Mei 58th Annual Conference: Keynote Address
It is a terrific pleasure for me to introduce our keynote speaker. I had the pleasure and honor to work for her for a number of years, both in New York, when she was the UN ambassador, and then in Washington, when she was secretary of state. I could go on for hours and days about this lady, but I think that if you really want to know who she is, you should read her book. It's an excellent recounting of her life and times.
She is someone who is not afraid to use military power, and stood up to our generals in the case of Bosnia, but also not afraid to use diplomacy when it is warranted. Opening the door to Iran and opening the door to Libya – she was responsible for the beginning of the process that led to Libya's renouncement of weapons of mass destruction. She is one very gutsy lady. I give you Secretary Albright.
Good morning to all of you. It's such a pleasure to be here and see so many wonderful friends, especially Ned. When I was first appointed to the UN, I was thrilled, but I also realized that I had an awful lot to learn. I knew that one of the things that I was facing was all those resolutions on Iraq. Fortunately, Ambassador Walker was there to help me through figuring out what all the words really meant and helping to keep the Coalition together. Then later, as secretary of state, when he was assistant secretary, I'd ask him to explain to me what was going on in the Middle East. Ned would shrug and say, "I don't know. Even God is confused."
I'd also like to point out that Ned's successor, Ambassador Skip Gnehm, is here, who also helped me through all those Iraqi resolutions. If you indeed do buy my book, you'll see I have a chapter in there called "Migraine Hussein," to indicate how much time we really spent on that subject.
This is the 58th anniversary year for the Middle East Institute. Like many of our other major foreign policy institutions, it was established in the aftermath of World War II. The leaders of that era did not want to repeat the mistakes of the 1920s and 1930s. They were determined that the world should develop a better understanding of the United States and that the United States should develop a better understanding of the world. For almost six decades, this institute has labored with energy and creativity toward those goals. Its efforts have been unceasing and its accomplishments legion, and its presidents – especially the current one – very charismatic. And yet, we know from the daily headlines that there remains a great deal of work still to do. This morning I will discuss that challenge in the context of today's topic, "Promise, Performance and Prospects in Iraq."
The promise, if you remember, went something like this. Prior to the war, President Bush said that regime change in Iraq would be a decisive first step in the transformation of the entire Middle East. He predicted that our show of resolve would cause terrorists and their sponsors to surrender or retreat. He said the transition to a democratic and stable Iraq would be relatively easy, financed primarily by Iraqi oil and requiring only the short-term presence of U.S. troops. He told us that a free Iraq would generate a new and welcome breeze of political openness that would refresh and modernize the Arab world. He said the spectacle of "shock and awe" produced by our military would provide a useful lesson to would-be proliferators in faraway North Korea and nearby Iran. He argued that anti-Israeli terrorists, deprived of Saddam's support, would close their bomb factories and that a new generation of Palestinian leaders would agree to a peace that Israel would accept.
The president's vision was uplifting and bold, and we all hoped that it would come true. It's fair to say, however, that we're not quite there yet.
Those inclined to look on the bright side do have a case. Some months ago, there were pessimists who didn't believe an interim Iraqi government could even be created. But as Prime Minister Allawi's recent visit showed, Iraq does have an assertive and dedicated leader who has a very difficult assignment. The prime minister told us, quite accurately, that just as parts of Iraq are unsafe, so there are parts that are stable and secure. He says there is real enthusiasm about the elections, and he predicts that the security forces now being trained will be able to fight effectively. He reports that the insurgency is weakening and sees proof in the rising number of attacks, which he considers a sure sign of desperation. He talks about the plans he has for the economy, restoring social services, and luring many of those now tempted by violence to join the political process. He reminds us, quite rightly, that building a democracy takes time. We are only at the beginning of the process, he says, and patience is required.
As for President Bush, he's eager to support the prime minister. He even called our attention to a survey showing that the percentage of people who think their country is moving in the right direction is higher in Iraq than it is in the United States. In other words, according to the president, the people of Iraq have more confidence in their leaders than we do in ours. If that is indeed the case, it is due primarily to the gap between promise and performance in this administration's record on Iraq.
