Public Diplomacy

Neutralizing Palestine to Better Focus on Iran

Clayton Swisher — Tue, 16 Jan 2007 12:00:00 -0500

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's trip to the Middle East, which begins today, will be aimed at convincing the so-called "moderate Arab states" of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia that the United States is finally ready, after six years of promises, to help Palestinians achieve their state. While good-faith American mediation would be welcomed, many Arabs will greet her visit with well-founded skepticism, questioning why a Bush administration that is seemingly locked at the hip with Israel now wishes to roll up its sleeves and help the Palestinians.

Six years of empty promises have bred considerable skepticism. Calls shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks for a Palestinian state, the pressure applied by President George W. Bush on then-Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to end the first siege of Yasser Arafat's Ramallah compound in 2002, and even the 2002 "road map" for peace were all viewed as no more than attempts to placate the international community, especially moderate Arabs, in order to prepare for war in Iraq. Without Arab cooperation, particularly from Jordan and Saudi Arabia, US plans to depose Saddam Hussein would have ended up in the same jar of formaldehyde as we now know was reserved for the Palestinian issue.

In instances where the Bush administration chose to momentarily focus on Palestine, the international media rushed to applaud the US commitment, hoping hands-on involvement would follow. This was particularly true once the 2004 presidential elections passed. Bush was expected to reward the coalition allies that had confronted Iraq by producing the oft-promised Palestinian state.

Then came Sharon's announcement in 2004 that Israel would unilaterally disengage from the Gaza Strip in 2005 - a move that allowed the Bush administration to keep focused on Iraq while blunting pressures created by virtual peace proposals indigenous to the region, namely the unofficial Geneva Initiative between the Israeli Yossi Beilin and the Palestinian Yasser Abed Rabbo. Although the road map called for at least a provisional Palestinian state by 2005, the administration calculated that Sharon's "generous" gesture would put the onus on Palestinians.

But the Arab world feared that "Gaza first" would be "Gaza last." In November 2005, Rice visited the region to secure the Agreement on Movement and Access to help breathe life into Gaza. The agreement is still unimplemented, the excuse this time being that the 2006 Palestinian election led to a Hamas victory, despite the administration's earlier pledge that the Arab pursuit of democracy would be matched by America's support for freedom.

Moderate Arabs were not opposed to the harsh US-led response to the Hamas victory. By their interpretation, a successful Hamas would spell victory for the Muslim Brotherhood or other Islamists threatening their rule. When depriving the Palestinians to bring Hamas down didn't work, the administration began more aggressive, undemocratic steps. As Fatah-Hamas unity government talks stalled, the US decided if politics would not work then it would arm its side to the teeth. The American channeling of money to and training of President Mahmoud Abbas' Presidential Guard, while Egypt and Jordan provided the weapons, sent the clearest signal that the US expected Fatah to put down Hamas.

Beyond eliminating Hamas and blocking the rise of Sunni Islamic movements lies the rising power of Shiite Islam and Iran's far-reaching tentacles throughout the region - from Iraq to Lebanon to Palestine. As the Bush administration comes to realize that success in Iraq may never be, and with pressure mounting domestically and internationally to build regional credibility through the Palestinian issue, the US has to look for new ways to shape its legacy, and Palestine isn't it. As Vietnam demonstrated, superpowers faced with a defeat tend to make matters worse, broadening the conflict in the name of withdrawing with dignity.

America doesn't necessarily need to take the lead as the argument for Israel's existence gains currency. And make no mistake: No American politician, including the Democrats, will protest Israel's actions once it presents its dossier that Iran is near to building a nuclear weapon.

With two years left in office, the Bush administration wants to see Iran's regime humbled, if not toppled. Neoconservatives who have had their sights set on Iran are buoyed by the new arrangement where Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Israel find themselves on the same page when it comes to confronting Iran's uranium enrichment program. They all want to do business together, including with Israel – which has the motive and means to degrade Iranian targets through air strikes – but moderate Arabs demand progress on the Palestinian issue to retain some measure of legitimacy and avoid public embarrassment.

