Media

Annual Conference Banquet Address

Wed, 31 Oct 2007 13:03:21 -0400

John Burns spoke about the situation in Iraq. His remarks were peppered with anecdotes from his childhood and his experiences as a correspondent. Mr. Burns stressed his belief that there is no simple solution to Iraq and we need to look to the future rather than blame past actions. He also addressed the responsibilities and limitations of journalists in Iraq.

On the Media: US Should Practice What It Preaches

David L. Mack — Wed, 4 Jan 2006 12:00:00 -0500

The consensus of much of the Arab press is that the Bush Administration has tried lying to the media, buying favorable media coverage and, failing all else, attacking the media, particularly Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya.

Arab journalists envy their American counterparts. They know that the train of events that led to President Nixon’s resignation started with painstaking and careful gathering of facts by investigative journalists, who in turn were backed up by an editor and a publisher prepared to take the political heat that resulted.

Speaking truth to power is an American tradition so well established that most US political leaders have learned to live with the consequences and moderate their behavior accordingly

So why has the Bush Administration been so sensitive about media criticism in the Arab world? To a significant extent, the US government was taken by surprise at the rapidly increasing degree of media independence from governments. In the past, there was some truth to the charge that there is no such thing as a free Arab press, given the sad record of media suppression by Arab governments and non-official media being suborned by government subsidies

The revolution of communications and the proliferation of satellite television news programming changed this reality. As a senior State Department official in the early 1990s, I only had to worry about how CNN, BBC, the Voice of America and a few European-based Arab newspapers covered the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. By 1998, Arab media had joined other major players covering the Palestinian intifada. In addition to the major satellite networks, the quality of government television news coverage has improved and an increasing number of serious and relatively independent Arab newspapers have emerged. Most challenging of all to the US self image, our media now often rely on the Arab media for news coverage of their countries – from reporting in the field to editorial commentaries.

But the administration’s reactions for the most part have tended to fall into a pattern at odds with American domestic tradition. Undersecretary of State Karen Hughes may be taking important steps to reverse this trend, but so far there is little evidence of that.

The first response has been to ignore the Arab media. In some Arab countries, where local news outlets are boring and lack credibility with their own audience, benign neglect probably makes sense. But a growing number of credible Arab media outlets complain they cannot reach American officials for comment. Ignoring the media can backfire. There are many non-official US sources who are happy to describe the views of the US government often distorted by their own ideological agendas.

There also have been incidents of deception, even if the US government seldom engages in the outright lies that carry too high a penalty if discovered. The Bush Administration has lost its credibility as a teller of the truth even faster in the Middle East than in the US. Constant repetition of “9/11” and ominous, but misleading, references to “a new Islamic caliphate” as justifications for American policies are having an adverse impact in the Arab world.

Then there is the old policy of trying to buy favorable media coverage. Maybe that is why our tax money is being wasted on the US government-financed and ill-considered Al Hurra satellite TV broadcasts. It also explains the bizarre notion that we can support a free press in Iraq by paying Iraqi journalists to write feel good stories or bribing Iraqi newspapers to publish “news stories” written by our own personnel. This is unacceptable at home and it should be unacceptable abroad too.

Finally, there are attacks on the Arab media. I don’t mean physical attacks but something far more insidious, involving requests by US officials of Arab governments to “rein in” media based in their countries. We don’t really know how often this is happening, but even a few such cases compromise the US commitment to the core value of media freedom.

We need to change our approach now or suffer continued damages. The Bush Administration and future US administrations must accept reality and stop trying to ignore, deceive, buy or threaten the Arab media. That does not mean we should be any less discriminating. Much of the Arab media remains either restricted or irrelevant and some influential media outlets have extremist political agendas that make it futile for US officials to deal with them.

US public diplomacy should avoid abstract debates on issues like freedom versus stability or the definition of terrorism and find ways to explain US policies and actions in specific circumstances. To do that intelligently, we need to decentralize the rapid response that is required. Cabinet level officials and top communications managers should recognize that professional US public affairs personnel, including US diplomats and US military officers in the field, are capable of dealing with the Arab media. For the administration, it would require decentralizing public diplomacy and learning to accept nuance and shades of grey, which will earn us more respect where it matters.

