Related Resources

There are five points that help define the context of the Pakistani parliamentary and presidential elections.

First -- To understand the current electoral process it helps to know how Pakistanis would like to think of themselves. Pakistani civil society is deeply committed to democracy in the tradition of their venerated founding father, Mohammed Ali Jinnah.

Jinnah envisioned a multiethnic, pluralistic, democratic country free from the hegemony of any one group…most particularly the army.

Pakistan’s history of erratic lurches from civilian to military governments doesn’t accord with this self image, but it does help us to understand the passions of the opposition to Musharraf as both President and Military man.

Pakistani civil society has been bridling at the bit throughout the last eight years of military rule. They basically backed the bloodless military coup in 1999 because of their disgust with the civilian governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawas Sharif. People yearned for military order…but only temporarily.

The intelligentsia reluctantly accepted his leadership because of extraordinary times and because Musharraf was basically moderate, not corrupt, and promised to return the government to civilian rule.

Patience has worn out, quickened by the sacking of the Supreme Court Justice Iftikahar Chaudhry in March. Now the civil society will accept nothing less than return to civilian government.

Second: Just as in the US, “all politics is local”, one might say in Pakistan, “all politics is personalities”.

Up until now the Bhuttos – father and daughter-- have come to personify the PPP. The party of Nawas Sharif is called PML-N, N for Nawas. Any discussion of democracy in Pakistan quickly becomes a mind-numbing recitation of coalitions between politicians.

This is significant for what discussions are NOT about. They are not about the other three PPPs -- Platform, and Promises to the People.

Third – with this in mind, one can understand the dynamics of the so-called negotiations for power sharing between Musharraf and Benazir. It is fundamentally a pre-election dance to sort the personal political problems before the actual election.

Musharraf faces two key obstacles – the constitutional provision that requires all public servants to step down for two years before running for office and the requirement that he take off his uniform.

Benazir Bhutto faces corruption charges and a prohibition on serving as Prime Minister for a third term.

The power sharing talks have been of a nature –“you help me with my problem, I will help you with yours”.

There are signs that the cult of personality is weakening. Both Bhutto and Musharraf have problems within their respective parties.

There is murmuring within the PPP that they can win without her. This undercurrent may be coming from the ambitious vice chair of the PPP who might aspire to lead the party, and it is hurting her. Nonetheless, a recent poll suggests her popularity runs at 63% countrywide. Her strength lies in the countryside.

Benazir is under attack from within the PPP by those who think that her negotiations with Musharraf are exclusively for her personal benefit and on issues that only affect her. She needs this concession from Musharraf as a deliverable. And therefore is insistent that he take off his uniform.

Musharraf’s personal inclinations may be more moderate than many in his party. The PML-Q is right of center and had attracted many of Nawas Sharif former followers when he was exiled eight years ago.

They are very unhappy with the prospects of power sharing with the more liberal PPP. Recently key figures have quit the PML-Q.

Musharraf may need to show strength within his own party. He cut off power sharing talks since September 4th and is maneuvering to get re-elected President by the current national and provincial assemblies while still serving in the Army.

It is important to Musharraf personally to get elected while in uniform as a show of power for the doubters in his party, but also

· Because of his personal comfort in his stature in the Army;
· Because he believes the army is his base of power (his family immigrated from India at Independence and therefore he has no regional or feudal ties);
· And because he fears that relinquishing his uniform will mean the professional and disciplined army will show first loyalty to the chief of army and not the President. I would defer to Steve Cohen.

Musharraf’s strong card in the power sharing negotiation is that Benazir will ultimately need Army support. The PPP will do well in the polls in a free and fair election but only the Army can assure it will not be rigged against her. And then, once in office, Benazir knows that she needs Army support to be an effective Prime Minister. She needs to make a deal.

Fourth point is the reality that the formal timetable for the elections is proceeding. The Constitution requires the Presidential election to take place between September 15 and October 15. Musharraf has yet to make an announcement on the date. The best guess is that he will set it for October 10, just before the Eid celebration on the 12 and 13th.

He must file papers and stand for re-election by an electoral college of national and provincial assemblies before October 15th. Time is passing and setting up electoral processes take a good deal of organizational capacity.

An interesting point is that Benazir has announced she will not return to Pakistan until the October 18th. This places her return after the presidential election by the current assemblies.

Musharraf has announced through his lawyer Mushahid Hussain that he will take off his uniform after he is elected president by the current assemblies but before he is sworn in as President on November 15.

The wild card in this scenario is the drama being played today, as we speak. The Supreme Court is deciding on six petitions from opposition parties on whether Musharraf must step aside for two years before running for office.

Supreme Court Justice Chaudry has recused himself from the deliberations.

There is the troublesome prospect that IF the Supreme Court does not rule favorably toward Musharraf, then he could declare some sort of modified or surgical martial law in order to bypass the Supreme Court. This would trigger violence in the street.

The final point to note as part of the context for the elections is the role of the rightist parties, or the Islamic parties.

The Jaamatt –i-Islami and other opposition parties say they will not support Musharraf under any circumstance. This may not be too significant because the religious parties typically poll in the single figures.

I noted earlier that many in Musharraf’s ruling party, the PML-Q were once supporters of Nawas Sharif and they lean to the right.

It was important for Musharraf that Nawas not return and attract people away from his ruling party. Or that Nawas Sharif establishes himself and form an alliance with the rightist religious parties that would polarize Pakistan along anti-American rhetoric.

The faction within the PML-Q that is much more comfortable with the more religious parties on the right are very upset that Musharraf is talking to Benazir. Some key folks have already resigned, like the Minister for IT and Lt General (retired) Majeed Malik, senior Vice President of the PML-Q.

These few observations hopefully set the stage for what I trust will be an interesting discussion on where US interests lie and how we can protect and further those interests in the Pakistani election drama.