Education

Studying Arabic Is Not Politics

Shukri Abed — Thu, 3 May 2007 12:00:00 -0400

It has been more than 70 years since President Elect Franklin Delano Roosevelt uttered the sentiment that we have “nothing to fear but fear itself” and yet his admonition still bears repeating.

Recently criticism has been directed at a secondary school that will soon open in New York City. The Khalil Gibran International Academy, set to open in September, has a mandate to “prepare students of diverse backgrounds for success in an increasingly global and interdependent society,” and to equip graduating students “with the skills they need to become empowered independent thinkers who are able to work with cultures beyond their own.” Inclusive in this mission is a curriculum of intensive Arabic language studies.

Some critics somehow see the study of Arabic as akin to political radicalization. Sadly, the refrain is all too familiar. We’d hoped it had been put behind us as our nation strove to overcome the forces of xenophobia and intolerance that threatened to pull us apart after 9/11. When was the last time anyone unleashed such criticism at schools which teach intensive French, Spanish, Mandarin or Hebrew?

It is not unheard of for certain curricula to bear the brunt of criticism by overzealous traditionalists, but it is still extremely disappointing to see unfounded exaggerations about Arabic studies carelessly hurled about in an apparent attempt to generate fear and cause concern. If such rhetoric dissuades even just a few students from studying Arabic then it will be unfortunate. If it succeeds in creating new, or perpetuating existing stereotypes and phobias then it will be a shame.

As technology and travel shrink the distances between us, it is illogical to cut ourselves off from our global neighbors and shut our minds and hearts to learning about and from them.

Such failures will not go unnoticed. The Iraq Study Report reported that the US Embassy in Baghdad, with a staff of 1,000 had just 33 Arabic Speakers with only six of them able to converse fluently. The Report went on to argue that US interests in Iraq suffered because of the lack of Arabic proficiency at all levels of engagement.

The need for Arabic speakers in America should be readily apparent, and the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC, where our language courses attract more than 1,000 students each year, is fortunate to have serious and dedicated students of all ages. Many of our students attend evening classes only after putting in a full-day’s work at their day jobs in business, government, NGOs, or as full-time students. While we offer courses in Arabic, Hebrew, Persian and Turkish, the language in greatest demand is Arabic.

For them learning a language opens a door into another society. Through proficiency in a shared language, enhanced understanding and appreciation of that society and its peoples can be achieved.

While there has been an increase in the number of students studying Arabic in recent years, the numbers are still anemic when compared to the sheer volume of students studying other languages. These numbers need to rise and it is my hope that students and critics embrace with open arms this language while checking their political baggage at the door.

As a native speaker of both Arabic and Hebrew, I have studied the Koran, the Torah and the Talmud, as well as the Bible. I respect all three religions as well as the great thinkers of the civilizations that spawned these sacred works.

It is my hope that my students and anyone willing to expand their knowledge of the world around them will share my reverence for these cultures as they acquire the language skills to engage in person-to-person interactions with those who speak the languages we teach.

Winning the Battle but Losing the War

Edward S. Walker, Jr. — Fri, 13 Aug 2004 12:00:00 -0400

The Chairman of MEI’s Board of Governors, Wyche Fowler, and I were deeply disturbed by the extreme reaction we encountered in the business community in Saudi Arabia in December toward the United States and toward the Administration’s visa and immigration policies. The sense was that our primary institutions are prejudiced and not particularly interested in the problems of others or in the facts. In this article, I wanted to highlight a particular critical issue they raised that does not get much attention from our media.

The United States is losing the battle for public opinion in the region for many reasons. But one of the most practical reasons, and probably the easiest to fix, is the restrictive visa policy and the hostile behavior of some of our officials at our borders which have prevailed since September 11, 2001.

According to our Embassy in Riyadh, visa applications in Saudi Arabia have declined by 70 percent since before September 11. Applications in the Arab world as a whole have declined 40 percent. At the same time, the refusal rate in Saudi Arabia has stayed the same at about 2 percent. Saudi businessmen we talked to said they could not do business with the United States given the long lead time for visas, and they would not subject themselves to the indignities of US border controls. They cited horror stories of strip searches, cavity examinations, and long waits off line to be questioned. They admitted that the stories may be exaggerated but said that all that was needed was a single bad incident. In the close knit Saudi business community, such news spreads like wildfire and has a profound impact. The Saudis said that they were moving their business to Europe and noted that British and French tenders now advertised that visas would be accorded within 72 hours. The American business community was deeply concerned that US policies would eat into their bottom line over time. The cost of the new US policy to US business would mount into the billions of dollars.

