Women's Issues

Lifting the Headscarf Ban in Turkey: Where do we go from here?

Fri, 15 Feb 2008 15:38:39 -0500

On February 9, 2008 the Turkish Parliament voted to amend the constitution, thus permitting women to wear the headscarf when entering the university- another step in the long-running dispute over secularism in Turkey. Devotees of Turkish secularism, who support the view that expressions of attachment to religion have no place in the public arena, will not quietly accept the change in religious behavior which the Islamic-oriented politicians have now voted to enact.

The first line of defense for the secularists will be to rely on the opposition Republican Peoples Party. Despite the fact that it lacks enough deputies in Parliament to prevent enacting the amendment, the party has pledged to take the issue to the Constitutional Court. Indeed, the head of the court warned politicians against softening the ban on headscarves in a speech on February 7. The Republican Peoples Party and others will argue that provisions entrenched in the Constitution prohibit changes to the secular nature of Turkey’s political scene. Though the chances of success are unclear, it will at the very least embitter relations between secularists and advocates of outward forms of Islamic piety. And polls have shown that those who favor freedom to wear a headscarf represent more than half the population of Turkey.

The argument will no doubt reflect clashing legal interpretations. Already we see that the Turkish legal community has held contentious meetings over whether the headscarf ban can legally be circumvented. In the end, the argument may hinge on this amendment’s proposed form of headscarf wearing. According to strict Muslim etiquette, no hair can be visible on a woman’s head. The ruling party in Turkey, on the other hand, is arguing that they instead would oblige those who wanted to cover their hair to wear a kerchief tied under the chin, thus making it difficult or impossible to cover every lock of hair. This is said to be a Turkish style and not necessarily an Islamic display. While its proponents argue that this reasoning could pass muster for secularists, it is unlikely to be accepted by either side. Secularist women in particular fear that this is the first step toward eventually forcing all women to cover their hair.

Although outnumbered, the secularists have several important political forces on their side. In addition to warnings by members of the courts, rectors of some of Turkey’s leading universities have gone so far as to complain that easing the ban would “turn Turkey into a religious state.” In accordance with this view, some university professors and others of the educated elite are determined to frustrate the ruling party. There is talk that they would be ready to expel headscarf wearers from their classes regardless of what the law and Constitution might permit. Were that to happen, it would inevitably entail more bitter legal battles and acrimony on campuses all over Turkey.

Of course, the main question that hangs over this dispute is the behavior of the military. Despite the fact that much of the officer corps has its roots in rural Turkey, normally the bastion of devotion to Islam, the senior generals have purged the ranks of any who do not appear to subscribe to the secularism of modern Turkey’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Accordingly, the military has been among the most extreme opponents of relaxing the ban on headscarves. In witness to this attachment to secularism, the generals called out tens of thousands of secular Turks last year to show solidarity in support of Turkey’s secular regime.

This year, top leaders of the military have been more circumspect. The Chief of the General Staff recently told the press that everyone knew where the military stood and thus it was not necessary to make any new pronouncement. While the military leadership has so far remained on the sidelines, secularists- particularly women- rallied just before the Parliamentary vote in demonstrations against a lifting of the ban on headscarves. It seems likely such demonstrations will continue along with court challenges.

Turkey thus appears to be in the midst of a disorderly process. While the military is likely merely to watch and wait, after their bluff was called when last year’s parliamentary election returned in favor of the Justice and Development Party, its supporters to continue to find ways to resist. To do more, however, would risk disrupting the course of negotiations to enter the European Union, which both Islamic-oriented parties and secularists favor. And the military knows that ruling Turkey is no job for the soldiers.

Kuwaiti Elections: New Voices

Jennifer McElhinny — Fri, 9 Jun 2006 12:00:00 -0400

Kuwait is in the midst of a political transformation. The past month has showcased the first youth movement demanding political reform and more backbone from their political representatives. Parliament has been dissolved. The new election, now set for the end of June, will reveal more registered women voters than men and promises to further the reform process. Eligible Kuwaiti female voters outnumber Kuwaiti men four to three.

Yes, Kuwait’s executive still wields undue influence over its democratically-elected parliament, but the latest developments clearly indicate radical change is underway. Democratic practices are entrenched and expanding.

