Related Resources

US policies toward Iraq over the years have provided examples of how to use force and diplomacy in international conflicts. They also provide examples of the price that is paid when diplomatic tools are neglected. In the crisis following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the US used its diplomatic leverage to build an international coalition, including Turkey, Egypt and Syria, as well as the Arab Gulf states and NATO allies. An even broader coalition supported the successful effort to sanction and isolate Iraq for its aggression. Under the leadership of the first President Bush, the US also operated under a strong legal umbrella of UN resolutions and legitimacy. By contrast, in 2003 the US proceeded in a largely unilateral way and focused on the use of military force rather than a strategy which coordinated the diplomatic, economic, intelligence and military tools of statecraft.

For the region and for the US, it is hard to see much good, if any, coming out of the Iraq tragedy. Rather than seeking a facile solution, we need a new US strategy for a long struggle to manage the fallout from the decision to launch the 2003 invasion and from its bungled aftermath. A Turkish proverb says, “If a mad man throws a stone into a well, 40 wise men would find it hard to get the stone out of the well.” It has become too easy to criticize the Bush administration. I have been a public critic of the US government’s strategy for Iraq and of its management of the crisis of Iraq over the past five years. Critics of the Bush administration policies, however, must acknowledge that there are no fail-safe parachutes. Painful though it is, we cannot simply walk away from Iraq.

Some have urged an abrupt withdrawal of US military forces from Iraq, and a substantial part of the Democratic Party political base has pushed candidates to take such a position. Certainly, we have to do what is right for US interests. This means we should not continue a policy intended to salvage an ill-considered strategy of the Bush administration. When, a year ago, President Bush rejected the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group and instead surged our military capacity, he made a historic gamble that buying time for Iraqi political leaders to achieve good governance and national political reconciliation would happen if US forces succeeded in improving security on the ground in Iraq. This was a misjudgment of Iraqi political psychology. Better to have begun a very gradual reduction of US combat forces as a concrete way to focus Iraqi leaders on the urgency of political accommodation.

Most security metrics indicate an improvement in security by the end of 2007, but the best strategic minds, including General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker, have made clear that the security gains which we have brought about at great cost will be ephemeral unless they lead to national reconciliation. There are very few signs that this is likely to happen. Indeed, the most surprising improvement, greater security in the Sunni tribal Anbar governorate, has been achieved by an alliance of convenience between the US and local forces against Al-Qaeda.

Unfortunately, those local forces and the Shi’a and Kurdish dominated central government are no closer to reconciliation, and little progress has been made in integrating Sunni Arab fighters into the Iraqi army or police. Pessimists believe the outcome will be Sunni militias prepared to do battle with the central government and its partners, the Kurdish and Shi’a militias. In other words, a full-fledged civil war may follow in the wake of withdrawals of US forces from key areas of mixed population, including the Baghdad area.

But vital US interests in Iraq won’t go away just because of bad judgments in the past. Last summer, I was part of a panel of experts involved in the Iraq Study Group that had a series of meetings to define what interests were truly important enough to justify a continued, if radically changed and downsized, US military involvement in Iraq. Our conclusions were summed up in the following points:

1. Prevent Iraq from becoming a haven or platform for international
   terrorists.

2. Restore US credibility, prestige and capacity to act worldwide, something
   that cannot be done when we are over committed to a losing venture in Iraq.

3. Improve regional stability, seriously threatened by Iraqi developments
   since 2003.

4. Limit and redirect Iranian influence, noting that Iran has been the one
   state that has gained in prestige in Iraq and in the region, while
   becoming more, not less secure.

5. Maintain an independent Iraq as a single state, an outcome sought by all
   of Iraq’s neighbors, especially including our NATO ally Turkey, and with
   the possible exception of Iran. This does not exclude a high degree of
   decentralization and federalism.

No US President, Republican or Democrat, can ignore these national security interests.

Iraq is already lost, if losing is defined as not achieving “victory”. That triumphalist rhetoric is rapidly disappearing. But there are other ways to measure success, such as downsizing and transforming our presence in Iraq and doing so in a manner that does not make a very bad situation worse – that does not transform a quagmire into a sinkhole for any efforts of regional stabilization, counter terrorism and energy security. The giddy predictions in 2003 of the Bush administration, neo-cons and aggressive Wilsonians were based on illusions that the US was the new Rome and could transform Iraq into a version of Norway in the Middle East with a minimum of sacrifice. Equally illusory is the notion that there is an obvious way out.

Our current strategy and presence in Iraq is not sustainable for much longer, either in Iraqi political terms or in US political terms. Like it or not, long term interests are at stake that US political leaders and concerned Americans must consider.