The question that should be asked now is how low the bar will be set by Arab moderates. Will nominal rhetorical gestures suffice as before the Iraq war? Will the anti-Iran bloc be pacified by pledges to really open the Karni crossing in Gaza this time and "humanize the checkpoints" with a new coat of paint? Will Arab moderates help Rice tube-feed Abbas on the notion of accepting a state with provisional borders and nominal sovereignty along the route of Israel's separation wall?

The difference here will be that Palestinians want and need an end to the conflict and occupation to get on with their lives, while moderate Arabs, Israel, and most significantly the US want the Palestinian problem contained, at least until Iran is taken care of. By then Palestine will be some other administration's mess to sort out.

UAE Warnings for a Friend

William A. Rugh — Mon, 18 Dec 2006 12:00:00 -0500

There are changes underway in the United Arab Emirates, but most go unnoticed abroad. First, I was struck by the high number of American visitors in town during my recent visit there, when I went to speak at a forum celebrating the second anniversary of Shaikh Khalifa bin Zayid’s accession to the presidency.

Just as I arrived, Karen Hughes, Colin Powell, Madeleine Albright, and the Chief of Staff of the US Air Force arrived with separate delegations and different goals. A large group representing the Guggenheim Museum was also in town to discuss cooperation with the UAE. A major international conference on breast cancer awareness and another one on women in business were just opening, with prominent American representatives in attendance. The best hotels in Abu Dhabi and Dubai were full. UAE newspapers and television provided ample coverage to the American visitors, along with prominent delegations from other countries. Posters displayed prominently on street corners announced future conferences planned for the coming months, including such featured speakers as “the first President Bush.”

When I was ambassador in the UAE 11 years ago, we had occasional visits from prominent Americans but nothing on this scale. The UAE has become a popular destination for Americans interested in commercial or humanitarian projects. The US ambassador says official bilateral relations are excellent and broad-based. Nobody mentioned the Dubai Ports flap of a few months ago. It does not appear to have discouraged people in the UAE from doing business with Americans.

Paradoxically, there is deep anxiety about the direction of US policy in the region despite the apparent desire of UAE officials and private organizations to work with the US in a wide range of activities. UAE nationals made clear to me their dismay over the US involvement in Iraq, Iran, and Palestine and their apprehension about what would happen next. Palestine was as usual part of their list of complaints, but their immediate concerns focused on Iraq and Iran.

On Iraq, the anger and disappointment over US policies is stronger than I have ever seen it. The UAE nationals I spoke with privately, (former and current officials, academics, businessmen, journalists) who are basically pro-American, want desperately for us to change some of the things we are doing.

First, they very strongly recommend the US declare loudly and clearly that we support the unity and integrity of Iraq. Everyone I spoke with insisted that supporting partition or leaving the impression that we would accept partition would be a disaster for Iraq and for the United States. They said Arabs would forever remember that decision the way they remember the Sykes-Picot agreement and blame us if Iraq disintegrated. They said that if Iraq falls apart and we do not support partition, the Iraqis will be blamed, but if it falls apart and we favored it, we will be seen as the party responsible for it. Moreover, if we favor partition, most Iraqis will assume it is inevitable and they will sit back and wait for it to happen. So, we would influence the outcome and then be blamed for it.

Second, my UAE interlocutors argued that we should find other countries to send troops to replace Americans – any others. Several suggested sending the UN – with Arab troops as part of the blue-helmet force – but not with a US contingent. Send Muslim troops. Almost anyone will do, just get the US troops out of there as fast as possible because, they said, we are the problem not the solution. When I pointed out that it would be tough to get the UN to send troops at this point, they understood but they believe it is essential to remove the irritant of American soldiers as soon as possible. When I asked if this would not lead to more bloodshed, they told me the US presence has not stopped the bloodshed, it has increased the bloodshed and we should have realized by now that we need a radical change of policy.

