Russian Middle East Policy

Russia in the Middle East: Is Putin Undertaking a New Strategy?

Robert Freedman — Thu, 10 Feb 2005 12:00:00 -0500

Following the rumored signing of an arms agreement with Syria and the creation of a new Palestinian leadership with a possibly increased role for the "Quartet," Russian involvement and interests in the Middle East are again of key importance. Dr. Robert Freedman is Professor of Political Science at Baltimore Hebrew University, visiting Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University and the author of numerous books on Russian policy towards the Middle East, including "Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970" and "Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy Since the Invasion of Afghanistan." Dr. Freedman will explain Russia's strategy and the principles of its foreign policy and provide case studies of the intricacies of Moscow's policy toward Iran, Iraq, Turkey, the Arab-Israeli Conflict, and Syria.

Meet the Author: Shafiga Daulet, author of Kazan & Moscow

Shafiga Daulet — Tue, 21 Oct 2003 16:00:00 -0400

Shafiga Daulet was born to Kazan-Tatar parents in Manchuria where she spent her childhood in the far east during WWII under Japanese occupation and is now a lecturer on Middle East Politics at the University of Connecticut. Her recently published book, Kazan & Moscow: Five Centuries of Crippling Co-Existence Under Russian Imperialism explains the unique history of Tatarstan, an economically vibrant region that boasts a substantial Muslim population. She will draw from her personal experience and research to explain why Tatarstan is one of the most advanced and prosperous of the 21 republics of the Russian Federation.

Tajikistan: A Small Country With A Grand Culture

Dr. Muriel Atkin — Thu, 25 Sep 2003 16:00:00 -0400

Tajik society was changed profoundly in some ways by decades of Soviet rule but in other ways went remarkably undisturbed. Dr. Muriel Atkin of the George Washington University will examine the tensions between tradition, enduring Soviet influences, and post-Soviet reform in Tajikistan, with special regard to national identity, politics, the economy, and Islam. Dr. Atkin holds a PhD. from Yale University, and her publications include Thwarted Democratization in Tajikistan, Tajikistan: Reform, Reaction, and Civil War, and The Ambiguous Position of Women in Tajikistan.

Russia in the Middle East: Is Putin Undertaking a New Strategy?

Robert Freedman, Professor of Political Science, Baltimore Hebrew University — Thu, 10 Feb 2005 12:00:00 -0500

Russian policy toward the Middle East in the last two years has sought to limit terrorism and Western influence, encourage economic reform, and protect the former Soviet republics that make up Russia's “soft underbelly.”

President Putin took two main steps towards gaining legitimacy and support for his fight against terrorist groups originating from the breakaway Russian republic of Chechnya. Russia sought to gain Saudi legitimization of Russian policy in Chechnya and obtain membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). By defining terrorism in terms that both Saudi Arabia and nations of the OIC could accept, Moscow continued to gain regional support in the form of humanitarian aid and strengthened partnerships. Yet increased international support against terrorism failed to gain Russia membership in the OIC, and Putin’s anti-terrorism strategies have shown limited signs of success because they offer diplomatic cover rather than a solution to the real problem of Chechnya.

As the United States relaxed its initial decision to deny reconstruction contracts to countries that did not support the initial invasion of Iraq, Moscow saw an opportunity to advance Russian policy through three objectives. By what Dr. Freedman called “playing both sides,” Putin planned to first recover as much of the debt Iraq owed to Russia as possible. The second goal was to capitalize on as many trade deals as possible with the post-Saddam Iraqi government, and the third was to internationalize the Iraqi situation so that the United States would not dominate. While Russia has received nothing but promises from Iraqi and EU governments to write off Russian debts, the recent Iraqi elections bring hope that these promises will be fulfilled.

Rising fears of Iran “backing down” on the international nuclear non-proliferation agreements as set out by the IAEA and EU-3 (Germany, France, and Britain) have left Russia with a dilemma. Recently, Putin took a firm stance against Iran’s nuclear weapon aspirations in the hopes that he could continue the Bushehr reactor project while ensuring Iran’s development of nuclear power for peaceful purposes. Yet while Russia has postponed the completion of the Bushehr nuclear reactor, Iran has not been convinced that it is not in their best economic and diplomatic interests to independently produce nuclear fuel. If Russia fails to figure out how to use tepid support for Iran while maintaining its own independence from Western interference, Russia will not accomplish its regional economic goals, and Russia’s “soft underbelly” will be exposed.

