Religion

The State of Sunni-Shiite Relations in Saudi Arabia and Why it Matters

Reza Zia-Ebrahimi — Wed, 16 Jul 2008 15:17:04 -0400

The ‘Shiite crescent’ has become a popular intellectual shortcut in media and policy circles to explain Muslim affairs. Yet, it is a flawed theory that ignores the complexity of religious, national, local and tribal allegiances that include, exclude or overlap each other in the Middle East. It does not account for a number of factors including the occasional inter-Shiite fighting in Iraq. In an interesting twist, two Shiites – Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – happen to be the most popular leaders in overwhelmingly Sunni Egypt (and probably most of the Middle East) according to a poll conducted by the Ibn Khaldun Center in Cairo. So much for Sunni-Shiite mutual hatred. This theory may be inadequate and over-inflated, but it refers to a real problem of rising tension between Sunnis and Shiites in areas throughout the Middle East.

One crucial but under-discussed arena of Sunni-Shiite relations is Saudi Arabia. Approximately 10 percent of the Kingdom’s population is reported to be Shiite. Since the Kingdom’s establishment in 1932, Shiite rituals have been subjected to significant constraints and Shiites have been marginalised and intermittently repressed. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group have all pointed out the systematic social, political, religious and economic discrimination of Shiites by Saudi state institutions and ulama (clergy). Since 1993, Saudi rulers have attempted some rapprochement by engaging Shiite leaders, although significant advances have yet to materialise.

Sunni-Shiite relations in Saudi Arabia are important for the rest of the Muslim world. Indeed, the Kingdom’s religious establishment often adheres to a puritanical and intolerant version of Sunni Islam and holds sway over many radical Muslim circles thanks to its worldwide network of mosques. As a result, the Saudi ulama bear much responsibility in the propagation of anti-Shiite feelings, but they are also in a strategic position to soothe tensions between the two communities. A radical break with well-established anti-Shiism is unlikely; observers of the Kingdom know that its inhibited culture and desire for total consensus makes Switzerland look like a fast-changing country.

However, there are two reasons to believe that the time is ripe for bold action. First, despite the slight détente in the Kingdom in the 1990’s, tensions have been mounting since the advent of civil war in Iraq and the reassertion of Iranian and Hezbollah influence, increasing alarm about regional Shiite domination. Many young Saudis who engage in jihad in Iraq are motivated inter alia by fervent anti-Shiite sentiments. This heated situation has also engendered an increase in despicable acts of vandalism such as cemetery profanation and the torching of Shiite mosques, threatening the inter-communal status quo.

Secondly, Saudi King Abdullah is investing much hope in his calls for interfaith dialogue. Earlier this month he concluded an interfaith conference in Madrid, which he hopes to be the first step in a sustained dialogue process. Christian and Jewish religious authorities worldwide have been involved and many declared their support for the King’s overture. It is quite an undertaking for the leader of a country that constrains or bans any non-Islamic religious act, sign or place of worship and he has attracted much attention. The legitimacy and credibility of the King’s move will, to a large extent, depend on the state of Sunni-Shiite relations within the Kingdom.

Recent moves indicate that the King is aware of this situation and wants to make advances, even at the price of infuriating some members of the ulama. Twenty two radical Saudi clerics issued a religious edict (fatwa) this month saying that Hezbollah’s fight against Israel in Lebanon is actually a disguise to conceal the movement’s anti-Sunni agenda. They proclaimed that Shiites followed ‘infidel precepts’. Reaction was swift: Mohammed al-Nujaimi, a prominent member of the religious establishment and a cleric one wouldn’t exactly call ‘liberal’, was dispatched last week to mend fences with the Shiites. He met with the leader of the Shiite community, Hassan al-Saffar, and other representatives to condemn the edict. There is good reason to believe that the King was behind this effort. By Saudi standards this is a bold move, as the rulers of the Kingdom are always wary of antagonizing the ulama, who provide them with legitimacy. Anti-Shiite sentiment is one of the main tenets of the ulama’s Wahabbi ideology and the King’s overture is unlikely to be appreciated.

