Political, Social & Economic Reform

Political and Constitutional Developments in Pakistan

Wed, 7 Nov 2007 17:00:00 -0500

Saudi Arabia Opening to Tourists

Tue, 30 Sep 2008 10:56:42 -0400

Many people snickered when Saudi Arabia announced a few years ago that it would create a tourism industry as part of a long-term effort to diversify its oil-dependent economy.

Tourism in Saudi Arabia? The forbidding alcohol-free kingdom where women are veiled, shops close at prayer time, religious enforcers patrol the streets, criminals are beheaded in public and the most important sites are off-limits to non-Muslims? What a joke.

Perhaps it’s time to stop chuckling. Crystal Cruises, a luxury cruise ship line that caters to affluent Americans, has added the Saudi port city of Jeddah to its ports of call. The Crystal Serenity, a 1,080-passenger liner, is scheduled to make its first stop in Saudi Arabia on March 23, 2010.

This is intriguing news for travelers, but it represents much more for Saudi Arabia. It can be read as a statement from the country’s rulers that they are determined to open up the country and engage with the world, despite what is certain to be outraged opposition from Saudi Arabia’s xenophobic religious and social conservatives.

For decades Saudi Arabia was difficult for non-Muslims to visit, but it mattered little because few people other than pilgrims headed for Mecca wanted to go there anyway, except on business. Now under the leadership of King Abdullah, the country is opening itself more and more to outsiders—issuing multiple-entry visas, creating an international university and hosting regional sports tournaments and even cultural events. The efforts of the Supreme Commission for Tourism are part of that trend, which has been driven mostly by the economic imperatives of creating new jobs and building self-sustaining industries beyond oil and petrochemicals.

The commission, headed by Prince Sultan bin Salman, an American-educated astronaut and grandson of the kingdom’s founder, has focused mostly on domestic tourism. The aim was to persuade Saudis to spend their holidays at home, on the Red Sea beaches or in the mountains of the sparsely-populated southwest. Welcoming boatloads of non-Muslim foreigners is another matter.

The cruise passengers may provide temporary employment for bus drivers and tour guides, but it is likely their presence will agitate the monarchy’s vocal Islamist critics. In Egypt, cruise ship day-trippers travel in armed convoys because of the security threat. What will be the security challenge in Saudi Arabia, where in recent years extremists have killed French travelers and attacked the US consulate in Jeddah?

According to Crystal’s announcement, the Serenity is scheduled to arrive in Jeddah at 8 a.m. and depart at 6 p.m. the same day. This is standard practice for cruise lines, which organize day trips to onshore sites and then sail on to the next destination in the evening.

But how many of the Serenity’s passengers, who on most cruises include many Jews, will want to disembark in Saudi Arabia? The State Department’s most recent travel warning “urges U.S. citizens to consider carefully the risks of traveling to Saudi Arabia” where “there is an ongoing security threat due to the continued presence of terrorist groups...”

For the passengers who do go ashore, there are other questions: What will the women wear? What will there be to see? Mecca is a short drive away but off-limits. The great Nabatean ruins at Midan Saleh and the vistas of Asir National Park are too far away for day trips. And will any passengers be permitted to disembark on their own and visit Jeddah independently of an organized tour, as some routinely do in other ports?

On its Web site, Crystal describes Jeddah as if it were an Arab Barcelona: “Jeddah is a dynamic and cosmopolitan commercial hub. It is also an artistic one, with public art on display on its roundabouts. In fact, the collection, which includes works by Alexander Calder and Joan Miro, makes the city the largest open-air art gallery in the world. For shopaholics, Jeddah is a paradise...And for anyone who appreciates scenic beauty, there are lovely beaches and a picturesque corniche, where locals and visitors alike can be found relaxing and drinking in the views.”

Jeddah is indeed interesting, but also hot, crowded and choked with traffic. The restored old city and its souk would take perhaps an hour to visit. And, while there is good snorkeling in the Red Sea, few beaches permit western-style bathing attire.

