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The US stumbled into a quagmire in Iraq. National security-based arguments eventually failed the test of careful intelligence analysis, but they seemed plausible to many honorable American political leaders and foreign policy experts in 2003. Less honorably, ideologues intoxicated by delusions of imperial grandeur manipulated claims by self-interested émigré politicians and their US publicists. They hyped the alleged need for urgent action, oversold the benefits of forcible regime change, and minimized the requirements for resources and planning.

Without excusing the shortcomings of strategic thinking and policy implementation that bogged us down in the Iraqi quagmire, responsible statecraft requires critics of the Bush Administration to acknowledge that the way we leave Iraq could make matters worse — worse for Iraqis and laden with future threats to vital US interests and with even greater demands on US resources. In short, a quagmire could become a sinkhole for a battered nation struggling to regain its footing, and for US efforts to defend itself against international terrorism and proliferation of really bad weapons.

There are no silver bullets or fail-safe parachutes. We only mislead Iraqis and ourselves by placing too much weight on timetables and milestones. The political leaders of the Bush Administration may be slowly learning this reality, long argued by career experts in the military services, intelligence agencies, and State Department. Critics of the administration should also avoid the trap of easy answers.

In retrospect, the litany of events that were supposed to bring victory in Iraq is a cruel joke. Overthrow Saddam Hussein, airlift Ahmed Chalabi to Nasiriya, install him in Baghdad, capture Saddam, dismantle the Iraqi army, stigmatize Baath Party members, form an Iraqi government, turn sovereignty over to that government, hold elections, pacify Falluja, pass the constitution in a popular referendum, etc. The next steps that will save Iraq and get us out are the elimination of Abu Musab Zarqawi and the election of a permanent National Assembly in December. The former would be marginally helpful, but the election might actually set back the chances for meaningful political reconciliation. More about that later.

The road out of Iraq begins by shedding our illusions.

The US should embrace modest but achievable expectations for Iraq. An abrupt end to the US military presence would probably lead to an upsurge of violence among Iraqis and offer new opportunities for terrorists, but this does not excuse the absence of a new strategy for orderly disengagement. Viewed another way, a realistic policy needs redlines for dangerous Iraqi behavior — a distinction from Iraqi behavior that is merely disappointing and annoying. The time has come for damage control and a gradual, painful reduction of the overextended and under-resourced US adventure into the politics of Iraq.

Two dangers confront us:

· First: Iraq may become a failed state, comparable to Afghanistan following the withdrawal of Soviet forces. As such, it would offer safe havens to international terrorist groups and a vast pool of embittered and desperate recruits from among the Iraqi population. The key differences from Afghanistan, however, would be Iraq’s far more critical location married to its superior resources of potential wealth, educated persons, and knowledge of advanced weaponry. A government vacuum would also have a profound and destabilizing effect on other states in the Middle East, including key US strategic partners.

· Second: the dominant political order in Iraq may be subject to overbearing influence from Iran that would be hostile to US interests. Iraqis, including the majority Shia population, tend to be highly nationalistic. Under circumstances of minimal stability and prosperity, they would strongly resist Iranian hegemony. However, faced with a committed insurgency, the potential secession of Kurdistan, and an abrupt withdrawal of US forces, the demands of survival would greatly increase the influence of Tehran. Militia forces trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and working together with vulnerable Iraqi government officials would be under great pressure to accept Iranian support with strings attached. One cannot deny that Iran has understandable concerns regarding Iraq’s future. US policy should help structure a political environment in which the security interests of all of Iraq’s neighbors would be taken into account in return for the acceptance by Iran and other regional states of the obligation to respect Iraqi sovereignty and independence.

Two goals are essential:

· First: Iraqi cooperation in the war against terrorists bent on violence against Americans and friendly governments in the region. Iraq was a theoretical safe haven for such terrorists before we invaded. Now it is much more likely to become one if a working relationship between governments in Washington and Baghdad were to collapse or, worse, if Iraq were to continue its slide into the failed state category.

· Second: Strict Iraqi adherence to UN resolutions prohibiting future efforts to reconstitute weapons of mass destruction or long-range missile programs. This would also be at or near the top of the goals of Iran and Iraq’s other neighbors.

If the new Iraqi political order failed to cooperate on those two points, they would have crossed redlines that I believe would be intolerable for the Congress or for any US administration. These are not matters for partisan controversy. They are fundamental to our national security.

There are two other objectives, vitally necessary for Iraqis, which would help sustain an Iraqi government that could deliver on the two primary American goals related to our national security.

The first of these second tier objectives is stabilization of Iraq under an Iraqi leadership, in order to ensure that it not become a breeding ground for a new generation of terrorist groups and a center for the recruitment of desperate and bitter young people. The results of the December 15 Iraqi election could be positive if it leads to consensus building and bargaining among Iraqi factions within a framework influenced by the constitution and the subsequent elections, but not in isolation from Iraqi political realities. There is a huge danger of Iraqi politics becoming a zero-sum game, leading to an eventual civil war as outside forces withdraw. A strict adherence to majority rule leads inevitably in that direction. With time and a modicum of personal security, Iraqis are capable of the skillful compromises that would drain away support for the continued insurgency. Hopefully, the elected Iraqi leaders will show restraint and be capable negotiators, but they need both support and pressure from the United States and other members of the international community. Failure of these efforts would lead to Iraq either falling under a new tyranny or becoming a failed state. In the latter case, the potential for an Iraqi civil war, massive bloodshed, ethnic cleansing, and regional destabilization introduces the prospect of human suffering far beyond what we have seen.