Even more troubling to the Saudi business community was the drop in student visas. Many families were reluctant to send their children to the United States to study because of the fear of prejudice and ill treatment due to their national origin. Students were transferring to European universities in record numbers. Saudi businessmen pointed out that their ties to the United States had been formed in their university days and that they preferred US suppliers because of this experience. The next generations of Saudi managers will likely look to Europe for supplies and services. In addition, although the United States is advocating democracy, the very people in Saudi and the rest of the Gulf that could lead this effort were the graduates of US universities. Over 60 percent of the members of the Shura Council in Saudi Arabia have advanced degrees from the United States. This is an incalculable asset for those in the region who are advocating economic reform and democratization.

Our Saudi interlocutors were also concerned that the United States, which historically had taken the lead in human rights and democracy building, was now engaging in practices such as detention without trial, trial by military courts, and other practices which it had condemned roundly in the Middle East in the past. As a result, regimes in the region felt they had a blank check to engage in such practices themselves all in the name of combating terrorism. The United States was losing the moral high ground.

Everyone we spoke to understood the need for careful scrutiny of visitors as a result of the terrorist threat. And each one was quick to point out that Saudi procedures were also restrictive. But they urged us to consider measures that would discriminate between a high potential threat and businessmen and students that had a clear record and did not fit a threat profile. For example, they suggested that full time students headed to four-year degree granting universities and to graduate schools could be handled on a special fast track. Such students should be treated differently from those going to special short courses like flying schools that could be used as an access point for short-term terrorist planning or operations. Certainly, businessmen that have been coming to the United States for years without incident should be accorded a different status than a one-time visitor. What these businessmen could not understand was that the United States, with all its technological capabilities, could not devise a faster, more efficient and more consumer friendly system for low threat proven visitors. We had no answer for their questions.

Missing Pages: 9/11 and the Battle Over Textbooks

Eric A. Lukas — Mon, 21 Apr 2008 12:00:20 -0400

Japanese historians Nozaki Yoshiko and Inokuchi Hiromatsu once described school textbooks as an “important site” for “creating and disseminating narratives.” By projecting a specific viewpoint of an event on the impressionable minds of students, the books can “readily reinforce dominant ideologies.” It was while reading an essay by these authors for a class on Asia-Pacific wars that I first became aware of the power of textbooks to not only educate our youth but construct an entire ideological mindset.

An Interview with Iran Conference Panelist Ibtisam al-Kitbi

Dr. Ibtisam Al-Kitbi and Naomi Stone — Tue, 19 Feb 2008 13:45:08 -0500

MEI: Dr. Al-Kitbi, you’ve written and spoken on political and social reforms like education and democratization in the UAE. To what degree are the Emirati people being impacted on the ground by these changes?

Al-Kitbi: The Emirates was the last country in the GCC to conduct elections. In elections, if you look at it, the people ask for more political rights. But you don’t find this here actually; maybe because of the economic situation. It’s not like Bahrain or Saudi Arabia in the UAE. For one, the population (of native Emiratis) is very small; its only 20% of the total population. Another difference is that the Emirates have not had any type of violent incident; when you compare it to Saudi Arabia, there is nothing. There are none of those violent Islamic groups in the Emirates like in Saudi Arabia. So, you cannot say that there is pressure from the inside towards democratization except from some people, like me.

To read the entire interview please download the .pdf file.

Reform at the University of Qatar: A Profile of Female Leadership

Mon, 4 Feb 2008 16:10:21 -0500

The story of the University of Qatar in the last three and a half years is one of success, and the lessons learned from it should be an inspiration for other national universities in the region. This success story is the result of the work of a striking woman, Dr. Sheikha Abdulla al-Misnad, President of the university. Dr. al-Misnad is also a close advisor of Moza bint Nasir al-Misnad, wife of the ruler of Qatar, Shaikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, also a trendsetter in the Persian Gulf. Dr. Sheikha and Princess Moza are also related; Dr. Shaikha is Moza’s aunt.

Dr. Shaikha al-Misnad became President of Qatar University (established 1977) in August 2003, an event making headlines in the Persian Gulf media since she was the first woman to head a national university in the Gulf. Few people had any idea she would change so much at the university in such a short period of time. Her changes aim to make the university more functional and to create an instrument that would support the speedy pace of economic, social and educational development in Qatar.