Crystal Cruises is Japanese-owned and its ships are registered in the Bahamas, but its offices are in Los Angeles and the great majority of its passengers are Americans. Like most cruise lines, it is always looking for new and offbeat destinations, and its 2010 itinerary in the Middle East reflects that quest. In addition to Jeddah, the Serenity is scheduled to call at Bandar Abbas, Iran; Khasab, Oman, on the Strait of Hormuz; and Ashdod, Israel.

Decision Time for the GCC

Dr. Hani Findakly — Thu, 28 Aug 2008 11:39:54 -0400

Tying the Persian Gulf countries to the dollar has bought decades of stability and prosperity. The time has come, however, to cut the tie.

The dollar has been a steady friend to the Gulf. In a region of small economies dominated by public sector spending, virtually all revenues have been in the form of dollar-denominated oil sales. As young and often sparsely populated countries in the 1960s and 1970s, they lacked the institutional framework—central banks, capital markets, regulatory agencies, and economic managers—that an effective monetary policy requires. Furthermore, their economic growth was relatively weak for decades. Western impressions notwithstanding, periods of dramatic growth in the Gulf were the exception rather than the rule from the 1970s to 1990s. While there were short periods of exceptional growth, real economic growth only averaged an anemic two percent over three decades.

A fixed exchange rate link to the dollar helped. It provided an anchor of stability as the Gulf economies got on their feet. It also created stable currencies and relatively predictable levels of government income and expenditure.

But in the last decade, everything has changed, and things are unlikely to go back to how they once were. Emerging markets around the world have blossomed, as good economic policies, enhanced governance, and rapidly rising global trade have combined to create some of the most auspicious conditions for growth that the world has ever known. In addition, and in part because of these conditions, persistently strong demand has boosted real commodity prices in a more sustained way than they have been in almost a century.

For the countries of the Gulf, the windfall is nothing short of remarkable. At roughly $140 per barrel, the region is amassing capital at an unprecedented rate, with projected surpluses approaching $400 billion per year, or an average $20,000 per citizen. In smaller, energy-rich countries such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, the per capita surpluses are several times higher. In addition, regional governments have learned their lessons from the 1970s and 1980s. Unlike past oil booms, in which governments spent with enthusiastic abandon, the governments of the region have become far more strategic. Now they seek to diversify their economies, to invest in their deficient physical, financial, and social infrastructures, and most importantly in the education of their people.

Even so, economies are overheating. Inflation is in double digits, growth is exploding, consumer loans are at precarious levels of personal income, and speculative bubbles in housing and the stock market threaten medium-term stability. These conditions will undermine the region’s capacity to recruit and retain their workforce—still 40 percent foreign overall and with a much higher percentage in the private sector. These workers, who are paid in Gulf currencies linked to the dollar, have seen the value of their repatriated wages shrink, while high inflation severely limits their capacity to save. Labor unrest is a growing problem, and one with no simple solution.

This decade’s prosperity presents Gulf policymakers with a serious dilemma. They have little control over the oil windfalls flooding into their economies, and the virtual absence of taxation in these countries means that governments lack an important tool of economic governance. The fixed link to the dollar compels central banks to mirror the Fed’s low interest rate policy needed to stimulate the U.S. economy, leaving their own economies woefully over-stimulated. Indeed, the governments have precious few tools to shape their local economies.

Of the few tools at their disposal is a currency float. Doing so now would be especially timely. Foreign exchange reserves are at an all-time high. The managerial talent pool is there. And while it will take time to fully develop the money markets necessary to conduct effective monetary policy, all of the elements are in place to begin that process.

Cutting historic ties to the dollar would be both courageous and controversial. Some would see it as a political act rather than an economic one, as if any close U.S. ally with a major economy ties its own currency to the dollar. In fact, none do.

Others fear that the Gulf nations will lose the security of the greenback. In reality, the opposite is true. A float would grant these countries greater stability, not only to stem inflation now, but even more so were the U.S. economy to grow and interest rates to rise at a time when Gulf economies were in an economic reversal.

The economic security of the move could be enhanced if the Gulf countries coordinated their actions, paving the way for greater regional coordination and integration. Doing so would smooth out speculative portfolio flows, help synchronize economic cycles, fight inflation, and ensure competitive access to both skilled and unskilled labor.