Any military expert will tell you that the way to minimize resistance to an attack is to apply the maximum amount of force at the outset. This allows you to establish control early, to reassure allies and deter potential foes. In Iraq, we took the opposite approach, going in strong enough to win the war but not to establish the peace. I turn your attention today to the most recent statements by Ambassador Bremer on this subject. The result was a breakdown in order that has still not ended and for which the U.S. is blamed.
Any historian will tell you that Iraqis – indeed, most Arabs – bitterly resent past periods of foreign domination. Still, the administration thought our troops would be greeted as liberators, leaving us with no plan to blunt Iraqi anger and no strategy for earning trust.
Any diplomat will tell you that the more countries you have on your side, the better your chance of success, and the way to attract support is to treat others with respect. When the president was asked about international support prior to the war, he said, "At some point, we may be the only ones left. That's okay with me. We are America."
Any statesman will tell you that nation-building is a complex job with many dimensions, demanding a variety of skills. But this administration campaigned against nation-building and so refused to heed the lessons of Bosnia, Mozambique, Kosovo and East Timor. Instead, it insisted on running every aspect of the Iraqi transition itself, with the UK as a junior partner. When it finally did ask for help, conditions were so bad that almost everybody said no.
Some people say our leaders deserve our trust. I say, fine – but first the American people deserve the truth. During his visit to Washington, Prime Minister Allawi told us that the southern city of Basra was safe. In August, British troops in the region were attacked 853 times, the most combat British military units have experienced in half a century. The prime minister told us that Baghdad is safe. Last Thursday, a bomb exploded, killing more than forty people, and yesterday bombs killed two dozen more.
In his speech aboard the famous aircraft carrier, President Bush told us that the liberation of Iraq is a crucial advance in the campaign against terror. Unfortunately – and predictably – our occupation of a Muslim country has increased, not decreased, the terrorist danger. In the words of former CIA Director George Tenet, the foreign jihadists see Iraq as a golden opportunity. President Bush says he's pleased with our progress in Iraq. But a recent CSIS study concluded that there has been backward movement in every sector. Our intelligence community is pessimistic, and Secretary Powell admits that the insurgency and terrorism are getting worse. General Abuzaid said we need more troops. Billions of dollars that were badly needed for reconstruction have now been diverted to security, which is obviously much in need. Coalition injuries and deaths are at record levels and significant chunks of Iraq are under enemy control. The price tag is headed toward $200 billion. The viability of elections scheduled for January is very much in doubt. All this is not exactly what the president promised when he sent America's fighting men and women into harm's way.
As it has been from the beginning, security is the key missing ingredient. We're assured that Iraqi troops are being trained and will be available to fight. We're led to believe that the enemy can be identified, isolated and defeated. My question is whether that is really true. In places such as the Sunni triangle, Najaf and the poor neighborhoods of Baghdad, is the enemy a relatively small and isolated group of fighters, as the authorities insist? Or do those fighters have a strong base of popular support, as some in the media suggest? Have religious and nationalist feelings transformed a criminal insurgency into a popular uprising that is actually gaining strength? Experts are divided on this question, and I confess that I don't know the answers.
Ordinarily, I'm an optimist who worries a lot, and I'm becoming a worrier who remains optimistic. I worry that too many Iraqis still don't identify themselves as Iraqis but rather as Kurds or Arabs, Sunnis or Shi'ites, or as members of a particular tribe or clan. I worry that we have placed the members of our armed forces in an environment in which their firepower means little, the only kind of environment in which they are at a strategic disadvantage. I worry that Iraq's future stability depends too much on the survival and goodwill of a single Shi'ite grand ayatollah with a heart condition. I worry that the presence of the U.S. military is both essential to keep Iraq together and a primary cause of the resentments fueling the violence, a classic no-win proposition.
So you're probably wondering what the solution to all this is. Nothing would make me happier than to reveal that to you, but the truth is that there are no good or easy answers. Some have talked about dividing Iraq into a Kurdish North and a Sunni Center and a Shi'ite South, as if the parts could be split as easily as slices of a pizza. But cities such as Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk and Basra are heterogeneous – any attempt to divide them would be violent and bloody, with boundaries subject to endless dispute.
