Islam

The State of Sunni-Shiite Relations in Saudi Arabia and Why it Matters

Reza Zia-Ebrahimi — Wed, 16 Jul 2008 15:17:04 -0400

The ‘Shiite crescent’ has become a popular intellectual shortcut in media and policy circles to explain Muslim affairs. Yet, it is a flawed theory that ignores the complexity of religious, national, local and tribal allegiances that include, exclude or overlap each other in the Middle East. It does not account for a number of factors including the occasional inter-Shiite fighting in Iraq. In an interesting twist, two Shiites – Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – happen to be the most popular leaders in overwhelmingly Sunni Egypt (and probably most of the Middle East) according to a poll conducted by the Ibn Khaldun Center in Cairo. So much for Sunni-Shiite mutual hatred. This theory may be inadequate and over-inflated, but it refers to a real problem of rising tension between Sunnis and Shiites in areas throughout the Middle East.

One crucial but under-discussed arena of Sunni-Shiite relations is Saudi Arabia. Approximately 10 percent of the Kingdom’s population is reported to be Shiite. Since the Kingdom’s establishment in 1932, Shiite rituals have been subjected to significant constraints and Shiites have been marginalised and intermittently repressed. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group have all pointed out the systematic social, political, religious and economic discrimination of Shiites by Saudi state institutions and ulama (clergy). Since 1993, Saudi rulers have attempted some rapprochement by engaging Shiite leaders, although significant advances have yet to materialise.

Sunni-Shiite relations in Saudi Arabia are important for the rest of the Muslim world. Indeed, the Kingdom’s religious establishment often adheres to a puritanical and intolerant version of Sunni Islam and holds sway over many radical Muslim circles thanks to its worldwide network of mosques. As a result, the Saudi ulama bear much responsibility in the propagation of anti-Shiite feelings, but they are also in a strategic position to soothe tensions between the two communities. A radical break with well-established anti-Shiism is unlikely; observers of the Kingdom know that its inhibited culture and desire for total consensus makes Switzerland look like a fast-changing country.

However, there are two reasons to believe that the time is ripe for bold action. First, despite the slight détente in the Kingdom in the 1990’s, tensions have been mounting since the advent of civil war in Iraq and the reassertion of Iranian and Hezbollah influence, increasing alarm about regional Shiite domination. Many young Saudis who engage in jihad in Iraq are motivated inter alia by fervent anti-Shiite sentiments. This heated situation has also engendered an increase in despicable acts of vandalism such as cemetery profanation and the torching of Shiite mosques, threatening the inter-communal status quo.

Secondly, Saudi King Abdullah is investing much hope in his calls for interfaith dialogue. Earlier this month he concluded an interfaith conference in Madrid, which he hopes to be the first step in a sustained dialogue process. Christian and Jewish religious authorities worldwide have been involved and many declared their support for the King’s overture. It is quite an undertaking for the leader of a country that constrains or bans any non-Islamic religious act, sign or place of worship and he has attracted much attention. The legitimacy and credibility of the King’s move will, to a large extent, depend on the state of Sunni-Shiite relations within the Kingdom.

Recent moves indicate that the King is aware of this situation and wants to make advances, even at the price of infuriating some members of the ulama. Twenty two radical Saudi clerics issued a religious edict (fatwa) this month saying that Hezbollah’s fight against Israel in Lebanon is actually a disguise to conceal the movement’s anti-Sunni agenda. They proclaimed that Shiites followed ‘infidel precepts’. Reaction was swift: Mohammed al-Nujaimi, a prominent member of the religious establishment and a cleric one wouldn’t exactly call ‘liberal’, was dispatched last week to mend fences with the Shiites. He met with the leader of the Shiite community, Hassan al-Saffar, and other representatives to condemn the edict. There is good reason to believe that the King was behind this effort. By Saudi standards this is a bold move, as the rulers of the Kingdom are always wary of antagonizing the ulama, who provide them with legitimacy. Anti-Shiite sentiment is one of the main tenets of the ulama’s Wahabbi ideology and the King’s overture is unlikely to be appreciated.

There is good reason to be sceptical about the outcome of the King’s outreach to the Shiite community, but mounting tensions and the King’s interfaith projects have created a state of affairs in which the Saudi Shiite situation cannot be shunned any longer. If a decent modus vivendi is worked out, it can have some impact on Sunni-Shiite relations worldwide thanks to the Kingdom’s special position within the Islamic world, and can reassert the House of Saud over an obscurantist and anachronistic ulama. Inshallah.

Shia Iran Versus Different Shades of Sunnism

Wed, 2 Jul 2008 16:49:34 -0400

Shia Iran is publicly unwavering in its commitment to forge unity among Muslim states. Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is again reaching out to Arab Salafists and Wahhabists and has declared the present Iranian year as the Year of National Unity and Islamic Solidarity. Sunni Saudi Arabia is also emphasizing dialogue. Two recent pan-Islamic conferences have been held in Tehran (May) and Mecca (June) to lessen intra-Muslim differences. However, neither conference produced concrete steps toward achieving this goal.