American Values

Edward S. Walker, Jr. — Mon, 16 Aug 2004 12:00:00 -0400

America has been a beacon for people of the Middle East because of what we stand for. The greatest test for our policy is that it exemplifies the behavior we expect of others. But we are in danger of failing that test. As an Ambassador, on instructions from our government, I repeatedly lectured the leaders of Arab governments about their practices of indefinite detention of prisoners without trial, torturing prisoners during interrogation, denying prisoners legal council, maintaining secret military courts and trials, stifling dissent, and compromising freedom of the press.

Now, people in the region believe the United States is embracing many of these same policies. In their eyes this justifies the behavior of states in the region that engage in such practices. One Arab friend told me: “We wanted to follow your example, not to have you follow ours!”

We don’t see ourselves this way, but how do we explain to the Arab world the practices at Guantanamo, or in our immigration system – indefinite detention without trial, detention without the right to counsel, military courts, etc? How do we advocate a free press in the region while we are taking steps to pressure Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya into censoring their reporting from Iraq? How do we explain the graphic pictures of Iraqi prisoners being humiliated and the allegations of abuse in Justice Department detention centers?

We can say that the abuses are limited to a few individuals. We must hope that is correct, although senior military officers and political figures also must be held accountable for inadequate training and supervision. Moreover, abuses are taking place in an environment in which civil liberties are being curtailed in the United States itself. Some consider it acceptable behavior to demean Arabs and Muslims or to limit their freedoms in the name of homeland security. The excesses of individuals are only possible in the absence of strong leadership. The President began well after September 11, but in the intervening period his record has become garbled. He is relying on the courts and investigations to provide our moral compass. And that absence of leadership has its impact on an environment that is permissive to the old Goldwater slogan: “Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice.” Is that what we stand for today? We are paying a price for this environment and it may come back to haunt us. When I worked for the US government in the region, I was instructed to speak to Arab leaders on issues such as these. Now, our image is being used to justify negative practices by others.

Thirty-eight years ago, then Sen. J.W. Fulbright wrote a passage which applies equally well now to the challenges we face in dealing with the Saudis and the broader Islamic world. He wrote of “two Americas.”

“One is generous and humane, the other narrowly egotistical; one is self-critical, the other self-righteous; one is sensible, the other is romantic; one is good-humored, the other solemn; one is inquiring, the other pontificating; one is moderate; the other filled with passionate intensity; one is judicious, the other arrogant in the use of great power….”

“There has been a tendency through the years for reason and moderation to prevail as long as things are going tolerably well or as long as our problems seem clear and finite and manageable. But when things have gone badly for any length of time, or when the reasons for adversity have seemed obscure, or simply when some event or leader of opinion has aroused the people to a state of high emotion, our puritan spirit has tended to break through, leading us to look at the world through the distorting prism of a harsh and angry moralism.”

The American example is critical to the hopes of many in the region that their countries can move toward democracy and fair treatment for all. If we appear to be hypocritical in our approach to civil liberties and our preaching of democracy to others, we will fail in the President’s efforts to change the region. I do not suggest for a minute that we should relax our security posture. But I wonder if what we are doing and the way we are doing it actually helps?

On the 4th of February this year, at the Library of Congress, President Bush shared his concept of a new Middle East where our system of values could prevail. He said: “We are the heirs of the tradition of liberty, defenders of the freedom, the conscience and the dignity of every person.” He added: “We seek the advance of democracy for the most practical of reasons: because democracies do not support terrorists or threaten the world with weapons of mass murder.”

If the perception grows in the region that we do not respect our own values, then we will sell out every moderate and reformer in the Arab World and we can kiss the hopes for democracy goodbye.

The Quiet Revolution - Saudi Arabia

Edward S. Walker, Jr. — Wed, 14 Jan 2004 12:00:00 -0500

There is a quiet revolution going on in Saudi Arabia. No one knows its depth, its breadth or its ultimate impact, but the reform effort is very real and is probably unstoppable. There was a note of caution sounded by government and business alike during my discussions in the Kingdom in December. King Faisal's reform effort and ultimate assassination were on people's minds and on their lips. The Crown Prince made it clear to me that he was dealing with a traditional and strongly religious society. He did not want to follow the example of Kuwait where the government had to back away from a proposed reform in the face of parliamentary opposition. He advocated one step forward at a time and none back.