The question is no longer why the Gulf states should depart from their dollar peg. Instead, it is why they should remain tied to the dollar despite the very obvious costs. To their credit, Gulf states are managing their wealth far more prudently now than in past oil booms. Rigidly remaining tied to a dollar peg that distorts their economies is no longer prudence, it is folly.

Lebanon’s Shia Deserve a Greater Voice

Tue, 18 Mar 2008 11:29:00 -0400

American objectives in Lebanon are clear, reasonable and honorable. The United States wants an independent, democratic Lebanon free from foreign interference, particularly from Syria and Iran. It also wants a prosperous Lebanon at peace with its neighbors, including Israel.

The question is why have these fair and reasonable goals been so difficult to attain? There is no single answer, but what is clear is that the United States does not understand the long-term political changes taking place in Lebanon and how they interfere with American objectives. Most important among these changes is the increasing influence of the Lebanese Shia community, which necessitates a redistribution of power within the Lebanese government.

At the time of its founding, the diversity of the Lebanese population was unique in the Arab world. In particular, the large Christian population made Lebanon the only Christian-dominated Arab state. Instruments of power were divided between Christians and Muslims with the preponderance of power resting with the Christians. The President, the army commander and a majority in parliament were Christian. The Muslims, however, had sufficient levers of power to prevent the government from taking actions inimical to their interests. The Prime Minister, the Speaker of Parliament, usually the head of the internal security forces, and a blocking minority in Parliament were Muslim. In this way, Christian control was assured, but Muslim interests were protected.

By the mid-1970’s, demographic shifts and changing regional politics created a rift between the actual division of power and political reality. The original political compact no longer represented the interests of all. After 15 years of civil war, the 1989 Taif agreement codified a new distribution of power. As painful as this was to the dominant Christian community, peace could not have come without the acceptance of a new political reality – equality between Muslims and Christians.

In the 18 years since Taif, demographic and regional political circumstances have again created a rift between the division of power and political reality. The crucial imbalance of power this time is not between Muslim and Christian, but between Sunni and Shia. Since the founding of the state, the Sunnis have dominated Muslim politics just as the Christians dominated national politics before Taif. Over time, the demographic and political balance has shifted in favor of the Shia, but no corresponding shift in the distribution of power within the government has occurred. If peace and normalcy are to return to Lebanon, Shia interests must be protected within the executive branch.

Each community – Christian, Sunni, and Shia – must be assured that the government will not and cannot make decisions against its vital interests. Under the current situation, the Shia do not have this protection. Christians and Sunnis have the power to block any government action, but the Shia do not. Christians control the Presidency, command the army, and have a blocking vote in Parliament and the Cabinet. Similarly, the Sunnis appoint the Prime Minister, command the internal security forces, and have a blocking vote in Parliament and the Cabinet. In comparison, the Shia have no controlling position in the Lebanese executive branch, and they, therefore, must rely on the Speaker of the Parliament and their militia to protect the community’s interest.

The current crisis began in late 2006 when all Shia Cabinet members resigned their posts terminating the ruling consensus. They thought that without a consensus, the government would have to reconstitute itself and thus address their concerns. However, the decision was made to continue governing without them, which highlighted the Shia’s inability to protect their own interests within the executive branch. Having the limited powers of the Speaker of Parliament as their only recourse, many Shia turned to their primary source of strength outside the government – Hezbollah – for leadership and protection.

The dominance of Hezbollah within the Lebanese Shia community is likely to continue so long as the Shia do not have the power within the government to prevent the government from taking actions against their interests. A lasting solution to the current crisis is not likely unless the Shia are afforded the same protection from government mistreatment that the Christians and Sunnis enjoy. In the short term, affording them a blocking third – 11 of 30 members – in the Cabinet would appear to be the only way the Shia could protect their interests from inside the executive branch of government.

Many argue that the Shia community should not be given “veto” power over government policies, out of fear of increasing the influence of Hezbollah. In fact the opposite is likely to be true. Empowerment of the Shia community would allow a wider diversity of views and over time would diminish the influence of Hezbollah. Until the Shia are guaranteed that the Lebanese government cannot act against their interests, in the same way it cannot act against Christian and Sunni interests, they will protect themselves by looking outside the government and obstructing the governing process. Under such circumstances, the influence of Hezbollah is likely to increase.

