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Asla Aydintasbas:

Thank you for the presentation. My account is going to start out with a little retrospective, as seems to be the need at the moment in the Turkish-American relationship.

Earlier this year, as you probably all know, as the United States was about to embark on perhaps the grand project of the century in Iraq, the Turkish-American relationship hit an all-time low. This was due to the March 1 decision of the Turkish parliament to not allow US troops to use southeastern Turkey as a launch pad for the northern front in the war.

Where we are right now is rather dramatic compared to where we were a few years ago. In many ways, Turks feel that – well, Turkey was not in the war. It created a good deal of ill feeling, I would say, on both sides, in both capitals, a good deal of tension perhaps – disappointed some friends of Turkey here.

The feelings linger. Turks feel they are somewhat left out of the equation in Iraq – left out of the decision-making process at least. They have no meaningful part in the reconstruction projects.

There is some degree of ambivalence among the US officers serving on the ground towards Turkey, because of the March 1 decision. The US administration seems to be backpedaling on an earlier request for Turkish troop deployment in Iraq, in the central region of Iraq. I think suddenly Ankara's worst fears are somewhat being realized, when Washington seems to unable to choose between its sort of long-time ally, Turkey, and its new partners in Iraq. They decided to take into account their objections about Turkish troops, hence going back on an earlier request.

Basically this is in stark contrast to what we've been used to seeing for many decades. Let's just quickly remember the basis of this strategic alliance before we go into why it failed. It's something that extends back 50 years, to the Korean War, the Cold War, NATO enlargement, the Gulf War and the containment of Saddam Hussein over the last 12 years. Many thought for decades that Turks and Americans saw eye to eye on issues like regional democratization, rogue regimes, Terrorism, and whatnot.

The story of how this love affair turned into something cooler than that is actually I think one of the more interesting stories of this war, one of the more interesting diplomatic stories. How we got from December to March has been the subject of a good deal of soul-searching in Ankara and Washington, but I think perhaps not enough, and here I'd like to go over a few key points, really trying to understand why we got to where we are.

If I had to give one headline to you, one thing to grab your attention, explaining why these tedious and at times combative negotiations between Turkey and the United States in the run-up to the war failed, I'd say differences, sensitivities of the Kurdish issue. But that's my headline to grab your attention, and it's worth delving deeper into this subject.

In retrospect – first let me talk a little bit about the US side. I want to talk about the mistakes both sides have made exiting and entering this relationship and the negotiations.

In retrospect, it seems the US demand for 80,000 – the final figure is some 70,000 I believe – US troops to be stationed in southeastern Turkey was rather too much. It was too much. It came with a request for a number of bases and ports and whatnot – for a country very sensitive about its national sovereignty, to raise the questions. Are these US troops going to leave? What are the implications for domestic policy? We all know the amount of discontent there is in Saudi Arabia, of course.

It also in some cases raised more questions than it answered among national security circles. People, after all, knew that Saddam Hussein was more or less a paper tiger. To have that huge a force deployed in Turkey and in the south in Kuwait – to be frank, I think it raised the question among some people, maybe the US is serious about going after Iran and Syria after Iraq. So, it suddenly did look like a huge adventure.

The negotiations were very public, which did not help. They started in December and intensified in February and March, in a tedious way.

In retrospect, another perhaps strategic problem was a result of the fact that the Administration here decided to primarily handle the issue with the new government in Turkey, the sort of, I should say, moderate Islamist AKP, which had just come into power. Very soon after the elections, AKP's leader, who was not yet the prime minister, [Recep]Tayyip Erdogan, was invited to Washington. In a country which has always had this delicate balance between military and civilian rule, that really was in some sense seen as an effort to bypass the military in Turkey. At least in the public view, that was the case. As I saw it, as the negotiations went on and on, almost a whole psychosis in this Turkish-American relationship that's been stashed away, hidden under the carpet for many years, came out. It was a good deal of mistrust, suspicions on both sides. I used to think it was sort of like the estrangement of a married couple, both sides believing that the other side is cheating. It was very hard to convince Americans that Turks were seriously negotiating, that they didn't have a secret agenda to stop the war or to sabotage US efforts. It was hard to convince Turks that Americans did not have a secret plan to establish a Kurdish state. I should say both the military-to-military talks and the political talks were somewhat acrimonious in turn.

