like Bhutto’s PPP if he hopes to be elected, or with several smaller parties. In either option, he must make compromises.

Musharraf faces other legal obstacles. First, the requirement that he take off his uniform and secondly, the constitutional provision that requires all public servants to step down for two years before running for office.

The Supreme Court is expected to make a ruling on his eligibility this week. Most observers believe the court will allow Musharraf to run but with concessions to his critics. He has said he will leave the Army by mid-November.

Benazir Bhutto also faces legal obstacles. While Musharraf has indicated he will help her with outstanding corruption charges, she still faces the prohibition on serving as Prime Minister for a third term.

The power sharing talks have been of a nature –“you help me with my problem, I will help you with yours”. There is little trust between Bhutto and Musharraf. The relationship is based on political expediency.

Musharraf strong card in the power sharing negotiation is that Benazir will ultimately need Army support. The PPP is expected to do well in the polls in a free and fair election but only the Army can assure it will not be rigged against her. And then, once in office, Benazir knows that she needs Army support to be an effective Prime Minister. She needs to make a deal.

The final point to note as part of the context for the elections is the role of the rightist parties, Nawas Sharif’s PML-N and the Islamic parties.

The Jaamatt –i-Islami and other opposition religious parties say they will not support Musharraf under any circumstance. They also oppose Benazir Bhutto. This may not be too significant because the religious parties typically poll in the single figures. The impact of their opposition is more likely to be disruptive street violence.

Nawas Sharif can play a disruptive role. You recall, he was the Prime Minister the Army deposed in 1999 and he was exiled to Saudi Arabia for 10 years. The Supreme Court ruled that he had a right as a Pakistani citizen to return, but when he tried to do that in last September so that he could lead his Party the PML-N in election he was promptly turned back at the airport.

Many in Musharraf’s ruling party, the PML-Q were once supporters of Nawas Sharif and they lean to the right. It was important for Musharraf that Nawas Sharif not returns, breaks up Musharraf’s party, and forms an alliance with the rightist religious parties that would polarize Pakistan along anti-American rhetoric.

In summary, Pakistan’s political environment is volatile and uncertain. The US has a stake in a stable and cooperative government in Pakistan that will secure its nuclear arsenal, and suppress extremism. Our actions and rhetoric have great impact. What we do and say over these next sensitive months will affect the Pakistani political future and our chances of achieving a stable region.

For the next few remaining minutes, I will make three suggestions on how best to work with Pakistan during this sensitive time to further regional Pakistan’s interests and US.

THE PROCESS

First, don’t play favorites.

The Pakistanis are very sensitive to any indication of our preference for President Musharraf and a Bhutto alliance in the election. This has hurt both of them. Both have dropped in the polls because they are seen to be in the American fold. Nawas Sharif has done better than expected because he is critical of the US and has not negotiated with Musharraf.

Pakistanis – people everywhere—recognize the US as the single most powerful country in the world. Those who admire us do so for our professed values. Those throughout the world, who scorn us, do so because our actions betray those values.

Every democracy has its idiosyncrasies, and Pakistan is no exception. But any democracy finds external interference to be a corruption. Over the next several months, our envoys and diplomats must continue to be visible, active, and courageous in actions and words - but we must also weigh every word and action very carefully.

It was an unfortunate accident that the Deputy Secretary of State was in Pakistan when the Nawas Sharif attempted to return so that he could run for office. Musharraf’s security forces arrested Sharif’s supporters, suppressed political rallies and returned Sharif to Saudi Arabia. Perhaps unfairly, Pakistanis perceived an American hand, but we did not criticize these heavy-handed security measures. Perceptions can be as true as fact.

So my first recommendation is to respect and support the process of democracy in Pakistan in word and deed. Pakistani democracy may never be completely free and fair by a purest standard. But we should leave no ambiguities in our support for an open democratic process, rather than for individual candidates.

Ultimately the US must be seen to support a fresh group of leaders drawn from Pakistan’s overwhelming young population, reform of its democratic process, and services for the people.