Finally, everyone agreed that we should declare we don’t want to keep bases in Iraq nor control Iraqi oil. People in the UAE and elsewhere in the region still believe we went to Iraq for those aims, and would be very relieved if we dispelled that idea.

On Iran, my UAE interlocutors asked anxiously whether President Bush would launch a military strike on Iranian nuclear sites before he left office, as they had heard he was thinking of doing. When I said I didn’t know and could not reassure them on that score, they expressed their conviction that a US attack would be a huge disaster for the UAE and the region. It would, they argued, provoke Iran to retaliate against American interests. There would probably be a negative spillover on America’s friends like the UAE. An attack would solidify Iranian public support behind the Iranian regime and it would not stop Iran from its nuclear program.

We have many friends in the UAE who want to continue doing business with us and continue sending their children to study here. But, they are deeply worried about the course our Middle East policy has taken under the Bush administration, especially on Iraq and Iran. As friends of America, they are sincerely hoping we will soon find better ways to approach the region. As friends of America, before it is too late to prevent more conflict.

Western Sahara: The Conflict Lingers

Jacques Roussellier — Fri, 26 Aug 2005 12:00:00 -0400

Self-congratulatory statements could be heard reverberating from Washington after the release of 404 Moroccan prisoners-of-war held by the Algerian-backed Polisario separatist rebels fighting for the independence of the Western Sahara region. The release is a fitting tribute to the tenacious, yet discreet, bipartisan American diplomacy that spanned the Clinton and Bush administrations. Still, the release does not fundamentally shift the political dynamics of one of Africa’s longest conflicts.

More than 2,100 Polisario-held POWs, captured between 1978 and 1991, were counted in 1995. Their piecemeal release started in 1996 and intensified after 1999. It was part of efforts to find a political solution to the Western Sahara dispute that for 30 years has pitted pro-annexation Morocco against pro-independence Algeria. The newest prisoners have been detained for fifteen years, others for more than 20 years.

The POW release was followed by calls to seize the opportunity to restart negotiations. But, it is hard to see how a new climate of confidence can overcome past failures, particularly the failed UN-brokered efforts at holding a referendum on self-determination between 1991 and 2000 and the current deadlock over a five-year autonomy plan.

Morocco’s reaction did not augur well for future talks. Rabat still holds Algiers accountable for a breach of international humanitarian law on its territory and denies that the POW's release was the Polisario’s gesture of good will. Instead, it has lavished praise on the US for bringing about the release and hailed the positive impact of international pressure

There is concern that a political vacuum in the strategic south-western Algeria, northern Mauritania and Western Sahara triangle could play into the hands of terrorist groups operating in the Sahara's vast expanses. New US counter-terrorism efforts, such as the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative that prepares training military units in Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger for security cooperation and support for democratic governance, have revived interest in securing a lasting solution for Western Sahara. The recent coup d’état in Mauritania and attacks by a terrorist group based in Algeria’s Saharan desert only underscore the overall fragility of US counter-terrorism engagement in the Sahara and the endless deadlock in peace negotiations on the Western Sahara conflict.

Sadly, the POW issue is not the only remaining obstacle to improving relations between Morocco and Algeria. Disagreement over the Western Sahara is only the symptom of a deeper rivalry between two competing national identities and developmental approaches. Above all, the search for a political solution should consider that both sides perceive a settlement as a draw, in terms of national security and regional ambitions.

In the age of globalization, free trade and regional integration, there is little room or understanding for an old-fashioned territorial dispute over a piece of the Sahara desert that does not boast any really significant natural resources. Successful negotiations that pave the way for a lasting solution to the Western Sahara dispute will stand as a powerful signal of a much-needed rapprochement between Rabat and Algiers. They also would boost US-backed counter-terrorism efforts, which would be weakened without regional integration of programs in North Africa and the Sahel.