On the Turkish side, it's fair to say that the new government had not had this type of a political exposure. They certainly did not have this type of international role to play. There was a good deal of amateurism on the part of the negotiators. There was no Tony Blair in Turkey that was in a position to negotiate, or willing to be on the side of the United States but in an unwilling fashion. A little work has been done to prepare the Turkish public, and on this issue of course the European public remains the same. There were significant portions of the population strongly anti-war. Of course the strange situation in Ankara whereby the leader of an elected party was not allowed to be the prime minister – Tayip Erdogan – due to the fact that he had served in prison earlier on. Yet he was the leader of the party, but nominally there was a prime minister. This did not really help, in terms of personal power, the strength, the control over the party.

I think again, to go back to the same theme, at the root of it is – I think there was this mistrust, mistrust on the part of Turks with their US counterparts about post-Saddam Iraq, about the Kurdish issue. Can you guarantee that you're not going to establish a Kurdish state? What sort of an order do you have in mind? What kind of a federation? Can you put these in writing? What about a detailed memo? What about the role of Turkomans? All these were very thorny issues that Americans were not in a position to really adequately answer, because there were no answers at that point.

In the end, March 1 came. The majority of parliamentarians voted yes, but the vote was not enough. We did not have an absolute majority, the vote was not enough for US troop deployment. AKP was divided, the governing party, the moderate Islamist party that's in power now. The secular opposition party, CHP, squarely voted no. Suddenly here we are, questioning what's long been termed a strategic partnership.

This was a term coined by President Clinton to describe the Turkish-American relationship. It was elevated to that at the end of the 1990s. Suddenly people in Washington started saying, you stabbed us in the back, or, take the strategy out of the strategic alliance and what are you left with? There was a lot of acrimony, I should say.

Perhaps the greatest wound was in the military-to-military relationship between the two countries, which has generally been the sort of pride of US foreign policy and genuinely worked well under the NATO framework. Perhaps the most poignant moment was in May when Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz took an unusual step and openly accused the Turkish military of "not showing leadership" in the negotiations.

Well, let's look at Turkey. The situation is equally – sort of the lingering effects of March 1 and the way the war turned out is, I think, equally dramatic. The war remains very unpopular, and the US efforts in Iraq remain somewhat unpopular. Generally in polls throughout the 1990s, Turks have said they see Americans as their closest foreign partners. This has dramatically changed now in polls where Europeans are perhaps seen as Turkey's closer allies. In a recent independent poll, well over 50% of Turks said they view American policies in the region as the single greatest threat to Turkey's security.

There was a recent exercise to get the relationship back on track, which was a US request to have Turkish troops serve in the “Sunni Triangle,” for stability, as peacekeepers. It is about to turn into another disaster, because there's been some level of criticism from Iraq's Governing Council, and very soon after that it seems the Administration decided that they may not want Turkish troops after all. Of course this is a huge existential shock to the Turkish establishment, raising the question, are we at the point where Washington might prefer their allies in Iraq, or perhaps Iraqi Kurds, to Turkey?

So, “Where do we go from here?” is perhaps something worth exploring further in the questions, but just a couple of points to touch upon in the two minutes I have left. I worry that there's a good deal to worry about in the future of the relationship. Certainly Turkey will remain a strong partner, and on some level Turkish and US visions about the Middle East and the future of the Middle East really do overlap.

But the fact that there's been such a strong reaction from the Governing Council, and there have been a few other instances – run-ins, let's say, between either US policies in Iraq or the Governing Council's policies and Turkey – has almost started things on a bad footing. It's very important for the US to encourage Iraqis and Iraqi Kurds not to pursue policies and public positions that are seen as openly unfriendly to Turkey, but I don't see that kind of an emphasis in US foreign policy at the moment. I don't see that as a priority. There's too many other things to worry about and certainly there's been no effort in that regard from Paul Bremer in Baghdad, the US administrator there.

The tone of the relationship between Turkey and the new Iraq is very important. There's nothing terribly great to report at the moment, though it's of course too early to say. Further down the road, we're about to run into some very serious and very thorny issues. If you think it was difficult So, far, wait until Iraqis start debating their constitution. The constitutional process is something that greatly interests Turkey, which wants a unified Iraq, [and] would prefer a secular constitution but does not insist on it. It's up to the Iraqis, but it would greatly worry if the result is a very loosely held federation or confederation.