In May 2008, Tehran hosted 850 Muslim clerics (ulema) and intellectuals from 45 countries for the 21st annual Islamic Unity Conference. The Iranian conference organizers said they wanted to provide a forum for debate among different sects and to push for a charter on Islamic unity. A key facet would be the rejection of takfirism, a school of thought among hard-line Sunnis that considers Shiites as heretics and sanctions violence against them. According to Iran’s state-funded Press TV, the charter had already been signed by 2,000 Muslim scholars by the time of the conference.

Ayatollah Mohammad-Ali Taskhiri, Iran’s Director-General of the World Forum for the Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought, chaired the conference. No senior Salafi/Wahhabi clerics attended, although there were Arab Salafi participants from Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

At the conference on May 9, former Iranian President Rafsanjani – presently chairman of two of Iran’s most powerful political institutions- the Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Council - notably urged the Shia to rethink some of the sect’s beliefs and practices. “You can see how much Sunnis refer to the exaggerated statements in our books and traditions, and accordingly call us pagans,” and that unless “corrective measures are implemented the Sunnis will retain the opinion that Shias are apostates because they see their [Shia] imams as gods, which is not the case.” He also urged Shias to refrain from “insulting Prophet's [Mohammed] disciples, the four Caliphs and those who are regarded as saints by Sunnis”.

Curtailing unorthodox Shia traditions has been a constant feature of the theological debate in Iran since before the 1979 revolution. The matter has become more urgent in recent years due to the rise of Islamic mysticism in Iran, and the emerging reverence in some rural and poor urban communities of Imams Ali, Hussein or Hassan and Fatima al-Zahra, the Prophet’s daughter. A number of Iranian Shia clergy have spoken against such trends, warning that it effectively amounts to kufr (disbelief in Islam) since no human being should be worshipped in Islam.

The state views the religious practices of Islamic mystic Sufi sects as a challenge to the regime’s monopoly on religious authority, which underpins its political legitimacy. Iran has witnessed a number of government crackdowns on Sufi orders since February 2006, which seem to contradict their calls for Islamic unity.

Regardless of motive, Iranian pleas for Islamic unity made little impression on some of Saudi Arabia’s most senior Wahhabi clerics. Twenty-two of them issued an anti-Shia statement on June 1 in which they accused Shiites of abusing Sunnis under their control. "If they [Shiites] have a country, they humiliate and exert control in their rule over Sunnis," and specifically mentioned conditions in Iran and Iraq. "They sow strife, corruption and destruction among Muslims and destabilize security in Muslim countries ... such as Yemen." The tone of the letter is similar to the 2007 statement of Ayman Al-Zawahiri accusing Iranian Shia leaders to be “intent on establishing certain [Islamic] concepts which nullify the intellects of their followers and prevent them from understanding the Quran and Sunna, except through [Shia clergy’s] interpretations and explanations”.

The letter reflected a common sentiment among Saudi Wahhabis, but it was issued only three days before the opening of the inter-faith conference held by King Abdullah in Mecca June 4-7. Bringing together some 500 Islamic scholars and academics, the organizers hoped to present Saudi Arabia and King Abdullah to the West as forces of moderation in the Islamic world. Despite efforts by Saudi officials to distance themselves from the letter, the fact that Saudi Arabia’s indigenous Shia minority was officially banned from the Mecca conference lessened their credibility among the Shia.

Iranian media reported the ban and covered the arrest of eight Shia clergy and community elders in the Eastern Province but avoided any condemnation, perhaps in recognition of King Abdullah’s own struggle with radical Wahhabi clergy within the kingdom. Nonetheless, the intended political message in Mecca was clear. King Abdullah walked into the opening ceremony alongside Rafsanjani who then sat on the King's left, interpreted by Saudi media to mean that the Wahhabi kingdom does not have a problem with moderate Shiites.

The failure of these conferences to produce tangible plans toward Islamic unity is a reflection of the level of suspicion and doctrinal divide between the two main groups, exacerbated by their geo-political rivalry since 2003. Still, these recent Iranian and Saudi attempts should not be dismissed. Ayatollahs Khamenei and Rafsanjani, often deemed as fierce rivals, both judged the events sufficiently worthy to rally behind them. King Abdullah too has maintained the momentum for dialogue in his kingdom despite stiff opposition from some Wahhabi clerics.

For sure, political and not religious motives have been the primary catalysts in both instances. Both Iranian Shia and Saudi Wahhabi clerical establishments continue to contain dangerous sectarian voices that will prove stubborn in their views. Still, in an age when sectarian violence has almost become the norm in Middle Eastern arenas from Iraq to Lebanon and from Pakistan to Yemen, these two leading Shia and Sunni states can ill afford to let others take the initiative.

Lifting the Headscarf Ban in Turkey: Where do we go from here?

Fri, 15 Feb 2008 15:38:39 -0500

On February 9, 2008 the Turkish Parliament voted to amend the constitution, thus permitting women to wear the headscarf when entering the university- another step in the long-running dispute over secularism in Turkey. Devotees of Turkish secularism, who support the view that expressions of attachment to religion have no place in the public arena, will not quietly accept the change in religious behavior which the Islamic-oriented politicians have now voted to enact.