Religious Reform

The core of the reform and its success or failure will depend on the Royal Family's unified efforts to define Islam and delegitimize its more extreme elements. King Fahd made a publicized speech while I was in Riyadh to a body of high Islamic religious scholars. He said: "scholars must highlight the dangers which extremism poses to the Muslim faith and conduct." He called on the scholars to join hands to "correct the flaws in the thinking of some Muslims through dialogue in seminars, conferences and the media." He stressed that "deviant thinking" has led to terror in the Kingdom and said that there is a need for clear meanings for terms such as "jihad." And among other more esoteric demands, the King told the scholars to devise religious arguments to annul "aberrant fatwas" which legitimized militancy and suicide bombings.

In and of itself, this was an extraordinary statement which threw down the gauntlet to those who advocated an extreme form of Islam, including al Qaeda. The King's statement appears to have the unified backing of the Royal Family and much of the population. It is being backed up on the ground by a series of acts. Over 2,000 Imams whose preaching advocated militancy have been removed from the pulpit and 1500 have been sent for reeducation or to jail. In December two prominent Saudi Islamic militant imams publicly recanted their fatwas in which they had called for militancy. At the same time, there has been renewed vigor in tracking down militants and in cooperating with US authorities in the war on terrorism.

According to some Saudi businessmen the role of the religious police has been curtailed - there are fewer mutawwas on the streets and their behavior is less aggressive. The process of curtailing the flow of cash to terrorist organizations has had the unfortunate side effect of substantially depressing all charitable giving. The government has, according to these businessmen, removed the poor boxes from the streets in front of mosques. Individual giving has declined precipitously in the face of new controls and fears of funds being diverted or misdirected. Edicts have been put in place to track funding through charitable institutions.

A National Dialog on Reform

The reform effort has been developing for some time in the mind of the Crown Prince. But the real thrust seems to have come after the May terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia. These attacks, and particularly the one against the Muslim compound this past fall, have brought the Royal Family, the businessmen and the average Saudi citizen together in opposition to the threat to the state, to moderation and to the tactic of terrorism. In June, the Crown Prince declared a reform initiative calling for self-reform and the development of political participation through a National Dialogue. The Crown Prince told me that this effort included all elements of the society including Shiites and other sects of the Islamic faith. He called this a process of the intellect to bring people together in consensus behind reform rather than a political process that tends to divide people on ideological lines.

Political Reform and Elections

In June 2003 the King granted the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council) the right to propose and debate, but not pass, new bills or proposed amendments to existing laws without the permission of the King. In October, the Saudi authorities announced that they would prepare for elections for half the members of each municipal council within one year.

The Media and Human Rights

In other areas, Saudi journalists established a trade association in February 2003, the first association of its kind. According to one prominent American journalist, there has been an improvement in the reporting of the Saudi press, which he attributed more to the competition of satellite TV stations like Al Jazeera and Al Arabia than to the Journalists Association. On human rights, in May 2002, the King approved establishment of an independent human rights organization but there has been little visible movement on this to date. A criminal procedure law was passed in 2002 regulating the rights of defendants and suspects before the courts and police, but the terrorist threat and pressure from the US and from within, particularly on issues such as detention without trial and access to a lawyer, where the US example is mixed, may have short-circuited implementation of these reforms.

Economic Reform

Economic reforms have been driven by the Saudi high unemployment figures and Saudi desire to join the WTO. Negotiations with the Europeans have led to new WTO compliant intellectual property laws and other legal and banking reforms. Negotiations with the US and a few others are still pending.

Education

Of all the problems the Saudis face, the most difficult and troublesome is the system of education and its religious content. Several limited steps have been taken. Girls education was removed from control of the religious authorities. Textbooks have been reviewed and egregious statements excised. The curricula are being updated and modernized. A woman has been appointed, for the first time, to a senior academic position in the Arab Open University in Jeddah. Student councils are being set up in public schools to begin educating young Saudis about civic responsibility and participatory governance. But the basic question of methodology - memorization and authoritarian teaching practices - and the extensive number of hours devoted in early education to Islamic studies have not been touched.

