Regional Security

Panel I: Exiting Iraq

Tue, 14 Nov 2006 02:00:00 -0500

In the “Exiting Iraq” panel of the Middle East Institute’s 60th Annual Conference, Jay Garner, Brian Katulis, David Satterfield, Qubad Talabani and moderator Bing West discussed various ways to improve the situation in Iraq and to find a comprehensive and successful way out of the current quagmire for US forces. Bing West identified the four major themes that appeared throughout each panelist’s speech: a greater advisory role of US troops, the necessity for regional dialogue, the essential nature of a pro-American Kurdistan and the need to develop contingency plans if the situation continues to degrade.

Deciding the Fate of the Mujahadin

Trita Parsi — Mon, 6 Oct 2008 15:30:48 -0400

The Bush administration inherited many of Iraq's problems when it invaded that country, including an Iranian terrorist organization funded and armed by Saddam Hussein the Mujahedin-e-Kalq (MKO). Though in the midst of a war on terror, the Bush administration chose in 2003 to protect 3,000 of the organization's militants and house them in a camp given to the group by Saddam — Camp Ashraf just north of Baghdad.

Ever since, the faith of this State Department-listed terrorist organization has been unclear. Hated by Iraqis for its involvement in Saddam's crimes against the Iraqi people, the Baghdad government wants to expel the group. But no country is willing to take them.

Though the Iranian government wants to put the group's leadership on trial in Iran, it seems less interested in the organization's rank and file. The European governments have little interest in taking in 3,000 battle-hardened Muslim militants, fearing that they will use Europe as a base to plan and execute further terrorist attacks.

The U.S., on the other hand, has already contradicted its own principles by giving preferential treatment to an organization on the State Department's terrorist list — even though President Bush himself pointed to the organization's patronage under Saddam Hussein as evidence of Iraq's support for international terrorists in his speech to the United Nations in September 2002.

"Iraq continues to shelter and support terrorist organizations that direct violence against Iran," President Bush said. To complicate matters further, if reports that the U.S. has used MKO terrorists for cross-border raids into Iran are true, then Washington certainly doesn't want these militants to end up in Iranian hands.

Washington seems doomed if it does, doomed if it doesn't.
Members of the terrorist organization have protested outside the White House this past week, angered by the Bush administration's decision to hand over Camp Ashraf to the Iraqi government. The government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki will surrender the MKO members to Tehran, they argue, who in turn will imprison and execute them.

Though approximately 500 MKO fighters have been repatriated to Iran and no reports of abuse have emerged according to the International Committee of the Red Cross, which oversaw their return, sending rank-and-file Mujahedin members to Iran against their will would be irresponsible.

Hated by the Iranian people for having fought on Saddam's side in the Iraq-Iran war, the Iranian Mujahedin is understandably fearful of the fate awaiting them in Iran. After all, the Iranian government systematically violates the human rights of journalists and union leaders alike, let alone anti-Iranian terrorists.
Yet, contrary to the protesters outside the White House, the issue is not a choice between freedom in Camp Ashraf and captivity in Iran.

The Mujahedin is not an effective opposition to the unpopular government in Iran as the organization's defenders in Washington claim, but a politico-religious cult that brainwashes its members, places children of Mujahedin members with other families in order to prevent parents from defecting, and who according to Human Rights Watch, maintains control by torturing its rank and file. "Members who try to leave the Mujahedin pay a very heavy price," according to Joe Stork of Human Rights Watch.

Its involvement in terrorism is undisputed. It assassinated several Americans in Iran in the 1970s. It supported the taking of the U.S. Embassy in Iran and blasted Ayatollah Khomeini for releasing the American diplomats in 1981, arguing instead that the hostages should have been executed. It made a pact with Saddam Hussein in the 1980s and fought alongside his army against their Iranian countrymen. Later in the 1990s, they became Saddam's most trusted henchmen, tasked with quelling Kurdish and Shiite uprisings against the Iraqi dictator.

According to defectors, Mujahedin members in Camp Ashraf celebrated the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

In 2004, French authorities descended upon the Mujahedin headquarters in France, arresting the leader of the cult, Maryam Rajavi. Immediately, zealous Mujahedin members staged hunger strikes and several set themselves ablaze. Hardly the behavior of a democratically oriented opposition group.

But the vast majority of the Camp Ashraf residents are not so much members of a terrorist cult as they are victims of it. The camp is itself a prison. It may have provided Mujahedin militants with protection against ordinary Iraqis who sought to avenge their relatives killed by the Mujahedin at the behest of Saddam Hussein, but the prison has primarily enabled the leaders of the terrorist organization to prevent the rank and file from defecting.