If the American goal of a free, democratic, peaceful and prosperous Lebanon and a diminished role for Hezbollah is to be achieved, then, as a prerequisite, the Lebanese Shia community needs a guarantee that the government of Lebanon cannot act without Shia concurrence. Each of the three principal communities—Christian, Sunni and Shia—needs this guarantee. A failure to equal protection to the Shia is likely to lead to greater instability and the strengthening of Hezbollah.

Lifting the Headscarf Ban in Turkey: Where do we go from here?

Fri, 15 Feb 2008 15:38:39 -0500

On February 9, 2008 the Turkish Parliament voted to amend the constitution, thus permitting women to wear the headscarf when entering the university- another step in the long-running dispute over secularism in Turkey. Devotees of Turkish secularism, who support the view that expressions of attachment to religion have no place in the public arena, will not quietly accept the change in religious behavior which the Islamic-oriented politicians have now voted to enact.

The first line of defense for the secularists will be to rely on the opposition Republican Peoples Party. Despite the fact that it lacks enough deputies in Parliament to prevent enacting the amendment, the party has pledged to take the issue to the Constitutional Court. Indeed, the head of the court warned politicians against softening the ban on headscarves in a speech on February 7. The Republican Peoples Party and others will argue that provisions entrenched in the Constitution prohibit changes to the secular nature of Turkey’s political scene. Though the chances of success are unclear, it will at the very least embitter relations between secularists and advocates of outward forms of Islamic piety. And polls have shown that those who favor freedom to wear a headscarf represent more than half the population of Turkey.

The argument will no doubt reflect clashing legal interpretations. Already we see that the Turkish legal community has held contentious meetings over whether the headscarf ban can legally be circumvented. In the end, the argument may hinge on this amendment’s proposed form of headscarf wearing. According to strict Muslim etiquette, no hair can be visible on a woman’s head. The ruling party in Turkey, on the other hand, is arguing that they instead would oblige those who wanted to cover their hair to wear a kerchief tied under the chin, thus making it difficult or impossible to cover every lock of hair. This is said to be a Turkish style and not necessarily an Islamic display. While its proponents argue that this reasoning could pass muster for secularists, it is unlikely to be accepted by either side. Secularist women in particular fear that this is the first step toward eventually forcing all women to cover their hair.

Although outnumbered, the secularists have several important political forces on their side. In addition to warnings by members of the courts, rectors of some of Turkey’s leading universities have gone so far as to complain that easing the ban would “turn Turkey into a religious state.” In accordance with this view, some university professors and others of the educated elite are determined to frustrate the ruling party. There is talk that they would be ready to expel headscarf wearers from their classes regardless of what the law and Constitution might permit. Were that to happen, it would inevitably entail more bitter legal battles and acrimony on campuses all over Turkey.

Of course, the main question that hangs over this dispute is the behavior of the military. Despite the fact that much of the officer corps has its roots in rural Turkey, normally the bastion of devotion to Islam, the senior generals have purged the ranks of any who do not appear to subscribe to the secularism of modern Turkey’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Accordingly, the military has been among the most extreme opponents of relaxing the ban on headscarves. In witness to this attachment to secularism, the generals called out tens of thousands of secular Turks last year to show solidarity in support of Turkey’s secular regime.

This year, top leaders of the military have been more circumspect. The Chief of the General Staff recently told the press that everyone knew where the military stood and thus it was not necessary to make any new pronouncement. While the military leadership has so far remained on the sidelines, secularists- particularly women- rallied just before the Parliamentary vote in demonstrations against a lifting of the ban on headscarves. It seems likely such demonstrations will continue along with court challenges.

Turkey thus appears to be in the midst of a disorderly process. While the military is likely merely to watch and wait, after their bluff was called when last year’s parliamentary election returned in favor of the Justice and Development Party, its supporters to continue to find ways to resist. To do more, however, would risk disrupting the course of negotiations to enter the European Union, which both Islamic-oriented parties and secularists favor. And the military knows that ruling Turkey is no job for the soldiers.