Russian relations with Israel “cooled” as Putin’s tilt towards the Arab side became more obvious. Although the bilateral Israeli-Russian relationship has been strengthened by trade and the conditional support of Sharon's plan for unilateral disengagement from Gaza, Russia ignored promises to include Israel’s concerns in the Roadmap to Middle East peace. Disagreements with Israel included Arafat’s role in the peace process, peace efforts with the Quartet (the United States, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations) after Arafat’s death, the construction of Israel’s security fence, and Israel’s anti-terrorism measures in Gaza and the West Bank.

In 2004, Russia and Turkey experienced increased economic cooperation that translated into improved diplomatic relations. Although Russia supported Greece over Turkey in the Cyprus conflict, disagreements over oil and terrorism were resolved. The common business interests and “multi-vectored” policy between Russia and Turkey have proven positive and profitable especially in light of deteriorating U.S.-Turkey relations. As all sides work on transforming old relations into viable policies that do not solely pay lip service to cooperation, Russia may well be on its way to once again becoming a great power.

Oil: Market Fundamentals Versus Geopolitical Realities

Dr. Herman Franssen, President, International Energy Associates — Thu, 5 Feb 2004 12:00:00 -0500

Dr. Franssen emphasized the importance of the Middle East to the global energy supply and demand. He looked at current rates of production and concluded that the production capacity of Middle Eastern countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Iraq, overwhelmingly surpasses those of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The Middle East has more than half of the world’s share of oil reserves and has yet to produce at its maximum capability. The world dependency on Middle East oil, combined with the International Energy Agency (IEA), not only creates higher market prices and a shortage of strategic reserves, but also will make IEA “a less powerful instrument” in case of severe oil disruptions. Using BP statistics, Dr. Franssen illustrated how US dependence on oil imports nearly doubled between 1973-2002 and suggested a similar pattern of increasing dependence was likely to continue over the next 25 years.

Since the oil shocks of the 1970s, levels of preparedness to deal with significant oil supply disruptions have significantly improved. Factors such as excellent market transparency, futures markets, IEA emergency stocks of 1.4 billion barrels, US supply reserves of 640 million barrels, past experience with management of oil crisis, and the decreased importance of oil to GDP, help make the global market more prepared to deal with future major turbulence in the sector. For example, the supply disruptions of Venezuela and Nigeria during 2003 had less impact than expected.

Dr. Franssen identified IEA and its strategic oil reserves as one of the two pillars of oil market security, Saudi Arabia being the second. Such oil import dependence poses concerns for supply security, especially as existing US relations with Saudi Arabia are currently under strain. Dr. Franssen explained that the “neo-cons” in the US are seeking alternative possibilities for energy security, looking to places such as the “new Iraq”, Iran, and Russia. All of these countries have been considered as counterweights to US dependency on Saudi Arabia. However, there are serious problems with all of these alternatives. With Russia’s halted plans for a Yukos-Sibneft merger and declining interest in foreign partnerships, it seems that President Putin is trying to centralize control of the oil sector. Similarly, the current security situation, the destruction of oil pipelines, ethnic tensions in the Shi’ite south, and the uncertainties of Iraq’s future government makes it an unreliable source of stability for future oil markets. America's turbulent past with Iran, and basic Iranian domestic political uncertainties, make the US reluctant to depend on it as a secure source of oil. Franssen observed that the failure to identify a future reliable supplier means that the US may have taken the dangerous turn of allowing its relationship with Saudi Arabia as a dependable resource to deteriorate before establishing feasible replacement oil sources.

Dr. Franssen concluded that although IEA is “still standing,” it is not likely to be very effective in the case of major oil disruptions. Additionally, it seems that the perceived second pillar of oil strength, Saudi Arabia, is slowly beginning to crumble. After comparing Europe’s consistent oil demands with the United States' steadily rising demands, Dr. Franssen urged that we not take the current oil availability for granted.

Putin's Middle East

Robert O. Freedman, Ph.D. — Wed, 11 Jun 2003 12:00:00 -0400

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Russian Federation found itself competing with the US for influence in the Middle East. Russia has maintained close ties with Iran, despite concerns over the US and over Iraq because of its oil resources and strategic location.