Iraq could become a safe haven for terrorists, as happened in Afghanistan at the end of the Cold War when we walked away from that country. But Iraq would be a failed state with vast stores of really nasty weapons and people trained to use them, an educated and energetic populace, massive economic potential, a central location and well-founded grievances against the U.S. Or, instead of a failed state, Iraq or large parts of Iraq could fall under hegemony of some of the more hostile elements in Iran.

While humanitarian disasters in Iraq – including ethnic cleansing and massive dislocations of refugees – primarily affect Iraqis now, continuation of this process threatens Iraq’s neighbors, including Turkey and Arab countries with which we share extensive economic and political interests.

The hard goal is to stabilize Iraq in a regional context which includes states like Iran and Syria, where our relations are either negligible or awful, and other states like Saudi Arabia and Egypt and Pakistan, which have autocratic regimes and cultures which many Americans find distasteful.

With a view of starting the process of adjusting US strategy to such realities, we should have modest expectations. “Victory in Iraq” is a slogan, not a strategy, and it only makes it harder for the American public to accept the harsh realities of partial success at a high cost. Moreover, the tone of unreality and triumphalism alienates both the international community, Iraqis and the regional allies we need to make any strategy successful.

Most understand that the intoxicating visions of regional transformation and other goals for our Iraq adventure are unattainable. But there is a substitute for victory. It is noteworthy that the Administration has already been using more realistic and less messianic metrics for success. Instead of talking about democratic and free market transformation, Secretary of State Rice speaks of the need to stabilize Iraq and the dangers that Iraq’s destabilization will destabilize the rest of the region. Instead of talking about peace in Iraq and a vibrant civil society, President Bush talks of reducing inter-sectarian violence in Iraq to manageable levels. This “mission crawl back” has been driven by facts on the ground, but it has yet to be articulated by the Bush administration in a consistent and convincing way.

This was part of what the Iraq Study Group headed by James Baker and Lee Hamilton tried to do. The ISG recommendations of December 2006 are reflected in much of the current Congressional and presidential campaign debate in the United States. Reducing the size and changing the nature of the US military presence by gradually disengaging from combat operations against Iraqis is one part. A second part would be maintaining a robust political and economic engagement in partnership with the international community. International measures would give a priority to stability, rather than democracy, and they would focus on containing both the level and the spread of violence while dealing with the human tragedies and economic burdens of refugee flows both within Iraq and across its borders.

That may not sound heroic, but changing the character and size of our military involvement in a manner that does not make a bad situation much worse will be a huge challenge requiring both continuing sacrifices by the US military and skilled diplomacy. It will take strong Presidential leadership working with leaders in both parties of the Congress to sell this to the American people and to make it clear to Iraqis, their neighbors and other key countries that we mean it. Regional stability and efforts to protect ourselves from the very real danger of non-state terrorists are already threatened. We must find overlapping interests, even with traditional adversaries, and build cooperation on this basis rather than saber rattling.

The violence in Iraq is already having a negative impact on several of its neighbors. At a time when Turkey is going through domestic debates on issues involving its Kurdish citizens and being strongly criticized by many Europeans, it must deal with the cross border terrorism of the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, from the safe haven which the mountains of northern Iraq and the politics of Iraq provide. The continuing turmoil in Iraq also limits the possibilities of economic development in southeastern Turkey. The looming specter of ethnic cleansing in Kirkuk is another understandable concern. The threats to political stability and economic well-being of every one of Iraq’s neighbors constitute areas of overlapping interests that can only be addressed through skillful diplomacy supported by the highest level of their governments, the US and other influential governments outside of the immediate region.

In the wake of the recent US-Turkish summit, we have finally begun providing Turkish forces with real time intelligence to enable them to target bases and lines of communication inside Iraq that the PKK has used for launching cross border attacks into Turkey. The wonder is that it took us so many years to reach such an arrangement, years in which relations between two allies deteriorated severely.

Such measures cannot be taken unilaterally or with only our closest friends. If we have any chance of minimizing the spillover of conflict, it must be in a genuine multilateral context open to all of Iraq’s neighbors, along with major states and international organizations.

The time when the US might have led such an effort has long passed. Here is the paradox. Few will participate in such efforts if the US is in full control of them and sets the agenda. But no international efforts can succeed without strong US backing. First in Baghdad, at the ambassadorial level and then at the foreign minister level conference in Sharm esh-Shaikh, the US government took the first steps. Given the initial rejection by President Bush of such proposals by the Iraq Study Group it represented remarkable progress in just a few months. In fact, it was progress driven by a combination of pressure in Washington on the Bush administration from senior Republicans in the Congress and pressure in the region from the government of Iraq, as well as the neighbors friendly to the United States. All of us are facing truly catastrophic developments if we do not swallow our pride and overcome outdated policies.