Pakistan at a Crossroad

Wed, 13 Feb 2008 15:39:52 -0500

Over the next several years, Pakistan will either become the nation that the clear majority of its people want – a modern democracy based on constitutional law – or, it will implode under extreme pressures and fall under autocratic rule by Islamist extremists. The general elections on February 18 are an important but not the only step in determining that outcome.

American analysts often simplify the struggle in Pakistan as a battle between moderates and extremists, but Pakistanis understand that it is really about law. Is the nation to be governed by laws based on a constitution, or on God’s law -- Sharia law?

Most Pakistanis view their country as the constitutional democracy their founding father, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, envisioned it to be. They have respect for their constitution and rule of law in the western tradition, and only welcomed Pervez Musharraf’s bloodless military coup in 1999 because he promised to end corruption and then restore civilian democracy.

But Musharraf balked at taking off his uniform and undermined the rule of law by declaring Emergency rule, jailing democratic activists and sacking the independent Supreme Court. Pakistani political elites criticize the United States for tenaciously supporting Musharraf’s military regime. They believe we value counter- terrorism before democracy.

The US has been respected in Pakistan and throughout the world for the righteousness of our core values of democracy, fairness, and justice. We must act on those values. The most compelling gesture our President could make to win the support of Pakistani people would be to firmly call for the reinstatement of the former Supreme Court Justices, including Iftikar Chaudhry. The US should continue to support the rule of law, protection of people, clean and fair elections contested on a level playing field.

It is true we both fear extremism as the most dangerous threat to Pakistan. The impatient response to the threat is with bullets and bombs. Perhaps a more enduring and ultimately successful strategy is through the ballet box and pocket book.

The United States has provided Pakistan over $11 billion in aid since 2002. But over 90% was security related assistance. It had little impact on the poorest civilian sectors of the society. It is time to shift US assistance from defense to development o foster programs that support job creation, education and health. In the long run, a shift in US aid priorities would do much to calm dissent, and stifle the attraction of militant jihadism than bombs and bullets.

Pakistan has in its midst an active militant jihadist element that threatens to ignite a young and frustrated population. To be successful our policies need to be based on a clear understanding of the needs and aspirations of the Pakistani people, and not just our own interests.

Pakistan is struggling through a volatile period of transition. We must adjust our policies to best serve the Pakistani people and their struggle for a stable democracy. No matter the outcome, the election this month may create new uncertainties and we must be prepared to deal with them in a way that can benefit both our nations.

Washington and Iraqi Governance: Time to Back Off

Wayne White — Tue, 10 Oct 2006 12:00:00 -0400

A series of apparent US ultimatums and veiled political threats aimed at the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in recent weeks—especially Maliki himself—is but the latest example of excessive US involvement in the Iraqi political process.

Some rather intense US involvement in various aspects of the Iraqi political scene in the Green Zone has continued well beyond the point at which this sort of thing was slated to become much reduced: the handover of sovereignty to the government of Iyad Allawi in late June 2004. At that time, Ambassador Negroponte signaled—I believe correctly—that the new US embassy in Baghdad would endeavor to assume a considerably lower profile.

This was meant to contrast with the high-profile dominance of Iraqi internal affairs by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). CPA was deeply involved in the full range of Iraqi political, military, economic and security matters because it was, essentially, a government of occupation. Yet, especially since 2005, driven in part by the activism of Negroponte’s successor, Zalmay Khalilzad, the US has continued to intervene at a number of key junctures in the Iraqi political process.

Last year, Khalizad reportedly was a player in a number of closed-door sessions held to draft the permanent Iraqi constitution, apparently even proffering actual language in some cases. Following the latest Iraqi elections, the US intervened forcefully in order to overturn the initial decision of Iraq’s dominant Shi’a political block to extend Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s term as prime minister. Instead, Nouri al-Maliki was installed, ironically, in part, because of the support of the militant, anti-US Muqtada al-Sadr.