The first line of defense for the secularists will be to rely on the opposition Republican Peoples Party. Despite the fact that it lacks enough deputies in Parliament to prevent enacting the amendment, the party has pledged to take the issue to the Constitutional Court. Indeed, the head of the court warned politicians against softening the ban on headscarves in a speech on February 7. The Republican Peoples Party and others will argue that provisions entrenched in the Constitution prohibit changes to the secular nature of Turkey’s political scene. Though the chances of success are unclear, it will at the very least embitter relations between secularists and advocates of outward forms of Islamic piety. And polls have shown that those who favor freedom to wear a headscarf represent more than half the population of Turkey.

The argument will no doubt reflect clashing legal interpretations. Already we see that the Turkish legal community has held contentious meetings over whether the headscarf ban can legally be circumvented. In the end, the argument may hinge on this amendment’s proposed form of headscarf wearing. According to strict Muslim etiquette, no hair can be visible on a woman’s head. The ruling party in Turkey, on the other hand, is arguing that they instead would oblige those who wanted to cover their hair to wear a kerchief tied under the chin, thus making it difficult or impossible to cover every lock of hair. This is said to be a Turkish style and not necessarily an Islamic display. While its proponents argue that this reasoning could pass muster for secularists, it is unlikely to be accepted by either side. Secularist women in particular fear that this is the first step toward eventually forcing all women to cover their hair.

Although outnumbered, the secularists have several important political forces on their side. In addition to warnings by members of the courts, rectors of some of Turkey’s leading universities have gone so far as to complain that easing the ban would “turn Turkey into a religious state.” In accordance with this view, some university professors and others of the educated elite are determined to frustrate the ruling party. There is talk that they would be ready to expel headscarf wearers from their classes regardless of what the law and Constitution might permit. Were that to happen, it would inevitably entail more bitter legal battles and acrimony on campuses all over Turkey.

Of course, the main question that hangs over this dispute is the behavior of the military. Despite the fact that much of the officer corps has its roots in rural Turkey, normally the bastion of devotion to Islam, the senior generals have purged the ranks of any who do not appear to subscribe to the secularism of modern Turkey’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Accordingly, the military has been among the most extreme opponents of relaxing the ban on headscarves. In witness to this attachment to secularism, the generals called out tens of thousands of secular Turks last year to show solidarity in support of Turkey’s secular regime.

This year, top leaders of the military have been more circumspect. The Chief of the General Staff recently told the press that everyone knew where the military stood and thus it was not necessary to make any new pronouncement. While the military leadership has so far remained on the sidelines, secularists- particularly women- rallied just before the Parliamentary vote in demonstrations against a lifting of the ban on headscarves. It seems likely such demonstrations will continue along with court challenges.

Turkey thus appears to be in the midst of a disorderly process. While the military is likely merely to watch and wait, after their bluff was called when last year’s parliamentary election returned in favor of the Justice and Development Party, its supporters to continue to find ways to resist. To do more, however, would risk disrupting the course of negotiations to enter the European Union, which both Islamic-oriented parties and secularists favor. And the military knows that ruling Turkey is no job for the soldiers.

When We Withdraw, Will Saudis Heed a Sunni Call to Arms?

Wayne White, Adjunct Scholar, Middle East Institute — Fri, 8 Dec 2006 12:00:00 -0500

If Iraq descends into a full-blown civil war during or following the withdrawal of American-led coalition forces, would Saudi Arabia be compelled to intervene?

The Saudis have come under mounting pressure to give Iraqi Sunni Arabs the wherewithal to stand up against Iraq’s Shi’ites and Kurds, especially the former. Riyadh has so far resisted this pressure. But it also has signaled its alarm over the deteriorating situation in Iraq, especially should events move toward a more clear-cut threat against Iraq’s Sunni Arab community in the context of a more generalized civil war.

In a civil war scenario, tens of thousands of Iraqi Sunni Arabs not yet involved in the violence would almost certainly step forward to defend their cities, towns and neighborhoods, probably transforming the Sunni Arab insurgency into something more like a popular militia, a process already underway in certain hard-pressed Sunni Arab communities.

Increasingly aggressive Shi’ite militias, and much of the Iraqi police so often affiliated with them, are viewed by Iraq’s Sunni Arabs — and probably also by Sunni Arab governments nearby — as violently anti-Sunni and backed by Iran. And the Iraqi army, predominantly Shi’ite and Kurdish, though relatively better behaved to date, could pose a similar problem for Sunni Arabs should a full-blown civil war take shape.

The Saudi leadership has been alarmed by the spiraling violence in Iraq and very much fears a withdrawal of coalition forces. In an effort to shield itself from the increasingly dangerous Iraqi maelstrom to the north, the kingdom has already begun work on an elaborate defensive barrier along its border with Iraq. But beyond the fear of spillover, Riyadh is deeply concerned over the potential emergence of an Iranian-dominated, Shi’ite-led state inside Iraq.