Rather than debating where to expel the Mujahedin terrorists, help should be provided to the rank and file to break with the cult and make free choices about their future. It's the only humanitarian solution to this dilemma - and one that defeats rather than protects this anti-American terrorist group.

Iraq: Security Gains in Jeopardy

Fri, 19 Sep 2008 17:38:11 -0400

The bulk of the improvement in security in much of Iraq over the past two years stems not from the surge, but rather the largely Sunni Arab “Awakening.” Yet, revived Iraqi government hostility toward the Awakening, and provocative moves by Iraq’s Kurds have made those security gains potentially very fragile, raising the risk of a significant rebound in violence.

The surge initiated by President Bush in January 2007 had two main objectives: to stabilize Baghdad during a wave of horrific sectarian violence spanning many mixed areas of the country, pitting Sunni Arab against Shi’a, and to create a period of calm during which there could be sectarian reconciliation. Only a small portion of the roughly 29,000 U.S. soldiers included in the surge was dispatched to predominantly Sunni Arab al-Anbar Governate, the scene of heavy fighting between U.S. forces on the one hand and Sunni Arab insurgents and elements of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) on the other. Virtually all other surge-related U.S. troops were deployed into Baghdad.

The most important element in dramatically reducing violence was not the surge, but rather a deal between U.S. forces and Sunni Arab tribal and insurgent elements in late 2006 that translated the Awakening among many Sunni Arabs into stunning progress in terms of overall security and reduced U.S. casualties. Elements of the Awakening first approached U.S. forces seeking a deal two years earlier.

In summer 2004, Sunni Arab tribal leaders and notables, some with ties to the insurgency and most from al-Anbar Governate, asked that U.S. forces enter into a truce that would allow all concerned to join in an effort to destroy AQI. Many Sunni Arabs had become enraged over excesses on part of AQI’s militant Islamic fighters.

There was, however, one important condition: these Sunni Arabs would not make their peace with the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi government. At a time when elections for a sovereign Iraqi government still lay ahead and the process of putting in place a new constitution was incomplete, Washington declined. The U.S. persuaded some of those who had approached us to meet with then Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi to try to work something out, but the talks failed. As a result, Sunni Arab insurgents and U.S. forces would fight on for two more years, at great cost to both. In addition, AQI remained largely free to continue its reign of terror, particularly anti-Shi’a suicide bombings.

Only when those same bombings triggered massive Sunni Arab-Shi’a sectarian violence following AQI’s bombing of the Shi’a Golden Mosque in north-central Iraq in early 2006 did the U.S. once again consider a separate deal with armed Sunni Arabs aimed at AQI. In the face of bitter objections from Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki, the U.S. finally agreed to a conditional ceasefire with many Sunni Arab insurgent and tribal elements, allowing them to arm and to organize. By late 2007, it was clear that this arrangement, which expanded far beyond al-Anbar Governate, vastly reduced U.S. casualties and allowed both sides to administer crippling blows to AQI.

The Iraqi government never signed onto the overall arrangement, despite the nearly 90% reduction in anti-Shi’a AQI suicide bombings and a major shift on the part of those in the Awakening (eventually numbering around 100,000 fighters called “Sons of Iraq” or SOI’s) who now wanted to be incorporated into government security forces. Likewise, despite some measures in that direction, the government has dragged its feet on broader reconciliation with the Sunni Arab community, even though the surge was aimed at tamping down sectarian violence to provide the calm needed for that very purpose.

The government’s attitude became especially problematic when the U.S. turned control of SOI-dominated al-Anbar Governate back to the Iraqi government in recent weeks and made clear that the U.S. could not continue paying SOI’s much longer. The Baghdad government, however, had only agreed to accept a limited number of SOI’s into its security forces, and even doing that had proceeded at a snail’s pace.

Making matters even worse, over the past several weeks, Maliki declared over 600 SOI’s “criminals” subject to immediate arrest and his intent to end the SOI’s this year. That, of course, already has caused some SOI’s to desert and others to return to the residual Sunni Arab insurgency. Talks between SOI leaders and the government to increase the number of SOI’s taken into the security forces last week reportedly ended in stalemate.

If that were not enough, armed Kurdish Peshmerga personnel have gained control of increased areas--some far beyond the boundaries of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) zone--arresting or apparently seeking to displace inhabitants of such areas, many of them Sunni Arabs. Kurdish moves have been so provocative in some locales that even Maliki finally reacted, using non-Kurdish Iraqi army units to force a few Peshmerga withdrawals. Nonetheless, Kurdish flags are flying defiantly in numerous Kurdish areas well beyond the KRG, which contain substantial Sunni Arab populations. This—coupled with arrests and harassment-has infuriated Arab notables and SOI’s elements.