Kuwait’s Emir exercised his constitutional authority to dissolve parliament on May 22 in response to increasing criticism within parliament and society over the number of constituencies in legislative elections. Kuwaitis currently vote in 25 constituencies, or electoral districts. Liberal, Islamist, Shia and centrist parliamentarians in Kuwait found common cause, arguing that the high number of electoral districts encourages corruption by making vote buying easier. It also privileges smaller constituencies and enables candidates to run on tribal affiliation rather than broad national platforms.

When the government appeared to back away from a reform proposal initiated in May, more than half the 50 members of parliament walked out in protest. This dramatic move was preceded by an unprecedented public pressure campaign from a customarily powerless sector of Kuwaiti society.

Debate over the constituencies sparked the birth of a youth campaign for reform that labeled itself the “Orange Movement” for the color its activists wore. The Orange Movement represented diverse groups of Kuwaiti youth, conservatives and liberals, women and men, who gathered and slept in front of the National Assembly and in the gallery and organized rallies using the internet and cell phone text messaging. They distributed materials lobbying the government to address corruption in the political system by reducing the number of electoral constituencies to five.

The mobilization of Kuwait’s youth around this reformist agenda startled the government as well as society. Kuwaiti youth, well versed in electoral politics from active campaigns for student representatives in university, are no longer content to sit on the sidelines. Their political influence is demonstrated by their numbers and will only grow. Nearly 40 percent of the population is under 25. The voting age in Kuwait is 21.

It was pressure from youth groups that prevented efforts to soften the reform process through a government-backed proposal to consolidate the districts into ten. The government was charged with flip-flopping on reform, and facing a legislative deadlock, the Emir chose to dissolve parliament and schedule elections for June 29.

The acceleration of Kuwait’s next legislative election by more than a year brings to the forefront another major transformation within the political system. A year ago, Kuwaiti women were given the right to vote and run for office. Women are already well integrated into the economic, educational and civic spheres, and had begun to develop political platforms for the July 2007 legislative elections immediately after receiving the right to vote. After the parliament was dissolved and, with only two weeks to declare candidacy, Kuwaiti women quickly answered those who questioned if their enfranchisement could affect the domestic political scene.

Thirty-two Kuwaiti women have declared their candidacy for parliament. Women have rented large tents to campaign in traditional Kuwaiti style, host prospective voters and speak to mixed groups about their platforms. The most striking effect of their participation has been the immediate transformation of political platforms of both male and female candidates to reflect long-neglected political concerns of Kuwaiti women.

It is premature to suggest that Kuwaiti women will vote for different candidates than their husbands, fathers and brothers did in the past. Evidence from Kuwait University, where women make up around 67 percent of the voting student body, indicates Kuwaiti women routinely elect male and Islamist candidates. Still, it is clear that all political candidates have quickly learned to respect the power Kuwaiti women now wield.

Both male and female candidates show a new commitment to reforming laws that have left Kuwaiti women as second-class citizens. One law getting a lot of attention in campaign speeches is the nationality law that prevents Kuwaiti women who have non-citizen husbands from passing Kuwaiti citizenship to their children.

Kuwait’s political system is in flux. Gone are the days when the Emir could dissolve parliament without declaring elections within the constitutionally-mandated two months, as the former Emir did in 1986. Some analysts suggest the move to dissolve parliament allows the powerful executive to shrink the political space for debate and reform. This may be true, but it overlooks just how far Kuwaitis have come in transforming their political system.

Kuwaiti women and youth are flexing their newfound political muscle with dramatic results. The Orange Movement has taught Kuwait’s youth they can successfully voice their political views and gain public support. Kuwaiti women have shown they can and will vote and run for office, despite death threats against some female candidates. These new voices appear determined to make sure Kuwait’s democratic reforms endure.

Delayed Democracy in Qatar?

Louay Bahry — Mon, 24 Apr 2006 12:00:00 -0400

Parliamentary elections in Qatar have been postponed until 2007. This is the third delay since 1995 but it should not be a surprise. It follows the strategy of Qatar’s ruler, Hamid bin Khalifa Al-Thani, to transform Qatar without political and social shocks into a vibrant regional and international economic and financial center. Qatar hopes the transformation will help it compete with neighboring Dubai, which is famous for its wealth, economic development, and political stability.