Morocco and Algeria stand to gain from successful counter-terrorism exercises in the region as long as signals from Washington are not misconstrued as meaning progress on the Western Sahara dispute can take a back seat to bilateral cooperation on counter-terrorism with the US. There is a historical opportunity now to link the two issues in a long-term approach that will require simultaneously seeking a peaceful solution in Western Sahara and pursuing counter-terrorism initiatives in the Sahara desert as a whole.

The release of the Moroccan POWs is about the only progress that has been made recently toward a negotiated solution on Western Sahara. Rabat and Algiers have been playing a tiresome game of predictable statements, political liturgies and empty words that barely serve their own domestic political agenda at the expense of a mature and farsighted search for cooperative approaches.

As long as the United States and the Europeans turn a blind eye to Moroccan and Algerian prevarications in Western Sahara and allow the opportunity for peace to pass by, nations gathering for the 60th anniversary of the United Nations next month will continue to face the unresolved dilemma of Africa’s last colony.

A Turning Point for Libya and the United States

David L. Mack — Tue, 17 May 2005 12:00:00 -0400

Muammar Qadhafi is still in charge and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. But the leader’s current direction is the most reality-based and promising of more than three decades in power. I recently returned to Libya, nearly 33 years after working there as a young US diplomat. What I saw and heard was encouraging, but progress remains fragile.

Qadhafi seems to have recognized that Libya’s security is best assured by wary but peaceful relationships with the US and other major governments, and that Libyan involvement with international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction had left Libya less safe. Qadhafi now actively seeks acceptance by the West, integration into the global system and interaction with private companies representing the best technology and management that Libya’s oil and gas revenues can buy or attract for investment.

The strategic benefits to the United States are immense. Libya is no longer an adversary state located on the Mediterranean basin. Instead, it can be a positive example to the North Koreas and Irans of the world of how to come in from the cold and become a respectable member of the global community.

Libya has considerable assets for positive development, if it establishes a sound macro-economic system, legal reforms and a globally competitive business climate. Its assets include a growing number of educated and assertive women seeking productive employment, along with their male counterparts. It also has substantial financial reserves, the potential for rapidly growing oil and gas revenues and, following Qadhafi’s decision to give up programs to develop unconventional weapons, a mutually non-threatening relationship with the US and Europe.

A theme I heard over and over was that Libya had done so much – offering up its citizens for trial at The Hague, providing a generous settlement to the Pan Am 103 families, giving up chemical weapons and its option to develop nuclear weapons – and had gotten so little in return.

Libya has gained a great deal, but three elements are still lacking. Libya remains on the US terrorism list, the US is delaying the issuance of visas in Tripoli, and relations are still well below the full ambassadorial level.

Removal of Libya from the terrorism list awaits some kind of resolution of the serious accusation of a Libyan attempt to assassinate Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah. While not actually denying the allegations, Libyans charge that the US is seeking any excuse to delay this step.

The lack of visa issuance in Tripoli and Washington impedes immediate expansion of US-Libyan contacts in commerce, tourism or education. The holdup on the US side is purely technical and depends on building a secure facility in Tripoli. Libya now enjoys full diplomatic relations with virtually every major government except the United States. Qadhafi did not embark upon the dramatic changes in his foreign policy to be spurned as somehow not respectable enough to have a US Ambassador in Tripoli who would deliver the occasional letter from the president.

There are steps that Libya should initiate itself to reassure the US of its commitment to change, but let me focus on moves the Bush administration could make to show its readiness to reciprocate. Set a target date for issuing visas in Tripoli. Inform the Libyan government of the date but say implementation depends on meeting practical requirements connected with the security of the US mission in Libya. This should encourage the Libyans to issue visas in Washington. Assure Libya that the US is reviewing their listing as a state sponsor of terrorism with an open mind and will not simply accept the Saudi claims. Formulate proposals for dialogue between Libyan and US entities about the process of economic and political reform. Endorse the establishment of private sector business groups in both the US and Libya to present the concerns of our respective business communities to the governments in each capital. Send a high-level visitor to Tripoli to convey these points to the Libyans. The US could also make public statements about Libya that are neither unduly gushing nor insensitive to their national pride.