When Dr. al-Misnad was appointed President of the University, the institution was notoriously dysfunctional. All registered students were virtually assured of obtaining a degree after a few years, even if they did not attend classes regularly. Students who failed tests were rare and cheating on exams was common. Qatari faculty were exempt from any evaluation or scrutiny and were appointed for life while foreign professors, comprising some seventy percent of the faculty, were appointed with contracts renewable every one or two years; they were rarely kept on for more than four or five years, leading to considerable turnover and instability. The fear and sense of insecurity among foreign professors as they faced yearly contract reviews and possible termination without any explanation, made for low faculty morale and opened a window for pressure on grades.

After a year in office, the new President shocked everyone in Qatar when she expelled some 700 students (out of a total of 10,500) from the university. She then retired or fired some 800 employees who were underperforming, doing little work or were otherwise unnecessary. In addition, Dr. al-Misnad reduced the retirement age for Qatari professors from 65 to 60, with the effect of putting some tens of older Qatari professors on retirement. Her actions were considered so radical that she was called before the country’s Shura Council- an appointed advisory body that plays the role of a parliament- to explain her actions in a session that lasted several hours. In the end, the Shura Council could do little to change her course, mainly because she was supported in her reform efforts by Princess Moza, and the Amir himself.

Dr. al-Misnad is trying to reshape the University of Qatar fundamentally and to make it a model for universities in the region, especially those in the six countries comprising the Gulf Cooperation Council. “The University of Qatar, as a national university, should be an important engine for developing Qatari society…. Our university should be a source of experience in Qatar when it comes to scientific research and preparing students for the challenges of Qatar society,” she said in an interview with the author in November 2007. Thus the curricula in various departments were changed so that new ones could focus on the development of Qatar and serve the local economy and as well as the social and political changes Qatar is currently undergoing. “We are trying to make students think and analyze instead of making them memorize descriptive information … the students must know English in addition to the Arabic language…. They must know the history of their country and they should know that they are living in a society based on the exploitation and export of oil and gas. They should also know the impact of changes taking place in the Middle East and the Gulf…. We are trying to change the University of Qatar from a traditional university to one based on international standards,” she said in the same interview.

To transform the University of Qatar into a functional institution, Dr. al-Misnad has decentralized the administration by giving the heads of departments and the deans of colleges more authority and freedom of management. The hierarchical structure of the university was a major problem facing the colleges and departments before Dr. al-Misnad’s reforms. To improve faculty standards, salaries for professors were increased significantly and most important, foreign professors were offered renewable three-year contracts instead of annual renewals. This has raised faculty morale and provided a needed sense of security among the overwhelming majority of faculty who are foreign.

In November 2007, I talked to a number of Qatari students about how they thought things were going at the university. They told me they were aware of the new changes, and also told me that they are learning material that is more practical and that attendance at their classes is higher than the generation before them. Since 2006, Qatari students have established a Student Union and the faculty has formed a Faculty Senate; both of these institutions are innovations in the university’s history.

These university reforms should be understood within the framework of the reform of the entire educational system in Qatar. Since 1998, Princess Moza bint Nasir al-Misnad has made the issue of educational reform in Qatar her central objective. She has been the driving force behind the establishment of Education City, officially inaugurated in 2003. This complex hosts branches of a number of foreign universities (mainly American but including other Western institutions) including Cornell Medical School, Carnegie Mellon University, Texas A and M, and the Georgetown School of Foreign Service, among others. There has also been substantial reform below the university level in grades K-12, including changes to the way teachers are trained; teaching methods in the classroom; reform of administration, and a reshaping of the curriculum. There are two kinds of primary and high schools in Qatar today--the older, traditional schools and the “new, reformed” schools called “independent schools”. Princess Moza aims to have the new independent schools replacing all the traditional schools by the year 2014.

