Peace Process

"The Arab Center: The Promise of Moderation"

Thu, 28 Aug 2008 16:12:42 -0400

MEI is honored to host Marwan Muasher, former Foreign Minister of Jordan, to discuss his new book, "The Arab Center: The Promise of Moderation."

Book Description:

Marwan Muasher, a prominent Jordanian diplomat, has been instrumental in shaping Middle East peace efforts for nearly twenty years. He served as Jordan’s first ambassador to Israel and was also ambassador to the United States, spokesperson at peace talks in Madrid and Washington, minister of foreign affairs, and deputy prime minister in charge of reform. Here he recounts the behind-the-scenes details of diplomatic ventures over the past two decades, including such recent undertakings as the Arab Peace Initiative and the Middle East Road Map.

Muasher’s insights into internal Arab politics and the successes and failures of the Arab Center are uniquely informed and deeply felt. He assesses how the middle road approach to reform is faring and explains why current tactics used by the West to deal with Islamic groups are doomed to failure. He examines why the Arab Center has made so little progress and which Arab, Israeli, and American policies need rethinking. Part memoir and part analysis, this book reveals the human side of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is essential reading for all who share the hope that moderate, pragmatic Arab voices will be heard in today’s vitriolic debates over how to achieve an enduring peace in the Middle East.

Can Israel and Syria Break the Middle East Deadlock?

Fri, 22 Feb 2008 11:27:12 -0500

Middle East Institute and Israel Policy Forum are proud to co-host Alon Liel, Chairman of the Israel-Syria Peace Society and former Director General of Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Dr. Liel has served in several foreign ministry posts and has spearheaded unofficial talks with prominent Syrians on a Syrian-Israeli peace treaty. Dr. Liel now lectures at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv University, and the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya.

Postscript on Annapolis: An Israeli Perspective

Fri, 7 Dec 2007 13:29:01 -0500

Middle East Institute is honored to host MK Ephraim Sneh, former Deputy Defense Minister of Israel. Minister Sneh has served in the Knesset since 1982 and as Minister of Health (1993-1996), Deputy Minister of Defense (1999-2001), and Minister of Transportation (2001-2002). In March 2006, he was re-elected to the Knesset and served as Chairman of the Labor Parliamentary Faction. In October 2006, he was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense for the second time.

Dr. Sneh has an M.D. from Tel Aviv University Faculty of Medicine, and was a Research Fellow at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center. He served as a career officer in the IDF until 1987, retiring with the rank of Brigadier General. He began his military career as a Medical Officer in the Paratroops Brigade and in 1974 became Chief Medical Officer of the Paratroops and Infantry Corps. He served as commander of the medical teams during the Entebbe Rescue Operation in 1976. In 1980, he was promoted to Chief Medical Officer of the IDF Northern Command, and the following year became Commander of the Security Zone in South Lebanon. He served as Head of the Civil Administration of the West Bank from 1985-87.

Israel's Kadima Contest

Fri, 19 Sep 2008 18:05:52 -0400

Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni narrowly won the Kadima party’s internal election this week to become chairwoman of Israel’s largest party and will replace Ehud Olmert within a few days. Olmert will remain as Prime Minister, however, until Livni succeeds in assembling a majority coalition in the Knesset. She has 42 days to accomplish that task; new elections will be called automatically if she fails, which would probably not be held until February at the earliest.

It should be noted that Livni won by only 1.1% of the vote ahead of her chief rival, former Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz. Hurt and angry in the wake of his narrow defeat, Mofaz has announced he is taking a “time out” from politics. This presumably means he will not lead an internal opposition to Livni but also might possibly erode her support in the center-right of the party and the country.

Livni has a good chance of putting together a coalition, but it is by no means assured. The second largest party, Labor, is headed by former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who has made no secret of his intense ambition to regain the post. However, he realizes that Labor is unlikely to gain in new elections held soon, so it will most likely join Kadima, as will the small left-Zionist Meretz party and the remnants of the new Pensioners party. All told, this only provides about 57 of the 61 votes needed for a majority.

Theoretically, there are two ways to get to the magic 61. One is to include some or all of the three “Arab parties”, which together have ten votes. This is highly unlikely, as Israel has never had a coalition including these parties and many Jewish Israelis might well consider it illegitimate. Additionally, although Livni is a dove in the larger Israeli political context, it is unlikely that they would be willing to endorse her security policies, i.e., the negotiations with the Palestinian Authority.

