Ethnic and Religious Minorities

"The Kurds Ascending:The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey"

Thu, 6 Mar 2008 15:10:57 -0500

The Middle East Institute is honored to present Michael M. Gunter to discuss his new book, “The Kurds Ascending; The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey,” a narrative that exposes the prospects of a positive future for the the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey.

The State of Sunni-Shiite Relations in Saudi Arabia and Why it Matters

Reza Zia-Ebrahimi — Wed, 16 Jul 2008 15:17:04 -0400

The ‘Shiite crescent’ has become a popular intellectual shortcut in media and policy circles to explain Muslim affairs. Yet, it is a flawed theory that ignores the complexity of religious, national, local and tribal allegiances that include, exclude or overlap each other in the Middle East. It does not account for a number of factors including the occasional inter-Shiite fighting in Iraq. In an interesting twist, two Shiites – Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – happen to be the most popular leaders in overwhelmingly Sunni Egypt (and probably most of the Middle East) according to a poll conducted by the Ibn Khaldun Center in Cairo. So much for Sunni-Shiite mutual hatred. This theory may be inadequate and over-inflated, but it refers to a real problem of rising tension between Sunnis and Shiites in areas throughout the Middle East.

One crucial but under-discussed arena of Sunni-Shiite relations is Saudi Arabia. Approximately 10 percent of the Kingdom’s population is reported to be Shiite. Since the Kingdom’s establishment in 1932, Shiite rituals have been subjected to significant constraints and Shiites have been marginalised and intermittently repressed. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group have all pointed out the systematic social, political, religious and economic discrimination of Shiites by Saudi state institutions and ulama (clergy). Since 1993, Saudi rulers have attempted some rapprochement by engaging Shiite leaders, although significant advances have yet to materialise.

Sunni-Shiite relations in Saudi Arabia are important for the rest of the Muslim world. Indeed, the Kingdom’s religious establishment often adheres to a puritanical and intolerant version of Sunni Islam and holds sway over many radical Muslim circles thanks to its worldwide network of mosques. As a result, the Saudi ulama bear much responsibility in the propagation of anti-Shiite feelings, but they are also in a strategic position to soothe tensions between the two communities. A radical break with well-established anti-Shiism is unlikely; observers of the Kingdom know that its inhibited culture and desire for total consensus makes Switzerland look like a fast-changing country.

However, there are two reasons to believe that the time is ripe for bold action. First, despite the slight détente in the Kingdom in the 1990’s, tensions have been mounting since the advent of civil war in Iraq and the reassertion of Iranian and Hezbollah influence, increasing alarm about regional Shiite domination. Many young Saudis who engage in jihad in Iraq are motivated inter alia by fervent anti-Shiite sentiments. This heated situation has also engendered an increase in despicable acts of vandalism such as cemetery profanation and the torching of Shiite mosques, threatening the inter-communal status quo.

Secondly, Saudi King Abdullah is investing much hope in his calls for interfaith dialogue. Earlier this month he concluded an interfaith conference in Madrid, which he hopes to be the first step in a sustained dialogue process. Christian and Jewish religious authorities worldwide have been involved and many declared their support for the King’s overture. It is quite an undertaking for the leader of a country that constrains or bans any non-Islamic religious act, sign or place of worship and he has attracted much attention. The legitimacy and credibility of the King’s move will, to a large extent, depend on the state of Sunni-Shiite relations within the Kingdom.

Recent moves indicate that the King is aware of this situation and wants to make advances, even at the price of infuriating some members of the ulama. Twenty two radical Saudi clerics issued a religious edict (fatwa) this month saying that Hezbollah’s fight against Israel in Lebanon is actually a disguise to conceal the movement’s anti-Sunni agenda. They proclaimed that Shiites followed ‘infidel precepts’. Reaction was swift: Mohammed al-Nujaimi, a prominent member of the religious establishment and a cleric one wouldn’t exactly call ‘liberal’, was dispatched last week to mend fences with the Shiites. He met with the leader of the Shiite community, Hassan al-Saffar, and other representatives to condemn the edict. There is good reason to believe that the King was behind this effort. By Saudi standards this is a bold move, as the rulers of the Kingdom are always wary of antagonizing the ulama, who provide them with legitimacy. Anti-Shiite sentiment is one of the main tenets of the ulama’s Wahabbi ideology and the King’s overture is unlikely to be appreciated.

There is good reason to be sceptical about the outcome of the King’s outreach to the Shiite community, but mounting tensions and the King’s interfaith projects have created a state of affairs in which the Saudi Shiite situation cannot be shunned any longer. If a decent modus vivendi is worked out, it can have some impact on Sunni-Shiite relations worldwide thanks to the Kingdom’s special position within the Islamic world, and can reassert the House of Saud over an obscurantist and anachronistic ulama. Inshallah.

Lebanon: Back on Track?

Fri, 20 Jun 2008 15:04:03 -0400

The recent agreement in Doha to end Lebanon's 18-month political stalemate begins the process of re-establishing a functioning government and addressing the legitimate concerns of the Lebanese people. It postpones the discussion about the future role of Hizbullah in Lebanese society until after the election of the president, which brings us to the genius of this agreement: it separates the concerns of the Shi'a community from those of Hizbullah.

