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This is a dangerous moment for everyone in the Gulf region. Arguably, the deteriorating situation in Iraq and the growing assertiveness of Iran combine to produce dangers barely envisioned in 1979 or 1990. The mistakes made by the US in Iraq are generally rather widely recognized now, but the question of how the US can disengage without creating an even worse situation is a real one, a challenge not only for the US, but for the states of the region as well.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have, since even before the creation of the GCC in 1981, had front-row seats for the continuing series of dramatic events around the upper Gulf: the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Iran-Iraq war, and the Kuwaiti re-flagging confrontation dominating the 1980s; the invasion of Kuwait and Operation Desert Storm in 1990-1991; the implementation of the no-fly zones and the long US confrontation with Iraq throughout the 1990s, and of course, since 2003, the war in Iraq. The continuing confrontations in the Upper Gulf have served, first to spur the creation, and subsequently to cement the determination, of the GCC to be an effective cooperative regional organization. But after a quarter century, not only is the Gulf still a dangerous place, but with the deterioration of the situation in Iraq and the ongoing confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program, it is arguably a more dangerous one than ever. Ken Katzman will be discussing the Iranian situation and the GCC. I’m going to discuss Iraq.

A week before the midterm elections, Iraq is of course something of a lightning rod in Washington. But with the Administration itself abandoning its “Stay the course” rhetoric, it is clear that everyone is looking for some way to defuse a deteriorating security situation, whether one calls it a civil war or something else.

Let me suggest several areas in which the situation in Iraq is cause for concern for the states of the GCC:

1) the danger of the spread of sectarian violence; 2) concerns over major geopolitical shifts which might result from either a breakup of Iraq or domination of an Iraqi government by Shi‘ite religious groups, including concern over the weakening of US influence in the Gulf and the region generally; and 3) concern over the increasing appeal of radical jihadi Islamist ideology as a counterweight to the US presence.

First, concern over the spread of the sectarian violence from Iraq to neighboring states. I’ve always been reluctant to draw too many parallels between Iraq and Vietnam. There are real differences: no rival major superpower, no jungle cover, no sanctuary provided by neighboring states. And, of course, the major difference that in Vietnam it was a failed Secretary of Defense who was made President of the World Bank, while in Iraq it was only a failed Deputy Secretary of Defense who was made President of the World Bank. My point here, though, is that just as the “domino theory” was an oversimplification but not completely invalid in Vietnam (some dominoes fell in Southeast Asia, and others fell from Afghanistan to Angola to Nicaragua in the wake of Vietnam), so too concerns about spreading sectarian violence may be overwrought, but not completely beyond the realm of possibility.

The Shi‘ite-Sunni sectarian warfare which has erupted since the Samarra bombings early this year has transformed the Iraq war from a war in which the US finds itself confronting a Sunni insurgency fueled by former regime elements and foreign jihadis, to a war in which the US finds itself trying to maintain order during an internecine sectarian war between Sunni insurgents and Shi‘ite death squads, some of the latter seemingly closely tied to Iraqi security forces.

Prior to the 1979 Iranian revolution, most Sunnis in the Arab world did not think a great deal about Shi‘ite Islam, even in Arab countries such as Lebanon or Iraq where the Shi‘ite presence was highly visible. Even the Iran-Iraq war was not a Sunni-Shi‘i war, since Iraqi Shi‘is formed a major portion of the Iraqi Army rank and file. But in Iraq today, the Sunni-Shi‘ite division is more pronounced than ever before, and this has also caused some Sunni Arab leaders discomfort: witness President Mubarak’s suggestion that Iraqi Shi‘ites may form a fifth column for Iran (which ignores the very independent history and nature of Iraqi Shi‘ism), or King Abdullah of Jordan’s warnings of an emerging Shi‘ite crescent.