There is good reason to be sceptical about the outcome of the King’s outreach to the Shiite community, but mounting tensions and the King’s interfaith projects have created a state of affairs in which the Saudi Shiite situation cannot be shunned any longer. If a decent modus vivendi is worked out, it can have some impact on Sunni-Shiite relations worldwide thanks to the Kingdom’s special position within the Islamic world, and can reassert the House of Saud over an obscurantist and anachronistic ulama. Inshallah.

Shia Iran Versus Different Shades of Sunnism

Wed, 2 Jul 2008 16:49:34 -0400

Shia Iran is publicly unwavering in its commitment to forge unity among Muslim states. Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is again reaching out to Arab Salafists and Wahhabists and has declared the present Iranian year as the Year of National Unity and Islamic Solidarity. Sunni Saudi Arabia is also emphasizing dialogue. Two recent pan-Islamic conferences have been held in Tehran (May) and Mecca (June) to lessen intra-Muslim differences. However, neither conference produced concrete steps toward achieving this goal.

In May 2008, Tehran hosted 850 Muslim clerics (ulema) and intellectuals from 45 countries for the 21st annual Islamic Unity Conference. The Iranian conference organizers said they wanted to provide a forum for debate among different sects and to push for a charter on Islamic unity. A key facet would be the rejection of takfirism, a school of thought among hard-line Sunnis that considers Shiites as heretics and sanctions violence against them. According to Iran’s state-funded Press TV, the charter had already been signed by 2,000 Muslim scholars by the time of the conference.

Ayatollah Mohammad-Ali Taskhiri, Iran’s Director-General of the World Forum for the Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought, chaired the conference. No senior Salafi/Wahhabi clerics attended, although there were Arab Salafi participants from Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

At the conference on May 9, former Iranian President Rafsanjani – presently chairman of two of Iran’s most powerful political institutions- the Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Council - notably urged the Shia to rethink some of the sect’s beliefs and practices. “You can see how much Sunnis refer to the exaggerated statements in our books and traditions, and accordingly call us pagans,” and that unless “corrective measures are implemented the Sunnis will retain the opinion that Shias are apostates because they see their [Shia] imams as gods, which is not the case.” He also urged Shias to refrain from “insulting Prophet's [Mohammed] disciples, the four Caliphs and those who are regarded as saints by Sunnis”.

Curtailing unorthodox Shia traditions has been a constant feature of the theological debate in Iran since before the 1979 revolution. The matter has become more urgent in recent years due to the rise of Islamic mysticism in Iran, and the emerging reverence in some rural and poor urban communities of Imams Ali, Hussein or Hassan and Fatima al-Zahra, the Prophet’s daughter. A number of Iranian Shia clergy have spoken against such trends, warning that it effectively amounts to kufr (disbelief in Islam) since no human being should be worshipped in Islam.

The state views the religious practices of Islamic mystic Sufi sects as a challenge to the regime’s monopoly on religious authority, which underpins its political legitimacy. Iran has witnessed a number of government crackdowns on Sufi orders since February 2006, which seem to contradict their calls for Islamic unity.

Regardless of motive, Iranian pleas for Islamic unity made little impression on some of Saudi Arabia’s most senior Wahhabi clerics. Twenty-two of them issued an anti-Shia statement on June 1 in which they accused Shiites of abusing Sunnis under their control. "If they [Shiites] have a country, they humiliate and exert control in their rule over Sunnis," and specifically mentioned conditions in Iran and Iraq. "They sow strife, corruption and destruction among Muslims and destabilize security in Muslim countries ... such as Yemen." The tone of the letter is similar to the 2007 statement of Ayman Al-Zawahiri accusing Iranian Shia leaders to be “intent on establishing certain [Islamic] concepts which nullify the intellects of their followers and prevent them from understanding the Quran and Sunna, except through [Shia clergy’s] interpretations and explanations”.

The letter reflected a common sentiment among Saudi Wahhabis, but it was issued only three days before the opening of the inter-faith conference held by King Abdullah in Mecca June 4-7. Bringing together some 500 Islamic scholars and academics, the organizers hoped to present Saudi Arabia and King Abdullah to the West as forces of moderation in the Islamic world. Despite efforts by Saudi officials to distance themselves from the letter, the fact that Saudi Arabia’s indigenous Shia minority was officially banned from the Mecca conference lessened their credibility among the Shia.