This is a crucial development because political equilibrium cannot be restored in Lebanon so long as these two issues are treated as one.

The Shi'a community was concerned with the failure of the Lebanese political system to provide adequate representation for the largest faction within Lebanon. Successful governance of Lebanon requires that the three largest confessional groups – Maronites, Sunnis, and Shi'a – have sufficient power within the government to protect their interests. For Lebanon to be governed, a consensus must be reached among these three groups, with each group's allocated political weight playing a determining role.

The redistribution of power that occurred at Taif in 1989 shifted influence from the Maronites to the Sunnis, while Shi'a concerns were left unaddressed. At that time, Hussein Husseini, a Shi'a leader, observed that Shi'a political rights were not protected by the Taif Agreement. He recognised achieving such protection was not then possible and that Shi'a concerns would have to be addressed in the future. They were not.

In November 2006, all Shi'a members of the Lebanese Cabinet submitted their resignations as an attempt to demonstrate their lack of confidence in the government. Thus, the essential consensus required for legitimate governance no longer existed. The Lebanese government chose to govern without Shi'a support.

Even though there were several reasons leading to the resignation of the Shi'a ministers, the government's decision reinforced the perception that Shi'a interests were not taken seriously. Thus, it became essential for the Shi'a community to prove that Lebanon could not be governed without their support. The past 18 months of political impasse has been the result.

The Doha agreement breaks this impasse and restores a governing consensus among Maronites, Sunni, and Shi'a. This objective was accomplished by forming a Cabinet in which the Shi'a and their allies have sufficient representation to assure that their interests are protected.

The second and most difficult accomplishment of the agreement was the drafting of a new election law to replace the Syrian-inspired one under which the current government had been elected. Revision of the law was essential to assure that a governing consensus was sustainable.

The accord achieved through the skilful facilitation of the government of Qatar and the Arab League has halted the sit-in demonstrations in downtown Beirut. Michel Suleiman was elected president on 25 May, and tranquillity is being restored in Lebanon. Political and economic conditions have the prospect of improving for the first time since the 2006 war with Israel.

However, the Hizbullah issue still needs to be addressed. While clearly intertwined with the concerns of the Shi'a community, Hizbullah presents a series of challenges well beyond the concerns of the Lebanese Shi'a. Few will deny that during the last 18 months the influence of Hizbullah increased.

That does not mean that the full array of Hizbullah actions and policies – which alienate much of the world – receive unanimous support among Lebanese Shi'a. They clearly do not. Nevertheless, in the scheme of Lebanese politics, so long as the Shi'a saw their security as being dependent upon Hizbullah, the community had no choice but to support them.

The Doha agreement begins the process of separating the well-being of the Shi'a community from support for Hizbullah. In the long run, this is the only way to confront the challenges posed by Hizbullah. As more and more Shi'a believe their community interests are protected by the government, and as more and more become less comfortable with Hizbullah policies, Hizbullah leadership will either begin to lose popular support or have to change their policies.

The challenge to this eventual reform is that in the short run many will see the recent Doha outcome as a victory for Hizbullah, which is likely to be given credit for the political changes. The objective must be to get beyond this initial perception and see the agreement for what it is: the first step toward establishing a more representative government in Lebanon, and in the long-term, diminishing the influence of radical groups.

Pakistan at a Crossroad

Wed, 13 Feb 2008 15:39:52 -0500

Over the next several years, Pakistan will either become the nation that the clear majority of its people want – a modern democracy based on constitutional law – or, it will implode under extreme pressures and fall under autocratic rule by Islamist extremists. The general elections on February 18 are an important but not the only step in determining that outcome.

American analysts often simplify the struggle in Pakistan as a battle between moderates and extremists, but Pakistanis understand that it is really about law. Is the nation to be governed by laws based on a constitution, or on God’s law -- Sharia law?

Most Pakistanis view their country as the constitutional democracy their founding father, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, envisioned it to be. They have respect for their constitution and rule of law in the western tradition, and only welcomed Pervez Musharraf’s bloodless military coup in 1999 because he promised to end corruption and then restore civilian democracy.

But Musharraf balked at taking off his uniform and undermined the rule of law by declaring Emergency rule, jailing democratic activists and sacking the independent Supreme Court. Pakistani political elites criticize the United States for tenaciously supporting Musharraf’s military regime. They believe we value counter- terrorism before democracy.

The US has been respected in Pakistan and throughout the world for the righteousness of our core values of democracy, fairness, and justice. We must act on those values. The most compelling gesture our President could make to win the support of Pakistani people would be to firmly call for the reinstatement of the former Supreme Court Justices, including Iftikar Chaudhry. The US should continue to support the rule of law, protection of people, clean and fair elections contested on a level playing field.

It is true we both fear extremism as the most dangerous threat to Pakistan. The impatient response to the threat is with bullets and bombs. Perhaps a more enduring and ultimately successful strategy is through the ballet box and pocket book.