Libya’s policy shift, even with its shortcomings, has been a dramatic success for both Libya and its former adversaries in Europe and the United States. The strategic gains, as well as the benefits for business, are nearly self-evident. Less obvious, but perhaps more important in the longer term, is the potential for ordinary Libyans to achieve economic and political reforms as a result of the country’s new openness to the global community. Neglect of the budding US-Libyan relationship would only put these gains at risk.

Bolton's Problem Goes Beyond Serial Abuse

Wayne White — Wed, 27 Apr 2005 12:00:00 -0400

At a time of continued criticism of the United States abroad, the Bush administration cannot afford to send John Bolton to the United Nations.

Despite all that has been said and done, there is still an opportunity for Republicans on Capitol Hill - and in the administration - to decide not to remain locked into the all-too-familiar Washington spectacle of an administration and its supporters in Congress pressing forward with a flawed nominee as if no others could be found. Continuing allegations relating to Bolton already have had a considerable impact on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (on both sides, it would seem). But the administration so far seems unmoved, doubtless hoping it can nudge wavering Republicans on the Hill back into line, which would allow the White House to ram home Bolton's confirmation come next month.

Sadly, Vice President Dick Cheney, in an apparent effort to sweep aside the derogatory information that has come to light regarding Bolton's past behavior, has reportedly declared, "I have looked at all the charges that have been made. I don't think any of them stand up to scrutiny." Once, some years ago, I was on the receiving end of an attempt by another senior State Department official to suppress intelligence analysis, somewhat similar to what has been described in connection with Bolton. It happens. I also stood my ground, my boss backed me up and in the end we were vindicated.

Former Bureau of Intelligence and Research Assistant Secretary Carl Ford – a conservative who called himself as a "reluctant witness" – has described Bolton as a "serial abuser." I had the great privilege of serving under Ford in the bureau and spending many, many hours working alongside him. Ford is a model of integrity. His word is as good as gold, period.

Meanwhile, to make matters even more difficult to sort out, issues clouding Bolton's confirmation are being framed by many as questions confined solely to "management style." I would be the last to downplay Bolton's reported abuse of subordinates and disruption of proper information flow, but to channel debate into only this one area of behavior ignores and trivializes a far more ominous issue: basic objectivity – perhaps even integrity. How many times has a foreign policy mistake been described as an "intelligence failure" when, in fact, what actually occurred was the insertion of spin into the process that ignored, distorted or reached beyond the intelligence to advance a policy objective. And there is a world of difference between healthy questions concerning intelligence analysis and politicized efforts to alter it or make it go away. Once intelligence analysis is exaggerated or rejected and dissenting analysts waved off, senior officials place us on the slippery slope to policy failure.

I agree with the president that we should "put aside politics." And in that spirit, Bolton's supporters must step back from the political fray and ask exactly how effective he would be in New York at this point if confirmed. One certainly could not expect Bolton, in some future crisis, when the chips were down, to advance effectively the American position at the UN, especially if doing so in any way involved "intelligence." The last thing this country needs is a UN ambassador who many around the world doubtless already believe has tried to cook intelligence or has mistreated, ignored or distanced himself from those who have merely attempted to offer clear-headed judgments that were inconsistent with a certain political agenda.

And that may be the bottom line: Regardless of how the administration feels about Bolton, it is hard to believe that his credibility abroad can ever be restored following the testimony that has been heard, let alone what might lie in the wings. And as the administration moves vigorously on various fronts to improve its international relations, why saddle itself with a significant liability so early in the game?

Who's Afraid of A Palestinian Moderate?