Saudi assistance in a civil war scenario would most likely come in the form of robust financial aid, not actual Saudi military forces. And perhaps never before has the kingdom been better positioned to come forward with substantial amounts of money for such an effort. The high price of oil has swelled the kingdom’s coffers to a degree that could not have been imagined only several years ago.

That said, Riyadh would have to be very careful in funneling such aid to Iraq’s Sunni Arabs. It would have to be done in a manner that would best ensure the money reached the more nationalist and less militant Islamist Iraqi insurgents, not groups like Al Qaeda in Iraq. Should fanatical Sunni Islamic elements gain still more strength in the course of a civil war, they could eventually pose as significant a threat to Saudi Arabia as they do now to Iraq’s Shi’ite population.

The Saudis are surely not alone in their concerns about the implications of the emerging struggle inside Iraq and the likelihood of a major, post-American withdrawal civil war. Jordan also would come under intense pressure to aid the Sunni Arab cause in Iraq under such circumstances. The king had his lines out to figures close to the insurgency as early as 2004 (primarily to see if they could be persuaded to peacefully join the mainstream Iraqi political process), and Jordan’s top military brass has close ties to Iraq’s former Sunni Arab military elite, some of whom already play major roles in the insurgency.

Consequently, despite occasional tensions between the two monarchies, outside assistance to Iraq’s Sunni Arabs could become, to some extent, a Saudi-Jordanian affair. The Jordanians would be of considerable use to Riyadh in the movement of munitions into western Iraq and in helping to steer Saudi financial aid into the hands of less irresponsible and more familiar elements associated with the former Iraqi military.

Egypt, the Arab world’s most important producer of military hardware and ammunition, also could become a significant player. Although more distant, Cairo shares the concerns of Amman and Riyadh with respect to the expansion of Shiite and Iranian power in the region. In addition, Egypt’s military industrial complex is always on the prowl for lucrative contracts. And Egyptian military industry can produce basic Soviet-era weaponry, with which Iraqis are most familiar.

A major canard heard frequently with respect to a struggle among Iraq’s Kurds, Shi’ite and Sunni Arabs is that the Sunnis would be unable to hold their own militarily because they have no oil. As noted here, it is quite possible that the Sunni Arabs would get just what they need to pose a formidable challenge regardless.

Iraq’s Sunni Arab community also contains the bulk of Iraq’s pre-war officer corps, as well as tens of thousands of former soldiers from elite formations of the old army such as Special Forces units and the Republican Guard. To the extent they could be provided with the hardware and munitions needed to confront Iraq’s Shi’ites and Kurds, these former military cadres would likely perform with great skill and tenacity.

Additionally, in a struggle of considerable magnitude, Shi’ite and Kurdish oil exports would come under attack by Sunni Arab saboteurs in any case. In fact, Iraq’s oil infrastructure already has suffered considerably as a result of repeated attacks on pipelines and other facilities by Sunni Arab insurgents.

Ironically, robust outside assistance to Iraq’s Sunni Arabs probably would, in turn, compel Iraq’s Shi’ites to turn increasingly to Tehran for similar assistance. Consequently, the very tendency most feared by Iraq’s Sunni Arab neighbors would likely be reinforced by their intervention.

There would, of course, be vigorous efforts, especially on the part of the United States, United Kingdom and United Nations, to pressure outside parties like the Saudis to refrain from contributing to such a bloody showdown in Iraq. The Saudis and other nearby Sunni Arab governments, however, could prove highly resistant to such entreaties.

If the United States were to lead a withdrawal of coalition forces from a destabilized Iraq, leaving Iraq’s minority Sunni Arabs particularly exposed, some Sunni Arab states would probably feel that Washington had abrogated its responsibilities concerning Iraq and left them little choice but to take measures to defend their own perceived interests accordingly.

The Implications of Iraq

Edward Walker — Fri, 20 Oct 2006 12:00:00 -0400

The United States has been a stabilizing and balancing force in the Middle East for many years. But when we broke up the existing balance of power in the region by toppling Saddam Hussein, we broke the Sunni hammer lock on the population of Iraq and opened the way for Shia resurgence as well as for the extension of Iranian influence and power in Iraq and, most recently through Hizbullah in Lebanon. We exposed fault lines in the Middle East centered in Iraq and hidden by the borders of an artificial state. It was the natural fault line between Sunni and Shia that has existed for centuries, as opposed to the borders drawn by the British for the convenience of its colonial empire.

The fault lines are not about terrorism. What we are witnessing is the clash within the Islamic civilization between the Shia and Sunni interpretations of the Koran, of Islamic history, of tradition and of culture. It is also a clash of power and privilege: the result of years of second-class citizenship for the Shiite plurality in Iraq. Now it is pay back time. And finally, it is a clash of nationalism between Persian and Arab nationalities. . In a broader context, it is also a clash between a radical, intolerant version Islam that seeks a purity of faith that has not existed in centuries, if it ever did, and those who believe in a different more tolerant, more modern Islam.