I think that the US is not at the point, because of this sort of loss of focus I think in foreign policy, whereby they see Turkey as a key partner in rebuilding Iraq. This is unfortunate, I'll say, because I think after the war Turks have made a strategic decision that US success in Iraq is in Turkey's interest, long-term and short-term. So, this sets Turkey apart from some other countries in the region, or in Europe. But I don't see any sensitivity to that.

There are bound to be other small crises, or other small tensions coming up. How is the United States, which is after all Turkey's southern neighbor now? How are they going to handle the PKK issue? There's about 5,000 PKK, Kurdish separatist guerillas in northern Iraq, which is under US control. Turks are already demanding, “We expect you to do something about that.” They will continue to demand that. The US government does express intention, but they also note that it's not a military priority.

I'm going to end on this note, on a somewhat more optimistic front, perhaps. Washington will continue and did encourage Turkey's integration with the European Union. Turks have started moving in that direction in a more serious way, with a significant number of reforms. I think Washington will continue to support that. I think in a very general level, this Administration's vision of the Middle East, of pushing the Middle East and the Islamic world towards – the more neo-con idea of pushing the Middle East towards a more democratic framework is something that Turks like. They don't like the military aspect of it, but they like the rhetoric of it. They want to push that.

Recently you had the Turkish president – well, six months ago in Tehran you had the Turkish foreign minister deliver a very critical speech on the need for Muslim countries to get their act together, do their housework – gender equality, transparency, corruption, democratization. This is something that we're increasingly seeing Turkish leaders, including leaders of the AKP, the governing party, bring to an international platform. I think they will continue in this direction, emphasizing the need for democratization. So, there you have a common ground with policymakers here.

Michael Collins Dunn:

Thank you.

I'd like to turn now to Abdul-Reda Assiri from Kuwait, for a Kuwaiti perspective.

Abdul-Reda Assiri:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ladies and gentlemen, it's frankly a great honor to be able to address such a distinguished audience and to attend the first conference or first meeting in America post-9/11. I hope my presentation will be brief and above all humble. Perhaps my paper will not address as such a Kuwaiti perspective but rather a Middle Eastern and Arab, Muslim or a Gulf perspective.

For the last 50 years, America was the Mecca for Arabs, for Middle Easterners. Here we sought freedom, opportunity, and in general perfectionism in all walks of life. America was perceived as the last resort for all agonies of mankind and totalitarian regimes, the defender of the oppressed and forerunner in human achievement and ingenuity, and above all, the haven for those denied their God-given rights in their own lands.

For the last 30-plus years, I used to come to America with enthusiasm and motivation to excel on the professional side. In short, America was to me, as to millions of Arabs and Muslim scholars, a second home. As I was crossing the Atlantic this time, a stream of ideas and fears passed my mind. The propaganda warfare has created an America which was much different from the one I knew. Has the America I admired and cherished changed? Are we in a different era of confrontation? Will I be handcuffed at the port of entry? Fortunately, my fears were unfounded. Here I am, safe and sound and able to address you in Washington, not the capital of America, but the capital of the new world order.

However, the major question remains still unresolved. Is it possible that some 19 lunatics succeeded in their mission of not only striking the Twin Towers in New York City but also the very values this country upheld and cherished? Is there a possibility that the Founding Fathers' dream has diminished in the aftermath of September 11, the day of terror that turned into a nightmare? The 20th century has witnessed the emergence of the United States as the guardian of Freedom, Liberty, and Democracy, as well as scientific achievement. To the majority of Muslims in general and Arabs in particular, America represented the power that might salvage the Middle East from the hegemony of colonial powers. September 11 seems to have shifted the policymakers in Washington to the left of the political spectrum. Needless to say that the public opinion has drastically grown more conservative. In essence, bin Laden fundamentalism seems to be confronted with the ultra- right, Christian fundamentalism.