Mubarak and Abdullah may be worried by the sectarian strife, but Egypt has almost no native Shi‘a and Jordan very few. The GCC states are another matter. Bahrain has a Shi‘ite majority ruled by a Sunni elite; Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have substantial Shi‘ite minorities (in the Saudi case, concentrated in the critical oilfields region); and there are smaller communities of Shi‘a in the lower Gulf states, sometimes of Arab and sometimes of Iranian origin. While these populations have generally been loyal and relatively peaceful, a deepening sectarian war in Iraq, in which Iran openly supported the Iraqi Shi‘a and the Sunni Arab states sought to provide support for the Sunnis, would potentially create ferment in the other Shi‘ite regions of the Gulf. (The Israeli confrontation with Hizbullah this summer has also added a sectarian fillip to the longstanding Arab-Israeli issue.)

A disintegrating Iraq, or an Iraq dominated by Shi‘ite religious groups with links to Iran, would be of major concern. (And of course, the Kurdish-Turkish issue adds to the potential for broader regional instability should Iraq plunge deeper into civil war). So, in seeking ways to disengage from Iraq, the Coalition needs to keep in mind the danger of leaving behind a black hole that will suck in neighboring states and create a broad regional conflict with a sectarian base. It is questionable whether anything quite similar has happened since the rise of the Fatimids in the tenth century AD, and one hopes it will not happen now.

The second area of concern is the danger of real geopolitical shifts as a result of the Iraqi conflict. The US now appears to be seeking a way to disengage, and that is welcome since the US presence is itself a major destabilizing factor that draws recruits to jihadi ideology. But will the US withdrawal be perceived in the region as a sign of the end of the American era in the Middle East? Certainly US prestige has rarely been as low. Although the war in Iraq did allow Saudi Arabia to finally rid itself of the American military presence that had endured since 1990, the Saudi Kingdom remains closely allied to the US, and Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain all played major roles in US operations in Iraq. Will an American retreat leave these states vulnerable? If a major collapse were to occur in Iraq, in addition to the dangers of involvement of Iran and the Sunni Arab neighbors of Iraq in the conflict, Turkey could easily choose to intervene in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The dangers of a major regional war may still be remote, but they are not unimaginable. And any major war has the potential for reshuffling the geopolitical deck in unforeseen ways. A diminished American role in the region, combined with growing Iranian assertiveness and the “black hole” that could emerge in Iraq, and nightmare scenarios are not hard to envision.

Akin to this is the danger of the degree to which Iraq has become a center for recruiting jihadi fighters against the Coalition forces. The Al-Qa‘ida in the Land of the Two Rivers (or Al-Qa‘ida in Iraq as the press usually renders it) has grown from nothing to a fighting force with recruitment in other countries. Just as many Arab countries during the 1990s had to deal with the danger of returning “Afghani Arabs” who had fought the Soviets in Afghanistan, there may be a new generation of Iraqi-experienced jihadi fighters returning to various Arab countries, whatever the outcome of their fight in Iraq.

The times are, then, somewhat fraught with dangers. The GCC countries are, to varying degrees, concerned about the continuing problems of Iraq. An American withdrawal could precipitate trouble, but so could a continuing American presence. A direct US confrontation with Iran could involve other neighboring states, but a nuclear-armed Iran is not a welcome prospect either; it could certainly provoke a proliferation race in the region.

The GCC states are, traditionally, cautious. Several of them have been active, either overtly or behind the scenes, in seeking to mediate between Israel and Hamas or Israel and Hizbullah. But there is no easy diplomatic solution to the worsening situation in Iraq. Some sort of international conference is perhaps part of the attempt at containing the problem, but that is easier said than done. Whatever the results of the US elections, the US is clearly looking for an exit: sooner, or later, but an exit. Leaving without leaving behind something worse will not be easy. The US and its coalition partners need to engage with all the regional states in order to try to contain the damage. I include Iran in that prospect, but also the GCC neighbors. Do they have solutions? I doubt if anyone has an easy solution at the moment, but that is why every option should be explored. Charging straight ahead without consultation is what got us here. We should hear the concerns of all (including Iraqi Shi‘ites, Kurds and Sunnis, of course) in trying to chart our way out.