Edward S. Walker — Thu, 18 Jul 2002 12:00:00 -0400

As the White House and the “Madrid Quartet” continue work to implement an Israeli-Palestinian cease-fire, Palestinian political reforms, and finally peace negotiations, they might devote more attention to saving Palestinian moderates.

Last December, right-wing Israeli Public Security Minister Uzi Landau detained Al Quds University President Sari Nusseibeh, a soft-spoken intellectual, as he hosted a cookies-and-juice reception for foreign diplomats in East Jerusalem. On July 9th, Landau closed Nusseibeh’s office at the university and seized its contents because “a civil representative of the Palestinian Authority was operating from the heart of Jerusalem with the aim of putting our sovereignty in question.”

Nusseibeh, you may recall, was the Palestinian who publicly called on his people to give up their dream of the “right of return” and to embrace a genuine two-state solution to the conflict. More recently, Nusseibeh was among those leading Palestinians who published advertisements in local newspapers calling for an end to suicide attacks on Israelis.

Ironically, Landau justified his actions against Nusseibeh by citing the Oslo Accords. But Landau’s Likud Party openly disavows the Oslo Accords. Fellow Likud MK Ze’ev Boim defended Landau’s December actions, saying of Nusseibeh, “If he is moderate, he is also dangerous.” Indeed, if your political agenda includes the reoccupation of Palestinian lands on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, rapid growth of settlements, and sole Israeli sovereignty over an expanded Jerusalem, and denies the possibility of a Palestinian state, you have much to fear from a man who warrants a security detail because he receives death threats from Palestinian extremists.

If Nusseibeh’s arrest and last week’s closure of his office were isolated incidents, I would not be concerned. But his case is just one of a number of actions, directed against individuals and against the spirit of Oslo, that have quietly eroded the position of Palestinian moderates. Being a moderate, on either side of the Green Line, is no easy feat these days.

Just recently, the Israeli cabinet approved a bill that would have barred Israeli Arabs from home ownership in Jewish communities built on state-owned land, meaning more than 90% of the country. The bill was a response to an Israeli Supreme Court decision, more than two years ago, that upheld an Israeli Arab’s right to build a home in a Jewish neighborhood in the Galilee. Fortunately, after the Labor Party threatened to vote against the bill, the Cabinet withdrew its approval and the bill is now buried.

The cabinet’s action was not legally proscribed under Oslo. But it was certainly not a shining moment in the history of Israeli democracy. The fact that the bill’s authors are from the core of the Likud, Prime Minister Sharon’s party, also calls into question Sharon’s credibility as an arbiter of Palestinian democratic reform.

Democratic reforms by the Palestinian Authority are a critical element of President Bush’s vision for a two-state solution. Unfortunately, the President’s June 24 speech and July 8 press conference did little to dissuade hardliners from undermining that vision. And it did nothing to ease the plight of the nearly one million innocent Palestinian civilians trapped in their homes and cities under interminable military curfew.

All humanitarian organizations operating in the West Bank and Gaza Strip report severe constraints on their ability to deliver food and medicine. UNRWA is critically understaffed and undersupplied as both local employees and goods are prohibited from moving. According to USAID, approximately 50% of all Palestinians require external food assistance just to meet their minimum daily caloric intake.

A Palestinian doctor working for Save the Children reports that only 45% of births occur in hospitals now, a dramatic decline from 95% prior to the military incursions. I found out after our meeting that his own premature, newborn son had died in April, after the IDF refused access to the ambulance sent to transport the baby to a neonatal ward.

I fully support Israel’s right to defend itself. But I contest the logic of its reliance on a strictly military solution to its security problems.

The Bush Administration, with its allies in the Quartet, must engage in a concerted effort to relieve the suffering of ordinary Palestinians. In doing so, the United States would reassure Palestinians and our allies in the region that we have not lost our moral compass, and that we are just as opposed to civilian losses among the Palestinians as we are to Israeli casualties. This will go far toward saving Palestinian moderates from near-extinction. And it will ensure that, once both the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships are serious about peace, they will have a constituency ready to make the necessary compromises.