The conclusion is inescapable. A new era of confrontation between the forces of crusaders versus mujaheddin is rising over the horizon, the manifestation of which is evident in the political terminology used by major policymakers in Washington and of course by the so-called Islamic fundamentalists. The puritan dilemma is created. The American dichotomy at this point in time seems to center about the balance between freedom and anarchy. Facets of this phenomenon may be realized in the case of Guantanamo prisoners, the benign occupation of Iraq, and the double-standard policy applied in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Arab-Israeli conflict seems always to be the cornerstone issue drifting the Muslim world in general away from the United States. It was this issue that compelled a young officer called Gamal Abdel Nasser to abandon his basically Western mentality to join the socialist world. Today, more than any other time, the uneven policy of Washington toward the issue is repeating past mistakes and lingering the agony of misconception and misunderstanding.

In light of all these historical factors involved in the United States-Muslim relationship, one might try to analyze Middle Eastern perceptions of the United States in a balanced manner.

First of all, hatred and hostility toward America is on the rise, simply because active fundamentalist minorities were able to convince the general public that East-West confrontation has been replaced by the emergence of the struggle between civilizations. The new world order, in the light of this misunderstanding, is a concept that emerged under the umbrella of the arrogance of the superpowers and not as a manifestation of the human rights bill. Irrespective of the truth in this view, Islamic radicals were able to present the Western world in general and the United States in particular as the fall of Islam and Islamic values.

Second, the American administration's message was clear: either with or against the United States. In other words, you were with America or counted as an enemy. Just white and black box, nothing in between, in contrast to the basic lesson we were taught in American institutions. In a sense, the approach adopted by the Administration recreated the era of McCarthyism in the American public mind.

Third, the post-Saddam perception is that aggression and hatred toward America characterized the liberation of Iraq. The fear syndrome is reinforced by the misconception that the other Arabs and anti-US regimes are next in line. The ongoing saga of never-ending American demands from Syria, from Iraq, as well as the accusation by congressional members and the media to the Saudi regime, is portrayed as an example of the clouds gathering over the horizon.

Fourth, American obsession with terrorism generated fear among Middle Eastern states that history is being rewritten and geography redrawn, by which anti-American regimes will be placed by American puppets and modeled after its choice.

Fifth, the War against Terrorism has backfired. Instead of eroding terror, it has increased hostilities and Terrorism against the United States and against American interests abroad, as well as against regimes perceived as pro-America. America was seen as the protector and guardian of corrupt and illegitimate regimes.

Sixth, the new century had witnessed the most strained relations between the Islamic world and the United States. The question is not whether the Middle Easterners, Arabs, Muslims and others hate or love America, but why America, the symbol of democracy, liberty and justice to all mankind, is limiting its domain of these values to its citizens, not making it a universal value.

What is needed, ladies and gentlemen, at this juncture is not to follow the politics of inaction but rather to follow the politics of active involvement. If America had listened to the voices of Arab and Middle Eastern irrationalities, then the Saddam regime would have stayed in power and made the region more menacing and troublesome. Iraq would have continued to pose as a destabilizing power. On the other hand, the inconclusive success of war of liberation in Iraq should not turn us to be anti-West and anti-United States. Nonetheless, liberation of Iraq is a reconfiguration of power and politics in the Middle East. Like it or not, that's the case.

Democratic reform is a long-term commitment. The road toward democracy is long, costly, and painful in societies where democratic principles and practices are alien and perhaps not rooted in the society. What we need at this stage is a network of communication, dialogue, interaction among us all – Muslims, Christians, Jews, and others. We need more research, more lectures, more conferences, to explain the true meaning of Islam, the religion of peace, the message of coexistence, and its role in war. We need an enlightened vision of Islamic jurisprudence, carried out by modern, open-minded individuals.

Despite the clashes, ladies and gentlemen, there's still room for a better understanding, a window of opportunity. Let us keep it wide open. We all should play a positive role in our different capacities to narrow the gap of misunderstanding and broaden the meaning and means of cooperation.

In conclusion, we certainly hope to see the political scene of the Middle East change into a universal value of Freedom, Democracy, Tolerance, and Justice. Iraq might serve as a source or sample of new hopes and expectations. That call could not be achieved without sacrifices. The question is, why is the whole world from east to west going forward in their achievement to the so-called “new world order,” whereas we – the Middle Eastern, the Arab, the Muslim – are destined for failure? We certainly need to enhance the scope of societal infrastructure to build a reviving rule to our people and to our infrastructure.

Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen.

