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On October 13, 1999, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said at the University of Maine:

"Our diplomacy is stronger because we have the threat of force behind it. In this way, force and diplomacy complement each other. It's like having Pedro Martinez to do your pitching and Mark McGwire or Sammy Sosa to bat cleanup. The intersection of force and diplomacy has spawned many theories, and a lot of newsprint. Clausewitz, the grandfather of grand strategy, asserted that 'War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of policy carried out by other means.'"

I don’t want to take on Clausewitz here or get into a philosophical discussion, but from my very limited perspective, war is a failure of policy and, more particularly, a failure of diplomacy.

When you, ladies and gentlemen, have to fight, it means that I have failed in my job. Let’s apply that premise to Iraq. Independent commissions and congressional committees have examined the failure of intelligence, but who has examined our diplomacy to determine why we did not achieve our goals through diplomacy? I think we have to keep in mind that the driving force behind our attack on Iraq was not democracy or the horrors of the Saddam regime. This I know first hand from the initial NSC meetings with President George W. Bush and his team in the new administration. As one individual put it in those meetings, “I don’t give a damn about Saddam Hussein. I care about weapons of mass destruction falling into his hands.” And he wasn’t the only one who cared about that or assumed that Saddam had certain weapons and was seeking more.

In 1998, Bill Clinton was President and I was ambassador to Israel. We were attacking Baghdad, and both the US and Israelis were put on notice that we could face a chemical or biological attack. I sealed up a room in the residence. We got gas masks into the hands of all our employees and trained them on how to protect the small children. We brought US military biological and chemical identification vehicles into Tel Aviv. There was no doubt in my mind that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, that he was seeking greater capabilities and that he would have no compunction about using them. The presumption was there, and there was no percentage in taking a risk on the future. This was not a problem of the current Bush Administration. It was a comprehensive assumption of at least three presidents and all their senior advisors.

At the beginning of the Bush Administration, war was not a foregone conclusion. But by that time, diplomatic options were already dwindling. In 1991 we put the sanctions policy into place. It was rigorous. When I was at the United Nations, I was called down to Washington to discuss the sanctions with the NSC. I was asked how long we could sustain the sanctions. I said that in New York we could hold the line for at least four years, i.e. 1995. It was felt that was more than enough time for Saddam to fall and for a new regime to take over. Well, Saddam did not fall and we did not adjust the sanctions policy. It became increasingly onerous for the people of Iraq. Children were affected. Saddam was having a propaganda windfall, convincing the people of the region and in Europe that he was the victim. The result was that the sanctions were being eaten away by some of our closest friends in the region and Europe. Saddam’s bribes were not confined to the United Nations oil for food program.

We allowed the sanctions policy to atrophy in the Clinton Administration and we were not able to reinforce it in the early days of the Bush Administration. We also lost the solid coalition that had opposed Saddam Hussein in Kuwait. The French were off being French, the Russians were looking covetously at the debts Iraq owed them, and countries in the Middle East were profiting from captive Iraqi markets for their goods — market shares that Saddam could hand out for good international behavior. The message to Saddam was clear: the sanctions were crumbling, he did not have to worry about a unified opposition against him, and the United States was unable to gain the support of its old allies except, perhaps, for Britain.

The collapse of our Iraq policy, and our diplomacy in that situation, crept up on us while the Clinton Administration was focused almost exclusively on the Israelis, the Palestinians, and Camp David. I certainly cannot prove that a stronger, harsher, more aggressive policy from 1998 on would have led to a different result. There are times when war is the only answer. But we owe it to ourselves to examine the history and see if other outcomes may have been possible, had we moved more rapidly and followed other courses.

The war was engaged, and the campaign of “shock and awe” was brilliant. The aftermath has not been so brilliant. We have the best equipped and best trained fighting force in the world. But they are not equipped, nor trained, for the duties they have been thrust into in so-called “nation building.” I spoke this year at the Marine Corps War College, and I was challenged aggressively on the fact that marines were being asked to do things that should not be their duty. “Where is your State Department,” I was asked. In fact, the State Department did have provincial representatives in, I believe, 26 of Iraq’s provinces in the days of the Coalition Provisional Authority. There are less today. But the criticism is valid in my view.

