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It is an honor to appear at this forum once again. Last June, at the Eighth Global Leadership Forum, I spoke on “Israeli-Palestinian Peace, An Unmet Challenge for US Policy.” I was critical then of the lack of forceful and sustained leadership by the Bush Administration, but I took the position that President Bush could still choose to help shape events in a positive way by initiatives to make his roadmap for peace a reality. In the past year there has been a somewhat higher degree of activity by American diplomats in that regard, but it has fallen way short of what would be sufficient. Moreover, as was predictable, the forces working against peace have become stronger and the obstacles greater. The price of neglect has been paid by Israeli and Lebanese civilians, by Palestinian children and their unemployed fathers, by Iraqi civilians and American soldiers, by Turkish victims of PKK terrorism, and by multiple other victims of violence from the mountains of Afghanistan to the cities of Algeria and Morocco. Less dramatically but inevitably, the price has also been paid by reform elements struggling for peaceful political change. They have lost ground to autocratic governments claiming that security against radicalism requires repression of democratic ferment.

I am not saying that all violence and conflict in the Middle East is caused by the lack of Arab-Israel peace. Far from it. The eight-year war between Iraq and Iran is a good example. However, I do maintain that the US cannot exercise effective leadership without pressing hard for peace between Israel, its neighbors and the Palestinian people with whom it shares the same land and, ultimately, a shared destiny.

The Middle East is the homeland from which most of my cultural heritage, what we inadequately call Western civilization, originates. Whether it is agriculture, writing systems, algebra, or the major religions of the children of Abraham – Judaism, Christianity and Islam – the Middle East is where it all began. There is no higher moral imperative for US policy than to work for peace in this region, in particular peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

We are also engaged in efforts to make peace between Iraqi factions, supporting the Afghan government as it struggles to put that country on the path to progress after decades of war, and helping Lebanon live at peace and without interference from Syria. There are many other areas where American diplomats will be called upon to facilitate peaceful resolution of conflicts. President Bush can and should demonstrate leadership, as previous US presidents have done. But we must also be honest about the relative decline of American power, credibility and influence in the Middle East during the past six years. Nor should we underestimate the gathering strength of forces that impede peaceful resolution of conflicts. Part of the reason for the loss of US credibility and the increase in negative developments is the perception that the US has lacked determination and persistence in building on the initiative of President Bush in calling for a Palestinian state that could be a viable partner with Israel in maintaining security and working for prosperity of Arabs and Jews in the holy land sacred to three religions.

Failure to do so has been a major factor in the evolution of a conflict that began early in the last century. As a young diplomat in Jordan 40 years ago, I failed to understand the full dimensions of the disasters that loomed as Israel and the Arabs prepared to go to war.

Israel’s swift and decisive victory in the Six Day War of June 1967 gave the country control of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, formerly held by Egypt, East Jerusalem and the West Bank, previously controlled by Jordan, and the formerly Syrian Golan Heights. This defeat was crippling not only to the Arab countries’ military force but also a major blow to the national pride of Arabs everywhere. Over time and without a peaceful resolution of the land for peace issues, it also transformed the conflict into a cause for Muslims around the world. At the same time, the growth of the settler movement made the issue a matter of religious destiny for a large part of the Israeli population and their supporters in other countries, including the United States.

Now, nearly four decades after the fact, I understand better why the June 1967 War was such a key turning point in the modern history of the Middle East and Muslim relations with the United States. I realized then that the Arab sense of humiliation and national dishonor would haunt US relations and the prospects for Arab-Israel peace, but I analyzed it as a continuation of the struggle between a well-established Israeli/Zionist nationalism and a bumbling but potentially powerful Arab nationalism focusing on the issue of Palestine. I saw this focus on Palestine resulting partly out of genuine grievance but also as an excuse for the shortcomings of Arab governments. Like other American officials, I hoped that Arab nationalism would develop in a manner similar to the secular nationalism of Mustafa Kamal and his followers in Turkey. Instead, many Muslims from Jakarta to Casablanca have been radicalized and their attitudes have taken on a dangerous religious character.