Iranian media reported the ban and covered the arrest of eight Shia clergy and community elders in the Eastern Province but avoided any condemnation, perhaps in recognition of King Abdullah’s own struggle with radical Wahhabi clergy within the kingdom. Nonetheless, the intended political message in Mecca was clear. King Abdullah walked into the opening ceremony alongside Rafsanjani who then sat on the King's left, interpreted by Saudi media to mean that the Wahhabi kingdom does not have a problem with moderate Shiites.

The failure of these conferences to produce tangible plans toward Islamic unity is a reflection of the level of suspicion and doctrinal divide between the two main groups, exacerbated by their geo-political rivalry since 2003. Still, these recent Iranian and Saudi attempts should not be dismissed. Ayatollahs Khamenei and Rafsanjani, often deemed as fierce rivals, both judged the events sufficiently worthy to rally behind them. King Abdullah too has maintained the momentum for dialogue in his kingdom despite stiff opposition from some Wahhabi clerics.

For sure, political and not religious motives have been the primary catalysts in both instances. Both Iranian Shia and Saudi Wahhabi clerical establishments continue to contain dangerous sectarian voices that will prove stubborn in their views. Still, in an age when sectarian violence has almost become the norm in Middle Eastern arenas from Iraq to Lebanon and from Pakistan to Yemen, these two leading Shia and Sunni states can ill afford to let others take the initiative.

Yom Kippur in August

Paul Scham — Fri, 18 Aug 2006 12:00:00 -0400

After 33 days of rockets, bombing and increasing ground combat, the guns have fallen (nearly) silent in northern Israel and southern Lebanon. To the surprise of many, initial reports indicate that, except for a few comparatively minor incidents, the ceasefire voted unanimously by the UN Security Council on Friday is holding.

Many are also surprised that both sides are vigorously claiming victory not only to the world but, much more importantly, to their own populations. And, strangely enough, both have some reason to. Some perception of accomplishment on both sides is a crucial component of any movement towards a more positive relationship between Israel and its northern neighborhood and, just as conceivably, toward a more stable situation in the region.

There are certain significant similarities to the situation after the Yom Kippur War of 1973, which Arabs refer to as the “October” or “Ramadan” War. While the nature of that war was totally different – Israel was attacked massively and unexpectedly by the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces, and it was primarily a war between armies, with few civilian casualties – the results, after 23 days of fighting, bear comparison. In conventional terms, Israel won on points. It repelled the attack, protected its heartland, and carried the fight to the enemy. Arab losses were significantly greater, and Israel was clearly on the offensive when it was stopped by a U.N ceasefire.

In 1973, Israeli politics also went through an upheaval, as is already beginning now. Prime Minister Golda Meir was replaced by Yitzhak Rabin, and other senior officials resigned. On a less visible level, Israelis also examined and condemned what was called the “Konzeptzia,” the fixed idea until the War that the Arabs simply were incapable of mounting a successful attack against Israel. One can likewise see the Israeli expectation of an easy victory in a few days as reflecting an outmoded and inappropriate “Konzeptzia.” It may be that Israel will have to find a way to coexist with Hezbollah on its borders, and Hezbollah will have to tacitly accept Israel’s existence.

However, the main, and perhaps overriding difference between 1973 and today is the role of the US. At that time, even though the Americans had provided desperately needed arms to Israel during the war while the USSR re-supplied the Arabs, the US was regarded as a respected and effective broker and could deal with all parties. Now, by contrast, many Arabs see the US as effectively allied with Israel and even, to some degree, as an instigator. In addition, the US refuses to deal with Iran and Hezbollah, two of the major actors in this conflict, and in effect does not negotiate with Syria, an equally important player.

This war has sharpened the differences between those who believe compromise is possible and those, led by President Bush and the conservative, unilateralist wing of the Republican Party, who do not. President Bush declared soon after 9/11, “If you’re not with us, you’re against us.” Largely as a result, pro-American Arab leaders and others now say “there are no longer moderates in the Middle East.” Dangerously, the former moderates are not allying with the US. In other words, the American unwillingness to deal with our declared opponents, and putting them all in an axis of evil, is denuding the US of effective allies.