Maliki, however, appears to have fared little better than Jaafari in addressing Iraq’s welter of problems. This should come as no surprise to those familiar with how daunting these many challenges have proven. Nonetheless, the US appears to be reaching a point at which it might well begin pressing for the replacement of Maliki. Unfortunately, the age-old game of reshuffling political players in the face of much deeper, fundamental problems usually solves very little and wastes valuable time: in Iraq, many critical months are lost every time a new government must be formed.

And there are other compelling reasons why such intense US political interference, particularly at this late stage of the game, is ill-advised. The Iraqi government is now supposed to be fully sovereign and not nearly so subject to the whims of American politicians. Also, the overall situation is so serious that one Iraqi politician is unlikely to perform all that much better than another in effecting meaningful progress toward restoring the normalcy Iraqis so desperately crave. And, so long as the US hovers ever so closely over the Iraqi political scene, Iraqi politicians, instead of trying to work out problems among themselves, will continue to turn frequently to the US to function as a broker of sorts.

Additionally, to the extent Washington remains a major player in Iraqi politics, with the power to make or break governments, it will share a hefty portion of the blame, and rightly so—inside Iraq, the broader Middle East, and in the eyes of the international community—for likely failures in governance to come.

Many will argue that senior Iraqi politicians have not shown the ability to address the many pressing problems at hand. Persistent US meddling at the very core of the Iraqi political process is thus driven by profound—and rising—frustration over the seeming inability of any players in the current Iraqi political mainstream to stabilize the country. US impatience and political activism is therefore understandable, to some degree, because of the stakes involved. However, Washington’s repeated forays into Iraqi politics since mid-2004 have not resulted in any real improvement.

Consequently, it is time that setting the overall direction of Iraqi politics must be left to Iraqis, for better or worse. Washington must recognize that it cannot orchestrate political success in that tortured land through still more heavy-handed political tampering. And stepping back from the Iraqi political fray is a prerequisite for any overall exit strategy.

Peacekeeping in Lebanon

David Mack — Fri, 18 Aug 2006 12:00:00 -0400

Lebanon's history and the history of peacekeeping elsewhere have much to teach us as we try to move from ongoing warfare to resolve both the current crisis and to lay a foundation for lasting peace in the relations between Lebanon and Israel. I was in Beirut when the Israeli Air Force attacked the International Airport … in 1968. Nearly four decades later, I wonder what has changed. We have not resolved the intertwined problems of Israel's security, infringements on Lebanon’s sovereignty and the survival and well- being of the Lebanese people.

Lebanon's government may be weak but at least it is not an autocratic regime. Lebanon's last elections were relatively free. Lebanon has a long history of constitutionalism and a dynamic civil society. It would seem to offer an opportunity for the success of freedom and democracy in an Arab country. Unfortunately, Lebanon has an even longer history of political instability, personal insecurity and an inability to control its borders. Combined with intrusive neighbors, this can give democracy a bad name.

President Bush says Hizbollah has suffered a defeat because, “there’s going to be a new power in the south of Lebanon, and that’s going to be a Lebanese force with a robust international force to help them seize control of the country.” This is far from a done deal but we should try to make it a reality.

It is doubtful that international peacekeeping will be sustainable -- to use a politically fashionable Bush Administration word -- if it does not lead to political agreements and to material support that build up Lebanese government institutions.

The Lebanese Army will have to become much stronger in order to come close to maintaining order in southern Lebanon, as Syria does in those parts of Golan under its control. In the short term, this requires a working alliance with an international force that provides the Lebanese Army the military muscle and political will to stand between Hizbollah and the Israeli Defense Forces. In the long term, it would also require better equipment for the Lebanese armed forces, domestic political accommodations and international concessions by Syria and Israel intended to strengthen the coalition government in Beirut.

Domestically, there might be a political deal whereby Hizbollah finally gives the Lebanese government sovereignty over the use of armed force. Hizbollah’s compliance is questionable, but it will never happen unless it gets in return a greater role in the Lebanese governing coalition. The Lebanese government is not going to go to war against Hizbollah, and a US tolerated Israeli strategy that relied on making life so painful for Lebanese that they would move in that direction has clearly failed.