Qatar’s Emir is moving cautiously with his political, social and economic reforms despite internal hurdles. In 1995, he announced his desire to have an elected municipal council in Doha. He encountered strong opposition from Islamic leaders after he announced in 1997 that women would be permitted to vote and run in elections. Dr. Abd al-Rahman Bin Umair al-Nu’aimi, a professor of history at the University of Qatar and a strong opponent of the move, was jailed for 100 days.

Qatar’s leader later announced his desire to write a permanent constitution and hold general elections for a parliament. Men and women would be allowed to vote and run for office. The permanent constitution was written and approved by referendum in 2004. Now the Emir appears to be waiting for an auspicious moment to hold the promised general elections. Apparently he calculates the time has not yet arrived.

Why such caution? There are several factors: Similar general elections in the region have produced strong showings for Islamist movements. In Egypt in 2005, and Iraq and the Palestinian territories in 2006, elections have produced parliamentary majorities with strong conservative religious elements, creating new problems for these countries and the region.

Qatari society is conservative and deeply Islamic. The population would most likely vote Islamist elements into office in the parliament. Qatar is also very much a tribal society and many tribal leaders, themselves conservative, would probably do well too. The result most likely would be a new parliament dominated by Islamic and tribal leaders who would probably reject many of the Emir’s social and political reforms The Emir already is having problems with some tribes. Last year he ordered the deportation to Saudi Arabia of some 5,000 individuals of the important al Murrah tribe, a significant number for a population of only 180,000. The last thing the Emir wants to face is a tribal or Islamist-dominated parliament that is hostile to his reforms.

For now, Qatar’s leader is focusing on modernizing Qatar’s economy, raising standards of living, and improving the infrastructure, including health services, roads, housing, water, and electricity. These projects are in full swing, thanks to Qatar’s natural gas reserves, which should make it one of the leading gas exporters over the next five years. In 2005 Qatar had a per capita income of $46,000, one of the highest in the world. In the last five years, Qatar has drastically improved its educational system — bringing in foreign institutions to set up college and university courses. The government is also opening up a path for civil society organizations. A liberal law for professional organizations was adopted in 2004. A human rights group opened its doors two years ago. Women’s organizations also are permitted.

Qatar’s leader appears to have concluded that elections will not provide the framework for democracy without first providing the proper institutions and liberalized environment to build on.

Kuwaiti Reform: Slow but Steady

Jennifer McElhinny — Mon, 27 Jun 2005 12:00:00 -0400

With so much attention focused on democratization in the Middle East, it was surprising that landmark reform in Kuwait was largely ignored. In just two months, Kuwaiti women were granted the right to vote and run for office, two women were appointed to the Municipal Council and a woman was named the country’s first female Cabinet minister.

While women have the vote in the majority of countries in the Middle East, Kuwait’s reform could encourage the expanding of democratic values beyond women’s suffrage in other countries in the region. The expansion of women’s rights and opportunities in Kuwait also suggests that successful reform efforts are usually slow-paced, homegrown and distinctive.

The long struggle for women’s suffrage sets Kuwait apart from other countries in the region where reforms are usually top-down, with the leaders - not the public - taking the decision to grant women their political rights. Kuwait’s action contrasts with Jordan, for example, where women gained their rights through royal decree.

Women’s rights activists in Kuwait have argued since 1962 that the election law denying women the right to vote contravenes the constitution, which is billed as egalitarian. Kuwait’s domestic women’s movement gained a powerful ally after the 1991 liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. US pressure for democratic reform led to the reconvening of the National Assembly and the Emir’s public support for women’s suffrage.

Despite that powerful support, both supporters and opponents of women’s rights insisted on dealing with the issue through parliamentary debate. Even women’s rights activists opposed letting the Emir unilaterally change the election law. In 1999, the National Assembly rejected a royal decree in support of women’s suffrage, thus rejecting executive intervention in the legislative process.

Instead, they chose to follow Kuwaiti law and debate women’s political rights in the constitutionally-sanctioned parliament. Elected representatives were determined that parliament control the reform process. Though that approach delayed women getting the right to vote, it made the May 16, 2005 decision more legitimate in the eyes of Kuwaitis.