Livni’s background as a former hawk is very similar to Olmert’s, and her current views have followed the same trajectory as his. The one exception is that he still promises an agreement with the Palestinians before he leaves office and before Bush’s Jan. 1 deadline while she, like virtually everyone else, has apparently given that up. We may assume she will continue with the ongoing negotiations that she is already leading. These would include the same promises to give up most of the West Bank to a Palestinian state, and the same constraints not to immediately discuss Jerusalem or address the Palestinian demand to the “right of return”. The probability, at least until the end of the year, is a continuation of the current situation.

In the longer term, things will not be so smooth. Palestinian President Abbas’s term ends in January and there are indications that he will try to extend it for a year, although Hamas and others may not accept this. Also, Israel’s 6-month tahdiya (calming) with Hamas in Gaza is due to expire in December, and Hamas will almost certainly demand concessions to renew it. Perhaps most important, the entire Middle East is in a comparative political lull, almost certainly in anticipation of the election of the new US President and the start of his term.

Since a coalition with the three Arab parties is ruled out, Livni is left with the more likely alternative: a coalition including the Sephardi ultra-Orthodox party Shas. They have twelve Knesset votes and are already a member of the current coalition. However, Shas is extremely unpopular with Israel’s secular population and has announced that it will demand considerable funding for its network of schools and other institutions in return for joining. There is also some speculation that they would be reluctant to support a female Prime Minister (the first since Golda Meir resigned in 1974). Shas is also moderately confident of its fate in new elections but cannot be sure it would be included in a government at that point.

If Livni fails to form a viable government and new elections are called next month, the probable winner would be the right-wing parties, especially Likud’s Benjamin (Bibi) Netanyahu, who would be the likely new Prime Minister, barring unexpected developments (which are always possible). In any case, Olmert will remain Prime Minister until a new government is sworn in, probably in 6-7 months if a general election is held.

However, it is more likely that, following melodramatic negotiations, Livni will get her majority and will form a government. In that case, new general elections must be held within two years, most probably sometime in late 2009 or early 2010.

The old cliché of plus ca change, plus la meme chose is completely applicable here. It is improbable even if Livni forms her government that she will emerge as a strong leader in the mold of many of Israel’s earlier Prime Ministers. Rather, the divisions within Israel and the stalemate with the Palestinians both seem likely to continue.

For Americans concerned about Israelis and Palestinians however, the important question is: which of the current candidates for president is most likely to help the parties break the stalemate? Without constructive American help, more decades of stalemate and bloodshed may ensue.

Israel's Prime Minister is Going; Where Does That Leave Peace?

Fri, 1 Aug 2008 19:13:12 -0400

The announcement by Israeli Prime Minister Olmert that he would not contest the leadership in his Kadima Party’s internal elections next month and would resign as soon as a new Prime Minister is in office was widely expected. But it still set off a political tumult in Israel, partly because the realistic range of options for his successor is so wide. Olmert may indeed step down as soon as mid-October but he could also end up staying in office until spring of 2009.

The transition is a gradual process. First come the internal elections within the Kadima Party. The two main candidates are Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and Transportation Minister Sha’ul Mofaz, a former Minister of Defense and Israeli Defense Force (spell out) Chief of Staff. Livni now seems the favorite but this could change as the internal campaign heats up.

What does Livni represent? Most say she would continue Olmert’s policies, especially with regard to peace. She has been leading the Israeli delegation to the current negotiations and both her political background and current positions are -identical. Of course this could change if she were in office, but that seems unlikely.

Olmert was seen as a weak Prime Minister but an extraordinary politician, holding his government together for two years after most had written its epitaph. Livni has shown no indication of similar skills. Even if she is chosen as Kadima’s candidate, she may face rebellion within party ranks or from its two coalition partners Shas and Labor. However, her greatest ally is fear of new general elections if Kadima cannot put together a government, since many Knesset members, especially from Kadima and its coalition party, Labor, might lose their seats if the election were held soon

Livni’s rival, Sha’ul Mofaz is on Kadima’s rightward fringe and probably would be as comfortable ideologically in Likud, whence he and Livni came. While he would be under pressure to continue negotiations, especially from the US, his heart probably would not be in it. It is difficult to imagine him announcing historic concessions, even more difficult to imagine him implementing them.