Internationally, Syria has been a large part of the problem. But it does not follow that Syria cannot be part of the solution. Syrian objectives in regard to Lebanon are quite different than Iranian goals. They are far more defensive in nature. Moreover, Syria wants to see Israel’s eventual withdrawal from the Golan Heights, Damascus desires better relations with Washington and Bashar Al-Asad’s government needs a Lebanese neighbor that is not hostile to Syria’s economic and security interests. Within a diplomatic structure, these factors can be motivations for Syrian cooperation in preventing the re-supply of arms to Hizbollah.

Public US threats and the drastic curtailment of American contacts with the Syrian government have been unhelpful, aside from gratuitously hobbling US diplomacy in this crisis.

Whatever the rationale for Syria’s decision to cede to Lebanon its claim over the disputed Shebaa Farms area, this provides an additional opportunity to build up the reputation of the Lebanese government led by Prime Minister Fuad Siniora. Israeli withdrawal from this occupied region could demonstrate that international diplomacy succeeded for Lebanon where Hizbollah had failed.

Aside from Israeli occupation, one of the reasons why Hizbollah emerged in 1982 and flourished politically in the following two decades was the failure of the government in Beirut to provide the economic and social safety net for the deprived elements of Lebanon’s Shi’a plurality. Instead, it was Hizbollah that took on this role.

The race is now on between the international community, with a scheduled donor conference in Stockholm at the end of the month, and Hizbollah, with Iranian backing. Right now, Hizbollah is clearly in the lead. Aside from humanitarian aid, the Lebanese economy has been dealt a body blow. The billions of dollars required for economic reconstruction probably will not be forthcoming in the short term from private Lebanese capitalists.

This is another challenge for sustainable peacekeeping. If the Beirut government is prepared to commit its human resources and leadership to this effort, the Bush administration and the Congress should be unstinting in their political and financial support. The alternative is too awful to contemplate.

Iraq: The Tortured Issue of Amnesty

Wayne White — Fri, 7 Jul 2006 12:00:00 -0400

Amnesty proposals for Iraqi insurgents have angered many Iraqis and Americans alike. But if there is to be a realistic chance of removing large numbers of Sunni Arab insurgents from the battlefield, such an amnesty must be as inclusive as possible. The government also must be able to keep its side of the bargain.

An amnesty might exclude indigenous Iraqi insurgents with blood on their hands, or, as Shi’a leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim reportedly declared on July 3, “Saddamists and takfiris” (presumably former Ba’th Party cadres and anti-Shi’a Sunni Arab militants). That would leave many thousands in the field to continue the fight themselves, assist fanatics associated with al-Qaeda in Iraq, and to shame or strong-arm other insurgents eligible for amnesty to keep fighting alongside them.

The situation on the ground in Iraq remains serious. It requires boldness if there is to be any hope of breaking the bloody stalemate between the government, Coalition forces and much of the Sunni Arab heartland. Nonetheless, the sheer scale of Sunni vs. Shi’a bloodshed, much of it on the part of al-Qaeda in Iraq and Shi’a militias, makes the Shi’a dominated government’s thoroughgoing amnesty offer very difficult.

The notion of an amnesty that includes those who have shed blood is not all that new. In fact, by one description or another, such sweeping amnesties often have been recognized as the only way to bring a certain amount of hope to especially bloody or potentially serious conflicts. George Will noted in a recent commentary an important amnesty in American history was that given to Confederate soldiers at the end of the Civil War, many thousands of whom had killed Union soldiers in the course of that long and terrible war.

Perhaps more relevant to the case of Iraq is Algeria’s late-1990’s amnesty to insurgents. The Algerian amnesty is instructive because it provides one way of dealing with insurgents who would not otherwise qualify (i.e. those already with blood on their hands). Those who had inflicted casualties on government forces, but who had not engaged in atrocities such as murder, rape, etc. against civilians, were eligible for a partial amnesty—a reduced penalty for what they had done. This combined full and partial amnesty package removed from the battlefield virtually the entire armed wing of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS). It led to the isolation today of Algeria’s few remaining GSPC-affiliated terrorists.

One problem with an amnesty proposal is the Iraqi insurgency is still quite robust. Situations involving amnesty work best when the party offering amnesty already has gained the upper hand over those on the receiving end. It is likely that many Iraqi insurgents still believe they can prevail, regardless of whether they are eligible for whatever amnesty formula might emerge from this debate.