Our best option is to make the best plans we now have. For that to happen, the Sunni Arabs must know that they will not be held collectively responsible for Saddam Hussein's regime, and that important jobs in the government and security forces will be open to them. The Shi'a must know that history will not repeat itself and that the upcoming elections will enable them for the first time to translate their popular strength into political power. The Kurds must know that their core needs can be met by remaining within Iraq. All Iraqis must know that the more rapidly their security forces are trained and equipped, and the more quickly the troublemakers are stopped, the sooner they will have full control of their own destiny.
Militarily, we must show neither desperation to leave, which would encourage our enemies, nor desire to stay longer than we are needed, which would alienate friends. Tactically, we will have to walk a fine line between too much caution, which would allow insurgents to operate with impunity, and too little caution, which would create more insurgents.
Economically, we must pump money into reconstruction far more rapidly, to provide jobs and services targeted at the grassroots.
Diplomatically, we should sit down with the Allawi government and with each of Iraq's neighbors to clear away suspicion, address problems, and create a regional strategy for success.
Politically, if elections are held, we must be absolutely neutral. If we try helping one group over another, we will be accused of meddling and betraying the core principles of democracy. We would also give the candidates we like best the kiss of death.
More generally, we must address the problem of America's wretched standing in the Arab world by admitting mistakes, reengaging in the Middle East, and holding higher officials accountable for the disgrace of Abu Ghraib. This is a tall order, requiring, as the president might say, a good deal of hard work. It will also require leadership that is smart, not stubborn; pragmatic, not ideological; and that will both earn and return respect in the Middle East and around the world.
There is no magic solution to the crisis in Iraq, but as I said, there is a bright side. The people of that country may be angry, but it is clear that most of them want for themselves what we want for them – democracy, prosperity, and peace. They will never get that from the insurgents or terrorists, who have nothing to offer their followers except defiance and death. Logic says that the insurgents will have trouble maintaining support, but logic does not always prevail over emotion in circumstances such as these.
It's also worth remembering that the Transitional Administrative Law, which protected Kurdish interests and was forward-leaning on women and human rights, will have no standing once a new government is elected. A year and a half after the fall of Baghdad, there is no constitution and no agreement on the basic rules for governing the country. All that hard work is still ahead.
Realistically, we must understand that we may end up with a flawed and fragile regime that opposes our policies and embraces values different from our own. We may not come close to meeting the promises made at the outset by President Bush. But I still believe we can eventually succeed in helping Iraq to become reasonably democratic, moderately stable and more or less united. That success will not come inevitably or easily or cheaply or soon, but we must not give up. Although the war in Iraq was a war of choice, not necessity, winning the peace is a necessity and not a choice.
Thank you all very much.
Madeleine Albright: I now would be delighted to respond to any questions you have. One of the best parts about no longer being secretary of state is I can actually answer your questions.
Edward S. Walker, Jr.: Perhaps I can start the questioning. You have indicated a very good roadmap for dealing with the Iraqi situation, but it would strike me that one of the missing ingredients in this entire structure has been diplomacy. I wonder if you could speak a little bit about the importance of diplomacy. You mentioned it in dealing with the other countries. We tend to be reliant on our military, and that bothers me a lot.
Madeleine Albright: I think that the hardest part about this is to go back and see how little diplomacy was actually used. I think that those of you who know me and have heard what I said – during the Clinton Administration, we called for regime change. I did that in March 1997, in a speech at Georgetown. We also were very robust in the use of force, in terms of how we continued to bomb in the north and south, the no-fly zones. In a number of periods during the time that President Clinton was in office, we did use force against Iraq. But we also worked very hard diplomatically to keep the Coalition together. I must say, that's what Skip and Ned and I did at the UN on a daily basis. Nobody ever said that Saddam Hussein was not all the things that President Bush said he was. I think that I actually made more statements against Saddam Hussein than George Bush, because I did it for eight years.
I do think the hardest part for us was when the inspectors were kicked out in 1998. Therefore, I thought it was a great diplomatic victory for President Bush when the inspectors went back in. But there was no building on the diplomatic part of that, which would have required a lot of retail diplomacy in terms of making sure that during a period that the inspectors were working, that we could build an international coalition. I think the lack of work at that period poisoned the well in many ways, in the way that the rest of the world is feeling about Iraq. So that, for one.