This is not to say al-Qaeda terrorists have not made use of the disintegration of security and stability in Iraq. They have. They have replaced the training grounds of Afghanistan and Sudan with the live-fire experience of Iraq. They have used Iraq to hone their tactics and develop new ways to cause American casualties. They are learning lessons in tactics and weapons that can be applied elsewhere against other targets, like Saudi Arabia, or Jordan or Egypt. They have capitalized on anti-American anger in the region and in expatriate communities in Europe as an effective recruiting tool. The recent NIE report confirms these suspicions.

When the President says that if we walk away from the problem, Iraq could become an even greater breading ground for international terrorism – he is correct. The President would also be correct if he said the US would lose deterrent power against the terrorists, if we are seen to be “cutting and running” in the President’s terms. In fact, the President has magnified the negative effect of withdrawal by so characterizing it. But even in the absence of withdrawal, the fact that it appears that we have been unsuccessful in achieving our objectives is giving terrorists around the world heart.

What the example of Iraq is doing, thus far is offering encouragement to radical Islamists and other terrorist wanna-bes. Because we have not yet been able to bring the violence under control, meet the challenge of asymmetrical warfare, or defeat the insurgency, we have encouraged the aspirations of other militant groups in the region, like Hizbullah and Hamas.

We will, of course, survive Iraq as our real power is represented by our economy, our technology, our entrepreneurial spirit. And our military will still leave us predominant in the world. But in the process we will have lost a psychological edge.

We may lose an even more important asset than the presumption of our military superiority if people in the world begin to doubt our leadership and our ability to carry out our promises. That is the real risk for America. America’s global image of powerful and rightful leadership is a major asset, , which we cannot afford to squander.

The question we have to ask is where our interests and those of our friends will be most affected. It seems to me that we have two choices: either to find a way to back out of our heavy engagement in Iraq so that we can take on the other, possibly greater challenges in the region, like the Palestinian issue and Iran. Or, we can roll up our sleeves and focus all of our attention on Iraq to accomplish the task the President has set – to build a real democracy there.

If the stakes are as great as the President contends, then it is time to abandon the failed tactics of minimal forces and inadequate investment. These are the questions I hope the administration is asking itself now and the questions we need to be asking ourselves as a nation.

Medical Metaphors and the Middle East

Paul Scham — Fri, 28 Jul 2006 12:00:00 -0400

Numerous pundits – not to mention government officials and generals – talk of “eradicating”, “cauterizing”, or “surgically removing” terrorism in one country as if once the last terrorist is removed, then a healthy polity can rejuvenate. In fact, there is not a single instance in which Islamist-based terrorist groups or ideologies have been eradicated by campaigns of this sort. Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Gaza Strip come quickly and uncomfortably to mind.

These references have proliferated in Israel’s current campaign against Hezbollah, and, incidentally against the people and infrastructure of Lebanon in which it is embedded. Many Israelis have described it as eradicating the “cancer” of Hezbollah (echoing, perhaps unconsciously, the words of Iranian President Ahmadinejad, who refers to Israel as a “cancer” in the Muslim world), and have emphasized the “surgical” nature of Israeli air strikes, despite the hundreds of thousands of refugees they have produced. The strategic tragedy, alongside the human one, is that a campaign reflected in unrealistic metaphors used to describe it, is almost certain to fail.

Presumably the medical metaphors are meant to show that if the terrorist cancer is not completely removed, it will grow back rapidly. Half or 99% measures will not help. Thus, drastic military action is the only kind that will allow a healthy organism to rejuvenate.

Like many organic metaphors referring to political life, this is based on reasoning that is fallacious – often dangerously so. If there is one thing that the twentieth century should have taught us, it is that ideologies cannot be stamped out militarily. This does not mean, of course, that countries cannot be utterly defeated, especially when their ideologies are peculiarly nationalistic. Thus, Germany and Japan were successfully subjugated in World War II and were moved, initially by force, onto the path of democratic development and full participation in the international community. But communism, for example, was a much more widespread ideology that could not be crushed by purely military means, and it finally collapsed primarily through its own contradictions. It was contained and fought with varying degrees of success, but never eradicated until the vast majority of its adherents finally concluded it simply did not work.

Violent Islamism is even more difficult to combat, since it is embedded in a huge, ancient, and legitimate religion. The Islamist strategy also includes various positive political and social facets, especially the provision of desperately needed social services that are rarely provided by corrupt and dictatorial regimes. Apart from these positive aspects, the negative elements of hatred of the west, Jews, and Israel, and a conspiratorial explanation for Islamic and Arab decline and weakness, all provide a worldview that fits the existing perceptions of many Arabs and Muslims. It should also be remembered that Shi’ite Islam – and Hezbollah is a Shi’ite organization – has historically thrived in adversity since its origins in the 7th Century. And Lebanon’s population is estimated as 40% Shi’ite.

None of this is meant to imply that violent Islamism is not dangerous or cannot be fought. It is dangerous and must be combated. But the idea that a “surgical” operation based primarily on military force can have a significant effect on it, even in one country, is simply wrong. There is no successful example that can be adduced.

Thus, the Israeli campaign is likely to backfire.