Michael Collins Dunn:

Thank you.

Next, Dr. Mustafa El-Feki.

Mustafa El-Feki:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It's also the first visit I have to the States after 9/11. Like my previous colleague, I'll just mention that I was under different illusions about the way I'll be treated, the way I'll be received. I discovered that America is still America.

When His Excellency, our distinguished ambassador in Washington, kindly arranged some meetings for me in the Senate and the Congress and the State Department, I felt that mutual dialogue and discussions and talks always are helpful in making and creating common vision between the Middle Eastern countries and the United States of America. When I received the invitation to participate in this distinguished gathering, I felt of course honored, because I know a lot about the Middle East Institute.

Ladies and gentlemen, I can't see the size of criticism to the American policy in the last few decades as it is now. Let us be frank and open. I'm coming from an area where everybody's asking why the Americans are doing that, do we deserve what's going on? In fact, I'll be more specific and I'll go ahead through my main points because of the limits of time.

If you come to the open war against terror, this is the first item in the open files of the American policy in the Middle East, you will see that there is a general feeling in the Arab-Islamic world as if Muslims are targeted. They may not be true. I myself, I am one of those who are against Islamization of all political items. I feel that religion is a relation between Creation and God. It shouldn't be indulged day and night in all political and life affairs. But they will tell you, why should it in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Palestine, before in Somalia, maybe in Sudan? Why? Always we respond, as intellectuals and as those who are keen to have strategic, mature relations with the States, we say automatically always, don't forget that the Americans also have supported majority Muslims in Kosovo against the orthodox country in Serbia. Then it's not a matter of religion; it's mainly political interests and foreign policies of a superpower.

Islam is taken always in the general vision as if it's a source of violence, which is not the case by all means. Islam is one of the most tolerant religions on earth. You may remember that our Prophet once made a steady income from the Muslim fund to an old Jew, in the days of the Prophet and his followers. Islam is a religion of tolerance. You can't be a good Muslim unless you accept openly Judaism and Christianity. That's why we feel that our religion is hijacked for one reason or another and we are paying a price doubly now, once by terrorism in our region – the country which I'm coming from, I'd like to remind you that we have a long battle against Terrorism. You may remember the Luxor massacre five or six years ago.

Though all these are understood, we can see some figures in the Western circles who are trying to point out to Islam as a source of Terror. This is by all means one of the main defects of the reaction we have against the West in general and the United States in particular. This should be very clearly understood. Islam should be respected, and we should differentiate completely between the behavior of one percent of Muslims and Islam as a religion. Not all Muslims are Taliban. Not all Arabs are bin Laden. This should be very clear to everyone.

There are two theories on finding the reasons of Terror. The American and the Western styles in general are talking about the regimes in the Arab and Muslim countries as responsible of creating the environment for Terrorism by lack of Democracy, the shrinking space of political participation, poverty, the lower level of life for the majority. This may be true. Yes, there is some responsibility on the shoulders of certain regimes in the region. But, on the other side, we have our own interpretation to the reasons of terrorism. We feel that the double-standard policy, the complete American support to the Israelis. We are not against the American-Israeli relationship. We can understand [it], and we are not going to tell a superpower how to shape its policy in one of the regions. But we feel that there is no even-handed policy, and the full support by the Americans for the Israelis are used by the hard-liners, by the extremists, against the Americans and against the moderate trend in the Arab-Muslim world. I'll remind you, Saddam Hussein has used that argument. Bin Laden has used the same argument. That's why we feel any breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli conflict, by positive and firm policy by the Americans in the Arab-Israeli conflict, will be of great help to its image and to us in the different Arab countries.

The second file is the situation in Iraq. I myself, I feel that – and forgive me for that – I feel that the Americans are not aware enough of the psychological factor in dealing with different peoples in the region. Maybe the British were experts in that. The French are experts in North Africa. But the Americans, they don't have enough experience in dealing with peoples in the Middle East. Whenever you start talking about Shi'ites and Sunnis, Kurds and Arabs, in fact you are reviving some reasons of difference which will create problems for the Iraqis for the future, for the relations with Americans. We feel that the situation in Iraq is one of the sources of the real headache to the majority of the Arab states. This is an additional problem we were not expecting. We had enough with the Arab-Israeli conflict, and now the situation in Iraq became another source of troubles and absence of stability in the region.