So Sunni Arab elements comprising the Awakening now find themselves assailed on two fronts, with levels of tension rising ominously. It would be sadly ironic if the Awakening (the main driver of improved security in so many areas beyond the more restricted scope of the surge) was to collapse, many SOI’s were to turn against the government, and, now, Iraq’s Kurds (or both).

These risky Iraqi government actions stem, in part, from the Bush Administration’s unconditional support. In late 2006, the Iraq Study Group recommended that U.S. support for the Iraqi government be made conditional, linked to progress on matters like reconciliation, in an effort to make it more likely that Maliki & Co. would avoid these nasty scenarios and to prevent Washington from being viewed as complicit in any government misbehavior. Failure to do so was a mistake, but there do not appear to be indications that the President is contemplating any change in this questionable course.

Resolving Old Rivalries

Karl F. Inderfurth and Wendy J. Chamberlin — Thu, 17 Jul 2008 12:37:49 -0400

The deadly suicide attack last week on the Indian Embassy in Kabul has put Afghanistan in a familiar but unwanted position - a "back to the future" scenario, caught up again in the intrigues and suspicions of its neighbor, Pakistan, and Pakistan's neighbor, India. But this time around, the stakes are too high to replay old rivalries.

President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan said that Pakistan's intelligence service, known as the ISI, was behind the Indian Embassy bombing. His government announced it would boycott a series of meetings with Pakistan until "bilateral trust" was restored.

Indian officials said the attack was intended to send a stark message to India: Get out of Afghanistan. India's national security adviser, M.K. Narayanan, declared that the ISI must be "destroyed" and that if things continued in this manner, there would be no choice but to "retaliate in kind."

Pakistan's prime minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani, declared all accusations "baseless" and "malicious."

It was not supposed to be this way.

The February election in Pakistan was a positive return to civilian-led democracy in that country. The new leadership in Islamabad said it wanted to improve long-troubled relations with Kabul. But five months later the civilian coalition in Pakistan is weak and in crisis.

Internal struggles between Pakistan's two major parties - the PPP, led by the late Benazir Bhutto's husband, Asif Ali Zardari, and the PML-N, led by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif - have left a foreign policy vacuum that radical elements, almost certainly with ISI connections, have exploited to advance their own agenda. That agenda is a flashback to the period before 9/11, when the ISI believed it needed a friend (Taliban) in Kabul to offset Indian influence in Afghanistan.

Combined with the many other challenges facing Afghanistan today, the recent revival of the Pakistan-Indian rivalry makes the odds of Afghanistan becoming a stable country that much more remote. A multi-pronged diplomatic initiative by the parties involved, with strong international support, is urgently needed to turn this situation around.

Reducing antagonisms between Afghanistan and Pakistan must be the top priority. Afghanistan has legitimate concerns, especially about the resurgent Taliban's use of Pakistani territory as a safe haven. Kabul blames Islamabad for this. Islamabad's full and continuous cooperation to stop cross-border attacks in Afghanistan, as well as ISI interference in Afghanistan's affairs, is an essential condition for stabilizing relations.

For its part, Pakistan is aggrieved at Karzai's public finger-pointing at Pakistan after every spectacular extremist attack, like the Taliban raid that liberated 400 prisoners in Afghanistan. The truth is that both Kabul and Islamabad share the same enemies. Taliban, Al Qaeda, ISI-supported terrorist groups that operated in Kashmir, and even the old militant groups that the United States once supported to fight against the Soviets now stage attacks on Pakistani, Afghan, U.S. and NATO forces. A mutual effort to counter the common threat would be a more productive approach.

Pakistan and India also should build on their positive diplomatic developments over the past several years to tackle the very sensitive issue of Afghanistan. Approaching talks in New Delhi between the foreign ministers of the two countries provide an excellent opportunity to do this. But it won't be easy.

India will claim it has legitimate interests in Afghanistan and that it is a major donor in the international effort to rebuild that country. Pakistan will charge that India is running operations out of its many consulates in Afghanistan to stir trouble across the border, especially to fan the flames of the anti-Islamabad insurgency in Baluchistan. Pakistan sees itself as potentially caught in a vice between its western and eastern neighbors.

But these long-standing concerns are now being trumped by a new reality, the need for India and Pakistan to look beyond their traditional rivalries and agree on a joint strategy to confront the extremists operating along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

"Whatever problems we had with Pakistan," says C. Raja Mohan, a leading Indian security analyst, "Pakistan had been a buffer between India and the badlands. Now the buffer is falling apart. Afghanistan needs to be stabilized. Pakistan needs to be stabilized. This requires more drastic action."