The October 1973 War and its aftermath restored some semblance of Arab honor and statecraft. Egypt had demonstrated heightened military capabilities and the wisdom to seek an achievable political outcome. Egyptian nationalism and pride soared. However, this military achievement was not enough to change the basic problem. The partially successful peacemaking that resulted in peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan did not lead to a comprehensive resolution to the Arab-Israel conflict.

Even the Oslo Accords, where Israelis and Palestinians seemed willing to work together toward a compromise, ultimately did not result in a solution. With the benefit of hindsight, it seems to me that the enduring problem is Israel's domination of East Jerusalem and much of its West Bank hinterland and US acquiescence in Israel’s decision. For historic and emotional reasons, Arabs and Muslims are strongly attached to East Jerusalem, which Palestinians need as the capital of an independent state. Israel’s determination to hold on indefinitely to large parts of the occupied territories, including all of greater Jerusalem, has changed the conflict from a conflict of national movements to a conflict of religiously defined political ideologies and emotions.

Since 1967, Israel has continued to expand and build new settlements in the occupied territories, a policy driven increasingly by right-wing religious groups. The coming to power of Hamas, Hizbullah, the Shi‘a religious movements of Iraq and all the repressed clones of the Muslim Brothers are mirrored by the stranglehold the settler movement has been able to exercise over Israeli politics. Al-Qa‘ida and “wanna-be” Al-Qa‘idas are only the most extreme manifestations.

The attraction these movements have even for secular Arab and for non-Arab Muslim intellectuals is a symptom we have been seeing for a couple of decades. Now we are reaping the whirlwind sown by the June 1967 War crisis.

If the Arab-Israeli peace process is the highest moral challenge of US foreign policy in the Middle East, it is also critical to the US strategic challenges of fighting global terrorism and defending the part of the world which has the bulk of the world’s oil and gas resources. Both US national security and global prosperity depend to a significant degree on the effectiveness of US policy toward the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region, and the US no longer can separate those issues from the Arab-Israel peace process. Washington strategists tried to do so in the past with only partial success. That effort is no longer possible. The globalization of communications, especially satellite television, brings the reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into living rooms in Riyadh, Istanbul and Tehran. The expansion of Israeli settlement activity on the West Bank, driven by religious motivations or rationales, coupled with the rise of Islamist Palestinian militancy creates a witches brew. What was a clash of competing national movements is becoming a religious conflict that will intensify popular discontent in countries from Nigeria to Indonesia. Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations, a theory with little credible academic substance when first enunciated, may become a reality by default due to lack of political imagination and leadership.

Washington is no longer viewed as a credible leader in managing regional security issues if it is seen as neglecting the peace process. Friends and allies of the United States avoid identification with its policies if they are seen as deeply unpopular with their own citizens. Public opinion counts, even for autocratic regimes. This has been true for the crisis in Iraq. While the Iraq of Saddam Hussayn was a long-term threat, the US effort to transform the entire Middle East by transforming Iraq threatens to destabilize our Turkish ally, as well as the moderate Arab states that we need as strategic and economic partners.

If tensions between Iran and the West escalate, it is likely that the US will once again find that Arab and other Muslim countries are reluctant to be allies in efforts to prevent Iran from expanding its power and ambitions in dangerous ways.

In short, active US engagement in reviving the Israeli – Palestinian peace process is not only the right thing to do, it is essential to US national security and global leadership. And the history of US Middle East policy since 1948 shows clearly that strong and active leadership by the President of the United States is essential to make US engagement meaningful. In the absence of presidential leadership and, at critical times, direct personal involvement, all of the US military power and economic weight cannot move Arabs and Israelis to make the existential accommodations that peace requires.

But US domestic politics does not mesh easily with what may seem to be the obvious requirements of both morality and statecraft. With a single exception, no American President has come to office with the intention of achieving peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The single exception was President Jimmy Carter, who interpreted his own deeply felt religious values as requiring him to make an effort to heal the breach between the descendents of the prophet Abraham, even at the cost of domestic popularity. History will judge him well on this matter, but historians do not decide the outcome of elections. It is ironic that another president with deeply felt religious values – George W. Bush – has so far been unwilling to take these risks in the sustained way necessary to achieve momentum and move the parties to make peace.