The Road Ahead

Saudi Arabia still has a long way to go - Saudis freely admit this. But they have been encouraged by the direction the Crown Prince is taking and by growing unity within the House of Saud in favor of reform. The image of the assassination by a religious fanatic of King Faisal, who organized the first major reform effort, and the takeover of the Holy Mosque by radicals, still haunt the Saudi leadership. They fear that a misstep will bring chaos. And they fear that the forces of change under those conditions would favor the radical Islamists not modernization or moderation. The fear of radical reaction will moderate the pace of reform, but what has been started in the Kingdom in the way of reform, will be very difficult to turn back, unless it is by violent overthrow of the House of Saud. And for now, overthrow looks unlikely. While the Crown Prince and other members of the Royal Family told me that foreign pressure would neither increase the pace of reform nor discourage it, Saudi businessmen were less sanguine. They felt that pressure, particularly from America, would work to the advantage of the religious extremists and undercut the legitimacy of the process of reform as a Saudi driven national priority.

The Media, Terrorism and Saudi Perceptions

Ambassador Edward S. Walker, Jr. — Mon, 4 Mar 2002 12:00:00 -0500

After a brief lull, on Thursday, Jan. 17, 2002, Saudi Arabia was back on the front pages of the Washington Post and New York Times. This time, the headlines announced—incorrectly as it turns out—Saudi reluctance to continue hosting U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia. By the following Sunday morning, the headlines had ceased, but administration and congressional leaders were faced with a battery of questions on the morning talk show circuit. Of course, there never was any official evidence that the Saudis had made, or were going to initiate, such a request. A scan of both papers on Monday, January 22, showed the story had cooled. But the rumors did not cease, despite direct denials from the head of Saudi intelligence and other members of the royal family.

Seeds of doubt about the fragility of U.S.-Saudi relations started taking root over a year ago with the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada and a perceived U.S. blind eye for often-disproportionate Israeli responses. Numerous articles and editorials in leading U.S. papers began criticizing the Saudis on both domestic and foreign policy fronts. With the events of September 11 and the discovery that a number of Saudi citizens had a hand in carrying out those horrific attacks, the Kingdom came under even more intense scrutiny. That is not to say that the oil-rich nation was the sole focus of the media. Egypt continues to face a similar barrage but mainly through scathingly critical editorials. However, with regard to Egypt, the news reporting itself is fairly accurate and impartial. The same cannot always be said of the journalistic interest taken in Saudi Arabia after September 11. The brief storm over hosting U.S. forces is just one example.

It would appear that some people in the United States, for whatever reason, want to undercut our relationships with key Arab states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia despite the significant national security and economic interests we have in these countries. Perhaps these people seek to fray the coalition fabric that Secretary of State Colin Powell has put together in the war against terrorism so that it starts coming apart on its own. Presumably, the less we have to do with the Arab world, the easier it will be to support Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians and the easier it would be to wage an all out attack on Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt are both prime targets. However, the Saudi target is much easier to hit. After all, from the complicated web of financial support for Bin Laden’s cause, to the Saudi nationality of many of the September 11 perpetrators, it is clear that the kingdom had much to answer for in the wake of those tragedies.

Yet, the sheer volume and negativity of the op-eds, commentaries, and articles in the U.S. press would leave an outsider wondering if we were not at war with Saudi Arabia itself. And this is in stark contrast to the comments of several senior administration officials who have made it clear that they have no complaint with Saudi Arabia’s level of participation in the war against terrorism. I have personally checked with sources at the Treasury Department, the National Security Council, the Central Command, and the State Department, and I have been reassured that we are getting Saudi support.

The reasons for targeting Saudi Arabia are not confined to internal politics in the United States or to differing perspectives here on Israel and Iraq. Of all the major Arab countries, Saudi Arabia best fits the stereotypes that Americans have come to believe are representative of the entire Arab world: a country of extraordinarily wealthy people who seldom work, dress in strange, flowing robes, and whose women are closeted, rarely seen or heard. Americans champion the underdog, the common man. Hence the "Rocky" phenomenon: it is the sweat of your brow that should get you ahead, not a birthright of power and privilege. At least that is the popular perception of American society, even if it does not quite fit with reality—just ask some of our minorities. Quite simply, Saudi Arabia and the United States are opposites on a cultural spectrum. In fact, only Taliban-ruled Afghanistan was more culturally remote from American-style living. And like most people, we fear that which is so remarkably different from us—as do many in Saudi society as well.