Any attempt to put together a government in this way would most likely take place by the end of October, after the Jewish holidays. If no government is formed by then new general elections for the whole country would be scheduled, probably for February or March 2009, shortly after the new US administration is in place but probably before it would be ready to deal with the complexities of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Ironically, according to Israeli law, Olmert will remain as caretaker Prime Minister until his successor is chosen and the new government sworn in, whether with or without general elections.

Until recently, the assumption was that, if general elections were held, former Prime Minister Benjamin (Bibi) Netanyahu of the rightwing Likud party would be a shoo-in, which is why he wants them soon and Kadima doesn’t. However, a new poll has startled Israel’s politicians by indicating that, if these elections were held, Livni might beat Netanyahu. It also shows her to be an appreciably stronger candidate than her Kadima rival, Mofaz.

What does this mean for the already ailing Annapolis peace process? Can it produce a peace settlement by the end of the year, as President Bush clearly desires?

A weakened Israeli government would be even less likely to be able to make peace, though Livni would certainly try, as will Olmert, for as long as he is caretaker Prime Minister. However, should there in fact be new elections next year (that is, if Kadima cannot avoid them), and if Netanyahu and the Israeli right were to form a government, chances of any peace settlement in the foreseeable future would drop dramatically. Such a government would be unlikely to engage in negotiations, would be liable to retake Gaza (most likely with high Israeli and Palestinian casualties) and assume a more belligerent pose toward Iran. It would probably be extremely suspicious of any relations with the Palestinian Authority and wary of any peace initiatives emanating from the United States.

Thus, in the short run, there is a hope, though not a strong one, of some sort of agreement if Kadima stays in power. In the longer run, it depends on who wins the next Israeli elections, whenever they are held.

Israel's Sudden Flurry of Diplomacy is a Switch

Tue, 1 Jul 2008 16:25:55 -0400

In short order, Israel has reached a truce with the radical Islamist group Hamas, acknowledged secretive negotiations with Syria, and declared a willingness to discuss peace with Lebanon. All this comes on top of regular meetings between Israel’s Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.

Diplomacy between Israel and its neighbors has been almost non-existent this decade. So why is all this happening now? And where is the United States, the traditional broker between Israel and the Arabs?

Three developments are driving this process. First, Olmert is facing serious political problems, including a corruption investigation over cash donations from a U.S. supporter. Olmert badly needs to change the headlines from the legal inquires swirling around him. He has now been in office more than two years and Israel’s unstable coalition governments rarely last longer than this. With his political career in jeopardy, Olmert’s best chance for extending his tenure is to ring up a diplomatic breakthrough.

Second, Israel’s military might has not proved decisive in recent confrontations. The Israeli Army largely quelled the Palestinian uprising that erupted in 2000. But Hamas, the most violent Palestinian group, only grew stronger politically. The same was true in Lebanon, where Israel waged war against Hezbollah during the summer of 2006, only to see Hezbollah emerge as a more potent political force. The Israeli public is weary of these inconclusive battles, and this has encouraged the Israeli leadership to seek compromises.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, the United States is preoccupied with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Washington has been much less active elsewhere in the region, and has boycotted its adversaries. Israel and its Arab rivals have seen conditions deteriorate on several fronts, and have taken it upon themselves to act now, rather than wait for the United States to show greater interest.

Egypt brokered the truce between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, while Turkey has acted as the go-between for Israel and Syria. It’s too early to tell whether either initiative will produce any real breakthroughs. Odds are they won’t.

However, the developments do point to a significant shift in the Middle East. The United States sought to reshape the region after the September 11 attacks, but this has proved a mammoth undertaking with the outcome still uncertain. As the United States has bumped up against the limits of changes it can impose, regional actors have been more willing to step in.

Israel and Hamas have refused to deal directly with one another since Hamas’ founding two decades ago. But after Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006 and seized full control of Gaza in the summer of 2007, some minimal contact became inescapable.

Israel controls Gaza’s borders, which means that everything going into the coastal territory, including food, fuel and medicine, has to be coordinated between the two sides. The Israeli restrictions made normal life impossible in Gaza, while Palestinian rocket fire out of Gaza made life unbearable for the nearby Israeli town of Sderot, the main target.