The last file, which is the most sensitive one, is the repeated talks about political, social, cultural and economic reform. We are not against reform, by all means. Not because it was started by a speech delivered by Colin Powell in mid-December last year; then we'll be reserved and will take an action against. We need reform. I'm not a governmental spokesman: I'm a parliamentarian now. I feel free as an individual intellectual from the Arab World to say whatever I feel. Yes, like other parts of the world, we need reform in different aspects of life, but such reform should emerge within the identity, within the store of civilization we have. You can't impose your own doctrines and ideas on others. By the way, I served within India four years, 25 years ago.

The lesson I have got, and I remember always, is that modernization is not always Westernization. It has to be according to the ideas and initiatives and the style of life and the social traditions people have. You can't just say we need you to do So, and So, and so. That's why there are a lot of rumors in the region that the Americans wanted to change Islam, they wanted to put their fingers in the Qur'an, they want to indulge their pressure on Al-Azhar. Such propaganda is So, destructive and should be dealt with carefully. Yes, we have to work for reform, for democracy, for strengthening civil societies, for human rights – nobody can argue. But these things should be done within the limits of our own identity, our own specialties, our own history and civilization and heritage.

We don't have any problem as such between Americans as a nation and the Arab countries – on the contrary. If I remind you, in Nasser's time, when my country was very close to the former Soviet Union, if you asked scholars who wanted to continue their postgraduate, would you like to go to the States or the Soviet Union, I can assure you 99% will say to the United States of America. There's a sort of admiration and respect to the style of life. It was considered the land of dreams, a nation which is very close to everyone. The Americans are reachable. You can talk to them easily. They are very simple. They don't have the conservative style of the British or the reserved character of the Germans.

They are easygoing on dealings, and also one of the main reasons of the common grounds between the Americans and the Middle Eastern peoples, in particular Arabs, is the effect of religion in this country. Religion has a role in one way or another in the back minds of the Americans – the same role we have in our part of the world. In Egypt, Alexander the Great, when he came to invade Egypt, he was advised by his supporters to go ahead to Amu's Temple and to announce himself as the son of god, just to be close to the heart of Egyptians. Bonaparte has repeated the same thing centuries ago, by even announcing himself as a Muslim and printing his statement in Malta on his way to Egypt. That's why religion is a common ground between the two sides, the American and the Arab side.

The only problem we have with the Americans has nothing to do with the people. Style of life is So, attractive – American cinema, American fast food, American – yes, you know how the attraction for the new generations all over the world. We are living the Pax Americana. I'm not Egypt, just to close my eyes and to say we are against this or with that. Life is life. The world has passed through the Pax Romana in one stage of history. Now we are in the Pax Americana. I'm not against. But whenever you are leading the world, you have more responsibilities. You have to be very careful and very fair. You should have balanced policies. You shouldn't take a side against others. You shouldn't be biased. You have to be fair and firm. This is the responsibility of leadership and this is the only bending point between us and the Americans. We ask our friends, within our strategic and mature relations, to be always fair and balanced on dealings with different issues, in particular the Arab-Israeli conflict. I can assure you from this forum, if the Americans make a positive, fair breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli conflict, considering the Palestinian rights, I can assure you that the situation in Iraq will be relaxed, the War against Terror will be stronger, the general temper in the region will be positive.

This is in brief my ideas, and I'm grateful to you.

Thank you.

Michael Collins Dunn:

Finally, we'll hear from Murhaf Jouejati a Syrian view, but I think also probably some broader comments as well.

Murhaf Jouejati:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

– Not necessarily a Syrian view.

I landed a few months ago in Dulles, one of my several journeys to the Middle East, and when I landed I did not have the expectation that I was going to be handcuffed. Let us hope that I am not at the end of this presentation. Nor will I address Middle Eastern perspectives on US Middle East policy, because I do not want to raise my blood pressure needlessly.

I will talk however about the approach that the US is using vis-à-vis Syria, which as you may expect I think is misguided.