Syria is generally recognized as the key. If the US retains its unwillingness to deal with it, and encourage Israel not to do so as well, there is no reason for the Syrians not to re-arm Hezbollah. This will bring us back to where things were before. On the other hand, frank negotiations can help to weaken the Syrian alliance with Hezbollah and Shi’ite extremists in Iran. But for that to happen, and to move the Middle East forward with creative diplomacy, we need leadership with an open mind that does not divide the world into black and white, with no shades of grey.

After years of denigrating the United Nations, the US found it a very useful forum for brokering this cease-fire. Perhaps we should learn from this experience and recognize that multilateral diplomacy, either through the UN or another forum, has advantages that unilateralism lacks. This would not please some of the President’s more conservative supporters, but it just might prevent another war in the region.

Intolerance and Terrorism Are the Problem, Not Islam

Edward S. Walker, Jr. — Thu, 28 Jul 2005 12:00:00 -0400

"Islam plays an ever increasing role in Muslim countries, in public attitudes and in the politics of the Middle East." "Secularism is in retreat." While I do not know of any scientific polls that could validate these statements, many Americans - including experts on the region - would agree.

Certainly mosque attendance in the region, as in the United States, has increased; but so too has the population. And because of the political nature of the issue, accurate statistics are very hard to come by.

Go to any Christian Web site and you will think that Islam is increasing at a declining rate compared to Christianity. A Muslim Web site will give you an entirely different story. Regardless of the statistics, circumstantial evidence of a retreat of secularism in the Arab and Muslim worlds is strong and in many cases visible. Take the pictures of the graduating class of the American University in Cairo over the years and you will find a marked trend among women graduates, from Gucci in the 1960s to hijab, or the head scarf, in the 1990s. The trend may be clear, but the underlying reasons are not.

While I was serving in Syria in 1978, a good Syrian friend from an educated, secular and Westernized background pointed out that his daughters had turned to religion and had taken up the hijab. He put it down to generational rebellion. In Egypt, during the mid-1990s, the minister of education engaged in a fight to prevent coercion by school administrators and teachers against girls who would not wear the hijab.

A number of women have expressed the same view as one Canadian-born Muslim woman, that the hijab is "liberating" and that it diminishes unwarranted physical attention in social interaction. Certainly, peer pressure and fashion trends also play a part. But regardless of the motivation, Islam is the unifying and most important factor.

In a May 2004 poll, conducted by Zogby International and Shibley Telhami of the University of Maryland, a majority of Arab respondents in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and a plurality in Morocco and Jordan, identified themselves as Muslims, not Saudis or Jordanians.

Only in Egypt and Lebanon did a majority claim nationality as their primary identity. Substantial pluralities in Jordan, the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia felt that the clergy should play a greater role in the political system. In Egypt, the respondents were almost evenly split, while only in Lebanon and Morocco did slight majorities feel that the clergy "should not dictate the political system." In every country polled a substantial majority felt that the clergy played "too little" a role or a "just right role."

The question, however, is not whether or not secularism is declining and Islam is increasing in influence. Let us assume that this is the case. The question is: "So what?" In the United States, I venture to say that most of us would find this fact disquieting and even threatening. And that may be the real problem that we should be facing. Why should it bother us that in these difficult times more people are finding religion to be a source of support and constancy?

Polls of Americans by the Pew Global Attitudes Survey for 2005 indicate that we, as a people, or at least 58 percent of us, feel we are not religious enough. In this we agree with Arab attitudes toward us. So our problem is not an aversion to religion or the strong hold of secularism.

The obvious, perhaps too obvious, answer to our fears is a mixture of the September 11, 2001 attacks, attacks by Islamic jihadists in Spain and London, terrorism and terrorists in Iraq and Israel, and the highly publicized appeals for violence against us that come from a few mosques scattered across the globe. We are at risk of allowing the few, the violent, the perverted to define a religion and a people. Perhaps there is growing recognition in Arab and Muslim countries and among religious authorities that these violent elements must be brought to heel in the interest of the nation and of Islam. Some of the indicators suggest this. Yet the preachers of hate continue to speak out, as they are doing in England, in ways that inflame relations between communities and create the conditions for terrorism and for virulent prejudice in response.