Direct talks also present the opportunity for India and Pakistan to address the one issue that has long bedeviled their relations - the dispute over Kashmir. After a long history of playing a "dirty game" with terrorist groups against India, the tables have turned. The terrorist groups present a much more serious threat to Pakistan's internal stability than they offer as instruments of asymmetrical warfare against India. Today's common security interests of India and Pakistan should drive the two countries toward finding a settlement over Kashmir.

Pakistan's foreign minister, Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi, recently said in Washington: "The time is now for taking bold steps to take Pakistan and India out of a cycle of hostility, acrimony, and mutual suspicion." That advice also applies to efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. All three countries need to engage in active, high-level diplomacy aimed at stemming the spread of extremism in their common neighborhood. Their security fates are intertwined.

Saudi Arabia, Iran and the US

Thu, 3 Jul 2008 12:10:00 -0400

Saudi Arabia has been a strategic ally of the United States for more than 60 years. Despite occasional differences, Riyadh was a firm – and generous – partner of American policy in the Cold War and in distant conflicts from Afghanistan to Nicaragua. President Bush and King Abudullah reaffirmed the two countries’ ties during Bush’s two visits to the Kingdom this year.

But the Saudis are putting a good deal of distance between themselves and the United States in one of the most important arenas of American Middle East policy – Iran.
Riyadh does not endorse U.S. efforts to isolate Iran and to put additional pressure on the regime of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. And the Saudis firmly oppose any move by the United States or Israel to use military force in an effort to shut down the Iranian nuclear program.

After a week of conversations in Riyadh with Saudi government officials, academics, businessmen and journalists, the reasons for this Saudi reluctance are not a mystery. There are reportedly some officers in the Saudi armed forces who favor a confrontation with Iran, but most Saudis forsee short-term dangers and long-term strategic damage in any such policy.

In simplest terms, the Saudis recognize that Iran is a major regional power, a potentially agressive neighbor that is not going away. Iran is much more capable of making trouble for Saudi Arabia than the other way around, and therefore the Kingdom’s security over time requires accommodation with Iran, however difficult it may be to manage the relationship. Americans and other foreigners may come and go, but Iran and its nearly 80 million people—almost four times the population of Saudi Arabia--will remain, a few miles across the Gulf.

Relations with Iran presented few problems for Riyadh before the Iranian revolution,. Iran under the Shah was also a Cold War ally of the United States, the two countries were founding partners in OPEC, and Iran in those days made no effort to export the Shiite version of Islam.

With the rise of the Islamic Republic, Tehran followed a different path, challenging the religious supremacy of Saudi Arabia and denouncing Riyadh’s alliance with the United States. The Iranians were furious over Saudi Arabia’s support for Iraq in its war with Iran. Iranian pilgrims to Mecca began staging anti-Saudi and anti-American political demonstrations, which culminated in gunfire when rioting erupted in 1987. The Saudis reported that 402 people died.

This was an intolerable provocation for a regime that bases its legitimacy on its custodianship of Islam’s holy sites, and Riyadh broke diplomatic relations with Iran. Mobs sacked the Saudi Embassy in Tehran. Relations were at their nadir, not to improve until the Iran-Iraq war ended and Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani became president of Iran.

The Saudis remember those years with dread and do not wish to repeat them, especially in pursuit of a policy they do not believe will succeed. Having reached a modus vivendi with Iran in the 1990s, they are determined to stay on peaceful terms. King Abdullah made symbolic public declaration of this policy last year when he invited Adhmadinejad personally to the pilgrimage.

Of course the two countries differ on many issues – on Lebanon, oil production, Iranian support for Shiite political movements, and the prospect of peace with Israel – but in the Saudi view, these can be managed. The Saudis were angered recently when Ahmadinejad publicly criticized their long-time foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, but they swallowed hard and let it pass.

A policy of confrontation, on the other hand, could leave Saudi Arabia vulnerable to Iranian troublemaking on many fronts, beginning with agitation among Saudi Arabia’s Shiite minority. And in the event of military action against Iran, the Saudis fear that they would be the first targets of Iranian retaliation. Saudi Arabia’s most important oil installations and most of its crucial water desalination plants are on the Gulf coast, within range of Iranian missiles. The Saudis are well aware that, as Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid wrote in National Security in Saudi Arabia, Iran could “launch asymmetric attacks in the gulf that would have a strategic effect out of proportion to the size and capability of its forces”—not to mention the effect of such a conflict on world oil markets.

The Saudis certainly would prefer that Iran not acquire nuclear weapons, but they do not believe Washington’s methods of trying to prevent such a development are constructive.