Dr. Shaikha al-Misnad was born on September 30, 1955 in the town of al-Khur in northern Qatar. Her father, Abdulla al-Misnad, was a well-known merchant and shaikh (leader) of the Misnad tribe. Despite his tribal origins and the conservative customs and attitudes of Qatari society in those days, especially toward women and women’s education, he treated all the women in his family well. He encouraged the young Sheikha to study and even to travel abroad for graduate studies after she received her BA in Education from the University of Qatar in 1977. Shaikha al-Misnad then went to England and obtained a Ph.D. in Education from the University of Durham in 1984. She was then one of only a handful of Qatari women with a doctorate in any field. Upon her return to Qatar, she became Assistant Professor of Education at the University of Qatar. Since that time, Dr. Shaikha’s professional career has been tied to the University of Qatar where she became Head of the Department of the Fundamentals in Education in the Faculty of Education (1992); then Vice President of the University for Research and Community Service (2000), and finally President of the University in 2003. Dr. al-Misnad has published extensively in the field of education in Qatar and sits on the boards of several institutions of education in Qatar and the GCC. She has also obtained honorary degrees from abroad.

As President of the University of Qatar, Dr. Sheikha is setting an example for young Qatari women, particularly among her student body. Some seventy percent of the students at the University of Qatar are women. Dr. al-Misnad's message for Qatari women is one of support and encouragement for them to follow their dreams. She says to them, “You have to chose what is right for you. Do not bow to pressure to fit a special role that does not fit you. Do not follow others; choose what is right for you.”

Empowering Saudi Women

HRH Princess Loulwa Al-Faisal — Thu, 28 Jul 2005 13:00:00 -0400

The Middle East Institute is pleased to welcome Saudi Princess Loulwa Al-Faisal to discuss steps being taken to expand educational and professional opportunities for women in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Princess Loulwa has played an active role in promoting women’s education and social family welfare in the Kingdom.

From 1990 to 1999, she helped supervise Dar Al-Hanan School, the first private high school for girls in Saudi Arabia. Since 1999, Princess Loulwa has served as the Vice Chair and General Supervisor of Dar-Al-Hanan School and the Effat College Board of Trustees. Since 1994, she has also served as the President and Chair of the Board of Trustees of Al-Maharat Cognitive and Skill Development Center in Jeddah. She has spoken to audiences around Europe and the United States about the empowerment of women and economic issues.

In order to include as many MEI members and other attendees as possible, MEI will host the event in the Ballroom of the Helen Dwight Reid Educational Foundation.

Educational Reform in Egypt and the Arab World

Ahmad Gamal El-Din Moussa — Mon, 28 Mar 2005 12:00:00 -0500

The talk in Arab capitals is increasingly focused on reform proposals, including modernizing educational systems. As Washington urges its Arab allies, including Egypt, to make drastic and significant changes, lasting reform can only be accomplished by taking into account the cultural, political and religious norms of each specific country.

His Excellency Dr. Ahmad Gamal El-Din Moussa was appointed last year as Minister of Education to spearhead Egypt’s educational reform. Viewed as a technocrat, Minister Moussa hailed not from the ordinary government bureaucracies; rather, he arrived at his post in 2004 after serving as President of Egypt’s Mansoura University. Dr. Moussa was educated in Egypt and France, where he ultimately earned his PhD in Law and Finance.

Dr. Moussa will discuss Egypt’s efforts to reform the educational system, and comment on regional trends and the broader Arab political considerations not commonly focused on in Washington.

The Iraqi Refugee Crisis: Humanitarian and Political Implications

Nir Rosen, Ken Bacon, Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin — Mon, 2 Jul 2007 12:00:00 -0400

Ambassador Wendy Chamberlain opened the discussion by providing context to the refugee crisis plaguing Iraq and its neighbors. About 1.2 million Iraqi refugees are currently residing in Syria, while another 750,000 are displaced in Jordan. About 54,000 and 40,000 have found refuge in Iran and Lebanon, respectively. In addition to the refugees escaping Iraq, roughly 1.7 million have become Internally Displaced People (IDPs) after fleeing their homes for safety elsewhere within the country.

Nir Rosen began his remarks by highlighting the parallels between Palestinian and Iraqi refugees. In his view, Iraqis have become the “new Palestinians,” also threatening to destabilize the Middle East. He noted that Ba‘thists and former regime members fearing reprisals for their association with Saddam Hussayn generated the first wave of refugees. However, not until the outbreak of civil war in 2005 did a mass exodus and genuine humanitarian crisis erupt. Fearing Shi‘a militias tied to the Iraqi government and unable to find refuge in the Shi‘a south, hordes of Sunnis fled their homes for safe haven. Describing the economic and social hardships that Iraqi refugees endure, Mr. Rosen explained that most fleeing Iraqis were forced to sell their possessions in order to secure their financial wellbeing. Due to the high price of private schooling, child refugees residing in Jordan typically do not attend school, and many of their parents can only find jobs on the black market. Relative to Iraq’s other neighbors, Syria has been quite generous toward the displaced Iraqis, offering them the same health care and free schooling afforded to Syrian citizens. However, the refugees’ resettlement in Damascus has spurred a spike in crime and prostitution.