I reach this conclusion by using the EU approach vis-à-vis Syria as a point of reference. I believe the EU approach is more productive. The EU has engaged in a dialogue with Syria for the past few years, especially through its MEDA [European Union’s Mediterranean Assistance - Editor]Program, which started by providing technical support for Syrian industries in order to be able to compete in the world market economy. There was an evolution – they introduced cultural programs So, as to bridge the gaps between Europe and Syria. That evolved into civil society programs in order to strengthen local non-governmental organizations so as to prepare and pave the road for future democratization.

Now, the EU-Syria interaction has not always been easy. There have been issues in which the two have differed and differ still. But as we speak, there is a process going on between Syria and the EU on such issues as human rights and terrorism.

All of this is to say that the EU approach to Syria has used both carrots and sticks. The carrots is that Syria will soon be able to penetrate the EU market; it's going to become an associate member of the EU by the year 2010. The stick is that the agreement with Syria will be suspended or rescinded if there is no progress on such issues as human rights and So, on. The result is that the EU-Syria relationship has been constantly improving.

Now, by contrast, as you know the U.S.-Syrian relationship has deteriorated and deteriorated rapidly. This, I think, is a result of A) our good old American aggressiveness; B) as a result of the Herculean efforts of the pro-Israel lobby in Washington, plus what I call the "yee-haw!" elements within the Administration; and C) I believe as a result of a failed Syrian policy. It is remarkable to me – it is absolutely fascinating how Syria for the past 30 years, for the past three decades under Hafez al-Assad, came close to war with Saddam Hussein's Iraq on numerous occasions and the distance that Syria has crossed to give at least the appearance that it is regretting the Saddam regime – although it does not, this is certainly the appearance it is giving. I think this is evidence of a colossal ineptitude on the part of many Syrian officials in the foreign policy apparatus.

The American approach has no carrots. The US stopped US aid to Syria in 1981. The US includes Syria in a list of states that sponsor terrorism – although Syria's worst critics readily admit that Syria has not been involved in terrorism for at least the past two decades. What the US does have for Syria though is sticks. The clearest manifestation of this is the Syria Accountability Act and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, or that is to say, the imposition of economic and political sanctions against Syria.

Although that is a draft resolution, although the bill is written in English, it has a very distinctly Hebrew accent to it. In the words of Patrick Seale, and I concur with him, this bill is outrageous. It would have been So, much more credible had it been evenhanded. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Eliot Engel, who is the sponsor of this bill, wants for example Syria to end its ties to a number of Palestinian and Lebanese organizations. That leads us into the issue of Terrorism, and I don't need to rehash the fact that Syria and Arab states do not view these organizations as terrorists. And we can turn blue until Washington believes in that and it won't, and vice versa. It's true you are going to have very few Arabs that believe that some of these organizations are terrorist organizations.

What Mr. Engel does not report, of course, is that Syria closed down the offices. What he does not report is that the political violence between Palestinians and Israelis in the Occupied Territories is going to happen whether Syria closes these offices down or not, and that political violence is going to continue until such time as Israel abides finally by UN resolutions, stops its brutality against the Palestinians, withdraws to the 1967 boundaries, and establishes a Palestinian state. It is then that we can expect the end of political violence.

Mr. Engel talks of Terrorism. He does not mention that Syria has been one of the closest partners with the United States in the war against international terrorism, to the point that one senior State Department official declared that Syria saved American lives, this by giving beforehand information to the CIA about an impending operation against the administrative unit of the 5th Fleet in Bahrain. I'm not going to go into a whole list of those things that Syria did to help the United States in the fight against International Terror, but it has been very significant.

Mr. Engel wants Syria to end its occupation in Lebanon. That's all very nice. It would be very much more credible if he mentioned something about Israel's occupation of Arab lands.

Mr. Engel speaks of the Lebanese government as though it were a puppet of the Syrian government. Well, it might be. If the Lebanese government is a puppet of the Syrian government, why does the US recognize it then?

He brings General Michel Aoun to the table to support his bill, forgetting that General Michel Aoun was Saddam Hussein's friend in Lebanon, one who was armed by Saddam Hussein in order to fight the Syrians. That was not said in the bill that Mr. Engel wrote.

Mr. Engel wants Syria to stop the development of short and medium-range ballistic missiles and the end of the development of weapons of mass destruction. Here all I can say is that it is absolutely remarkable, the chutzpah this man has, absolutely remarkable, with Israel next door having something like what, 300 nuclear warheads? These can be not only land-fired, but, we have learned a few days ago, they could be launched from submarines. So, this is quite ironic actually, and it is also ironic that Syria is the country in the Middle East that is demanding that the region be turned into a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. If Israel accepts that, Syria and the rest of the Middle East accept it also.

