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The last years of the 20th Century and first five years of the 21st witnessed Libya’s efforts to break free from international sanctions and end its relative isolation from the rest of the world. The United Nations, United States and other members of the global community responded by step-by-step measures intended to reward Libyan behavior and take advantage of both the possibilities for resumed economic ties and new forms of security cooperation. We also see halting and still very inadequate Libyan economic reforms intended to deal with popular discontent and to attract outside investment and other business opportunities.

Political reforms are even more tentative and are meeting resistance from Libyan-vested interests whose influence grew relative to the rest of Libyan society during the preceding decades of ideological turmoil. Reformers have emerged but face determined opposition by those who have benefited from regime favoritism, based both on particular tribal identities and loyal adherence to the shifting dogmas of Libya’s leader, Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi.

The highly personal and unpredictable but dominating leadership of Qadhafi reflect his ambivalence about new directions in foreign policy, economic reforms and, especially, steps to introduce political reforms. Clearly dissatisfied with Libya’s isolation and lack of international influence, Qadhafi has shifted dramatically from identification with the Arab and Muslim worlds to espousal of the Libyan role in Africa as being Libya’s primary international vocation. Similarly, he initiated openings to the United States and key European governments that were both pragmatic and visionary. He foreswore both support for terrorism and efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction. Internally, he vacillated between encouragement of reforms and opposition to the development of institutions that would not be subject to his firm control. By 2005, the pace of positive change was accelerating but its duration was still uncertain.

Various members of the international community have reacted to shifts in Libyan policies in different ways. The U.K. normalized its relations quite rapidly in the years after Libya turned over the accused agents in 1999. Together with other West European governments, it has held summit meetings with Qadhafi. The U.S. has moved more slowly, but the direction is clear. U.S. and Libyan diplomats opened offices in Tripoli and Washington respectively in 2004. In the same year, the U.S. lifted restrictions on the travel of Americans to Libya and ended most economic sanctions. Libya remains on the US list of state sponsors of terrorism, a designation that imposes sanctions on dual use and civil aviation equipment.

In early 2005 diplomatic relations are still below the full ambassadorial level, and lack of visa issuance in Washington and Tripoli is still a major obstacle to travel by both Libyans and Americans.

Libya’s relations with Arab countries have deteriorated in recent years. Libyan disenchantment with Arab brotherhood intensified during the period of UN sanctions, which Arab governments generally observed. Libya’s relations have been difficult with several Arab states, but they reached a new low with Saudi Arabia after an exchange of insults between Qadhafi and Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah at an Arab League meeting in March 2003. Subsequently, there were arrests in Saudi Arabia of alleged Libyan intelligence officers promoting the assassination of Abdullah. In a parallel development, the United States arrested a Muslim-American activist who was convicted in July 2004 of being part of the plot and who reportedly linked it directly to Qadhafi.

African countries have proven to be somewhat more receptive to Libyan efforts to improve relations, but the record is mixed. In June 1999, Qadhafi proposed that they form a United States of Africa. He backed up the notion with Libyan checkbook diplomacy in the form of both economic aid and selective military transfers. Most African governments remain wary, but a less ambitious African Union officially came into being in July 2002 with Libyan promises of support.

The suspension of UN sanctions in 1999 and their formal end in 2003 marked key psychological turning points for Libya and its people. The rapid improvement of relations with European nations and the cautious but promising steps with the U.S. have also encouraged Libyans to believe that they are once again welcome participants in the global community. Higher oil prices in recent years and the considerable commercial interest that international firms are expressing have enhanced the optimistic atmosphere.

Although most West European governments observed the UN sanctions, they avoided applying unilateral sanctions or taking other measures the U.S. advocated to confront Libya. The economies of Libya and many European countries, most specifically Italy, are complementary. Libya’s emotional empathy with Africa, the Arab world and Muslim countries in general is not matched by the high degree of mutual economic interests it shares with Europe. In the long view of history, the Mediterranean basin has often been a historical unit with strong cultural and economic ties and a common destiny.

US interests in Libya are far less commercial and more political in nature. While particular US companies may benefit greatly by the improvement of US-Libyan relations, it is sufficient for US strategic concerns that Libyan energy resources be integrated into the global economy and that Libyan wealth be used in constructive ways. The tragic events of September 2001 injected a new and promising element into what had been a slow moving and secretive dialogue. Qadhafi was among the first Muslim leaders to express public sympathy for the United States. Through intelligence channels, the two governments exchanged information on radical Islamist groups that might threaten both the U.S. and the Qadhafi regime. In its overall international stance, the U.S. needed to demonstrate that there were alternatives to the measures used against the governments of Afghanistan and Iraq. The example of Libya appeared to provide a safer and less costly paradigm for dealing with states that were either on the U.S. terrorism list or viewed as seeking weapons of mass destruction. Libya was both, and both governments took initiatives to turn this potential into reality.

At home, one threat to Qadhafi’s rule has been conspiracies within his own military by officers that share the discontent of civilian technocrats with the failure of Qadhafi’s political system to satisfy the economic and social needs of the Libyan people. Dissident forces and rivals attempted several coups during the 1980s and 1990s, but so far Qadhafi appears to have mastered the skills necessary to detect and preempt any plots by military officers who might try to repeat his success of 1969.

Radical Islamist groups could pose a greater threat to Qadhafi. Devout Muslims resent some of his policies, and he was one of the first Muslim leaders to identify Usama bin Laden and Al Qaeda as threats to his regime. In 1995, Libyan nationals associated with Bin Laden in Aghanistan formed the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, committed to Qadhafi’s overthrow. In December 2004, the U.S. designated the Group as a terrorist organization, proving that the global war on terror can directly benefit the Libyan government.

Maintaining internal stability will depend in great part on the production and use of oil revenues to satisfy the needs of the Libyan people. It seems probable that Libyan oil and gas revenues will increase dramatically in future decades. What is less certain is that internal economic reforms will take hold. They are opposed by a bloated public bureaucracy and the ideologues spawned by Qadhafi’s revolutionary theories of decades past. For now, at least, Qadhafi seems prepared to support the reformers at the helm of the current government.

Mu’ammar Qadhafi faces no obvious rival and is still not old by the standards of Arab world leadership. Clear rules for succession to his role as head of state do not exist, and Qadhafi’s role as charismatic leader of the revolution would probably disappear with his departure from the scene. Qadhafi has demonstrated for nearly four decades that he has the political skill to remain in power.

We are at a point where the United States has both actual and potential influence, which we must either use or lose. If we stand by and wait for Libya to become an ideal partner for US political and economic relations, we will become less and less relevant to Libya’s future. Our potential influence would dry up like a sudden rain in the desert sand. Libya would continue to rapidly improve ties with Western European countries and other commercial competitors of the U.S. That might not be a disaster, but the sad truth is that the governments of most other countries are unlikely to make the same efforts we would to hold Libya to its commitments for proper international behavior. Similarly, the United States is far more likely than others to press for economic and political reforms that would greatly benefit the Libyan people.