One other issue is critically important, terribly basic and a major obstacle to any offer of amnesty: trust. Those insurgents who accept amnesty must be reasonably confident that when they turn themselves in, they would not be killed or otherwise ill-treated. With respect to those who might respond to a more inclusive amnesty, they must be sure they could benefit from due process of law. Although the regime in Algiers was notoriously heavy-handed and authoritarian, the government did succeed in convincing those being offered amnesty that it would keep its end of the bargain.

Large numbers of Sunni Arab insurgents will not turn themselves in if they run the risk of being murdered by government security forces dominated by Shi’a militias, militias themselves (or Kurdish Peshmergas), or other ethno-sectarian vigilantes.

In the end, the issue of amnesty takes us right back to bedrock issues continuing to plague governance in Iraq: widespread ethno-sectarian violence, an inability to maintain law and order (regarding not only the insurgency, but also serious crime), and failure to disarm and disband powerful militias.

Governance in Iraq is an iffy affair beyond the Green Zone, to say the least. Ministries and courts face an enormous challenge just to do their jobs. Therefore, the ability of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to convincingly offer safety to those who might take advantage of an amnesty is clearly as important as the nature of the amnesty itself.

Delayed Democracy in Qatar?

Louay Bahry — Mon, 24 Apr 2006 12:00:00 -0400

Parliamentary elections in Qatar have been postponed until 2007. This is the third delay since 1995 but it should not be a surprise. It follows the strategy of Qatar’s ruler, Hamid bin Khalifa Al-Thani, to transform Qatar without political and social shocks into a vibrant regional and international economic and financial center. Qatar hopes the transformation will help it compete with neighboring Dubai, which is famous for its wealth, economic development, and political stability.

Qatar’s Emir is moving cautiously with his political, social and economic reforms despite internal hurdles. In 1995, he announced his desire to have an elected municipal council in Doha. He encountered strong opposition from Islamic leaders after he announced in 1997 that women would be permitted to vote and run in elections. Dr. Abd al-Rahman Bin Umair al-Nu’aimi, a professor of history at the University of Qatar and a strong opponent of the move, was jailed for 100 days.

Qatar’s leader later announced his desire to write a permanent constitution and hold general elections for a parliament. Men and women would be allowed to vote and run for office. The permanent constitution was written and approved by referendum in 2004. Now the Emir appears to be waiting for an auspicious moment to hold the promised general elections. Apparently he calculates the time has not yet arrived.

Why such caution? There are several factors: Similar general elections in the region have produced strong showings for Islamist movements. In Egypt in 2005, and Iraq and the Palestinian territories in 2006, elections have produced parliamentary majorities with strong conservative religious elements, creating new problems for these countries and the region.

Qatari society is conservative and deeply Islamic. The population would most likely vote Islamist elements into office in the parliament. Qatar is also very much a tribal society and many tribal leaders, themselves conservative, would probably do well too. The result most likely would be a new parliament dominated by Islamic and tribal leaders who would probably reject many of the Emir’s social and political reforms The Emir already is having problems with some tribes. Last year he ordered the deportation to Saudi Arabia of some 5,000 individuals of the important al Murrah tribe, a significant number for a population of only 180,000. The last thing the Emir wants to face is a tribal or Islamist-dominated parliament that is hostile to his reforms.

For now, Qatar’s leader is focusing on modernizing Qatar’s economy, raising standards of living, and improving the infrastructure, including health services, roads, housing, water, and electricity. These projects are in full swing, thanks to Qatar’s natural gas reserves, which should make it one of the leading gas exporters over the next five years. In 2005 Qatar had a per capita income of $46,000, one of the highest in the world. In the last five years, Qatar has drastically improved its educational system — bringing in foreign institutions to set up college and university courses. The government is also opening up a path for civil society organizations. A liberal law for professional organizations was adopted in 2004. A human rights group opened its doors two years ago. Women’s organizations also are permitted.

Qatar’s leader appears to have concluded that elections will not provide the framework for democracy without first providing the proper institutions and liberalized environment to build on.