The solution was to work through Egypt. The Gaza truce could collapse at any time but it marks the first time Israel and Hamas have effectively negotiated an agreement. Regardless of what happens this time around, Egypt is likely to be called on to play a similar role in the future.

Israel and Syria had not held full-fledged negotiations since 2000, when the United States came close to brokering a deal. The Bush administration subsequently sought to isolate Syria and discouraged negotiations between the two sides. These positions were very much in line with the views held by Ariel Sharon, Israel’s prime minister from 2001 to 2006.

But Olmert has taken a very different approach. The Israeli air force bombed a suspected Syrian nuclear reactor last September, an attack that risked unleashing widespread turmoil. Yet within months, the two countries began under-the-radar negotiations moderated by Turkey. Next month, Olmert and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad plan to attend a conference in France, raising the possibility of face-to-face talks between the leaders.

In Lebanon, the government has snubbed the Israeli overture, but Israel and Hezbollah have been engaged in indirect talks on a prisoner exchange.

The United States is still sponsoring the talks between Olmert and Palestinian Authority President Abbas. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has visited the region almost monthly since discussions were launched late last year. But the two sides have given no sign that they will reach an agreement, or even the outline of deal, before President Bush leaves office in January.

Bush’s successor will inherit a fluid Middle East where the rules are changing. Many of the parties that have been fighting this decade are now willing to talk, and they no longer see Washington as the exclusive mediator.

"Lake Success" and Annapolis: Completing the circle?

Mon, 17 Dec 2007 11:05:05 -0500

November 29, 2007 marked the 60th anniversary of the United Nations vote to partition the British mandate of Palestine into two states, Jewish and Arab. Jews called it "The Miracle of Lake Success" (the location of UN headquarters at the time) while Arabs called it illegal and a betrayal of Palestine's Arab inhabitants.

The anniversary coincided with the Annapolis meeting that has restarted Israeli and Palestinian peace negotiations after seven bleak and violent years. Though presumably unintentional, the coincidence highlights the long history of seemingly indispensable international efforts to settle the conflict. Unknown at this point is whether Annapolis represents a new beginning or simply a political show.

Looking at the international framework gives cause for hope. In 1947, the Arab countries were vociferously and unanimously against partition, and for decades maintained their steadfast opposition to Israel's existence. This year, in contrast, most of the Arab countries attended Annapolis, demonstrating desire for peace. They all approved the Arab League Initiative, adopted in 2002, and reconfirmed in 2007, which promises a consensual resolution of the issue of Palestinian refugees and peace and normalization with Israel in return for Israeli withdrawal to the boundaries of 1967—boundaries establishing a considerably larger Israel than those the Arabs previously rejected in 1947.

The biggest stumbling block ahead continues to be the suspicion built up over six decades of violence. Palestinians are convinced that Israelis have no intention of terminating their presence in the West Bank and Gaza, and ending Israeli control of Palestinian lives and land. Palestinians insist they will not make peace without East Jerusalem as their capital, an issue that arouses deep-seated religious emotions on all sides.

Israelis find it very difficult to forget the day after their declared independence in 1948 when five Arab countries sent troops into Palestine/Israel. Although Israel managed to defeat them easily, the fear of annihilation lingers. These fears are further buttressed by memories of the 1967 war, when even larger forces were arrayed against them. Suicide bombers, although far less common than a few years ago, continue to convince Israelis that Palestinians are still bent on their annihilation. Israelis want guarantees of security, perhaps beyond the capacity of anyone to provide.

Above all, Israelis and Palestinians need mutual recognition and affirmed legitimacy. Israelis are convinced that the Arab world, even if it promises peace, does not really accept a Jewish state in its midst. Even though 70% of Israelis tell pollsters that they would accept a Palestinian state, polls show that Palestinians cannot imagine Israel ever giving up control of Palestinian lives. In a symmetry that would be amusing were it not tragic, polls show that Palestinians possess a similar willingness to accept the other side, but cannot believe they themselves would be accepted. Both sides are convinced that they are the victims, that it would be so easy for the "other" side to grant what they feel they need, and that the compromises they are asked to make are unendurable given what they have suffered.

Many took from the failure of the Oslo Process an experience that good intentions were defeated and betrayed by the other side. That historical "memory" is a major obstacle to peace within both societies.