This is a problem for Islam, yet the problem is not all on the side of Islam. The violent jihadist minority would not have had such a profound impact on our attitudes had we not been already predisposed to think the worst of Islam. If we are going to defeat this vicious brand of intolerance and the resulting threat of terrorism against us, then we have to start by recognizing that religion is not the problem and, specifically, that Islam is not the problem. We need to be able to say "so what?" when it comes to our neighbors going to the mosque in greater numbers, whether they live next door or in a country apart, and to welcome them for what they are and do.

The Quiet Revolution - Saudi Arabia

Edward S. Walker, Jr. — Wed, 14 Jan 2004 12:00:00 -0500

There is a quiet revolution going on in Saudi Arabia. No one knows its depth, its breadth or its ultimate impact, but the reform effort is very real and is probably unstoppable. There was a note of caution sounded by government and business alike during my discussions in the Kingdom in December. King Faisal's reform effort and ultimate assassination were on people's minds and on their lips. The Crown Prince made it clear to me that he was dealing with a traditional and strongly religious society. He did not want to follow the example of Kuwait where the government had to back away from a proposed reform in the face of parliamentary opposition. He advocated one step forward at a time and none back.

Religious Reform

The core of the reform and its success or failure will depend on the Royal Family's unified efforts to define Islam and delegitimize its more extreme elements. King Fahd made a publicized speech while I was in Riyadh to a body of high Islamic religious scholars. He said: "scholars must highlight the dangers which extremism poses to the Muslim faith and conduct." He called on the scholars to join hands to "correct the flaws in the thinking of some Muslims through dialogue in seminars, conferences and the media." He stressed that "deviant thinking" has led to terror in the Kingdom and said that there is a need for clear meanings for terms such as "jihad." And among other more esoteric demands, the King told the scholars to devise religious arguments to annul "aberrant fatwas" which legitimized militancy and suicide bombings.

In and of itself, this was an extraordinary statement which threw down the gauntlet to those who advocated an extreme form of Islam, including al Qaeda. The King's statement appears to have the unified backing of the Royal Family and much of the population. It is being backed up on the ground by a series of acts. Over 2,000 Imams whose preaching advocated militancy have been removed from the pulpit and 1500 have been sent for reeducation or to jail. In December two prominent Saudi Islamic militant imams publicly recanted their fatwas in which they had called for militancy. At the same time, there has been renewed vigor in tracking down militants and in cooperating with US authorities in the war on terrorism.

According to some Saudi businessmen the role of the religious police has been curtailed - there are fewer mutawwas on the streets and their behavior is less aggressive. The process of curtailing the flow of cash to terrorist organizations has had the unfortunate side effect of substantially depressing all charitable giving. The government has, according to these businessmen, removed the poor boxes from the streets in front of mosques. Individual giving has declined precipitously in the face of new controls and fears of funds being diverted or misdirected. Edicts have been put in place to track funding through charitable institutions.

A National Dialog on Reform

The reform effort has been developing for some time in the mind of the Crown Prince. But the real thrust seems to have come after the May terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia. These attacks, and particularly the one against the Muslim compound this past fall, have brought the Royal Family, the businessmen and the average Saudi citizen together in opposition to the threat to the state, to moderation and to the tactic of terrorism. In June, the Crown Prince declared a reform initiative calling for self-reform and the development of political participation through a National Dialogue. The Crown Prince told me that this effort included all elements of the society including Shiites and other sects of the Islamic faith. He called this a process of the intellect to bring people together in consensus behind reform rather than a political process that tends to divide people on ideological lines.

Political Reform and Elections

In June 2003 the King granted the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council) the right to propose and debate, but not pass, new bills or proposed amendments to existing laws without the permission of the King. In October, the Saudi authorities announced that they would prepare for elections for half the members of each municipal council within one year.