Presumably, it will significantly reduce the number of Iranian-supplied Hezbollah rockets aimed at Israel, which is not bad. But the cost – of making Hezbollah and similar Islamist groups an even more important force in the Islamic world - may vitiate much of this. Given the weakness of the Lebanese government and its army, it is hard to imagine that the borders of Lebanon can be hermetically sealed against a new flood of weapons coming through Syria, whether or not Israel eventually accepts an international force as part of an eventual cease-fire.

What Israel did not do before launching its campaign was to try to make common cause with the majority of Lebanese who are vehemently opposed to Hezbollah. Of course, there was no guarantee that this would have succeeded, but it would have created much more understanding, had a military campaign followed. Instead, however, Israeli actions have made the ideological fight against Hezbollah and its sister organizations much more problematic and difficult in the long run.

The Battle for Islam

Edward S. Walker, Jr. — Wed, 12 Oct 2005 12:00:00 -0400

President Bush has outlined a strategy for fighting terrorists who are trying to "enslave whole nations and intimidate the world," saying that "defeating the militant network is difficult because it thrives, like a parasite, on the suffering and frustration of others."

He spoke of the U.S. battle against extremist ideologies and described Iraq as the central front against terror. When he spoke at the United Nations Sept. 14, he said that "this war will not be won by force of arms alone. ... We must also defeat them in the battle of ideas."

I remember after 9/11, when it was considered unpatriotic for Americans to suggest that poverty, lack of opportunity and absence of hope play a part in the terrorist cycle. It has taken a long time for Americans to recognize publicly that terrorism does not simply spring from the minds of a few religious fanatics and that the human condition plays a part in creating ground where terrorists can be cultivated.

What Mr. Bush did not dwell on is another battle that is going on today to defeat terrorism - the battle within Islam. And it may prove to be the most important battle of all.

It is a battle being spearheaded by King Abdullah II of Jordan, and it has the solid support of other Muslim leaders around the world.

Jordan issued the "Amman Message" on Islam Nov. 9, nearly a year ago. It spoke of those who claim to belong to Islam who have "done gruesome and criminal acts in its name." It preached the message of tolerance, brotherhood and humanity, upholding what is good and forbidding what is wrong.

It denounced extremism and condemned "fighting against non-fighters - no assault on civilians and their properties, on children in their mothers' laps, on students in the schools, on older men and women." And the statement concluded, "On religious grounds, on moral grounds, we denounce the contemporary concept of terrorism."

It was a strong statement, but on its own it would have meant very little. So the king took the Amman statement to the International Islamic Conference in July. With participants from Muslim countries around the world, the conference represented the broad spectrum of religious scholars from the different schools of Islam.

The conference, in King Abdullah's words, "agreed that religious edicts [fatwas] cannot be issued by people lacking the proper qualifications and religious knowledge" (like Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq). The king added: "We intend to revisit education and media roles as well. The ultimate goal is to take back our religion from the vocal, violent, and ignorant extremists who have tried to hijack Islam over the last hundred years. They do not speak for Islam any more than a Christian terrorist speaks for Christianity."

True to his word, the king is in the forefront of educational reform in Jordan. His actions are being mirrored in other countries as well. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia recently allocated $3.3 billion from his country's oil-revenue surplus for modernizing the Saudi educational systems and curriculum. At the same time, he has taken a leading role in a Saudi campaign to delegitimize the preaching of those who support bin Laden's false theology.

The battle is not over. Even if we are successful militarily and can make inroads on poverty and hopelessness, the Jordanian king and other Muslim leaders have their work cut out for them to win the battle for Islam.

In the Pew Global Attitudes project report released in July, 57 percent of Jordanians said they believed that violence against civilian targets is often or sometimes justified. Compare this to Morocco, where 79 percent said it is never justified. In most Muslim countries surveyed by Pew, with the exception of Jordan, "support for suicide bombings and other acts of violence in defense of Islam has declined significantly." That is encouraging news.

It is important for the countries of the world to continue to join with Mr. Bush in putting pressure on the terrorists, in draining their financial resources, in digging them out of mountain redoubts, and particularly in changing the conditions of poverty and hopelessness.

But the final battle will be fought within Islam itself. So we can take comfort in the allies we have, the kings and presidents in the Muslim world, who are stepping up in their leadership of this battle of ideas.

Why Is Federalism Rare in the Middle East?

Michael C. Dunn — Fri, 12 Aug 2005 12:00:00 -0400

The completion of an Iraqi constitution has been delayed in large part because of a debate over whether the state should be a federal one, as the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) had defined it, or a unitary one. Kurdistan has enjoyed autonomy since 1991 and remains insistent on a federal system. But, many Sunni Arabs fear that too much federalism would undermine the unity of the state and exclude them from sharing the oil revenues from the fields located in Shi‘ite and Kurdish regions.

The quarrel over federalism is larger than just Iraq. The Middle East is a mosaic of minorities and ethnicities. Many minorities are small or geographically dispersed, such as the Christian populations of the Arab world, or the groups of ethnic Circassians found in the Levant. But many others are significant communities with geographical cohesion -- the Berbers in North Africa, the Kurds in the Middle East and the non-Arab populations of southern Sudan.