However, history can also provide another, more optimistic, perspective. It is worth recalling that it would have been unimaginable in 1947 for a Palestinian and an Israeli leader to repeatedly proclaim their joint desire for peace.

Unlike 1947, or even 1993, when the Oslo Declaration of Principles was signed, the pieces for sustainable peace are on the table, just waiting for the statesmen to assemble them into a viable framework: a Palestinian state within the 1967 boundaries and a sharing of Jerusalem; 1:1 land swaps for settlement territories; security for Israelis guaranteed by working Palestinian civil and military institutions; and resettlement of refugees in a Palestinian state or elsewhere with some compensation. These are the most likely contours of peace. As the saying goes, it's not rocket science.

What Annapolis made noteworthy, in vivid contrast to past efforts, is that the current Palestinian and Israeli leaders are not only willing to go further for peace than any of their predecessors, but have staked their political futures on it. In addition, the leadership of the Arab world and even much of the Muslim world has weighed in on the side of a consensual settlement. This is unprecedented, and should be recognized as such.

With most of the world's leadership now actively supporting peace, the peace forces within the two societies now face a major challenge: to re-ignite the people's faith that a two-state solution can result from the Annapolis process within the next year, not in an undefined future.

Annapolis Talks: Big Plans for Weak Leaders

Wed, 21 Nov 2007 16:07:14 -0500

Here’s the sad irony of the coming Israeli-Palestinian conclave: if Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas were locked in a room and left to their own devices, they would be quite capable of real progress on some of the thorniest Middle East problems.

Both leaders are willing negotiators and desperately need some sort of breakthrough, no matter how modest, to boost their sagging political standing at home. Yet Olmert and Abbas are so weak among their own constituencies that any promises they make at the talks in Annapolis, Maryland, will immediately raise questions about their ability to deliver.

When Olmert campaigned for his post in the spring of 2006, he told Israeli voters he wanted to set Israel’s permanent borders, which would mean giving up many West Bank settlements. But his coalition government has never gained traction, and a skeptical Israeli public is in no mood to consider major concessions to the Palestinians.

A few years back, Abbas was one of the first prominent Palestinian politicians to publicly criticize violence against Israel, saying the attacks were counterproductive and undermined Palestinian efforts to achieve statehood. Yet he has no control in the Gaza Strip, the source of persistent Palestinian rocket fire. Mr. Abbas has been powerless in Gaza since his Fatah movement was defeated by the radical Islamic group Hamas in fighting last June.

President Bush is speaking loftily of establishing a Palestinian state before the end of his term in January 2009. But after years of daily violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians, it has taken a major diplomatic push just to get the leaders to meet face-to-face.

The metric for success at the Annapolis conference should be modest: Can the Israeli and Palestinian leaders start working together on a range of problems, including the crisis in the Gaza Strip?

Olmert and Abbas, along with the United States, share an interest in pressuring Hamas. But punishing Hamas has meant squeezing Gaza and making normal life impossible for the territory’s 1.5 million residents.

If Olmert wants to help Abbas, then Israel will have to allow Palestinian people and goods to move more freely, in both Gaza and the West Bank. If Abbas wants to help Olmert, he will have to crack down on Palestinian militants, relying on the Palestinian security forces in the West Bank and on his powers of persuasion in Gaza.

Hamas, which will not be at Annapolis, is rooting for the conference to fail, and could have much to cheer about. Hamas believes that Abbas will have little to show for this visit, buttressing the group’s argument that negotiating with Israel is futile.

If Abbas goes home empty-handed, he could face increasing Palestinian pressure to resume a dialogue with Hamas in hopes of mending the fracture between the two main Palestinian factions.

In one example of how bizarre life has become in Gaza, Abbas does not want Palestinian security force members there to cooperate with the Hamas leadership.

So Abbas is paying the vast majority of the security force members in Gaza not to work, according to Safwat al-Kahlout, a Palestinian journalist who runs the Gaza News Service. Hamas, in turn, is paying a small minority of security force members who support Hamas.

When President Bush came into office, he viewed Bill Clinton’s intensive Middle East peace efforts a failure and has largely kept his distance. The periodic diplomatic pushes have been short-lived,
and it’s difficult to see how this one will fare better.

The most ambitious venture was the Road Map in 2003, with its detailed timetable for negotiations. It flopped immediately.