The Media and Human Rights

In other areas, Saudi journalists established a trade association in February 2003, the first association of its kind. According to one prominent American journalist, there has been an improvement in the reporting of the Saudi press, which he attributed more to the competition of satellite TV stations like Al Jazeera and Al Arabia than to the Journalists Association. On human rights, in May 2002, the King approved establishment of an independent human rights organization but there has been little visible movement on this to date. A criminal procedure law was passed in 2002 regulating the rights of defendants and suspects before the courts and police, but the terrorist threat and pressure from the US and from within, particularly on issues such as detention without trial and access to a lawyer, where the US example is mixed, may have short-circuited implementation of these reforms.

Economic Reform

Economic reforms have been driven by the Saudi high unemployment figures and Saudi desire to join the WTO. Negotiations with the Europeans have led to new WTO compliant intellectual property laws and other legal and banking reforms. Negotiations with the US and a few others are still pending.

Education

Of all the problems the Saudis face, the most difficult and troublesome is the system of education and its religious content. Several limited steps have been taken. Girls education was removed from control of the religious authorities. Textbooks have been reviewed and egregious statements excised. The curricula are being updated and modernized. A woman has been appointed, for the first time, to a senior academic position in the Arab Open University in Jeddah. Student councils are being set up in public schools to begin educating young Saudis about civic responsibility and participatory governance. But the basic question of methodology - memorization and authoritarian teaching practices - and the extensive number of hours devoted in early education to Islamic studies have not been touched.

The Road Ahead

Saudi Arabia still has a long way to go - Saudis freely admit this. But they have been encouraged by the direction the Crown Prince is taking and by growing unity within the House of Saud in favor of reform. The image of the assassination by a religious fanatic of King Faisal, who organized the first major reform effort, and the takeover of the Holy Mosque by radicals, still haunt the Saudi leadership. They fear that a misstep will bring chaos. And they fear that the forces of change under those conditions would favor the radical Islamists not modernization or moderation. The fear of radical reaction will moderate the pace of reform, but what has been started in the Kingdom in the way of reform, will be very difficult to turn back, unless it is by violent overthrow of the House of Saud. And for now, overthrow looks unlikely. While the Crown Prince and other members of the Royal Family told me that foreign pressure would neither increase the pace of reform nor discourage it, Saudi businessmen were less sanguine. They felt that pressure, particularly from America, would work to the advantage of the religious extremists and undercut the legitimacy of the process of reform as a Saudi driven national priority.

Maintaining Iraq's Unity for All Iraqis

Ambassodor David Mack — Tue, 2 Dec 2003 12:00:00 -0500

Creation of three nation states from Iraq would be impractical for the people of that country and harmful to US interests in both Iraq and the region. Leslie Gelb of the Council on Foreign Relations is the latest voice suggesting a three state solution to the security and political problems we face in Iraq. But Iraq bears only superficial resemblance to the former Yugoslavia created and sustained by a single dominant political figure. By contrast, the twentieth century history of Iraq created a real nation state; it was the tyranny and misrule of Saddam Hussein which almost destroyed it. However artificial it may have been at the outset, Iraqi nationalism has developed to an impressive level. This happened despite the brutal rule and miserable performance of many of Iraq's political leaders.

By the beginning of a new century, Iraq had become a nation state in which the vast majority of the educated elites of its Shi'ite population, despite pervasive discrimination and under representation in many institutions, had chosen non-sectarian political identities. Many Shi'ites had positions of great prominence, and the community as a whole had proven its loyalty to the Iraqi nation during the eight-year war with Iran.

Iraq is also a nation state in which various minorities, especially Kurds and Sunni Arabs, can have representation in the government that exceeds their numerical weight in the overall population. This could take place as the result of federal arrangements within the context of Iraq's geographic unity. (While I always hesitate to suggest American political formulas for other countries, the successful example of our constitutional deference to states with small populations is worth considering in the Iraqi context.) Beginning in the spring of 1991, I worked closely with Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, as well as other Iraqi Kurdish leaders. Their views developed into pragmatic decisions to seek a destiny for Iraqi Kurdistan, as well as political power for themselves, within the context of a unified Iraq.