Statecraft, And How to Restore America's Standing in the World: MEI Book Event with Ambassador Dennis Ross

Ambassador Dennis Ross — Tue, 24 Jul 2007 19:00:00 -0400

The Middle East Institute will host Ambassador Dennis Ross for a discussion on his recently published book, Statecraft, And How to Restore America's Standing in the World, which argues that in the post-Soviet era of globalization it is essential to use the traditional tools of statecraft—diplomacy, economic, and military—to advance American national interest.

Ambassador Dennis Ross is currently the Washington Institute for Near East Policy's counselor and Ziegler distinguished fellow. A scholar and diplomat with more than two decades of experience in Soviet and Middle East policy, Ambassador Ross worked closely with Secretaries of State James Baker, Warren Christopher, and Madeleine Albright. Prior to his service as special Middle East coordinator under President Clinton, Ambassador Ross served as director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff in the first Bush administration. During the Reagan administration, he served as director of Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council staff, and deputy director of the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment. Ambassador Ross is also the author of Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace.

John Stempel to Discuss Religion and Diplomacy

John Stempel — Mon, 9 May 2005 13:00:00 -0400

The link between religion and diplomacy goes back well beyond this century, but it has more meaning today than it has for 450 years. Dr. John Stempel will explain how religion affects both the substance and the fact of diplomacy and intelligence, as well as why it is nearly impossible to truly understand international affairs today without some knowledge of the intertwining of these subjects.

Dr. Stempel is former Foreign Service Officer, currently at the Virginia Military Institute on sabbatical from his post as Senior Professor at the University of Kentucky's Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce. In his 23-year Foreign Service career, Stempel saw both Islamic fundamentalism in Iran and Hindu fundamentalism in India "up close and personal."

Public Diplomacy and Dialogue with the Arab and Islamic World

Gunter Mulack — Wed, 20 Apr 2005 13:00:00 -0400

As the Bush Administration looks for ways to improve public diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim world, the Middle East Institute is pleased to welcome Ambassador Gunter Mulack, the German Commissioner for the Dialogue with the Islamic World, to provide insights on how the German government has approached this critical objective following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

The Commissioner for the Dialogue with Islam and his task force were established in the spring 2002 in response to the shock felt by Germans after discovering that many of the 9/11 perpetrators had been living among them. It was agreed that fighting threats of such a global dimension is not enough—the root causes of Islamist terrorism had to be examined. Islamist terrorism emanating from the greater Middle East is of special concern to Germany, given the geographical proximity of the region to Europe. Relations with the Muslim world are thus at the top of Germany’s foreign policy agenda.

Ambassador Gulack earned his PhD in International Law from Göttingen University. A fluent Arabic speaker, he entered the German Foreign Service in 1971, rising through the ranks to become German Ambassador in Kuwait and Bahrain (1991-1994). Ambassador Mulack also served as German Ambassador in Damascus, Syria (1999-2002).

Discussion: Ephraim Sneh’s Post-Script on Annapolis: An Israeli Perspective

Member of Knesset, Ephraim SnehAmy Aminah Teachout — Tue, 11 Dec 2007 16:24:58 -0500

MK Sneh’s remarks summarized the potential and reality of the peace process between Israel and Palestine as well as the greater Middle East. To begin, he noted the successes of the meeting at Annapolis. Based on the meeting and MK Sneh’s personal discussions with both Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President Mahmud ‘Abbas, he was confident that both parties are seriously dedicated to sustained negotiations and the completion of a comprehensive plan, or at a least solid draft, by the end of 2008. He also identified the unprecedented international support for the peace negotiations and highlighted the support of Arab states, indicated by their presence at Annapolis. MK Sneh credited these nations with understanding the new threats evolving the region, emphasizing the need for the moderate Middle Eastern powers to stand up against the menace of the Persian Empire. He reminded the audience that previous negotiations had failed partly due to the lack of widespread support in the region; therefore, the attendance at Annapolis was promising. Next, MK Sneh praised the future economic projects announced by Tony Blair on behalf of the Quartet of Mideast Peacemakers. He asserted that the best way to undermine the already declining support for Hamas was to improve the lives of Palestinians and economic conditions in the West Bank. He was optimistic about upcoming meeting of the states donating to the Palestinian economic projects in Paris.