Moreover, several Saudis said they have to take the long view. President Bush will be gone in seven months, and the provocative Ahmedinejad might fail to win reelection next year. The Iranian people, however, have long memories. A policy of confrontation, even in the unlikely event that it succeeded in the short run, could inspire Iranian grievance that will last for a generation, making the Gulf region more difficult to manage than it already is. The Saudis fail to see how such an outcome would benefit them.

Iraq: Muqtada al-Sadr Still in the Game

Wayne White — Tue, 13 May 2008 11:02:32 -0400

Iraqi militia leader Muqtada al-Sadr remains a force to be reckoned with, regardless of his recent reverses. Unlike other militia leaders, he is more charismatic and has a large popular street following in locations extending from Baghdad through Iraq’s heavily populated Shi’a south. Ever since the surge, Sadr has been waiting out Washington, biding his time until the balance of political and street power is more to his liking.

To many outside observers, this seemingly moody and much maligned young cleric might seem a spent force in Iraqi politics, with his Mahdi Army worn down by lopsided combat with more capable US forces. However, those who have brokered the latest shaky ceasefire between the Mahdi Army on the one hand and Iraqi government and US forces on the other doubtless know better. Sadr has a powerful name and considerable charisma among Iraq’s Shi’a downtrodden. He also reportedly has been studying in Qom to burnish his clerical credentials.

Clumsy US counterinsurgency tactics in the early years of the Iraq War generated as many-—if not more--insurgent recruits as those fighters killed or captured. Likewise, in the recent fighting in Sadr City, during which US forces did much of the heavy lifting, numerous casualties among civilians and extensive property damage probably rallied many angry Shi’a to Sadr’s cause.

Sadr and his Mahdi Army may be the only Shi’a militia on the Iraqi scene with real street power. Following the example of other Islamist groups in the region, he is expanding that base by endeavoring to provide Iraqi Shi’a with some of the basic medical, educational and social services Iraq’s dysfunctional central government has been unable to deliver. Sadr certainly is not popular everywhere within Iraq’s majority Shi’a community, but has large followings in areas such as East Baghdad, al-Amarah, al-Kut, portions of Basrah, etc.

Many Iraqis, including poorer Shi’a, are tired of the violence associated with efforts by the Mahdi Army to secure control of additional areas and take on US and government forces, as well as abuses on the part of some Mahdi Army cadres. Yet, there have been no firm indications that his support base has weakened significantly. Indeed, to many Shi’a, Sadr’s fierce anti-Americanism and opposition to “occupation” still resonate very strongly.

Much has been made of Sadr’s acceptance of considerable support from Iran. However, Sadr’s principal rival, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and his “Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council” (SIIC), which recently has cozied up to the government of Prime Minister Maliki and Washington, also receives assistance from Iran.

Unlike al-Hakim and many of his supporters however, the Sadr clan did not set up shop in Iran during the Iran-Iraq War or flee Iraq during the worst of Saddam Hussein’s tyranny. They stayed and often defied Saddam, resulting in the murder of Muqtada’s influential father, Ayatollah Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr in 1999, Muqtada’s two brothers, as well as his famous father-in-law in 1980. That, combined with Muqtada’s strong nationalist message, makes Sadr’s ties to Iran less controversial than otherwise might have been the case.

Muqtada al-Sadr also is his own man. In part for this very reason, Iran withheld support from him in 2003. Efforts to stereotype Sadr, especially among non-Iraqis, as an Iranian client who progressively can be peeled away from his Iraqi constituency reflect a profound misunderstanding and underestimation of Sadr’s overall clout in many quarters.

Sadr largely has been playing a waiting game since the beginning of the surge. His anti-American agenda apparently has not changed but he knows he currently is outmatched. Yet, neither the US nor the Maliki government can destroy Sadr’s power without removing the grievances of the many Shi’a who support him. Since the government has shown little ability to deliver, and one major grievance is the US occupation itself, Sadr—-or someone very much like Sadr if something should happen to him—probably will remain a robust fixture on the Iraqi political scene for some time to come.

US and Iran: Drifting Toward Conflict?

Wayne White — Wed, 30 Apr 2008 11:57:58 -0400

The U.S. once again is stepping up its rhetoric aimed at Iran. Renewed charges of nefarious Iranian activities related to Iraq have been surfacing ever since the hearings featuring General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker earlier this month. Diplomacy is stalled on both Iran’s nuclear ambitions and Iraq. It is unclear whether the U.S. and Iran will succeed in avoiding a military confrontation of one sort or another.

Not only have accusations escalated, but also the tone of Administration and U.S. military commentary on Iran has become noticeably more shrill. There has been a focus on Iranian-trained “special groups” operating in Iraq, especially in the context of this month’s bloody confrontation involving radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army.