I think now we are in a deep hole. The first thing you have to do when you're in a deep hole is stop digging. I think what we need to do is to try to figure out how to use diplomacy more effectively – that is, in the region itself, by making clear to the countries in the region that they also have a role and a responsibility. I think that one of the things that is happening with the Bush Administration, while slow, they are in fact learning some of these issues. Secretary Powell has talked about the fact that there is now plans for a regional summit of some kind and trying to get people involved. He was particularly talking about the importance of getting the Syrians to help on controlling the porous borders. Yesterday, Secretary Rumsfeld said that they weren't doing their job. So I think there's some question about [that].
Diplomacy, as you know, Ned, is not a one-time thing. You have to do it all the time. You can't expect that people will just respond very quickly. So there's diplomacy in the region. There's diplomacy with the allies. I think an understanding that the organizations of this world, whether it's the UN or NATO or the Arab League or various groupings, can be helpful. Our allies are not Lilliputians trying to tie down Gulliver. They are force multipliers, and diplomacy is required to get them along.
Edward S. Walker, Jr.: I'd like to paraphrase some of the questions here. One of them is related to the peace process, which President Clinton worked so hard on, which you worked so hard on. But a number of people in this administration have indicated that the road to Jerusalem lies through Baghdad. We certainly haven't heard much about the peace process lately. I wonder if you could comment on that question of the relationship between the peace process and Iraq.
Madeleine Albright: I really do think that the administration got it backwards on this – not that the road to Jerusalem is through Baghdad, but active work on the Middle East peace process in fact would have helped the process not only in Iraq but throughout the Middle East. There were a lot of people who felt that President Clinton went to Camp David because he wanted a legacy. That is not why we went to Camp David. It was because Barak wanted to push, in the last months that President Clinton was in office, and we had spent a great deal of time with the Palestinians and we were very close to peace. It is easy enough for me now to look back and say mistakes that were made. We made some mistakes, I think, by not involving enough of the moderate Arabs in the whole process.
But for me, the biggest mistakes have been made since, which is that this famous Roadmap has never really been taken out of the glove compartment. We are not working along any task. The U.S. is not really involved. President Clinton and I, and Dennis Ross and Ned, all spent an incredible amount of time on the Middle East peace process – daily meetings and hundreds of trips to the region. While we did not get a peace, the number of people who died, either among the Palestinians or the Israelis, was infinitesimal in comparison to what is going on now. The U.S. does need to be actively involved. A couple of speeches and fly-bys do not do the job.
I personally – and this is a personal opinion – believe that what happened with Arafat was a mistake. Arafat was impossible to deal with. I spent more time with Arafat than I ever wanted to, or thought I would. I think I got to understand him a little bit. He was incapable of making the decisions that he had to at Camp David, and what was interesting was that the Palestinian team of negotiators were frustrated with him. There was no question about that. I have to tell you, if I were to ask any of you whether you'd like to spend a couple weeks at Camp David, you'd probably say yes. I can tell you, after two weeks in the rain with the Israelis and the Palestinians, I don't care if I ever go back.
But the mood was so bad. Arafat really wasn't capable of making those decisions, and the negotiators kept – you could see they were beginning to marginalize him. I believe that they would have systematically given him president emeritus or some other job. By the Israelis and the U.S. saying they would not deal with him, and then following it up with a bombing of his headquarters, they gave him what he wanted most in life and what is his best role, which is to be a victim. All you have to do is remember the picture of him in his bombed headquarters, with the flag and the candles and CNN, and you knew that he was where he wanted to be. So I think that has been a mistake.
I would think that what needs to happen now is obviously a much greater role for the United States, with the help of the Europeans – but ultimately, we are the ones that need to be there. And also to involve the region – I think the Egyptians (also one of your assignments) can play a more productive role.
Edward S. Walker, Jr.: There have been also, in commenting before the war, and I think you mentioned it as well, the concept that if we can turn Iraq into a democratic society, this would have enormous influence on changing other societies – Iran, Saudi Arabia and others. Iran is looming as a huge problem for the next president, no matter who he is. I wonder if you could give us an idea about what you think we should be doing about Iran. Is this an area for preventive action, military action, diplomacy, sanctions? Perhaps you could talk a little bit about Iran.