History shows that American presidents tend to avoid deep involvement in the Arab-Israel peace process until events force their hands or offer a clear opening. But when they do engage, they often have surprising weight. President Bush himself demonstrated for brief moments the powers of the American presidency to shape both Israeli and Palestinian attitudes when he called for an independent and viable Palestinian state, living by the side of a secure Israel. By laying out the very sketchy roadmap to a negotiated peace between the government of Israel and the Palestinians, he raised expectations that remain unmet. But polling data among both Palestinians and Israelis suggest that strong majorities accept the validity of a two state solution, even if there is wide difference on details. George W. Bush can still exert influence by a serious effort to revive the peace process, but he would have to summon up the political will and apply himself to the issue more than sporadically.

Even when the Arab Summit meeting in Beirut called in 2002 for a peaceful two state solution based on the pre-June 1967 boundary lines, a major step forward for most Arab governments, it did not meet the response it merited. President Bush, consumed with preparations for war in Iraq, did not seize the opportunity presented by Saudi King ‘Abdullah and other moderate Arab leaders to establish new momentum toward a just and lasting peace. Belatedly, the Bush Administration has discovered the virtues of this Arab initiative, but only after a decline in US influence and credibility. Nonetheless, it is not too late to start building a peace process upon that development, recently reaffirmed by the last Arab summit.

Many US political leaders like to say that US engagement is a waste of time and resources unless both the Israeli government and the immediate Arab parties genuinely want to move ahead and are prepared to make the necessary compromises. This is an argument for dodging responsibility. If the United States only takes decisive action when the way ahead appears very easy, that is more a form of public image making than statecraft.

It is true that the current leaders of Israel, the Palestinians and Syria do not offer ideal material for making peace. Prime Minister Olmert presides over what is probably the weakest Israeli government in domestic political terms since 1948. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas lacks power in the Palestinian Authority, while the US remains unwilling to have any dealings with the elected Palestinians who include the Prime Minister. Hamas is portraying itself as the victim rather that accepting responsibility for governance and the compromises that requires. Palestinians will blame their suffering on Israel and the United States. Palestinian politics are likely to become increasingly radicalized, and leaders such as President Mahmoud Abbas, who do accept the basic elements of a two state solution, will become less and less relevant. However, as head of the PLO, Mahmoud Abbas has a mandate to start negotiations, and those negotiations could lead in promising directions.

As for Syria, the leadership of President Bashar Al Asad has been disappointing, but US efforts to isolate him have proven to be counter-productive. Washington would have been wiser to proceed as Ankara has, to deal directly but firmly with Damascus. The reality is that the Syrian government has offered to resume negotiations with Israel, and the outlines of an Israeli-Syrian peace are not that hard to conceptualize. But rather than encouraging Israel to enter into talks, the US has discouraged the initiatives of third parties and unofficial Israeli and Syrian negotiators to bring the two sides to the table.

It remains true that Israel cannot force the Palestinians or the Syrians to make peace, just as they cannot force Israel to give up its rights to security. Currently, the only dynamic elements in the equation are the unilateral measures that Israel is taking to reduce its military, political and budgetary exposure in the hopeless effort to govern lands populated by a large majority of Palestinians. But in taking these steps, Israel is also trying to strengthen its hold on the territories it will continue to occupy and is making the claim that it will determine Israel’s final borders unilaterally. But while the unilateral measures are preferable to paralysis, they will never provide Israelis with lasting peace. It is also true that the security of northern Israel and its relationship with Lebanon is held hostage to the lack of progress on resolving the dispute with Syria over the occupied Golan Heights.

The bits and pieces of the West Bank from which Israel may withdraw unilaterally, as it withdrew from the vast prison slum of Gaza, do not come close to constituting the viable Palestinian state that could be a stable partner with Israel in a peaceful relationship. Israeli military power, barriers that split up Palestinian neighborhoods in order to divide Jews from Arabs, and Washington’s economic support and political acquiescence will not make a future generation of Israelis safe. Palestinians who have no hope of attaining a minimum level of national respect and material well being will resort to violence, driven by the conviction they have nothing to lose. And, when they do, the shock waves are felt not only in the Middle East. They reverberate in the attitudes of Muslims in Asia, Africa, the Americas and Europe.