Late last week, Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, alluded to Iran’s “increasingly lethal and malign influence” (in Iraq). The normally cautious Mullen even went so far as to note that the Pentagon is preparing for “potential military courses of action” against Iran. General Petraeus reportedly is preparing a briefing on Iran’s provision of lethal munitions to anti-U.S. elements in Iraq.

On the nuclear front, Defense Secretary Gates -- also typically reserved -- charged in a speech last week that Iran “is hell bent on acquiring nuclear weapons.”

Tehran probably is guilty of supplying sympathetic militias in Iraq with money, arms, and training. The evidence so far has not made believers of many observers, but the sheer volume of reporting on this is sizeable. Yet, the U.S. does not seem to appreciate that Iraq is in Iran’s backyard and expecting the Iranians to eschew involvement there—especially in the face of a robust U.S. presence--is simply unrealistic.

On the diplomatic front, there is little prospect for meaningful progress. Talks between Ambassador Crocker and the Iranians consist of American accusations against Iran and predictable Iranian denials. The restriction of these exchanges to Iraq blocks any useful trade-offs that might be drawn from other contentious issues dividing the two governments. The dim prospects for useful engagement were underscored when Secretary of State Rice apparently went to a major regional meeting on Iraq this month with explicit instructions not to engage with the Iranians.

A key factor the Administration either does not wish to acknowledge or cannot appreciate is that Iran’s overall responsibility for the mess in Iraq is actually quite limited. In a country shattered by war, looting and violence, saddled with a dysfunctional, sectarian and corrupt government and ethno-sectarian communities with maximalist agendas, the fundamental problems are inherently Iraqi. Indeed, the Administration’s focus on Iran might be, in part, driven by the need to distract attention from the more fundamental reasons for disappointment—even failure--in Iraq.

Regarding Iran’s nuclear intentions, Defense Secretary Gates may be right. However, the main driver for any Iranian nuclear weapons program most likely relates to Iran’s desire for the ultimate defensive deterrent against U.S. interference—not a desire to launch a suicidal nuclear first-strike against Israel.

Gates has noted quite accurately that war with Iran would be “disastrous.” Hostilities between the U.S. and Iran would trigger a major crisis without a clear end game in the Persian Gulf upon which the world depends for a huge slice of its tightening energy supplies.

Something often neglected in American policymaking is the good sense to proceed cautiously in certain highly complex situations. To avoid another massive crisis the U.S. can ill-afford, it would be best to acknowledge an Iranian role in Iraq, engage Tehran in a less one-dimensional fashion, and prepare to live with a nuclear Iran.

Iran: The American Threat

Reza Zia-Ebrahimi — Fri, 14 Mar 2008 09:04:57 -0400

Iranian foreign policy is shaped by two factors: an acute sense of insecurity and a thirst for international recognition. Insecurity is largely the result of the country’s immediate geostrategic situation. Indeed Iran’s natural habitat – characterized by an abnormally high level of interstate tensions and transnational violence – poses major security challenges to the country’s policymakers.

To the east, there is Pakistan, an unstable military dictatorship with nuclear capability, and the failed state of Afghanistan, now home to a hostile American military presence. There is instability to the north with a recently crushed independence struggle in Chechnya, guerrilla warfare in Dagestan, and still unresolved conflicts between Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as between Georgians and Ossetians. The former superpower Russia seems to be on Iran’s side but is ultimately unpredictable and therefore unreliable. Iran’s western border is shared with Iraq, with which it fought one of the longest interstate conflicts of the 20th century and which is now also home to an American military presence. Last but not least is a nuclear capable Israel, which boasts the region’s most powerful military and regularly calls for the Iranian issue to be dealt with ‘by any means’.

This is not intended to dismiss Iran’s responsibility in antagonising some of these nations, particularly Israel. Rather, its purpose is to underscore that the Iranians’ sense of insecurity is real and justified. This is especially true when considering that throughout the 20th century Iran has regularly been the object of incursions or invasions (most notably by the Allies in 1941 and Iraq in 1980).

Iran’s thirst for recognition is a direct consequence of the country’s nationalist posture. This has deep historical roots in past Russo-British interferences into the country’s internal political affairs and exploitation of economic resources. After the United States replaced Russia and Britain as Iran’s main imperialist challenge, it gave its hand to the removal of democratically-minded Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq in 1953 and subsequently supported and armed Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi’s royal dictatorship.
The significance of this traumatic encounter with the West cannot be sufficiently stressed, and its impact on foreign policy cannot be overstated. It is continuously discussed in public and private circles, effectively reopening old wounds. The most radical form of Iranian nationalism can be understood as a collective post-traumatic condition, which is revived by vivid flashbacks and reinforced by fresh evidence of the outside world’s perceived ill-feelings towards Iran.