Ken Bacon offered several explanations as to why the Iraqi refugee crisis has received underwhelming media attention. Above all, the American military’s efforts to pacify Iraq have dominated the headlines. In contrast to the humanitarian emergency in Darfur, the displaced Iraqis are not resettled in refugee camps and instead have blended into the urban centers of Iraq’s neighbors, such as ‘Amman and Damascus. Mr. Bacon described the United States’ response to the crisis as “pathetic,” citing the political difficulty for American policymakers to acknowledge the negative repercussions of the war in Iraq. Furthermore, security concerns have prevented the United States from resettling large numbers of Iraqis within its borders. Hoping to resettle 7,000 Iraqis by the end of the current fiscal year, the US has until now only admitted a meager 130 refugees.

Mr. Bacon also outlined how the United States can effectively address the humanitarian crisis in the heart of the Middle East. While working toward a peaceful and stable Iraq that will eventually welcome the refugees home, Washington simultaneously should financially support the host countries that have born the burden of the crisis. Iraqi refugees account for 14% of Jordan’s population — equivalent to an influx of 45 million people into the United States. With only a small minority of Iraqi child refugees attending classes in Jordan, according to Mr. Bacon, the United States should pump money into ‘Amman so as to enable more displaced Iraqis to receive an education.

After offering their initial remarks, the three panelists took questions from the audience. Responding to a question about advocacy efforts to bolster American support for Iraqi refugees, Mr. Rosen pessimistically stated that the United States was “sick” of Iraq and has begun to blame the Iraqis for the chaos enveloping their country. Later, Mr. Bacon explained that “denial and indifference” have contributed to insufficient resettlement efforts in the United States. Unlike at the end of the Vietnam War, the United States has not admitted defeat in Iraq. Washington considers the refugees as simply temporary and thus not requiring resettlement inside the United States.

Clash of Civilizations . . . or One Civilization?

Michael Morgan — Wed, 20 Jun 2007 12:00:00 -0400

Mr. Morgan began by noting that when Americans think of history, they tend to stay within the bounds of their own national narrative. If they need to go further, they look to renaissance Europe or to ancient Greece or Rome. He reminded the audience that classical Islam must be included in this framework, without which there would be an 800-year gap. Mr. Morgan then thanked His Excellency King ‘Abdullah II of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for writing the forward to his book, and His Royal Highness Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid al-Hussein, Jordanian Ambassador to the US, for his additional support of the volume.

Mr. Morgan lauded the Islamic thinkers of a thousand years ago for laying the foundation for digital technology, modern philosophy, pharmaceuticals, civic leadership, and other advancements, while also praising their society’s tolerance of diversity. This period was a wellspring of innovation that is often overlooked. As time passed, explained the former diplomat, new histories were written and old ones forgotten.

He asserted that although Americans and Europeans refer to their culture as “Judeo-Christian,” other histories cry out for inclusion, and Islam is the first among them. Mr. Morgan stressed that he was using the term “Islam” not in a religious sense, but as a cultural and civilizational term. Under this banner he included not just the Abbasid empire of the Arab world, but also Moghul India and Ottoman Turkey. One popular view is that Muslims safeguarded the knowledge of the Roman and Greek civilizations during the dark ages, a concept known as the “refrigerator theory.” Mr. Morgan decried this notion as incomplete and demeaning, contending that Islam also produced a vast array of original ideas, in addition to preserving older ones.

He illustrated his point by relating the stories of several Muslim scholars, derived mainly from translations of authentic primary source texts, beginning with the Persian mathematician al-Khwarizmi. Working from the “House of Wisdom,” a library and translation institute in Abbasid-era Baghdad, al-Khwarizmi was responsible for the diffusion of the Hindu number system in the Middle East and the West. Armed with the concepts of zero and negative numbers, al-Khwarizmi greatly broadened the ancient Greek geometric understanding of mathematics to include these more abstract concepts, leading him to formulate the notion of the algorithm. Because the algorithm underlies all modern software, Mr. Morgan praised al-Khwarizmi’s work as one of the single most influential discoveries in intellectual history. According to Mr. Morgan, the scholars of classical Islam were the first true renaissance men and women, laying the foundation for the European renaissance.