The presence of substantial ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities in many countries has long been a problem. A federal system granting a reasonable amount of regional autonomy would seem the natural solution. And yet, only a handful of federal experiments have succeeded.

The United Arab Emirates, in fact, is the one truly federal experiment in the Arab world that has worked over a reasonable period of time. It is something of a special case. Of the seven emirates, only Abu Dhabi and Dubai might be able to make it on their own as independent states. The others are too small and in many cases too poor, but in a loose confederation with Abu Dhabi and Dubai they have become part of one of the world’s most prosperous states.

Sudan now is experimenting with a new federal system. Sudan's earlier attempt at federalism, from 1972-1983, collapsed after the central government essentially reneged on the deal. Sudan’s new federal arrangements are still untested. The fierce rioting that followed the recent death in a helicopter crash of Southern President (and national First Vice President) John Garang is not encouraging. Besides, the peace plan gives the south the right to secede entirely in six years if the federal system does not work. The Sudanese experiment is a daring one but it is far too early to proclaim it a success.

Other attempts at federal systems have usually been linked to the chimeric efforts at Arab unity in the 1960s and 1970s. To give one example, Egyptian domination of the Syrians was so thorough under the United Arab Republic (1958-1961) that it led to the union’s break-up.

Why have federal systems mostly failed in the Middle East? The answer may be found in the tradition of centralized authority and, perhaps to a lesser extent, in past Arab nationalist ideologies.

Centralized authority has been the rule. Traditional governance in the Middle East has long centered on the major cities. When local regions did enjoy a certain autonomy, it was usually because of the inability of the central government to enforce its rules. In some of the region’s more mountainous terrain, autonomy was often the result of natural defenses that aided local resistance.

In much of the Arab world, the tradition has been reinforced in more modern times by autocratic regimes and systems under which provincial governors are appointed by the capital, not by local authorities. Autocrats worldwide tend to favor centralized authority over local autonomy. Consider the refusal of Spain under Francisco Franco to even acknowledge the linguistic rights of Catalans, Basques or Galicians, all of whom today enjoy regional autonomy. Consider too the fact that all of China, despite its size, has only one time zone: Beijing’s.

Federalism also has to confront the role of Arab nationalism and identification with a perceived al-watan al-‘arabi or Arab nation. Arab nationalism in its various forms — Nasserism, Ba‘athism, and other variants — emphasized ‘uruba, Arabism, as a national identity transcending the individual Arab nation-states. But, by emphasizing Arab identity, it left the substantial non-Arabic-speaking populations — Kurds, Berbers, southern Sudanese, and others — out of the national fabric of identity.

Ironically, the passing of the vogue of Arab nationalism may have eased some of the problems of dealing with non-Arab identities but the rise of political Islam has created similar problems of handling non-Muslim minorities in a Muslim state. Christians, Jews, Mandaeans, Zoroastrians, Yazidis and other religious minorities find themselves in an awkward position in countries that identify the state with Islam.

In Iraq today, some sort of federal solution seems inevitable, since the Kurds will obviously not settle for anything that reduces the autonomy they already enjoy. But, the provision in the Transitional Administrative Law that would allow similar autonomous regions elsewhere might not make it into the new constitution.

Iraq’s Sunni Arabs, who were the primary support group for the former nationalist Ba‘ath rule, are the least comfortable with a federal system that gives more authority to Kurds and Shi‘ite Arabs. But they are not alone in opposing it. Many Shi‘ites also worry about any arrangement that would weaken Iraq’s national identity or seem to encourage separatism.

Intolerance and Terrorism Are the Problem, Not Islam

Edward S. Walker, Jr. — Thu, 28 Jul 2005 12:00:00 -0400

"Islam plays an ever increasing role in Muslim countries, in public attitudes and in the politics of the Middle East." "Secularism is in retreat." While I do not know of any scientific polls that could validate these statements, many Americans - including experts on the region - would agree.

Certainly mosque attendance in the region, as in the United States, has increased; but so too has the population. And because of the political nature of the issue, accurate statistics are very hard to come by.

Go to any Christian Web site and you will think that Islam is increasing at a declining rate compared to Christianity. A Muslim Web site will give you an entirely different story. Regardless of the statistics, circumstantial evidence of a retreat of secularism in the Arab and Muslim worlds is strong and in many cases visible. Take the pictures of the graduating class of the American University in Cairo over the years and you will find a marked trend among women graduates, from Gucci in the 1960s to hijab, or the head scarf, in the 1990s. The trend may be clear, but the underlying reasons are not.

While I was serving in Syria in 1978, a good Syrian friend from an educated, secular and Westernized background pointed out that his daughters had turned to religion and had taken up the hijab. He put it down to generational rebellion. In Egypt, during the mid-1990s, the minister of education engaged in a fight to prevent coercion by school administrators and teachers against girls who would not wear the hijab.

A number of women have expressed the same view as one Canadian-born Muslim woman, that the hijab is "liberating" and that it diminishes unwarranted physical attention in social interaction. Certainly, peer pressure and fashion trends also play a part. But regardless of the motivation, Islam is the unifying and most important factor.