Madeleine Albright: I have developed a new term for those countries that are part of the "axis of evil" – they are the "axes." Iran is one of the "axes." I think that the messages that have been sent out on Iran are confusing.
There is no question that it is a difficult country to try to figure out what the relationship should be. We spent quite a lot of time, actually, in a diplomatic minuet or ballet with them, responding to some of the initiatives or statements that President Khatami made, frankly without much success. We tried a number of different tacks. I personally was involved with them, in terms of giving speeches that were signaling and lifting some sanctions. Because our goal here is to get them to stop supporting terrorism, not have a nuclear weapon, and be more – at least not oppose the Middle East peace process – those are pretty large obstacles from their perspective, in terms of getting a normalized relationship with them.
But I believe that it is absolutely essential for us to move towards some kind of a more engaged position with them. I do not think it is acceptable for them to have a nuclear weapon. The question, I think, is whether they are legally entitled to have nuclear reactors for peaceful purposes. Someday I would love to teach a course on the unintended consequences of foreign policy decisions. The biggest one, I think, was the way that we dealt with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but you could also make the argument that President Eisenhower's "atoms for peace" speech has had lingering effects, where it is legal for a country that is a signatory of the Nonproliferation Treaty to have peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is very hard to draw the line between when they are developing highly enriched uranium for reactors for peaceful uses versus getting ready for a bomb.
What I think is very important and interesting is what I think should be happening as a division of labor between the Europeans and us. The initiative that the three foreign ministers – from Germany, France and the United Kingdom – took, to go to Iran and really look at what they were doing and try to get a better idea about how the IAEA, et cetera, could work, with us in the background, is a very good idea. I think we need to pursue this relationship between the EU doing the heavy work and us looking in some way at attempts to have some kind of engagement with them.
I am definitely of the theory, having spent four years at the UN and four years as secretary, that we are better off engaging with countries that we don't like. It is very hard to deliver messages to countries when you don't talk to them. You have arms control agreements and various relationships with your enemies, not particularly with your friends. So I think some engagement with Iran, based on quid pro quos and trying to get them to give up the idea of having the highly enriched uranium and trying to take the waste from that – there are a number of ideas out there – I think is worth pursuing.
There are a lot of students in this audience. They watch Jon Stewart on "The Daily Show." He basically said that – he calls Iraq "Mess-o-potamia." He says, you know, Iran is more dangerous than Iraq, and the president just got the last letter wrong. It's just from N to Q. What we should have really done is bomb Iran.
Edward S. Walker, Jr.: I wonder if we could turn to something that Senator Kerry has talked about, and that is that Iraq essentially was the wrong war, or at least the way it was pursued was the wrong way and it's now a disaster. But he would put the emphasis more on terrorism and Al Qaeda and the war that we're engaged in there, and that Iraq tends to be a distraction from that. I wonder if you – I'm sure you do agree with Senator Kerry, but I wonder if you could elaborate a bit on this question of terrorism, how it relates to the war in Iraq, and whether we're indeed engaged in a clash of civilizations.
Madeleine Albright: As some of you probably noticed in my remarks, when I was secretary of state, I said that I had all my partisan instincts surgically removed. They have clearly grown back, as I'm sure you've noticed.
I think what we have seen here is that it was not Saddam Hussein or the Iraqis who hit us on 9/11. I think it's very interesting to look at the various statements of the administration at various times about the connection between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein and 9/11. They have changed a bit. The people who hit us came from Afghanistan. Al Qaeda had its base in Afghanistan. This attempt to conflate Afghanistan and terrorism with Iraq, I believe, has been a major diversion.
Afghanistan – I hope that their elections work at the end of this week. I think it's going to be very important. President Karzai is a remarkable leader. But given the difficulties he has in moving around his country, one can say that he's the mayor of Kabul. He was subjected to an assassination attempt when he went into one of the provinces. So Afghanistan is far from finished. The Taliban is resurging. The warlords have a great deal of control. The poppy crop, which produces massive amounts of opium, is not just bad in terms of the health of the world and drug consumption, but provides the money for the terrorists. So that is part of the disaster.