Iranian nationalism is based on the belief that while Iran is by all standards a powerful country, it is prevented from assuming its place on the world stage by perennial American, British and Israeli opposition. Iran is a populous, culturally sophisticated, nationally cohesive and - by the standards of the developing world – technologically advanced country. How else can a policymaker in Tehran explain why Israel, India and Pakistan have been allowed to develop nuclear arsenals without much international outrage while Iran is ostracized for its own program, so far carried out within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty?

Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weaponry is an obvious response to these concerns. First, it would give Iran some security guarantees and would preclude outside attempts at regime change. Second, the prestige surrounding the possession of nuclear technology is believed in Iran to be a necessary step in the country’s quest for international recognition.

With this in mind, it becomes clear why four years of pressure, isolation, subtle threats and serial embargos have so far failed to weaken the Islamic Republic’s resolve. They have in fact had the opposite effect by intensifying security concerns and reinforcing the belief that Iran is being denied what its neighbours already possess. The need for a nuclear deterrent is thus rendered even more pressing in the Iranian point of view.

The alternative to the current trend of threats and embargoes is engagement by the West. This does not come with a guarantee of success but it must be attempted since isolation and non-engagement have been unsuccessful. The 2006 proposal made by the EU 3 (France, Britain and Germany) gave some vague assurances about regional security schemes and normalisation, which is a start.
However, if viewed from Tehran’s perspective it is difficult to believe in Washington’s good faith when it still refuses to talk unconditionally to Iran. There was some flesh to former President Mohammad Khatami’s opening toward Washington, as it helped provide the Pentagon with crucial intelligence on the Taliban ahead of the invasion of Afghanistan, only to have Iran included in the ‘Axis of Evil’ a few weeks later. This episode confirmed the belief among some Iranians that it is Washington that cannot be engaged.
The gradual and infinitely dangerous empowerment of the Islamic Revolution’s Guards Corps (IRGC), the impunity with which Ahmadinejad acts despite his very poor domestic performance, the retour en force of hard-line rhetoric, and the new repressive measures against dissidents are all justified using the excuse of an ‘American threat’. If the United States is sincere in its wish to see a more moderate regime in Tehran, the best policy would be to eliminate that pretext and throw all its weight into negotiations over Iran’s nuclear file and establish direct negotiation channels. If engagement fails, then the blame can indisputably be laid on Iran’s door. But if it succeeds, apart from the tangible benefits of an improved regional security situation, this could also encourage a more moderate Iranian government. History has shown that engagement can moderate.

Recognizing Realities for Israel and Hamas

Wed, 13 Feb 2008 15:50:48 -0500

Knowing when to recognize unpleasant realities is perhaps the most significant hallmark of a statesman.

Israel’s leadership cannot ignore the growing citizen anger at the continuing Qassem rocket attacks on the southern town of Sderot. But it also has to decide how to deal with the Islamist organization Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip.

Its choices boil down to three: maintain the current policy of retaliation and targeted killings of Hamas leaders and those responsible for the attacks; unleash a major ground attack on Gaza to “clean out” terrorists and return control to the Palestinian Authority; or move towards a truce with Hamas – most probably out of public view through diplomatic signaling, second track diplomacy or third party mediation.

The US administration would look askance at a truce, as would PA President Mahmoud Abbas’ Fatah Party. Encouraged by the US, Israel has been building up Fatah as a moderate alternative, hoping to chip away at Hamas’s popular support.

It is time for both Israel and the US to acknowledge this policy is failing. Targeting the perpetrators of the rocket attacks will not stop them. An attack on Gaza would cause massive Israeli and Palestinian casualties, end the Annapolis peace process -- already on life support -- and further discredit the Fatah government, which most Palestinians view as a weak tool of Israel. It would also be likely to unleash violence elsewhere in the Muslim world.

Most important, it is unlikely to fatally weaken Hamas. The party is now a part of the Palestinian political landscape as the only effective opposition to Fatah and as a representative of the Islamist currents now prominent in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Hamas has gone to great lengths to differentiate itself from al Quaeda and similar groups. Destroying Hamas’s current leadership could well result in a much more radicalized Palestinian Islamism.

So, is a cease-fire with Hamas possible? And what would be the likely effects?

In fact, Hamas has “signaled” numerous times its desire for a truce. Actually implementing it would be tricky and would require an awareness of Islamic tradition, a degree of trust, and a clear-eyed understanding of what is possible on both sides. Still, a number of mainstream Israeli leaders believe it is essential to try, including a former chief of the Mossad, Ephraim Halevy, not known as a dove.