US diplomacy was stepped up briefly in 2005 when Israel withdrew its settlers from Gaza, raising hopes that the Palestinians would focus on nation-building in the coastal territory. But Gaza descended into ever more chaos, and the “Gaza First” plan quickly collapsed.

Today, the Bush administration is looking to prop up Abbas in what amounts to a “West Bank First” policy. Yet the timing of the Annapolis talks feels artificial and forced, motivated by an administration trying to show it is doing something, no matter how long the odds.

For all its good intentions, the Annapolis meeting is a stark illustration of how much time has been wasted and how much ground has been lost during seven long years of violence.

Lack of National Iraqi Loyalty Confounding Surge

Wayne White — Thu, 3 May 2007 12:00:00 -0400

The irony surrounding the current surge is that it might not be a surge at all. Prior to the bombing of Samara’s golden mosque in February 2006, the primary mission of US forces in Iraq had been defeating or containing the Sunni Arab insurgency and related terrorism. The outbreak of massive, Shi‘a militia violence, like widespread death squad activity, opened another front. Given this new challenge, do the 30,000 troops comprising the surge give US forces much additional combat power relative to these two major threats? Or do they merely help fill a deficit in military strength created by the emergence of the new second front?

Observers should beware of claims of progress at this stage of the game. The fall-off in civilian casualties in Baghdad is mainly the result of the decision on the part of the most active Shi‘a militia, Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, to either lay low in the face of the surge or take refuge in southern Iraq, largely beyond the reach of US forces.

Meanwhile, however, the Mahdi Army is unable to man its extensive system of checkpoints shielding Baghdad’s largest Shi‘a neighborhoods. This has allowed Sunni Arab fanatics to increase their suicide attacks against Shi’a Baghdadis. While it waits out the US surge, one can be sure the Mahdi Army is tallying up the gruesome Shi’a death toll in the Iraqi capital since the surge. The likely response will be renewed death squad rampages and sectarian cleansing whenever the surge has run its course.

With still too few boots on the ground, the US surge remains a gamble, regardless of its eventual duration, so long as Iraq’s overall political situation remains so fragile.

While an advisor to the Iraq Study Group, I prepared a surge proposal. It called for more than double the troops involved in the existing surge. Yet, I judged the probability of success of even this more robust effort as “substantially less than 50/50.” I was not alone. As a result, I also suggested that the US transition to withdrawal should that more ambitious surge fail to produce meaningful progress in its first year.

The current surge appears set to continue at least through early 2008. It may well last longer. No matter. The Mahdi Army, other Shi‘a militias, and their legions of allies in the Iraqi security forces unfortunately have the patience to wait out the surge and will almost certainly resume their bloody sectarian agenda whenever the surge winds down. In fact, some Shi‘a security elements operating alongside US forces apparently have been warning Shi‘a residents prior to US security sweeps to hide weapons and militia-related paraphernalia.

The reported desertion of many Kurdish soldiers who were sent to Baghdad for the surge draws attention to the greatest challenge facing US forces in Iraq: the creation of a truly national Iraqi security structure to which authority can be turned over if and when Baghdad (and the country writ large) can be stabilized. Much attention has been placed on adequate training and equipment, but the principal problem has been loyalty: a failure, in many cases, to perform duties reflecting loyalty to a shaky Iraqi central government rather than to one’s ethnic or sectarian community.

One bright spot may be a reported change in the situation in the Sunni Arab stronghold of al-Anbar province, where some tribal elements apparently have been moving against Sunni Arab terrorists and jihadists. Sunni Arabs also are said to be joining local Iraqi security forces in numbers not seen before.

These are positive trends, to be sure. But we must bear in mind that eliminating Sunni Arab terrorists as a major challenge would eventually re-focus the attention of their erstwhile Sunni Arab enemies on other dangerous goals: the struggle to end “occupation” and squaring off in a more organized fashion against the Shi‘a militias and Kurdish Peshmerga that have driven Sunni Arabs from mixed areas of the country from Baghdad to Kirkuk.

Indeed, with little loyalty toward a government so often at odds with Sunni Arab politicians, Sunni Arab recruits joining the security forces, like so many Kurds and Shi‘a, could put their training to use in the post-US withdrawal civil war scenario so feared by all.

Success or failure, the surge probably will leave the US facing the hard choice of whether or not to sacrifice still more lives and treasure to keep the lid on a boiling kettle of centuries-old ethno-sectarian strife that outside intervention has so far aggravated, not resolved.