So the job in Afghanistan is not finished, and by diverting our resources, not only our forces but our intelligence capabilities, I think that we have not finished the job in Afghanistan.
Iraq, for me, is a different question, which is that there is no doubt, as I said earlier, that Saddam Hussein was a horrible person and that he was doing terrible things. I actually believed he had weapons of mass destruction. But I did not think that they were an imminent threat and that we should take our eye off the ball in Afghanistan. The important point here was to finish the job in Afghanistan. I actually believe that while certainly Saddam Hussein was not benign, what happened was that this war has created more terrorists and has made Iraq a recruiting ground and a magnet for all those who hate us. So I think not only was it a diversion, but definitely the wrong war at the wrong time, in the wrong place. The fact that there was a real war to fight in Afghanistan, and it's not finished, has made the problem more serious.
Edward S. Walker, Jr.: I wonder if we could turn to Sudan, where incredible problems have cropped up. I wonder if you have any thoughts on what the policy should be toward the Darfur crisis and whether you think the administration is pursuing this crisis with the energy that is necessary.
Madeleine Albright: I hate to kind of keep going back all the time to our life in the UN, but I think we all sat there and were stunned and appalled by our lack of ability to do anything on Rwanda. It is so ironic that on the tenth anniversary of Rwanda, when there have been all kinds of retrospectives and documentaries and a lot of finger-pointing and blame-placing, that we are now in the middle of something which is, for want of a better word, rolling genocide. It is going on as we speak. In Rwanda, the problem was that we couldn't do anything fast enough, even if we had wanted to. As I say in my book, I wish we'd fought harder, but the truth is that we couldn't have done anything, because it was a volcanic explosion. Hundreds of thousands of people were killed instantaneously.
In Darfur, we are seeing something that is going on in front of our eyes and we are incapable, for some reason, of dealing with this, because all of a sudden Sudan is kind of interesting to us because of oil. Also, because there was – and I must say, this is positive – some agreements between the North and the South on issues about shari'a law and the existence of people in the South. But we are ignoring this issue and saying that the African Union can take care of it. Now, it is a big step forward that the African Union, with President Obasanjo of Nigeria as the chairman, has said that it does have a role to play in Darfur, but it can't get there. I think that this is a time that the international community – and I personally believe, this is my personal view – that the Americans need to supply the logistics and generally to get us there. Because if this goes on, we will all be apologizing again for this. If the African Union is now prepared to go, it needs to go in.
The problem is that the UN is slow on this. There are those on the Security Council that have problems with it. I think this is where diplomacy really does come to work, and you've got to push. The issues are how you handle the diplomatic work and what support the United States is prepared to give to the African Union.
Edward S. Walker, Jr.: Madame Secretary, when we were in office still, we had talks with the Turkish foreign minister about the Palestinian peace process. He was very helpful at times. Do you think there is a role for Turkey in the peace process, and would that role be enhanced if it were made a member of the EU?
Madeleine Albright: Just on the absolute facts here, I think Turkey needs to be a member of the EU. I have felt that from the very beginning. I find, having spent quite a lot of time looking and working on Turkey at various times, it is a pivotal country. It has a fascinating government at this point, which is one of a secular Muslim state, and I think has in fact begun to follow the track on the various standards that the EU has set. I have made statements in Turkey and to the EU saying that Turkey does have to follow out on these standards, but the EU cannot keep moving the goalposts.
So I do think, just on any aspect of this, that Turkey does need to be a member of the EU. But as the EU so reminded President Bush, we are not members of the EU, so we cannot tell them what to do. But a suggestion is that in the long run they would be better off taking Turkey into the EU, because if they don't, the European countries are already – they will either have Turks in Europe or they will have Turkey in the EU. I think it is absolutely essential.
I do think that it is possible for them to play a useful role in the Middle East peace process, but I continue to go back and say that, for better or worse, it's the U.S. role that is key, and that we are the ones that are needed in there. We can't cede that responsibility to either the EU or the Russians or the Egyptians or the Turks.