Ambassador Khalilizad and Secretary Rice deserve credit for persuading Iraq’s elected leaders to consider constitutional amendments, and to permit entry into Iraq’s democratic life of former Baath Party members not implicated in specific crimes. The process of developing a constitution can be a means for hammering out a consensus among disparate groups. A negotiated struggle for power can avoid a bloody struggle for power. But meaningful negotiations leading to a consensus that will survive in Iraq’s shattered political life are likely to be prolonged.

This was true among the 13 newly independent colonies of our own country. From the time we declared our independence in 1776, it took us nine years to come up with a constitution that enabled us to begin an orderly federal union. In so doing, we deferred lots of problems — slavery and women's rights to name just two. It took another 80 years and one of the world's bloodiest civil wars to come to a conclusion about the balance between the powers of the central government and the individual states. It takes real arrogance for Americans to lecture Iraqis on how to do this terribly difficult job in a tolerable manner. We pressured the Iraqis to meet a timetable for the constitution that enabled us to declare another victorious milestone. The perception of many Iraqis that US government views about the constitution and the timetable were dictated by US domestic politics is poisonous. It goes along with the notion, imbedded in the rhetoric of President Bush and others, that by fighting terrorism in Iraq we don’t have to fight it here in the US. This sounds good in Peoria, but it strikes a sour note in Baghdad.

The Transitional Administrative Law allowed for a six-month extension of the constitution drafting process. Fifteen Sunni Arab representatives had been added to the elected Shia Arab and Kurdish representatives in a commendable effort to get a consensus. The Sunnis negotiated badly, but it was an act of great courage for them to participate. Two of them were killed, so the request of the remaining 13 for more time was not frivolous. Moreover, several of the substantive issues — including the ease with which Iraq’s majority Shia provinces could effectively secede from a united Iraq — should be a concern to us as well. Rather than continue the effort to reach consensus, Iraq’s Kurdish and dominant Shia religious leaders imposed a draft constitution over the objections of most Sunni Arab and secular Shia leaders.

One outcome of the referendum was an even more embittered Sunni Arab community, who voted heavily against the constitution. Many of the Sunni Arabs believe that their views are disregarded by a coalition of the two dominant Kurdish parties and the three dominant Shia religions parties. Two of the latter are viewed, not without reason, as being under Iranian influence. This did not provide a political framework for military efforts to end the insurgency.

The second objective necessary to sustain the new Iraqi government is economic reconstruction that generates employment, delivers basic services, and puts Iraqi oil production on a sound basis for gradual growth. During the first year of the occupation, the US used Iraqi funds for major infrastructure projects, usually awarding contracts to American firms and creating few Iraqi jobs. Now that we are moving the over $18 billion US aid program into the pipeline, we need to do better. Regrettably, the lack of basic security and a culture of corruption, both on the part of some Iraqi officials and some American contractors, diminish what could be a demonstration of US generosity and concern for the basic needs of the Iraqi people. The US has encouraged other countries to form an economic consortium to share the burden of Iraq’s economic reconstruction. But we have been unwilling to merge our own aid program with a broad international effort, just as we have unsuccessfully tried to monopolize the foreign role in Iraq’s political process.

There is a chance that Iraq can still be stabilized. But without a broad international consensus, US diplomatic and economic influence will be inadequate to help Iraqis with this task. To the diminishing extent that Iraqis will tolerate the role in Iraqi politics of a prominent foreign diplomat, it would be better if that person were of another nationality. US leadership from behind the scenes would be more acceptable to Iraqis.

Let me suggest an agenda for that leadership in terms of proposals for a responsible disengagement from Iraq:

· Work with either the United Nations or an ad hoc international coalition to set up an Iraqi contact group composed of Iraq’s neighbors and major outside governments prepared to commit themselves to supporting Iraq’s territorial integrity and economic reconstruction. To be truly meaningful, such a group must include Iran and Syria, and the US must be prepared to meet with their representatives in this context on a basis of mutual respect.

· The contact group should name a respected non-American figure to offer international good offices to Iraqi political leaders. This would support the development of a more inclusive constitutional process and efforts to bring dissident Iraqi groups prepared to renounce the resort to violence into national institutions.

· At the next conference to encourage donors to Iraq’s economic reconstruction, the US should offer to bring its own assistance program into a multilateral planning process as incentive for greater efforts by other donors.

· Enter into urgent discussions with the Iraqi government to establish benchmarks for the gradual disengagement of US and other foreign military units from the policing of Iraqi cities and major lines of transportation, as well as the gradual reduction of overall force levels.

· Agree with the Iraqi government on arrangements for the period in which residual US forces might be requested by the Iraqis to provide training, logistics, air cover, and backup to Iraqi forces attempting to regain control over Iraq’s borders, and to deal with armed insurgent groups.

· Make clear in private and in public that the intention of the US is not to maintain forces in Iraq beyond minimal and mutually agreed levels. At the same time, we will not engage in a precipitous withdrawal that would jeopardize Iraq’s own efforts to assure their national security. We will not establish artificial deadlines.

Encourage Iraq to seek the assistance of other governments, especially from the NATO alliance, in providing military training and assistance. To the extent that sovereign Iraqi decisions are compatible with our own interests, we should encourage governments to respond generously to Iraqi security needs.