A New Regional Leadership

Thomas W. Lippman — Fri, 27 Apr 2007 12:00:00 -0400

This Perspective first appeared online in the April 26, 2007 edition of Bitter-Lemons International.

King ‘Abdullah of Saudi Arabia caused a lot of heartburn in official Washington with his speech at last month's Arab summit in Riyadh, where he referred to the "illegitimate foreign occupation" of Iraq.

The Americans had good reason to be distressed after reading the speech, but not because of what ‘Abdullah said about Iraq. After all, he was addressing Arab conference delegates; he could hardly have endorsed the US adventure there, which everyone in his audience knew he had opposed.

No, what should have bothered the Americans was that the ruler of an important, longstanding regional ally was so unhappy over US policy and performance in the Middle East that he took the unusual step of distancing himself publicly from Washington. Saudi Arabia always prefers to express its displeasure with the United States in private conversations and diplomatic exchanges. Only rarely in the 60 years of their alliance with America have Saudi leaders felt compelled to issue a public challenge, the last notable example occurring during the oil embargo of 1973 to 1974.

What drove ‘Abdullah to say what he did, senior aides said, was seeing the Arab world in turmoil, Arabs shedding Arab blood, and US policies contributing to the problems rather than solving them. America has failed to stabilize Iraq, failed to contain Iran's influence, failed to bring peace to the Palestinians and Israel, failed to relieve the suffering in Darfur, failed to rectify Syrian behavior, failed to protect Lebanon against Israeli attack, and failed to resolve the ensuing Lebanese power struggle. Collectively, these failures pose a threat to the security of Saudi Arabia; more importantly, in the king's perception, however, they threaten the security of the entire Arab world.

Distraught over the carnage in Iraq and over the spectacle of Palestinians fighting among themselves in the internecine Fatah-Hamas struggle, ‘Abdullah concluded it was time for someone new to exert regional leadership — a role for which, at the summit conference, he offered himself.

King ‘Abdullah was in "a very emotional state" over the infighting between Palestinian factions, his foreign minister, Saud Al Faisal, said in a Newsweek interview. "He just couldn't believe that Palestinian guns are turned against Palestinian people and blood is shed and people are killed and children are orphaned by them fighting against each other, while they're facing such horrendous treatment from the Israelis. He just couldn't take that."

’Abdullah is not seeking a full-scale rupture with the United States, which his country cannot afford. But he has, for many months, been pursuing policy initiatives that have deviated from Washington's preferences because he has not liked what he is seeing. He brokered the Mecca agreement between the Palestinian factions, met with Syrian President Bashar Al Assad, received Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Riyadh, and invited the Iranian foreign minister to the summit conference.

All these initiatives ran counter to the American policy of isolating Iran, Syria, and Hamas. As ‘Abdullah has recognized, President George W. Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney live in an imaginary Middle East where people behave better if sent to bed without any supper. The king lives in the real Middle East, where business gets done in face-to-face negotiations. The British did not recover the sailors and marines taken captive in the Shatt Al Arab waterway by refusing to talk to the Iranians.

Americans who take a more distanced view of the region found positive elements in ‘Abdullah's speech, as they have in his recent policy initiatives. Perhaps his most constructive point was that the mess in which the Arabs find themselves is their own fault. Unlike many of his subjects and their neighbors, he did not blame Mossad, the Central Intelligence Agency, or the "crusaders." He did not even blame Bush. He blamed Arab leaders, not excluding himself.

Citing the violence among the Palestinians and in Sudan, Somalia, and Lebanon, the king said: "the real blame should fall on us, the leaders of the Arab nations. Our permanent differences, our refusal to take the path of unity - all of [this has] led the nations to lose their confidence in our credibility and to lose hope in our present and future." This assessment, and his call for "a new beginning aimed at uniting our hearts and closing our ranks," signaled a continued willingness to cut pragmatic deals that could end some of the region's divisions, a vision Washington would do well to share.

One of the pragmatic deals ‘Abdullah wants to pursue is a negotiated settlement between Israel and the Palestinians that would bring about the "two-state solution" endorsed by the United States. As the king made clear in putting together the Mecca agreement, he does not share Bush's opinion that the two-state solution can be achieved by refusing to talk to the political group selected by the Palestinian people to lead their government.