Over time, the representation of minority groups in the Iraqi political system will likely flourish due to the country's growing urbanization, secular education system and increasingly frequent inter-marriage. Greater Baghdad has for some time been the home of the largest populations of Shi'ites, Kurds and Arab Sunnis in the country, something that may well be true for the Christian minorities as well.

The nation state which the British, the Hashemite dynasty and various Iraqi political leaders put together early in the twentieth century was not as artificial as some contend. It was an effort to recreate in the twentieth century a Mesopotamian-centered state that had waxed and waned over thousands of years of history. Iraq has emerged with lots of bruises, but it has not broken into pieces. Instead, it is woven together by a complex web of interests, personal relationships and shared history. During the past thirty-five years, the shared experience includes suffering through three wars, harsh sanctions and a brutal dictatorship. The historians of the twenty-first century and the Iraqi people themselves will judge the US and the international community badly if we were to encourage the shattering of a unity that developed despite these traumas.

Shopping for Head Scarves, Jordanian Style

Liana Paris — Mon, 15 Sep 2008 14:11:33 -0400

*Before I left for my Rotary International scholarship year in ‘Amman, I had many conversations like this:

“So … you are going to live in … Jordan?”

At which point I would explain about Rotary, Rotary scholarships, and my interests in Arabic, the Middle East, and intercultural dialogue.

Then invariably one of their real concerns emerges: “How will you figure out what to wear?”*

King Solomon, Ibn-Rushd, and Leibniz: Three Models for Dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Dr. Marcelo Dascal — Mon, 29 Jan 2007 12:00:00 -0500

The Middle East Institute is pleased to host Dr. Marcelo Dascal to discuss how religion and philosophy can help improve understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. An expert on the conflict, Dr. Pascal will address possible solutions to the deadlock using models of conflict resolution drawn from the region’s three main religious traditions: Judaism, Islam, and Christianity.

A Professor of Philosophy and former Dean of Humanities at Tel Aviv University, Israel, Dr. Dascal is also President of the New Israeli Philosophical Association and of the International Association for the Study of Controversies (IASC). He has published over two hundred articles and twenty books covering his main fields of interest, which include the philosophy of language and communication, the philosophy of mind, the history of modern philosophy, and the study of controversies.

Human Rights, the Land of Israel, and Justice: A Religious Perspective

Rabbi Arik W. Ascherman — Thu, 14 Dec 2006 12:00:00 -0500

The Middle East Institute and the Foundation for Middle East Peace are pleased to host a presentation by Rabbi Arik W. Ascherman, Executive Director of Rabbis for Human Rights. Ascherman will provide insights into the religious motivation of Israeli settlers and where it fits in the spectrum of Jewish religious belief and the universal Jewish values of justice and devotion to human rights.

Rabbi Arik Ascherman graduated from Harvard University in 1981. From 1981-1983 he worked for Interns For Peace, a community work program aimed at bringing Israeli Jews and Arabs together in positive interaction. For most of this time Rabbi Ascherman lived in the Israeli Arab village of Tamra.

Rabbi Ascherman was ordained by HUC-JIR in New York in 1989. After returning to Israel in 1994, Rabbi Ascherman served for three years as the director of Congregation Mevakshei Derech, and three years as the part time rabbi of Kibbutz Yahel, a Reform kibbutz near Eilat. Beginning in 1995 Rabbi Ascherman served as co-director of Rabbis For Human Rights, becoming executive director in 1998.

John Stempel to Discuss Religion and Diplomacy

John Stempel — Mon, 9 May 2005 13:00:00 -0400

The link between religion and diplomacy goes back well beyond this century, but it has more meaning today than it has for 450 years. Dr. John Stempel will explain how religion affects both the substance and the fact of diplomacy and intelligence, as well as why it is nearly impossible to truly understand international affairs today without some knowledge of the intertwining of these subjects.

Dr. Stempel is former Foreign Service Officer, currently at the Virginia Military Institute on sabbatical from his post as Senior Professor at the University of Kentucky's Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce. In his 23-year Foreign Service career, Stempel saw both Islamic fundamentalism in Iran and Hindu fundamentalism in India "up close and personal."