Then there is also the economic factor: oil, oil, oil. Since the oil embargo in 1973, Americans have believed that the price they pay at the pump is going directly into Saudi pockets. Most Americans, including their politicians, find it easier to blame high prices on the Saudis and other producers than apportion blame to the distribution system, oil company policies, U.S. government policies, refining capacity, speculation, other producer policies, and so on. The embargo years ago had a traumatic effect on the American political structure, and its impact continues. Its proportions have increased with political hyperbole, time, and distance.

Hidden in this antipathy is the sense that Saudi Arabia, through its oil policy, exercises a hidden power over us. And this perception of a hidden hand at work in our economy is played up by certain elements in the U.S. press and political structure that find it convenient to have an easy scapegoat for internal U.S. structural problems. In November, the Wall Street Journal published an editorial that called for a U.S. military takeover of the Saudi oil fields. And, perhaps even more disturbing, I was informed by an extremely reliable reporter that a newspaper editor directed a rewrite of a draft prepared on U.S. dependence on Saudi oil. The original story did not follow the perceived wisdom and speak about our dangerous over-reliance on this one source. Instead, the draft pointed out that in terms of total percentage of oil imported, the United States imports less from Saudi Arabia than it did a decade ago. However, the editors demanded that the article showcase U.S. dependence on Saudi oil, not the more balanced picture portrayed of our declining dependence. In the end, that was the story that millions read. Stereotypes, latent fears, and basic misunderstandings were fueled in the process.

Nationalism is also one of the roots of this public conflict with Saudi Arabia. Many Americans—among them several members of Congress—are intolerant of any criticism from Saudi Arabia due to the overwhelming role we played in planning and waging the Gulf War. When Crown Prince Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz sent his famous letter to President George W. Bush suggesting that the continuing impasse on the Israeli-Palestinian front might cause us to part company, critics of Saudi Arabia blasted the crown prince and tarred him as an ingrate. Of course, among those loud voices were individuals who are wary of any change in U.S. policy that could be interpreted, however loosely or inaccurately, as weakening our support for Israel. Many are overly fond of telling audiences that Saudi Arabia would not be a freestanding nation right now had it not been for U.S. leadership and the sacrifices of the men and women in the U.S. military.

You can notice a trend here. Basic misconceptions and the actual reality of the cultural divide are the filter through which we suspiciously eye one another’s actions. And then there was Khobar. The deaths of American military personnel and the leaked reports of frustrated federal investigators that the Saudi government was not cooperating in locating the perpetrators further deteriorated the American public’s view of the country.

Now add into this mix my earlier point regarding unilateralists in the administration and in a number of policy centers at the heart of conservative Republican thought. Currently, there are several senior policy officials who have traditionally sought to press for unilateral U.S. action in foreign affairs through our military and economic strength. They would have us impose our will on the world. These people represent a cross-section of the American political structure, starting as acolytes of the Democrat, Henry Jackson, but migrating to the Republican Party Right. They are not, as some Arab journalists have claimed, the "Jewish Lobby." And while they support Israel, their cause is not Israel. This political phenomenon is particularly opposed to multilateralism, whether in the sense of U.N. action or U.S. efforts to build coalitions of countries to achieve our goals. In the current context, they seem to believe that the sooner we recognize the futility of coalition building, the faster we will get along with taking care of our enemies directly.

What better way to scuttle coalition building than to discredit the support we are getting from our major Arab allies? And this was clearly the basis of several of the initial attacks on Saudi Arabia and Egypt. But once the floodgates were opened, the commentators and talking heads began to pile on, particularly on Saudi Arabia, exposing their frustrations, prejudices, and ignorance. The articles and their implications are unfair, but they are backed by a long gestation period of anti-Saudi feelings.

And what actions has the kingdom undertaken to head off this onslaught? I can only point to glossy pullouts in major newspapers and a spate of advertisements. Sadly, such ingrained negativity will scarcely flinch in the wake of a major marketing campaign. Even worse, there are the eyewitness accounts and testimonials that offer unflattering glimpses into Saudi Arabia. A former senior intelligence officer recalls being forced to take the service elevator to brief General Staff at the Defense Ministry because she is a woman. Cultural difference, most assuredly. But does that sort of story play well when repeated in the United States? No. Every expatriate has his or her own story to tell, and they are all too willing to divulge their most humiliating or maddening moment.