IRAQ: Vladimir Putin has followed policies towards Iraq similar to those of former president Boris Yeltsin. Prior to the defeat of Iraqi president Saddam Hussien's regime, Russia's goals were to secure the $8 billion owed them by Iraq, protect Russian business interests there with full or partial lifting of the UN sanctions, and pursue future contracts, especially in the oil and gas sector.

Putin's policies have focused on strengthening the Russian economy. Russia has at least one major advantage over the United States in the region: it has maintained diplomatic relations with both Iran and Iraq in recent years. After 9/11, Putin's willingness to cooperate with the United States increased. As war with Iraq approached, Putin faced a clear dilemma: how to maintain good relations with the US while protecting Russia's business interests in Iraq and the rest of the Middle East?

Putin adopted a dual-track strategy. His overt aim was to prevent war by calling for a unified decision to go to war by the United Nations Security Council. Additionally, he sought to prolong the crisis to keep extra income flowing into the Russian economy thanks to higher oil prices, important to the speed with which Russia continues to pay down its international debts. Meanwhile, Putin has worked hard to maintain good relations with the United States and the Iraqi opposition to ensure that Russian oil companies will continue to have access to Iraqi oil.

IRAN: Russia has been Iran's primary supplier of military equipment, including a nuclear reactor, and has resumed arms sales despite the Gore-Chenormydin agreement of 1995 in which Russia had agreed to end all arms sales to Tehran by 1999. Putin has made few concessions to the US over Iran: in fact, Russia has acted as a diplomatic buffer for Iran against the US. The Bush Administration asked Russia to help slow down development of an Iranian nuclear plant at Bushehr, with the aim of such pressure to have the Iranian government return spent nuclear fuel to Russia which could be otherwise used to develop nuclear weapons. The US also wants Iran to sign on to the additional protocol of the IAEA as a prerequisite to receiving nuclear fuel from Russia in the future.

Russian-Iranian relations have been hampered by dispute over oil production in the Caspian Sea, in addition to US pressure following 9/11. President Khatami's election in May 1997 also brought a surprising challenge to the Russian-Iranian relationship, as it signaled a possible rapprochement between Iran and the US and contributed to a new domestic policy for "liberalization and reform" within the Middle East.

TURKEY: With ties to Greece improving and the possibility of joining the European Union looming, Turkey has become an attractive economic partner for the states of Central Asia and thus to Russia. Until the 1998 Russian economic collapse, Turkey was Russia's main economic partner, with trade ranging between $10 - $12 billion a year.

Russia faces several obstacles to improving its relations with Turkey. Close military ties between Russia and Armenia worry Turkey. Turkey wants the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline and is willing to finance this route, which would attract Western oil companies to ship product from the Caspian Sea that way and divert the use of Russian pipelines.

In conclusion, Putin's actions can be read in light of a general goal to maintain (or reclaim) Russia's political status by regaining real economic power.

Assertions and opinions in this policy brief are solely those of the above mentioned speaker(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.

US Challenges and Choices in the Gulf: Iran and Proliferation Concerns

Sun, 15 Sep 2002 12:00:00 -0400

I. The Proliferation Picture in the Gulf: A Tough Neighborhood

The Gulf region is beset by historical rivalries, competition for regional influence, territorial disputes and explosive conflicts. These factors create a dangerous strategic environment in which many key regional actors look to defend their national interests by pursuing weapons of mass destruction (wmd) and ballistic missiles.

This regional attraction to wmd poses serious problems for U.S. policymakers. It represents a clear and present danger to U.S. interests, troops and allies in a region with vital oil and gas deposits, a pivotal geographic location and a volatile recent history. Iraq is currently the center of attention in Washington and at the United Nations (UN) because of the combination of Saddam Hussein’s determined efforts to acquire wmd and the disarmament obligations imposed on Iraq by the Security Council in 1991 and thereafter. In contrast, Iran’s wmd development programs remain largely unknown and unchecked. They were the main subject of a recent Congressional Staff Briefing organized by the Atlantic Council of the United States, the Middle East Institute, the Middle East Policy Council and the Stanley Foundation.

Focusing Attention: The Clear Iraqi Threat Versus the Ambiguous Iranian Proliferation Picture

Iraq is considered to have clandestine nuclear weapons programs, biological and chemical weapons stockpiles and short range (1000 kilometer) ballistic missiles. UN weapons inspections confirmed the existence of these in the early and mid 1990s and the Iraqi government’s past missile attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia, as well as its chemical weapons use against both Iran and its own people, have been well documented.