He explained that the flowering of knowledge during this period was attributable to the high status learning was accorded in the religion of Islam, recalling for example the Qur’anic verse which states that “the ink of a scholar is holier than the blood of a martyr.” He opined that, of the three Abrahamic religions, Islam held knowledge in the highest regard. The rise of the great cities of the Caliphate, including Baghdad, Damascus, and Cairo, further aided the development of a large scholarly community. Even as the empire began to fracture, competition among rival regional rulers for intellectual capital continued to elevate the value of knowledge.

Mr. Morgan went on to give brief sketches of other prominent Muslim scholars, including physicist al-Haytham, mathematician and poet Omar Khayyam, and physicians Abu al-Qasim and Mussa bin Maimun. In closing, he stressed the artificiality of the distinction between the West and the Muslim world.

The Future of Iran's Democratic Movement

Ali Afshari — Tue, 23 Jan 2007 12:00:00 -0500

Mr. Afshari began his talk by emphasizing that the democracy movement in Iran is not a new phenomenon. It began in the early 20th century with the constitutional movement, whose supporters sought to establish parliamentary rule in Qajar, Iran, and more recently gained momentum during the presidency of Mohammed Khatami, a moderate who attempted to liberalize Iranian politics. However, this climate of reform ultimately ended with the election of Mahmud Ahmadinejad as President in 2005.

Mr. Afshari explained that the democracy movement is in an inherently weak position in Iran as a result of the governmental structure outlined in the Constitution. The Constitution gives about three-quarters of all political power to the executive branch, which is dominated by the clerical position of Supreme Leader (currently held by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei). In addition, the powers of the elected legislature are hamstrung by an appointed clerical body, the Council of Guardians, which must approve all bills. According to Mr. Afshari, in such a political climate, “the greatest opportunity for reform allowed … is less than the least such opportunity under a Democratic constitution.”

Operating under the current restrictive governmental structure, would-be democratic reformers are forced to adopt a new strategy of political protest. Although the Iranian government would be likely to deny protest permits in response to such a strategy, Mr. Afshari argued that peaceful protest in favor of political reform should occur nonetheless. He labeled this approach a “radical reform” strategy, necessitated by a government that denies political freedoms and human rights.

Mr. Afshari also discussed the current political climate under President Ahmadinejad, whose worldview he described as messianic. President Ahmadinejad has expressed the desire to bring about the coming of Imam Mehdi, a major figure in Shi‘a messianism, and to establish an Islamic world government. In the pursuit of this ideal, he has been more than willing to silence legitimate domestic opposition and block many paths to political reform. In response, Mr. Afshari advocated the expansion of political protests, citing the recent protests against the President at Amir Kabir University in Tehran as an example of the approach that should be taken by the democracy movement.

Another obstacle that reformers must overcome is public apathy, as many Iranians of the middle and lower classes see democracy as simply a luxury of the elite that does not have real-world applicability to their lives. Therefore, in order to succeed, the democratic movement needs to show the people that governmental reforms would substantially improve the lot of the average Iranian.

Focusing on Iran’s relations with the international community, Mr. Afshari noted the increased impact that foreign pressure has had on Iranian domestic politics as a result of President Ahmadinejad’s nuclear program. He outlined three possible outcomes to mounting external pressure on Iran: 1.) In order to gain more control over the domestic population, the government could increase its suppression of dissent. 2.) The government might have the opposite reaction and loosen its restrictions on political freedoms in order to improve its image internationally. 3.) External political and economic pressure could lead to the use of military force and the situation in Iran, particularly in regards to the economy, could become substantially worse.

Mr. Afshari stated that the single-minded focus of the international community on Iran’s nuclear program was not conducive to facilitating a peaceful democratic transition. He elaborated that the status of Iran’s nuclear program is not a daily concern for the average Iranian; therefore, in order to gain popular support, the international community needs to center its protests with the Iranian government on issues that are of more concern the people, such as human rights.

Mr. Afshari concluded by reiterating that democratic reform in Iran faces many obstacles, most notably the natural resistance of the constitutional structure to serious reform and participatory politics. Democracy is not a cure-all for all of Iran’s ills, but it is a starting point from which the Iranian people can begin to improve their country on their own terms.