Edward S. Walker, Jr.: There are a couple of questions here about the role of other Arab countries in the region and what they should be doing in terms of support for Iraq's democracy and reconstruction. Also, how we should frame our relationships with the Arab world. In particular, one question has arisen in this campaign period about Saudi Arabia and how we should be dealing with the Saudis, considering the importance of Saudi Arabia to oil production and this country. I was wondering if you could make a few comments.
Madeleine Albright: I do think, as one goes back and reviews things, I do wish that we had pushed harder on some of the issues of reform within the Arab countries. It was not easy and I think that we, in fact, kind of missed the boat on that. I spent a lot of time with the Saudis, as you know. I have some trouble always criticizing them, because in fact when we were in office, they did do a number of things behind the scene that were very helpful. So I don’t know whether they're doing those kinds of things now. So I think one has to be a little careful.
On the other hand, I happen to believe in the long run that countries that have input from their people and are moving in a democratic direction are actually more stable than autocratic regimes. Therefore, it is important to keep pushing for reform in even the moderate Arab countries.
I think one of the issues that we all have to deal with, and I know this is a perfect audience and conference to be dealing with this, is that we have very little understanding – except maybe for you, Ned – of the Arab world and how it relates internally, how Muslims feel about each other. We cannot fight extremism without the help of Islamic countries and the Arabs in particular. Therefore, a great deal of work has to be done bilaterally with all of these different countries, and to systematically work toward some kind of democratization.
Let me explain something, because it's important in terms of vocabulary here. I'm proud of many things that we did, and I'm especially proud of what we did on democratization. The Community of Democracies that we had in Warsaw in the summer of 2000 is something that I have a great deal of pride in. I do actually believe that all of us are the same and that everybody ultimately wants to make decisions about his or her own life. It begins at a lower level, as to where you live or school or job or whatever, and then moves up to trying to make decisions about your own government.
The differences between me and some of the statements that have been recently made by the Bush Administration is you cannot impose democracy. Imposing democracy is an oxymoron. You have to offer democracy. I'm chairman of the board of the National Democratic Institute, which is part of the Endowment for Democracy, that has a Republican Institute and a Democratic Institute and a business and a labor one. The point of those institutes is to offer the tools of democratization. We are on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq, working at the grassroots. So I am all for democracy in these countries, but it cannot be the imposition of American democracy brought in by occupying forces.
Edward S. Walker, Jr.: As you said in your remarks, our standing in the region is wretched. People are inclined to believe virtually everything – we went into Iraq because of the oil, we wanted their oil – but many of them believe that we went into Iraq not to remove a threat to the United States but to remove a threat to Israel. They go back to the 1996 paper that – I guess it was Richard Perle wrote for Bibi Netanyahu, urging that Israel take on Iraq. I wonder if you could give a little bit of perspective that we might pass on to our friends in the Middle East about our own interests and the relationship to Israel and Iraq.
Madeleine Albright: Let me back up quite a lot. President Clinton told me to read many things, but one book especially he said I had to read, and it was called "The Peace to End All Peace," by David Fromkin. It describes the creation of the Middle East after the First World War and how the Ottoman Empire disintegrated, and how in fact the Western allies dealt with the Ottoman Empire. It's a great book because it really is the background to everything that's going on. The thesis of it is that the Middle East was created as a result, in shorthand, of the fact that the British and French bureaucracies lied to each other. These artificial countries were created and the whole aspect of the borders became very complicated. When we were talking with the Israelis and Palestinians or with the Syrians, we were talking about lines that were established in 1921. So background like that, I think, is very important for understanding. Then, of course, the creation of Israel as a country added on to this complication, created an area that was filled with instability and insecurity, and in many ways unfinished business, in terms of what was happening in the 20th century.
I personally find it very hard to believe – I don't want to believe – that we went into Iraq for oil. I don't know anymore, but I have said very many times that I personally do not believe that was why we went in.
I do know for a fact, and all of you do also, that the United States has a special relationship with Israel. It is one that has been created by history and culture and the fact that Israel is the only functioning democracy in the area and is under threat. I think what the United States wants is to have Israel respected in the region and safe. I don't think, however – I don't agree with Richard Perle on anything, so I would not agree on this.