Though concrete information on Iranian wmd programs is relatively unavailable, Iran is widely believed to have clandestine nuclear weapons programs, biological and chemical weapons stockpiles and medium range (1000-3000 kilometer) ballistic missiles. In addition, as a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (npt), Iran has legally commissioned Russian firms to complete a German-designed nuclear power plant at Bushehr and is negotiating with Russia for the supply of additional power reactors. The relative ambiguity of Iran’s wmd programs combined with U.S. suspicions regarding its Bushehr project raise the basic question of Iranian regional threat perceptions. How does Iran view its security situation, and how are these views linked to the current Islamic regime in Tehran? What are the linkages with the conventional or wmd programs of Iran’s neighbors?

II. The Proliferation Picture in Iran

The Legacy of the Iraq-Iran War

Iranians view Iraq as one of the foremost threats to its security. Iran fought an eight-year war with Iraq (1980-1988) during which Saddam Hussein’s forces employed chemical weapons and conducted massive missile attacks on Iranian cities. The international community largely stood by, content to sell weapons to both combatants. This history of wmd attacks on Iran by Iraq (and even of tacit international support for Iraqi war efforts in the 1980s) lead Iran to the conclusion that it must provide for its own defense, making acquisition of missiles and wmd relatively more attractive.

The View from Tehran: Other Regional Considerations

Iraq aside, Iranians live in a threatening strategic environment. Across the Gulf, to the Southwest of Iran, Saudi Arabia is a signatory to the npt and a strong advocate of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. However, it possesses Chinese CSS-2 missiles with a range of 2,600 kilometers and, since the end of the Gulf War, the Saudi government has invested heavily in upgrading its military. (Military expenditures accounted for 13% of the Saudi gdp in fiscal year 2000, some $18.3 billion.)

Though Israel does not border on the Gulf, its policies and armaments are viewed as a major threat by many in the region and are often a standard against which others’ military programs are designed. Israel possesses nuclear weapons, though it has not signed the npt. Indeed, Gulf states such as Iran and Iraq cite Israel’s nuclear capability as justifying their own need for nuclear weapons, though this is but one of the motives behind their programs. In addition, Israel maintains medium range ballistic missiles (1000-3000 kilometer) and is believed to have chemical and biological weapons stockpiles.

Recently, the U.S.-led ouster of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan has yielded a large concentration of U.S. forces in countries that border Iran. U.S. forces are currently based in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and elsewhere in Central Asia. These developments are seen as threatening Iranian security because of the possibility of strategic encirclement by foreign powers or by states in the region such as Pakistan, which has both nuclear weapons and a recent history of tense relations with Tehran.

Given the above considerations, even a future end to Saddam Hussein’s rule in Iraq and a clear termination of Iraq’s wmd programs would not entirely mitigate Iran’s security concerns. Iranian leaders see their country as the natural leader in the Gulf region and will continue to wish to ensure that they have the military as well as other sources of power to play this role. Not only does Iran see Iraq and Saudi Arabia as challenging its position, but Iran and Turkey compete for regional influence and the United Arab Emirates disputes Iranian ownership of three islands - Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Mussa - located at the entrance to the Gulf. Iran also maintains a cooperative-competitive relationship with Russia; Russia sells Iran armaments and nuclear reactor technology, though the two vie for influence in the Caspian region and central Asia.

Iran’s Strategic Goals

Broadly, Iran’s foreign policy is aimed to ensure:

§ Its political independence;

§ Recognition of its territorial integrity and;

§ Recognition of its leadership role in the region.

Iranian leaders probably reason that possession of wmd (particularly nuclear weapons) will help them achieve these goals. wmd appear to offer dependable and relatively inexpensive protection from external threats, especially as Iran’s conventional forces are not all that strong, and would increase Iran’s regional clout vis-à-vis Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Israel. For these reasons, wmd are likely to remain an attractive option to Iran’s leaders - regardless of who is in power - and some experts even argue that under a new nationalist regime Iran’s nuclear program might advance more rapidly than it has done in recent years under the regime dominated by the Islamic clerics.