The dramatic speeches, political bargaining and coalition-building that led to the May 16 decision are familiar to democratic assemblies the world over. But some aspects of that process were distinctively Kuwaiti and defy “western” labels. Kuwaiti liberal forces that support women’s suffrage cannot be equated with secular forces. Liberals and Shi‘ite religious members formed a coalition to support women’s rights, reflecting their shared minority status.

Women’s activists in Kuwait are distinctive and reflect Kuwait’s conservative political culture with their use of religious rhetoric. The suffrage bill itself contains an elastic clause that women voters and politicians must abide by Islamic law. Rather than challenge the legitimacy of introducing religion into a debate of political rights, Kuwaiti supporters of universal suffrage sought religious authority. The head of the parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, Mohammad al-Sager, quoted religious fatwas that stated there is no verse of the Quran prohibiting women from participating in political life and noted during parliamentary debate that women already have full political rights in most Muslim countries.

Perhaps no one represents the Kuwaiti vision of equal rights and liberalism better than Dr. Massoumah Al-Mubarak, recently appointed Minister of State for Administrative Development Affairs and Planning — the country’s first female minister. Dr. Al-Mubarak holds a Ph.D. in international relations, has taught political science at Kuwait University, agitated for women’s rights in Kuwait for decades and is a Shi‘ite Muslim who wears modest Islamic dress, including the traditional headscarf.

While critics complain of the slow pace of reform, now that women have gained their rights the government appears eager to show its support. Realizing the May 16 decision would not give women enough time to organize and register for municipal elections, the government appointed two women to the Municipal Council. Less than a month later, the Prime Minister announced Dr. Al-Mubarak’s appointment, placing Kuwait in a small group of countries in the region that have entrusted important ministries to women. Within a week of gaining their rights, five Kuwaiti women announced their intention to run for office and women’s groups refocused their activism to encourage women to register and vote in the next parliamentary elections, which are scheduled for 2007.

It is not only Kuwait’s women who are adjusting to the new reality. Both conservative and liberal male members of parliament are already shifting their appeal to potential women voters. They realize women voters may focus on different political issues, from health care and discrimination to education and other social issues.

Kuwaiti parliamentarians who support women’s rights acknowledge that peer pressure from other Muslim countries with universal suffrage impacted their vote. In speeches, they noted that lagging on women’s rights was embarrassing for a country that could boast being the only Arab Gulf state with a fully elected parliament. Now, Kuwaiti reforms are likely to influence other countries in the region.

Following Kuwait’s vote for women’s rights, a member of Saudi Arabia’s all-male Shura Council introduced a debate over allowing Saudi women to drive. Saudi Arabia’s government has also suggested women will be permitted to vote the next time the country holds municipal elections. Saudi Arabia is now the only Arab country where women do not have the right to vote. (The U.A.E. is an exception because it does not have elections.)

Reform in Kuwait may have been slow-paced — often seen as too slow by western measures — but that does not diminish the significance of what Kuwaiti women have achieved. As Kuwait moves beyond universal suffrage with the landmark appointment of Dr. Al-Mubarak, the unique characteristics of Kuwaiti reform — its deliberate pace, the strength of the domestic women’s movement, and the fact that the entire reform process reflects Kuwait’s social and political culture — may make it more legitimate, and ultimately, more sustainable.

Shopping for Head Scarves, Jordanian Style

Liana Paris — Mon, 15 Sep 2008 14:11:33 -0400

*Before I left for my Rotary International scholarship year in ‘Amman, I had many conversations like this:

“So … you are going to live in … Jordan?”

At which point I would explain about Rotary, Rotary scholarships, and my interests in Arabic, the Middle East, and intercultural dialogue.

Then invariably one of their real concerns emerges: “How will you figure out what to wear?”*

Oman's Dress Identity: Preserving a Part of History

Aisa Martinez — Tue, 8 Jul 2008 11:09:58 -0400

Muscat, Oman is a place of contrast. Newly constructed tarmac roads wind through gaps in ancient mountain passes. Luxury cars zoom past trucks carrying goats and camels. Old fishermen’s dhows silently bob in the Muttrah harbor, in the shadows of oil tankers and cruise ships. These contrasts of the old and the new are embodied in the black and white of the local dress: Omani men proudly don the traditional crisp white dishdashas, and Omani women flaunt the latest style of flowing black abayas. Abayas originated from ancient times. In the past 20 or so years, this ubiquitous symbol of the modern Gulf woman is fast replacing traditional Omani dress.