In a May 2004 poll, conducted by Zogby International and Shibley Telhami of the University of Maryland, a majority of Arab respondents in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and a plurality in Morocco and Jordan, identified themselves as Muslims, not Saudis or Jordanians.

Only in Egypt and Lebanon did a majority claim nationality as their primary identity. Substantial pluralities in Jordan, the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia felt that the clergy should play a greater role in the political system. In Egypt, the respondents were almost evenly split, while only in Lebanon and Morocco did slight majorities feel that the clergy "should not dictate the political system." In every country polled a substantial majority felt that the clergy played "too little" a role or a "just right role."

The question, however, is not whether or not secularism is declining and Islam is increasing in influence. Let us assume that this is the case. The question is: "So what?" In the United States, I venture to say that most of us would find this fact disquieting and even threatening. And that may be the real problem that we should be facing. Why should it bother us that in these difficult times more people are finding religion to be a source of support and constancy?

Polls of Americans by the Pew Global Attitudes Survey for 2005 indicate that we, as a people, or at least 58 percent of us, feel we are not religious enough. In this we agree with Arab attitudes toward us. So our problem is not an aversion to religion or the strong hold of secularism.

The obvious, perhaps too obvious, answer to our fears is a mixture of the September 11, 2001 attacks, attacks by Islamic jihadists in Spain and London, terrorism and terrorists in Iraq and Israel, and the highly publicized appeals for violence against us that come from a few mosques scattered across the globe. We are at risk of allowing the few, the violent, the perverted to define a religion and a people. Perhaps there is growing recognition in Arab and Muslim countries and among religious authorities that these violent elements must be brought to heel in the interest of the nation and of Islam. Some of the indicators suggest this. Yet the preachers of hate continue to speak out, as they are doing in England, in ways that inflame relations between communities and create the conditions for terrorism and for virulent prejudice in response.

This is a problem for Islam, yet the problem is not all on the side of Islam. The violent jihadist minority would not have had such a profound impact on our attitudes had we not been already predisposed to think the worst of Islam. If we are going to defeat this vicious brand of intolerance and the resulting threat of terrorism against us, then we have to start by recognizing that religion is not the problem and, specifically, that Islam is not the problem. We need to be able to say "so what?" when it comes to our neighbors going to the mosque in greater numbers, whether they live next door or in a country apart, and to welcome them for what they are and do.

Maintaining Iraq's Unity for All Iraqis

Ambassodor David Mack — Tue, 2 Dec 2003 12:00:00 -0500

Creation of three nation states from Iraq would be impractical for the people of that country and harmful to US interests in both Iraq and the region. Leslie Gelb of the Council on Foreign Relations is the latest voice suggesting a three state solution to the security and political problems we face in Iraq. But Iraq bears only superficial resemblance to the former Yugoslavia created and sustained by a single dominant political figure. By contrast, the twentieth century history of Iraq created a real nation state; it was the tyranny and misrule of Saddam Hussein which almost destroyed it. However artificial it may have been at the outset, Iraqi nationalism has developed to an impressive level. This happened despite the brutal rule and miserable performance of many of Iraq's political leaders.

By the beginning of a new century, Iraq had become a nation state in which the vast majority of the educated elites of its Shi'ite population, despite pervasive discrimination and under representation in many institutions, had chosen non-sectarian political identities. Many Shi'ites had positions of great prominence, and the community as a whole had proven its loyalty to the Iraqi nation during the eight-year war with Iran.

Iraq is also a nation state in which various minorities, especially Kurds and Sunni Arabs, can have representation in the government that exceeds their numerical weight in the overall population. This could take place as the result of federal arrangements within the context of Iraq's geographic unity. (While I always hesitate to suggest American political formulas for other countries, the successful example of our constitutional deference to states with small populations is worth considering in the Iraqi context.) Beginning in the spring of 1991, I worked closely with Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, as well as other Iraqi Kurdish leaders. Their views developed into pragmatic decisions to seek a destiny for Iraqi Kurdistan, as well as political power for themselves, within the context of a unified Iraq.

Over time, the representation of minority groups in the Iraqi political system will likely flourish due to the country's growing urbanization, secular education system and increasingly frequent inter-marriage. Greater Baghdad has for some time been the home of the largest populations of Shi'ites, Kurds and Arab Sunnis in the country, something that may well be true for the Christian minorities as well.

The nation state which the British, the Hashemite dynasty and various Iraqi political leaders put together early in the twentieth century was not as artificial as some contend. It was an effort to recreate in the twentieth century a Mesopotamian-centered state that had waxed and waned over thousands of years of history. Iraq has emerged with lots of bruises, but it has not broken into pieces. Instead, it is woven together by a complex web of interests, personal relationships and shared history. During the past thirty-five years, the shared experience includes suffering through three wars, harsh sanctions and a brutal dictatorship. The historians of the twenty-first century and the Iraqi people themselves will judge the US and the international community badly if we were to encourage the shattering of a unity that developed despite these traumas.