It does not have to be this way. But if Saudi Arabia wants to avoid these harsh judgments, then there must be a real commitment to playing an active role in turning the story around. Cultivating both good and reliable journalism at home as well as seeking it abroad is going to be the best weapon in the public relations arsenal. I know for a fact that a very highly regarded nationally televised program was seeking appointments with senior Saudi officials to deliver a more nuanced picture of the kingdom. Unfortunately, their visa approval came too late. The show had to air without including what I believed were important voices from within Saudi Arabia. Worrying over negative publicity without doing anything to give the Saudi viewpoint on a story will only net more negative stories. No amount of PR work by high-priced public relations firms will turn this around.

In recent weeks, I have been greatly heartened by the orchestrated efforts of a number of senior Saudi officials to create some effective counter-spin. From sophisticated polling of American opinions on the kingdom, to facilitating press access and expediting the visa process, change is underway. These efforts are a small, welcome step in the right direction. Of course, reaching common ground while agreeing to allow our respective and divergent cultures some breathing room is no easy feat. Yet, I am convinced that in the tragedy of September 11 are new opportunities to do just that.

But September 11 should also be viewed as a clarion call to the senior princes. Saudi Arabia is in trouble. Bin Laden was taken seriously enough to exile, yet his rants against the ruling family received the financial assistance and moral backing of many Saudis. Since he ran his operations from the relative safety of Afghanistan, he was not viewed as a significant threat. Exporting problems, however, does not solve them.

Now, the ruling elites must face certain undeniable facts: over 50 percent of the Saudi population is under the age of 25; the job market is not keeping pace with the population growth rate; the educational system ceded, in part, to the religious extremists has produced a generation more familiar with the Qur’an than skills relevant to the job market; the mosques are the only outlet where free statement is tolerated, and the sentiments found in a great majority instill intolerance.

There is an urgent need for economic and political reform in the kingdom. There is no way to sugar coat this message. I have some experience with previous administrations’ aversion to including mention of such difficult issues in discussions with Saudi rulers as well as other leaders in the region. "It’s the peace process, stupid!" would be the most useful analogy. But we did ourselves and a vital ally in the region a great disservice by allowing conversations on reform to be hijacked by the peace process. Actually, moves toward regional peace and stability must include discussions about maintaining such an outcome. Repressive tactics will not, in the end, sustain peace. And, the kingdom will find itself increasingly challenged to avoid internal fissures and outright conflict if it does not begin to confront the root causes of Saudi participation in the tragedies of September 11. Yes, anti-American sentiment was a key motivational device. But it was certainly not the only reason so many Saudis willingly gave their lives to serve Bin Laden’s diabolical cause.

Prior to September 11, Abdullah had undertaken a number of steps forward on the economic front that would make investing in Saudi Arabia more palatable and less bureaucratically daunting for foreign companies. His program to increase the number of Saudis working for private companies was also taking shape. But much more needs to be done. More dramatic steps will have to be taken to meet the very real economic and social challenges facing the regime. Due to widespread antipathy toward the United States, any dialogue with the kingdom on these challenges should be arranged through a mutually acceptable third party. We must be extremely cautious in our approach, creative in our delivery method, but absolutely firm in pressing for change.

Finally, it is time for us to accept that the reason people in this part of the world view the United States with antipathy does have something to do with our policy toward Israel. This is not a popular viewpoint to articulate for fear that if we reach such a conclusion it will somehow diminish our support for Israel. But, if our policy toward Israel stands up to the test of national interest, we should not have to apologize for it or hide it. Let us make the case openly and in terms that our friends in the region can understand. If the cause of national interest is not served, however, then it is time to take a hard look at the policy.

Mission Al-Jazeera: MEI Book Launch with Josh Rushing

Josh Rushing — Fri, 20 Jul 2007 13:00:00 -0400

The Middle East Institute is pleased to welcome Josh Rushing for a presentation on his riveting new book, Mission Al-Jazeera: Build a Bridge, Seek the Truth, Change the World. Published in June of 2007, the book takes readers inside Al-Jazeera, offering a unique behind-the-scenes look at this controversial news channel.