But I think that clearly the problem – the truth is, I don't know why we went into Iraq. I really don't. I have read every book I can on the subject. There clearly was some other agenda here, but I don't know what it was. I do know that there are all kinds of theories – that this is a result of a fight that actually happened in the first Bush Administration, where some of the people lost the fight about how far to go in Iraq and they in fact did continue to meet throughout the time that we were in office. I do know that they wanted us to invade Iraq in 1998 and create a beachhead for Chalabi. I know all that. But I still wonder why it had to happen now. I don't really know. But I hate to think it's about oil and I hate to think that it is only about the way that Richard Perle describes our relationship with Israel.
What we need to have for not only the stability of the United States but for the stability of the world is a Middle East that is relatively democratic and stable and part of the international system, and not just a source of oil and trouble.
Edward S. Walker, Jr.: I was with a group of people from the Gulf the other day, and I was asking the question of how we might restructure America's message to undercut some of this hostility and so on. They basically said there wasn't any opportunity to do so anymore, that the feeling was so intense.
I'm going to throw a political question now. I wonder if you believe that this attitude might change if Senator Kerry is elected president.
Madeleine Albright: Obviously.
Let me say this. I was unbelievably proud to serve at the United Nations behind a sign that said "The United States." I know that Ned and Skip felt the same way. It's quite incredible to sit there behind that sign. I was very proud to serve as secretary of state. I, to the best of my ability, told the truth about things and felt very proud of our human rights record.
I think the combination of the lack of credibility that has come about because of the non-existence of the weapons of mass destruction – and it isn't just that they aren't there. I don't know where they are. As I said, I thought they were there by deduction, because the inspectors had not finished their job and not all the weapons had been accounted for. It's conceivable that they were there. But what this administration did was manipulate the facts to make it seem as if they were an imminent threat, and they were not, because the sanctions had actually worked. Iraq was debilitated.
So our credibility and the president's credibility, and unfortunately the credibility of the secretary of state, is very much in question. Therefore, the credibility of the United States is. Our moral standing has been damaged to an incredible extent by Abu Ghraib, and the fact that those hearings did not really produce anything and everybody is still in office is unacceptable.
So – to make a political speech – accountability will come on November 3. I think that it will make a difference if there is a different president, because people in – not just in the Gulf, but in various places – would not understand why we would reelect somebody that has not told the truth on this issue and has – in fact, our credibility has been destroyed with Abu Ghraib.
I think that Senator Kerry would be better, but I have to say the following thing – even Senator Kerry, this will be very hard. I think that people that we've all talked to know that it will take a long time to rebuild the reputation of the United States, that it will require a great deal of work and a great deal of openness and a great deal of honesty and a lot of diplomatic efforts, because as I said, we are in a hole. I travel a lot. You all travel a lot. I think it is very hard to explain what it is we did. But I think, what I have said, it is necessary to have Senator Kerry as president but it is not sufficient. We are all going to have to work if we want to rebuild the relationship in the Middle East and with Europe.
That is why I think the kind of work that your institute does makes so much difference, because I have a tendency to believe that whatever I'm doing is more interesting than what I've just finished doing – a little hard to say when you've been secretary of state. But I do think that personal ties and track-two diplomacy and exchanges – and I also have come to believe that the role of business is very important in developing these kinds of relationships, that in many ways our businesspeople are as good ambassadors as real ambassadors – I learned this when I was secretary – because businesspeople are on the ground on a daily basis dealing with real issues.
So I think the response to all of this is that we all have to work on something, where the United States' credibility has been deeply damaged. I happen to believe in the goodness of American power. I said we were an indispensable nation and we are, but we can't do it alone. That is what the next years are about.
Edward S. Walker, Jr.: Madame Secretary, thank you very much for your comments.
Madeleine Albright: Thank you.
About This Transcript: Madeleine Albright delivered the keynote address at MEI's 58th Annual Conference, October 5, 2004.
Speaker: Madeleine Albright served as Secretary of State of the United States from 1997 to 2001. She was the first woman Secretary of State and the highest-ranking woman in the history of the United States government. She currently serves as chair of the Albright Group, chairman of the National Democratic Institute, and a member of the board of directors of the New York Stock Exchange.