His commentary then turned to the negative aspects of the situation post-Annapolis. The prospects of an effective peace will not improve if the smuggling of arms, munitions, money, and terrorist experts to Gaza continues. With this in mind, MK Sneh was highly critical of Egypt, which, contributes to the sustained violence in Gaza by not preventing smuggling or taking the initiative to curtail violence. In support of his argument, MK Sneh referenced how Egypt recently facilitated the reentry of terrorists to Gaza after training in Iran. Next, he discussed the “combustible” situation in Lebanon and its potentially negative impact on the peace process. The political uncertainty surrounding outcome of the presidential elections is precarious and is compounded by the continued flow of arms to Hizbullah. Lastly, he suggested that the growing pressure on the Olmert Administration within Israel — prompted by the ultra-orthodox Sephardic Shas party and also by fellow Knesset member Avigdor Lieberman — will burden the development of negotiations with Palestine.

MK Sneh concluded that ultimately, the possibility of having effective negotiations and reaching a final agreement rested on the Israeli and Palestinian leadership and public. First, Israelis need to give Prime Minister Olmert strong political support. Second, both Minister Olmert and President Abbas must take a courageous stance with regard to the necessary concessions of both parties that both leaders and the people “already know.” They need to be frank with the public about the unavoidable compromises to be made in order to reach a peace agreement. For Palestinians, it will be imperative they give up the demand for the right-of-return and accept alternative solutions for the current refugee situation. MK Sneh contended that to allow the refugees to return en masse would ‘[undermine] the integrity of the Jewish State’. With Israel, MK Sneh urged its citizens and leadership alike to accept that Jerusalem as the future home of the capital of two states. He commented further on the current state of Jerusalem, noting the complete lack of unity between Israeli municipality and citizens, and the neighboring Arab population. He also remarked that only one-third of Jerusalem’s population is Jewish and asserted there is a need for the city to become a Jewish majority city. He suggested eliminating the surrounding Palestinian villages and replacing them with a metropolitan Jerusalem with a solid Jewish character.

In closing, MK Sneh assessed the goal of having a comprehensive plan within 13 months as ‘ambitious but not impossible.’ Afterward, MK Sneh fielded several questions elaborating on the current situation in the Palestinian Territories and the region generally. Most notably he detailed the danger Iran poses to Israel, the peace process, and the Middle East. Additionally, he commented on the threat of Iran’s nuclear program and called for imposition of economic sanctions on Iran as an act of deterrence. He said he was doubtful that any part of the process was halted in 2003 and is certain that the threat persists of a nuclear Iran. In his opinion the responsibility to confront Iran and its political ambitions do not rest solely on the shoulders of Israel but also on the US and the international community.

MK Sneh also defended Israel’s current policies in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. He described the dire conditions of Palestinians, especially in the Gaza Strip, but given the daily attacks said that Israel could do little to facilitate economic development in Gaza. However, the economic development plans for the West Bank would hopefully provide a positive example of the incentives for stopping the attacks. Moreover, he was confident of the US Congress’ continued support of the peace process. He noted the importance of the US efforts to build new Palestinian security forces loyal to the government, which would significantly help change the realities on the ground. Furthermore, MK Sneh expressed reservations about engagement with Syria, considering its prominent support of Iran and its lack of actions against Hizbullah. Before Israel would consider giving back Golan Heights or otherwise pursuing diplomatic relations with Syria, he believed it would be necessary for Syria to make reconciliatory gestures towards Israel.