We are neither equipped, trained, nor organized to take on the role of nation-building. That was clear on a small scale in Somalia, and I think it has become even clearer in the case of Iraq. If we are going to take on the responsibilities of rebuilding societies, then we have to organize ourselves to do the job. As the Marines told me, it is a different job than war fighting, even though it has some components of war fighting. Are we getting the best use out of our reserves and national guards? Should we have substantial specialized units with language, cultural, and civil administration training?

The question is how can we better prepare ourselves for the next time? Or, better yet, how can we anticipate and avoid the next time? We have not proven to be very good at prediction. But if diplomacy depends on the cooperation of others, then we must take a hard look at our standing in the world.

The Pew Global Attitudes project tracks the standing of the US in major countries throughout the world. The last temperature check in June of this year was a pretty appalling predictor of our ability to engage others in support of our policies. If we take a look at the favorable opinion of the US in Canada, it has fallen from 71% in 2000 to 59% in 2005. Britain is more troubling — 89% favorable in 2000, 55% in 2005. Germany fell from 78% to 41%. Jordan — forget it: 25% in 2000 and 21% in 2005.

Now it is not true that popular attitudes are direct predictors of governmental actions. In Jordan, for example, King Abdullah is way out in front of his people in his support of America. In virtually every Arab country, the king or president is out in front of his people and more willing to support us than his people would be. But some of these leaders are getting tired of being exposed. Some are tired of the constant criticism they hear from the US media and our Congress. Some are ready to wash their hands of us, and that is not a good sign for our future ability to drive policies in the region to our advantage.

I am not alone in worrying about the problem of attitudes towards the United States. In a survey that Public Agenda took of US attitudes in August 2005, three-quarters of those surveyed said they worry that, “the US may be losing the trust and friendship of people in other countries,” and that “there may be growing hatred of the US in Muslim countries.” In the same survey, when asked to grade our performance on foreign policy, “nearly two thirds (64 %)” gave “the US a ‘C’ or worse on having good relations with Muslim countries.”

When asked if showing more respect for the views and needs of other countries would enhance our security, 49 percent said “a great deal” and 38 percent said “somewhat.” There is a lot of other depressing reading in the Public Agenda report as well. But getting depressed is not going to answer our problems.

Before we went into Iraq, we made assumptions: assumptions about our reception — we would be greeted with flowers; about the Iraqi people — they would welcome anyone who got rid of Saddam Hussein; about the expatriate opposition — they knew Iraq better than Iraq’s neighbors; about the history and structure of Iraq — national pride would hold the country together. It just so happens that many of our assumptions were wrong.

Before the war I traveled through the region. In conversation after conversation with regional leaders I was warned, and so I am sure our government was warned; that Iraq is not like any other Arab country. It is not Kuwait. It is not Afghanistan. You will not be welcomed with open arms. You are releasing forces you can’t control. There is a risk of chaos and you will strengthen extremists throughout the region.

Our failure was not a failure of intelligence; it was a failure to listen, or perhaps, to understand what we were hearing. Or, maybe we didn’t think we had to listen. I think we have had a hard time adapting to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Perhaps we took too seriously the hyperbole of the United States being the world’s only superpower. We got caught up in an ideology of unilateralism that flew in the face of our long-standing policies of alliances and common action. No doubt, there are times when we may have to go it alone, but in my view we were a lot stronger when we propelled Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait with a broad military and political coalition behind us than we have been in Iraq with the “Coalition of the Willing.”

No matter how many boots we have on the ground, we cannot win the war on terrorism in Iraq. The scope of our battlefield has to be a lot broader than that. We have to win this war wherever there is support for the terrorist ideology. And that means we have to have common cause with countries and leaders spanning the globe.