The gentlewoman from California – and I'm not sure how much she knows about the Middle East – Ms. Pelosi, she supports the imposition of sanctions against Syria, she says because hopefully they'll convey "a stronger message of our seriousness." I fear that Syrians, both government and people, are going to understand the message differently. They are going to understand that the US Congress has hopelessly become an Israeli occupied territory.

Mr. Engel wants Syria to stop its illegal imports of oil from Iraq. Here frankly I am quite confused. Is he referring to Syria's illegal imports of oil from Iraq before the war? If that is the case, why did he not object to illegal imports of Iraqi oil from Turkey and by Jordan? If that is not what he's referring to, if he is talking about the trade today, then he must be talking about a deal that is brokered by General David Petraeus, the commander of the 101st Airborne in Iraq. It is this American commander that is exchanging Iraqi oil for Syrian electricity. Don't believe me, ask him. Ask him about the Syrian cooperation, about the busloads of Syrian and other jihadists that are infiltrating into Iraq. He is apparently of the view that the Syrians are doing, given their limited resources, an admirable job. So, what we get on the ground there is not what we hear here.

Mr. Engel wants Syria to enter into "serious bilateral negotiations with the government of Israel, in order to realize a full and permanent peace." Hello? Syria is calling for the resumption of peace talks with Israel based on UN Security Council resolutions, based on the Madrid terms of reference. Syria accepted the Saudi [Crown Prince Abdullah] Plan, So, did all the other Arab states. It is Israel that does not want to resume the talks with Syria. Here, what is frustrating is that Syria is damned if it does and damned if it doesn't. When it calls for the peace process, it is accused by pro-Israeli elements in Washington that Syria wants the peace process not for peace itself but for the process. Go figure.

US pressure against Syria is not going to alter Syria's behavior the way Washington wishes. When Syria feels external pressure, it usually runs in the other direction. This has been the case as a result of the U.S.-Israeli strategic alliance in the early 1980s. This is what pushed Damascus into the arms of the Soviet Union, not any ideological affinity. What pushed Syria closer to Iraq, despite three decades of enmity, was the Turkish-Israeli strategic alliance of 1996. US pressure now, I fear, has already had negative effects. President Assad, in his recent cabinet reshuffle, did not put the cabinet that he wanted for fear of being perceived as bowing to US pressure. I'm only going to whet your appetite. I'm not going to talk more about this, because I would like you very much to read my upcoming article on the Middle East Institute website, but all this is to say that US pressure is unwittingly uniting new guard and old guard in the Syrian regime, and all this at the expense of reforms.

Sanctions are very good if they punish the culprits, and in this case I assume it is the Syrian government. The problem is they don't. By prohibiting the export of US products, as Mr. Engel wants, by prohibiting the export of US products and prohibiting US businesses from investing or operating in Syria, this is going to hurt US businesses. The United States exports to Syria a figure somewhere in the area of $300 million, which is not a whole lot of money but it is certainly enough to keep food on the table of hundreds of working American families.

Finally, Mr. Engel wants to reduce US diplomatic contacts with Syria, but, in the end, if that happens, it undermines the Administration's ability to carry out foreign policy. Here Syria is a major player, and the US does need Syria's cooperation on many regional issues.

All in all, ladies and gentlemen, I'm determined that the Syria Accountability Act is a “bum rap,” to use the words of the first President Bush, against Syria. The only item I can identify with, and here it's not in the bill but it is in the discussion among the representatives, is the need for Syria to free all political prisoners. I absolutely concur with that.

My conclusion is that imposing sanctions against Syria might make the "yee-haw!" elements of the Administration feel good, but it's not going to advance the US national interest. It is unbalanced. It is unproductive. Our policy of confrontation will not reap any benefits, and instead we must employ a policy of dialogue – not appeasement, but dialogue. As we hold the stick in one hand, we must also carry a carrot. The good news in all this is that it's not too late to stop the bill. The House passed the bill but the Senate has not yet voted for it.

So, do call your senators to oppose the Syria Accountability Act.

Thank you.