Hamas’s official ideology is embedded in its founding charter, a bloodcurdling document, which offers no compromise with Zionism. And there is no doubt that those who composed it in 1988 meant what they said.

Founding documents are important but their significance can change over time. For revolutionary movements like Hamas, they serve as a base of theoretical agreement even as different factions develop. Twenty years later, Hamas has garnered more power more quickly than it probably expected. Its leadership would never break away from the Islamist framework in which it is embedded, but nevertheless gives strong signs of desire to face the reality that is today’s Israel. It is in Israel’s interest to encourage this.

Hamas’s leadership understands that Israel is more powerful than ever, with strong US support. It realizes that most neighboring Arab governments have no use for it, but must behave circumspectly because their own populations see it as heroic. Hamas is now a maturing revolutionary movement and beginning to see the virtue of stability. It appears ready for a truce.

Israelis believe that Hamas wants a truce to strengthen itself so as to eventually destroy Israel. But so what? Israel will never turn a blind eye to Hamas, whether the truce lasts for weeks, years or decades. Hamas’s religiously-founded belief that Israel must disappear is not all that relevant any more. Its actions are what count. A truce must certainly limit Hamas’s access to weapons, difficult but not impossible to enforce. With both parties still enemies, the threat of force against any violation is a given.

Such an arrangement between enemies certainly is not new. The US and the Soviet Union uneasily lived in a Cold War for almost half a century. It was not an ideal arrangement but it provided considerable incentives for restraint. And, it prevented nuclear war.

Creating a truce with Hamas is neither a reward nor diplomatic recognition. Nor should it be burdened with any moral implications. It should be seen for what it is, basically a tactical move for both sides.

But it would also constitute a recognition of realities. Hamas is not an aberration or an incidental factor. It and other Islamist organizations are now part of the Middle East reality. We must develop an arsenal of diplomatic tools to deal with them. Otherwise, our tactics will continue to backfire and create more violence and more jihadists.

If Hamas will not accede to a truce, or violates it, Israel will have strengthened its moral and political stance if and when hostilities are resumed. Hamas’s strength can never be a match for Israel. It is time to for both sides to recognize and build on these realities.

Pakistan at a Crossroad

Wed, 13 Feb 2008 15:39:52 -0500

Over the next several years, Pakistan will either become the nation that the clear majority of its people want – a modern democracy based on constitutional law – or, it will implode under extreme pressures and fall under autocratic rule by Islamist extremists. The general elections on February 18 are an important but not the only step in determining that outcome.

American analysts often simplify the struggle in Pakistan as a battle between moderates and extremists, but Pakistanis understand that it is really about law. Is the nation to be governed by laws based on a constitution, or on God’s law -- Sharia law?

Most Pakistanis view their country as the constitutional democracy their founding father, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, envisioned it to be. They have respect for their constitution and rule of law in the western tradition, and only welcomed Pervez Musharraf’s bloodless military coup in 1999 because he promised to end corruption and then restore civilian democracy.

But Musharraf balked at taking off his uniform and undermined the rule of law by declaring Emergency rule, jailing democratic activists and sacking the independent Supreme Court. Pakistani political elites criticize the United States for tenaciously supporting Musharraf’s military regime. They believe we value counter- terrorism before democracy.

The US has been respected in Pakistan and throughout the world for the righteousness of our core values of democracy, fairness, and justice. We must act on those values. The most compelling gesture our President could make to win the support of Pakistani people would be to firmly call for the reinstatement of the former Supreme Court Justices, including Iftikar Chaudhry. The US should continue to support the rule of law, protection of people, clean and fair elections contested on a level playing field.

It is true we both fear extremism as the most dangerous threat to Pakistan. The impatient response to the threat is with bullets and bombs. Perhaps a more enduring and ultimately successful strategy is through the ballet box and pocket book.

The United States has provided Pakistan over $11 billion in aid since 2002. But over 90% was security related assistance. It had little impact on the poorest civilian sectors of the society. It is time to shift US assistance from defense to development o foster programs that support job creation, education and health. In the long run, a shift in US aid priorities would do much to calm dissent, and stifle the attraction of militant jihadism than bombs and bullets.

Pakistan has in its midst an active militant jihadist element that threatens to ignite a young and frustrated population. To be successful our policies need to be based on a clear understanding of the needs and aspirations of the Pakistani people, and not just our own interests.

Pakistan is struggling through a volatile period of transition. We must adjust our policies to best serve the Pakistani people and their struggle for a stable democracy. No matter the outcome, the election this month may create new uncertainties and we must be prepared to deal with them in a way that can benefit both our nations.