III. U.S. Challenges & Choices: Managing Proliferation Issues with Iran

Recognizing Limitations

If Iran’s leaders remain determined to pursue wmd, the United States will almost certainly be unable to prevent them from acquiring nuclear weapons, short of overt military attack, in view of Iran’s oil wealth and extensive human resources and international networks. Moreover, with no direct government-to-government relations (and almost no unofficial presence in Iran because of U.S. sanctions), Americans have little first hand knowledge of how the Iranian government and public currently think about wmd. As a result, the United States has little ability to engage influential Iranians in discussion about security issues in the Gulf. Iranian development of nuclear weapons, for example, could spark a nuclear arms race in the region, which would further threaten Iranian national security. Regardless, Iranians appear more seized with internal problems related to the mismanaged economy and to the invasive social strictures imposed by the clerical regime. Reform is badly needed and the government tries to divert the attention of its people by focusing on the threat posed by the “Great Satan.”

Coercive efforts by the United States, mainly in the form of unilateral sanctions, have proven ineffective in compelling Iranian leaders to give up wmd options. Many experts believe that even with U.S. sanctions in place, Iran has enough money to spend what it chooses on wmd development. By this logic, a lifting of U.S. economic sanctions - which have in any case proven less effective over time - need not automatically lead to higher Iranian spending on wmd or ballistic missiles and would likely provide better U.S. access to Iranians.

Another limitation on U.S. policy options is the U.S. government’s recent rejection of a proposed strong verification regime for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (bwc). In so doing, the United States has effectively precluded the possibility of international inspection of suspected Iranian biological weapons facilities and reduced U.S. diplomatic credibility in regard to international weapons inspection generally. By contrast, the Chemical Weapons Convention (cwc) already benefits from a strong verification regime; it is unlikely, however, that the U.S. government would challenge Iran over suspected violations as such action could expose the United States to similar, retaliatory Iranian challenges.

Ways to Increase U.S. Influence in Iran

Improved relations between the United States and Iran are not likely until Iran resolves the internal contradictions between the policies of its clerical regime and the will of its people. In the longer term, however, many experts believe that the Iranian people will gain increasing control over their lives and, eventually, over their foreign policy. The United States is evidently quite popular among the people of Iran and normal relations might be quickly restored if such an option were put to a vote.

In the meantime, the United States should pursue many of the strategic interests it shares with Iran, such as energy security and combating terrorism, international crime and illegal drugs. It can also work to reduce tension in the region. For example, the United States could make known to Iran general U.S. objectives vis-à-vis Iraq and warn Iranian ships of U.S. exercises in the Gulf. There are probably also opportunities for cooperation with Iran in rebuilding Afghanistan and, quietly, for dealing with Saddam Hussein.

In the near term, due to the lack of trust between the two parties, such cooperation is improbable. Building trust would require, at a minimum, a toning down of rhetoric on both sides. Iranian leaders should reduce public incitements to “crush” the United States (and to destroy Israel) and U.S. leaders should reconsider the utility of labeling Iran a rogue state. Even limited U.S.-Iranian engagement could give the Bush administration valuable information and leverage - a better understanding of events in Iran and a greater potential to influence them.

Delaying Iran’s Acquisition of wmd

Ultimately, Iranian leaders will decide whether and how far to pursue wmd and ballistic missiles. Given the limited influence of the United States over these decisions, U.S. efforts in the short term must instead focus on working with potential suppliers of critical technologies, particularly Russia, to limit their exports to Iran. Though a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime, Russia provides the bulk of Iranian nuclear and missile technology. U.S.-Russian rapprochement over the fight against terrorism, along with Russia’s entry into the new G8, suggests the utility of pressing for tighter Russian export controls. The Russian government is well aware of U.S. concerns and it has indicated that any fuel provided for Iran’s nuclear reactor will be returned to Russia for reprocessing - thus reducing the chances that some may be diverted for nuclear weapons.

U.S.-Russian cooperation could also provide the opportunity to develop a “trust-but-verify” approach to Iranian wmd and missile development. For example, the United States might drop its objections to Russia’s nuclear energy contracts with Iran, provided that Iran agree to return all its spent fuel to Russia for reprocessing and to accept the more intrusive advanced safeguard inspections approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea). Such an agreement would help Iran maintain its international bona fides as fully compliant with its npt obligations. In turn, this renewed U.S. commitment to international treaty verification would help empower the iaea and provide a valuable conduit for U.S. efforts to track Iranian activities.