High Tea and High Hopes in Riyadh

Wed, 2 Jul 2008 11:23:35 -0400

We met for high tea in the Globe, the restaurant with a panoramic view of Riyadh atop the Faisaliyah Center, in the heart of the Saudi Arabian capital.

I was the guest of two Saudi women — professionals in their early 30s, one a journalist, one a hospital administrator, both with advanced degrees from Saudi universities, both married, one with children, the other not. Neither was veiled.

This was the first time in more than 30 years of visiting Saudi Arabia that I had a social encounter with any Saudi woman outside her own home, and it dramatized the contradictions and absurdities that Saudi Arabia faces in trying to maintain its rigid old social rules in an increasingly modern and educated society.

Marriage Advertisements in Saudi Arabia

Fri, 7 Mar 2008 10:45:04 -0500

At no time in the modern history of Saudi Arabia have women enjoyed more liberties than they do today. There are now prominent women physicians, professors, journalists, and business owners. In early 2008, the Saudi government responded to pressure from Saudi businesswomen who frequently travel by lifting the ban preventing single women from renting hotel rooms, and they have even talked about lifting the ban against female drivers by the end of the year. Increased freedom has now reached into family relations and marriage customs as well, but in ways that generally go unnoticed in the West...

An Interview with Iran Conference Panelist Ibtisam al-Kitbi

Dr. Ibtisam Al-Kitbi and Naomi Stone — Tue, 19 Feb 2008 13:45:08 -0500

MEI: Dr. Al-Kitbi, you’ve written and spoken on political and social reforms like education and democratization in the UAE. To what degree are the Emirati people being impacted on the ground by these changes?

Al-Kitbi: The Emirates was the last country in the GCC to conduct elections. In elections, if you look at it, the people ask for more political rights. But you don’t find this here actually; maybe because of the economic situation. It’s not like Bahrain or Saudi Arabia in the UAE. For one, the population (of native Emiratis) is very small; its only 20% of the total population. Another difference is that the Emirates have not had any type of violent incident; when you compare it to Saudi Arabia, there is nothing. There are none of those violent Islamic groups in the Emirates like in Saudi Arabia. So, you cannot say that there is pressure from the inside towards democratization except from some people, like me.

To read the entire interview please download the .pdf file.

Reform at the University of Qatar: A Profile of Female Leadership

Mon, 4 Feb 2008 16:10:21 -0500

The story of the University of Qatar in the last three and a half years is one of success, and the lessons learned from it should be an inspiration for other national universities in the region. This success story is the result of the work of a striking woman, Dr. Sheikha Abdulla al-Misnad, President of the university. Dr. al-Misnad is also a close advisor of Moza bint Nasir al-Misnad, wife of the ruler of Qatar, Shaikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, also a trendsetter in the Persian Gulf. Dr. Sheikha and Princess Moza are also related; Dr. Shaikha is Moza’s aunt.

Dr. Shaikha al-Misnad became President of Qatar University (established 1977) in August 2003, an event making headlines in the Persian Gulf media since she was the first woman to head a national university in the Gulf. Few people had any idea she would change so much at the university in such a short period of time. Her changes aim to make the university more functional and to create an instrument that would support the speedy pace of economic, social and educational development in Qatar.

When Dr. al-Misnad was appointed President of the University, the institution was notoriously dysfunctional. All registered students were virtually assured of obtaining a degree after a few years, even if they did not attend classes regularly. Students who failed tests were rare and cheating on exams was common. Qatari faculty were exempt from any evaluation or scrutiny and were appointed for life while foreign professors, comprising some seventy percent of the faculty, were appointed with contracts renewable every one or two years; they were rarely kept on for more than four or five years, leading to considerable turnover and instability. The fear and sense of insecurity among foreign professors as they faced yearly contract reviews and possible termination without any explanation, made for low faculty morale and opened a window for pressure on grades.

After a year in office, the new President shocked everyone in Qatar when she expelled some 700 students (out of a total of 10,500) from the university. She then retired or fired some 800 employees who were underperforming, doing little work or were otherwise unnecessary. In addition, Dr. al-Misnad reduced the retirement age for Qatari professors from 65 to 60, with the effect of putting some tens of older Qatari professors on retirement. Her actions were considered so radical that she was called before the country’s Shura Council- an appointed advisory body that plays the role of a parliament- to explain her actions in a session that lasted several hours. In the end, the Shura Council could do little to change her course, mainly because she was supported in her reform efforts by Princess Moza, and the Amir himself.