Specifically, we must be clear that we believe the Pakistan Army’s intelligence service, the ISI, must not meddle in election. This oversteps a line.

Our ultimate goal of regional and Pakistani security will be undercut if the people believe Musharraf uses - and the US tacitly approves - undemocratic means to assure his re-election. The most visible indication will be street violence.

THE PEOPLE

Following from our support for the democratic process, is the second recommendation that the US must make clear that our relationship is with the Pakistani people, and not one man or woman or party or institution like the Army, but the people.

There is no doubt that the United States has invested a great deal in Pakistan since 2001--$10 billion. As a result Pakistan’s macro financial situation is greatly improved. But it is also just as clear that our aid has had little impact on the lives of the poorest people. It overwhelmingly goes to the Army and military assistance and macro-economic support.

Our aid is not aimed at addressing the needs of the Pakistani people, but rather at our short-term counter terrorism objectives narrowly focused along the border with Afghanistan. We currently provide $100 million a month to compensate Pakistan for security efforts along the border. We give $100 million a year for development assistance to the rest of the 140 million people of Pakistan.

CSIS recently released an excellent report, Pakistan: a Perilous Course. It concluded that US efforts are not addressing the underlying fault lines in Pakistani society. As a consequence, our aid is seen to be working against the people, thusly aiding the militants.

The report recommends, and I agree, that the US aid must address the main drivers of conflict, instability and extremism. These include a culture of impunity, discontent in the provinces, ethnic and sectarian tensions, a rapidly growing and urbanizing youth population, and extremist views among traditional allies.

To sharpen the point, we are expending a great deal along the border in what we have defined as a border problem. In fact, the solution to Pakistan and regional security lies much deeper within the Pakistani nation, system, and population. We should support primary education, job creation, and an effective community police.

POLICY:

This takes me to the third and final recommendation. The CSIS report made a strong case for the US to develop a comprehensive, interagency, integrated policy approach and that this process must lead to a new definition of our relations with Pakistan.

If we fail to do this, we are condemned to undercutting our broader interests, wasting our investments, stunting Pakistan’s potential for development, and endangering the region.

Pakistanis listen carefully to the political dialogue in Washington. Our message is contradictory.

One very disturbing example of the effect of our contradictory policy can be tracked by US approval ratings in Pakistan following the earthquake assistance effort. The American military was fast, competent, and generous in immediate aid to the earthquake victims.

American popularity soared from 23% before the earthquake to 45% in November 2005. Clearly we were doing something right and the people recognized appreciated genuine American aid to the stricken Pakistani population.

By January, US approval ratings had dropped sharply to 15%. The event that precipitated the fall was a US predator strike on a madrassah in Bajaur along the Afghan border, killing many civilians and alienating the nation.

The predator strike was viewed throughout Pakistan as a unilateral strike by a foreign power on Pakistani citizens that killed innocent civilians. It fell into the classic definition of an act of war. Perhaps because it was such a jolt, President Musharraf stepped up and said publicly that he had ordered the strike and it was a Pakistani military action. It is worrisome to think what might have happened had he not. Most Pakistanis did not believe him. Musharraf’s support fell has hard and fast as the approval ratings for the US. We had undone all the goodwill our genuine relief efforts had built up and undercut our ally.

I am not arguing that US counter terrorism effort along the border are not important. I am saying that we must pursue those objectives in ways that do not undermine our equally important objectives of suppressing extremism within and throughout Pakistan.

The United States and our goals will succeed to the extent we are effective in helping in addressing the aspirations of the people.

In conclusion, the political outcome of the election may be uncertain, but US policy makers can be prepared for the inevitable. It is inevitable that large, angry crowds will spill into the streets and that it will be violent. It is also inevitable that the United States will be a factor in the rhetoric of the election, and not in a helpful way. Finally it is inevitable that we will have less influence over the outcome than we think or the Pakistanis fear.