Indeed, the end game the United States must learn to tolerate will not leave the US as the dominant foreign presence. This will disappoint proponents of a 21st century American version of the Roman Empire. But it could be lots worse. We must try to avoid a scenario whereby Iraq’s implosion sets off a regional power struggle in which the dominant victor is our adversary and losers become our dependent clients. If we continue striving for regional primacy, we may forfeit the chance for equal treatment and future respect. The US government should aim to be part of a truly regional diplomacy where we collaborate with our closest allies and friends in the region to maximize our collective leverage at the conference table. Only in this way can we bolster an Iraqi government struggling to demonstrate its legitimacy and, eventually, to demonstrate its responsibility.

Relations between Tehran and Washington have dramatically worsened since we spurned the Iranian offer of an across the board dialogue in 2003. Tehran doubtless fears dilution of its increasing influence in Baghdad, and some factions in Iran objected to being part of meetings with the Great Satan. Wisely, we let the Iranians sort that out, and the Iraqis prevailed upon Foreign Minister Motaki to come to the meeting at Sharm esh-Shaikh.

Relations between Damascus and Washington have deteriorated sharply since the early 1990s. While trying not to seem too eager, the Syrian government clearly welcomes the chance to show it can play a useful role in regional stability.

We should have no illusions. Outside actors are not likely to be a major driver of either violence or the prospects for stability because of the self-sustaining character of Iraq’s internal sectarian dynamics. The governments in Tehran and Damascus do not have clean hands regarding the violence. But at the end of the day, neither Iran nor Syria wants a failed state or outlaw region on their borders, providing a safe haven for terrorists and setting off a new tidal wave of refugees. Both governments seek indications that the US has priorities other than regime change in mind for them. For Syria in particular, an implosion in Iraq leading to a failed state is an existential threat. As for the other neighbors, they need the assurance they will not be abandoned to deal alone with the consequences of Iraq’s disintegration, a new Muslim civil war and increasing Iranian power.

What is novel about the regional meetings is that they required an unaccustomed degree of modesty for the United States. We followed the lead of others after consulting with our friends. It is hard to see a major downside to offering both Iran and Syria a chance to be part of the solution rather than it being assumed that they would always and inevitably contribute to Iraq’s problems. Diplomatic dialogue is not a seal of approval for current or past policies. Rather, it is a tool for engaging both friends and adversaries in finding areas where our interests overlap. Beyond damage control and containment, a positive evolution of the situation in Iraq would require mutually reinforcing actions by Iraq’s neighbors and other states in support of decisions we hope the sovereign government of Iraq would be taking.

For the near term, the US can deploy great military power in Iraq and elsewhere in the region. But it has never been clearer that military power outside of a strong diplomatic context is wholly inadequate. Moreover, it has been an unpopular war at home and abroad. As a result of this, coupled with years of neglect of the Arab-Israel peace process, our soft power is much less than it was in 2003. As our military and economic inputs start to decline, we need to take up the slack with subtle, daring and effective diplomacy throughout the region. Modesty will have great merit in the coming phase of efforts to stabilize Iraq and stop the spread of violence and suffering. We must be present at the creation of this new international framework for it to have credibility, but it would be better if we shared the stage with others.

Arguing over whether to use force or diplomacy in dealing with adversaries is usually a false dichotomy. During the cold war, NATO and the Warsaw Pact had the means to annihilate one another. Yet we maintained full diplomatic relations and even had summit meetings. This did not mean the US approved of the evil empire of the Soviet Union. But history shows that the use of diplomacy avoided terrible outcomes from our long struggle.

At the present juncture, I am glad that we have military forces available in this critical region and only wish that they had not been squandered in Iraq at a time when we deployed them without adequate planning and consultation with our strategic partners regarding the non-military factors that were so critical to the outcome. There is no contradiction between the use of diplomacy and military force. The two work best in tandem.

Let me close by quoting from both an American Congressman and a Chinese strategist. The American is Tom Lantos, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Speaking in a Congressional debate about Iraq, he said: "This country needs to concentrate more on involving regional powers in stabilizing Iraq and assisting with its reconstruction. The Administration has given diplomacy short shrift in its dealings with the situation in Iraq from the start. And while you cannot unscramble an omelet, there are better ways to clean up this mess than throwing more of the same ingredients into it." The ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tsu also said it well: “Military force is most impressive when you do not have to use it.”