Dr. al-Misnad is trying to reshape the University of Qatar fundamentally and to make it a model for universities in the region, especially those in the six countries comprising the Gulf Cooperation Council. “The University of Qatar, as a national university, should be an important engine for developing Qatari society…. Our university should be a source of experience in Qatar when it comes to scientific research and preparing students for the challenges of Qatar society,” she said in an interview with the author in November 2007. Thus the curricula in various departments were changed so that new ones could focus on the development of Qatar and serve the local economy and as well as the social and political changes Qatar is currently undergoing. “We are trying to make students think and analyze instead of making them memorize descriptive information … the students must know English in addition to the Arabic language…. They must know the history of their country and they should know that they are living in a society based on the exploitation and export of oil and gas. They should also know the impact of changes taking place in the Middle East and the Gulf…. We are trying to change the University of Qatar from a traditional university to one based on international standards,” she said in the same interview.

To transform the University of Qatar into a functional institution, Dr. al-Misnad has decentralized the administration by giving the heads of departments and the deans of colleges more authority and freedom of management. The hierarchical structure of the university was a major problem facing the colleges and departments before Dr. al-Misnad’s reforms. To improve faculty standards, salaries for professors were increased significantly and most important, foreign professors were offered renewable three-year contracts instead of annual renewals. This has raised faculty morale and provided a needed sense of security among the overwhelming majority of faculty who are foreign.

In November 2007, I talked to a number of Qatari students about how they thought things were going at the university. They told me they were aware of the new changes, and also told me that they are learning material that is more practical and that attendance at their classes is higher than the generation before them. Since 2006, Qatari students have established a Student Union and the faculty has formed a Faculty Senate; both of these institutions are innovations in the university’s history.

These university reforms should be understood within the framework of the reform of the entire educational system in Qatar. Since 1998, Princess Moza bint Nasir al-Misnad has made the issue of educational reform in Qatar her central objective. She has been the driving force behind the establishment of Education City, officially inaugurated in 2003. This complex hosts branches of a number of foreign universities (mainly American but including other Western institutions) including Cornell Medical School, Carnegie Mellon University, Texas A and M, and the Georgetown School of Foreign Service, among others. There has also been substantial reform below the university level in grades K-12, including changes to the way teachers are trained; teaching methods in the classroom; reform of administration, and a reshaping of the curriculum. There are two kinds of primary and high schools in Qatar today--the older, traditional schools and the “new, reformed” schools called “independent schools”. Princess Moza aims to have the new independent schools replacing all the traditional schools by the year 2014.

Dr. Shaikha al-Misnad was born on September 30, 1955 in the town of al-Khur in northern Qatar. Her father, Abdulla al-Misnad, was a well-known merchant and shaikh (leader) of the Misnad tribe. Despite his tribal origins and the conservative customs and attitudes of Qatari society in those days, especially toward women and women’s education, he treated all the women in his family well. He encouraged the young Sheikha to study and even to travel abroad for graduate studies after she received her BA in Education from the University of Qatar in 1977. Shaikha al-Misnad then went to England and obtained a Ph.D. in Education from the University of Durham in 1984. She was then one of only a handful of Qatari women with a doctorate in any field. Upon her return to Qatar, she became Assistant Professor of Education at the University of Qatar. Since that time, Dr. Shaikha’s professional career has been tied to the University of Qatar where she became Head of the Department of the Fundamentals in Education in the Faculty of Education (1992); then Vice President of the University for Research and Community Service (2000), and finally President of the University in 2003. Dr. al-Misnad has published extensively in the field of education in Qatar and sits on the boards of several institutions of education in Qatar and the GCC. She has also obtained honorary degrees from abroad.

As President of the University of Qatar, Dr. Sheikha is setting an example for young Qatari women, particularly among her student body. Some seventy percent of the students at the University of Qatar are women. Dr. al-Misnad's message for Qatari women is one of support and encouragement for them to follow their dreams. She says to them, “You have to chose what is right for you. Do not bow to pressure to fit a special role that does not fit you. Do not follow others; choose what is right for you.”