Mr. Rushing is currently a correspondent for Al Jazeera International and a military analyst. A 14-year veteran of the United States Marine Corps who held ranks from private to captain, he gained prominence through his role in the documentary Control Room, which featured his struggles as the US military's lead spokesperson to the Arab world during the invasion of Iraq. He has also been featured in GQ, Fast Company magazine, The Village Voice, Mother Jones, and has appeared on The Today Show, Anderson Cooper 360, and on The O'Reilly Factor.

Arab Satellite TV: Agents of Change in the 21st Century Middle East

Jihad Ballout — Wed, 15 Feb 2006 12:00:00 -0500

What role does Arabic language 24 Hour News satellite television play in shaping public opinion in contemporary Arab societies? The Middle East Institute is pleased to welcome Jihad Ballout to discuss the role of Arabic news networks in framing the political debate.

Ballout is a seasoned journalist with nearly thirty years of experience working in pan-Arab media outlets. He is Spokesperson and Director of Media Relations at Al Arabiya New Channel in Dubai. From 2001 to 2004, Ballout served in the same capacity for Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel in Doha, Qatar.

Beyond Borat: Essentials on the Real Kazakhstan

Ambassador Elizabeth Jones, Martha Brill Olcott — Thu, 5 Jan 2006 12:00:00 -0500

The Middle East Institute is pleased to host Ambassador Elizabeth Jones and Martha Brill Olcott, two distinguished experts on Kazakhstan and Central Asia, to provide a primer on what Americans should understand about the real Kazakhstan, the topic of much controversy since the 2006 screening of the box-office hit comedy "Borat."

Ambassador Jones, Executive Vice President, APCO Worldwide, has extensive international experience in Europe, Eurasia, South Asia, and the Middle East. She spent 35 years in the U.S. Foreign Service, where she achieved the highest rank of Career Ambassador. She held numerous high-ranking positions, among them: Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia, US Ambassador to Kazakhstan, and Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy, Islamabad, Pakistan.

Martha Brill Olcott, Senior Associate with the Russian and Eurasian Program at Carnegie Endowment has followed interethnic relations in the former Soviet Union for more than 25 years. She is author of Central Asia's Second Chance, which examines the economic and political development of this strategically vital region in the context of the post 9/11 security threats.

Update on Saudi Arabia

Khaled Al Maeena — Wed, 25 May 2005 13:00:00 -0400

MEI is delighted to welcome Arab News’ Editor-in-Chief Khaled Al-Maeena to discuss recent trends in Saudi Arabia. He will offer his insight into political reforms in Saudi Arabia, Gulf security, the status of the press in the Kingdom, and his outlook on future developments in the region.

Khaled Al-Maeena is a well-known Saudi PR consultant, media personality, editor and journalist. Mr. Al-Maeena has been the Editor-in-Chief of Arab News for over fifteen years and has many media and diplomatic achievements including representing the Saudi media at important Arab summit meetings and serving as a diplomatic delegate to the People's Republic of China and Russia after diplomatic relations between the Kingdom and those countries were established. Mr. Al Maeena has also worked as an anchor for Saudi TV and as CEO of the Saudi Public Relations Company (SPRC). Mr. Al-Maeena is a regular political and social columnist for Gulf News - Dubai, Asharq Al-Awsat, Al-Eqtisadiah, Arab News, Times of Oman, Asian Age and The China Post and has been a commentator on CNN, Star News, and CBS.

Broadcasting to Iran and Iraq

David Newton, Stephen Fairbanks — Wed, 16 Mar 2005 12:00:00 -0500

As the US government searches for ways to promote its "freedom and democracy" agenda in the broader Middle East, resources are increasingly being channeled into radio broadcasting, particularly in Iraq but also in Iran. The Middle East Institute is pleased to present panelists David Newton, an MEI Adjunct Scholar who formerly served as the Director of Radio Free Iraq, and Stephen Fairbanks, who was formerly the Director of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Persian Service ("Radio Farda"), to reflect on their experiences managing the US government’s broadcasting activities toward the people of Iraq and Iran. Both will be on hand to discuss and take questions regarding what message the US government should be sending to the people of Iraq and Iran, as well as the most effective means of doing so.