King Abdullah of Jordan, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, President Mubarak of Egypt — these are some of the men who are on the frontlines of the war on terror. King Abdullah of Jordan has been leading an international Islamic effort to discredit the philosophy that drives Al-Qaeda. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia has been cleaning house of radical Islamists. President Mubarak has been in the forefront of the fight since the mid-1990s when we worked together to expel terrorism from Cairo and Luxor. President Ali Abdullah Salah of Yemen has been bringing tribal areas under control that were being used as conduits for terrorists and training grounds. I remember one occasion while I was ambassador to Egypt when we lost an opportunity to capture a major terrorist operative because the Yemeni authorities turned a blind eye as he went through the Yemen airport. That would not happen today. President Bouteflika of Algeria has been fighting an at times lonely war against religious extremists in Algeria. We refused him military support because we did not understand the nature of the threat until it came to our own shores.

Our very ability to project our forces into the region and to protect our interests still depends on access. In the old days of the tanker war in the Gulf when we were reflagging and escorting Kuwaiti tankers to protect them from Iranian attack, we could not travel through the Suez Canal. It was closed to nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed ships for “safety” reasons. This meant we had to bring our ships from East Asia at great cost to readiness and training. Having the flexibility to move ships to the Gulf from the Mediterranean or the Atlantic had a marked impact on the sustainability of our presence there. And it was a critical issue when we had to move forces at the last minute from outside Turkey to the Gulf in the most recent Iraq war.

Over-flight rights for Egypt and the Gulf states have been crucial to our war effort in Iraq. Propositioning troops in Qatar, our naval base in Bahrain, our forces in Kuwait, the UAE and Oman, have all been critical components of the US footprint in the region. I am afraid that most Americans do not understand the complex logistics problems — which can affect the lives of our men and women — that depend on the support of other countries. Nobody should be confused about this: we need allies. We need friends. And we need support for the vital interests of America.

Our military is as much a component of our diplomacy as are our Foreign Service officers. When I was ambassador to the United Arab Emirates and we were building up for a war to displace Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, there was considerable skepticism among the ruling families about hosting our forces. They had no experience with our military. They did not know us.

Tony Zinni, the CENTCOM commander, came to the Emirates and he not only charmed them, but also seduced them. He went out hunting bustards with them. He got up in the middle of the night to join in male-bonding on a different bird hunt. He was a super diplomat. And he worked so closely with me that there was never a miscommunication. When the Emirates asked for a joint exercise on tanker refueling, the Pentagon moved heaven and earth to make it happen. It didn’t matter that the aircraft weren’t compatible at first. The whole point was to show Saddam Hussein that the Emirates were not alone. That is diplomacy. Tony wasn’t unique. Every commander in the field, from Colin Powell on down, understood the importance of diplomacy to the war effort.

That wasn’t always true of Washington. We had whole tent camps of air force personnel to run the squadrons of F-16s and other aircraft stationed at a number of airfields in the Emirates. We had the navy minesweepers in Dubai, as well as, the largest liberty port in the region. The Pentagon lawyers wanted a status-of-forces agreement, understandable for a Muslim country where Sharia law prevails. So I went in to sit with Sheikh Zayed, the UAE President. I explained the idea and the need. I explained the importance of an agreement to protect both sides from recriminations. I explained how the President of the United States wanted such an agreement. Zayed looked me in the eye and said, “I give you my word. No US military personnel will be touched. If there is a problem we will take care of it and return your people immediately.”

The Pentagon was not happy. They wanted me to go back to Zayed and demand an agreement. In effect, they wanted me to go to him and say, “We do not trust your word.” And to do this when I have hundreds of US aircraft and thousands of military personnel depending on his good will. As you can imagine, I told the Pentagon to go to hell, and I had the support of the military commanders in the field. You can get away with that in a war. We had 300,000 US military personnel come through Dubai and Abu Dhabi that year, and not one incident in which our personnel were detained or subjected to Emirate law. In fact, we hardly had any incidents at all. That, too, is diplomacy. The quality of our troops and their behavior in spite of the pressure on them opened the way for long-term cooperation well after the war ended. I cannot tell you how proud I was of our men and women in the service, of course for their bravery and sacrifice, but also because they understood their role as ambassadors of the United States.

Iraq has had a significant and negative impact on our image abroad. We are called arrogant, aggressive, a bully, immoral, materialistic, and spoiled. And that is only what Americans think about how we are viewed by others. Polls of attitudes toward America in the region are at the lowest point ever. We don’t have to be liked, but it sure helps our policy when we are. Public diplomacy is important. The most important part of public diplomacy is listening to our audience. We cannot hope to have a significant impact if we centralize the dictation in Washington. Our news management in Washington is directed toward the Washington Post and Congress. It has a “Made in Washington” label, and it is not going to be persuasive in many other parts of the world.

The other day Karen Hughes, our new Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, was challenged by people at the State Department on the fact that ambassadors and Embassy people are afraid to talk to the press, afraid to go out in public, and make the case for America for fear of saying something wrong and being disciplined by Washington. That is an attitude that is not unique with this administration. A young officer told me the same thing yesterday when I was over at the Foreign Service Institute giving a lecture. Hughes responded that ambassadors and officers would not get in trouble so long as they use the approved talking points as a basis for their remarks. I am afraid too many people heard “approved talking points” and very few heard “basis.”

Our ambassadors obviously have to stick to the general policy script — that is their job. But how they present that script, where they put the emphasis, how they tailor it to their local audience — that is what will make the difference. We made a study of attitudes towards America in Egypt. The impressions we heard from Egyptians bore no resemblance to who we are: cowboy, colonialist, bully, materialistic, hedonistic, and so on. So Karen Hughes has a tough job ahead. But the fact that there is stereotyping, misinformation, and manipulation of the facts in the region means that we should be able to correct the record and convince the people of the true nature of America.

Most people in the region dismiss the importance of public diplomacy and say, “it’s the policies, stupid.” Certainly policies do make a difference, but when their understanding of the policies and the motivations behind them are skewed, then it is not just a matter of policies.

They used to tell a joke in Egypt before we went into Iraq. It goes like this:

· Saddam Hussein called President Bush before the war and told him, “I had a dream last night, we won the war and I was flying over Washington. There were hundreds of banners proclaiming ‘Long Live Saddam’.”

· President Bush said: “How interesting, I had a dream last night as well. We won the war and I was flying over Baghdad where there were thousands of banners flying.”

· Saddam asks: “Well, what did the banners say?” Bush says: “I don’t know; I don’t read Hebrew.”

Well, just as oil was not the driving force behind our Iraq policy, neither was Israel. But that is what many people believe, because they put two and two together and came up with five. Who benefited? Obviously, Israel is more secure with Saddam out of the picture and not paying stipends to terrorists. Therefore, America did it for Israel. Not true. At least Israel was never mentioned in this connection in the early meetings of the Administration that I attended. And it was never mentioned in any of the papers I, or my staff, wrote for the Secretary of State and the NSC. But the belief persists in the region.

We are also accused of having a double standard – one standard for Israel and another for the Palestinians. We are not even-handed. This is the most persistent charge in the region.

The fact is that the charge is correct. We have a special relationship with Israel, and will continue to have one. And this is what will make it possible for us to help resolve the conflict. Can anyone imagine the French convincing Israel to take a chance on peace?

In fact, Arabs recognize the value of the American relationship with Israel — but only if we use that relationship in the cause of peace. There is a direct correlation between attitudes towards America in the region and our engagement in the peace process between Israel and the Arabs. When the Clinton Administration was engaged, our stock went up. When the Bush Administration walked away from the process — even though it was for good and understandable reasons — our stock went down. People in the region want US intervention; they want US help on issues of concern to them.

When I was in high school, many years ago now, we were taught that the great flaw in the Soviet system was that it did not allow for criticism, and that the strength of America is our freedom to challenge our leaders and learn from our mistakes. We have a self-correcting mechanism that is the strength of our system. And we have a secretary of state who is doing her best to correct some of the problems that confound us. The first order of business is repairing relations with our allies. This she is doing. The second is to recast America’s campaign for democracy from an interventionist-dictate to a program of help, for changes that countries need to undertake for their own self interest. The third is to put the Palestinian issue back on the agenda. Prime Minister Sharon has taken the first steps, and now we have to connect the dots to the West Bank. The final point is that the Secretary of State is willing to listen to what others are saying, and not only listen, but hear, and act on what we are hearing. This is the essence of diplomacy. Regardless of nationality, people don’t like to be ignored.