The United States has provided Pakistan over $11 billion in aid since 2002. But over 90% was security related assistance. It had little impact on the poorest civilian sectors of the society. It is time to shift US assistance from defense to development o foster programs that support job creation, education and health. In the long run, a shift in US aid priorities would do much to calm dissent, and stifle the attraction of militant jihadism than bombs and bullets.

Pakistan has in its midst an active militant jihadist element that threatens to ignite a young and frustrated population. To be successful our policies need to be based on a clear understanding of the needs and aspirations of the Pakistani people, and not just our own interests.

Pakistan is struggling through a volatile period of transition. We must adjust our policies to best serve the Pakistani people and their struggle for a stable democracy. No matter the outcome, the election this month may create new uncertainties and we must be prepared to deal with them in a way that can benefit both our nations.

Iraq's Sunni Arabs: Tenuous Bedfellows for US

Wayne White — Mon, 9 Jul 2007 13:00:00 -0400

Sunni Arabs turning against al-Qaeda and other terrorist elements in their midst is perhaps the first profoundly positive turn of events in Iraq since 2003. However, this does not mean that the US should remain in Iraq hoping this trend will herald more sweeping successes on other fronts. Quite the contrary.

A very bright spot in the otherwise typically dismal scene in Iraq has been the spreading phenomenon of Sunni Arabs taking on al-Qaeda. The trend began with tribal-based elements centering primarily on the al-Anbar Governate. It has expanded to include hardcore insurgents and portions of Diyala Governate, along with one major neighborhood in Baghdad. Former insurgents also now are working as scouts for American forces in many communities. As a result, al-Qaeda in Iraq has suffered a number of reverses and violence in some previously very dangerous areas like al-Anbar has dropped considerably.

As early as 2004, Iraq-watchers within the US intelligence community knew that resentment was building among Sunni Arabs against al-Qaeda and other fanatical jihadis. These tyrannical militants had dominated many communities, meting out brutal punishments, forbidding various activities and bringing death and destruction to many innocents around them. It was only a matter of time before Iraqis previously hosting such elements would begin pushing back.

Some might view this as an affirmation of the US administration’s position that staying the course would, one way or another, build momentum for trends in Iraq to turn Washington’s way. One can always hope, but such an assumption would be premature and rather shaky.

Sunni Arabs are, by far, the most anti-occupation of Iraq’s various ethno-sectarian communities. They also have the deepest mistrust for the largely Shi’a-dominated government in Baghdad, which is shielded by American security, and behind which most Sunni Arabs see Iran.
-- whether true or not.

Consequently, as welcome as is this turn of events may be, the cooperation of even many battle-hardened insurgents with US forces against al-Qaeda and other terrorists is most likely a rather fragile—and temporary—marriage of convenience.

By turning against al-Qaeda, Sunni Arabs rid themselves of a vicious loadstone around their collective necks. In addition, for the first time, they are filling the ranks of the local police in large numbers. Despite denials, the US apparently has provided munitions or at least exercised much greater tolerance toward the acquisition and carrying of arms by Sunni Arabs for use against a common enemy. Such US-Arab Sunni military cooperation and the admission of many thousands of Arab Sunnis into the police has made the Shi’a-led Iraqi government visibly uncomfortable.

Iraqi Shi’a are very conscious of something the US must not overlook: if and when al-Qaeda in Iraq and its ilk have been crushed, those same Sunni Arabs who helped accomplish this might well turn against their American occupiers and the Iraqi central government, the next two parties on their long-standing hit list.

However, there are possible opportunities to consider. If the threat from al-Qaeda in Iraq were substantially reduced, then car-bombings aimed mainly at Iraqi Shi’a and Kurds, could fall off significantly. That could improve the atmosphere for the inter-communal reconciliation needed to jump-start the stalled Iraqi political process. Yet, with all the blood already spilt, ethno-sectarian cleansing and zero-sum issues like the status of Kirkuk still simmering, notable success on the political front remains a very iffy proposition.

The real opportunity for improving US relations with Iraq’s Sunni Arabs relates to withdrawal. A timely US withdrawal, coupled with assurances that the US does not intend to retain bases in Iraq, would provide a chance for a far more peaceful disengagement from what were previously the most violent regions of the country.

And the defeat of al-Qaeda in Iraq would vastly reduce the likelihood that a US withdrawal would leave behind a major terrorist threat. The threat of a post-withdrawal civil war would not be eliminated. Regrettably, preventing that outcome almost certainly is no longer within our power. It is a matter that now must be left to the Iraqis to address.

Iraq in Need of Unification, not Partition

Louay Bahry, Adjunct Scholar, Middle East Institute — Thu, 21 Jun 2007 12:00:00 -0400

In the 1950s, when I was growing up in Iraq under the monarchy, all school children would assemble in the schoolyard every Thursday morning to raise the Iraqi flag and to sing the national anthem. In the evenings, family and friends would sit by the Tigris until the wee hours of the morning and return home safely to the other side of Baghdad. Although people perennially complained about the government, the legendary statesman, Nuri al-Sa’id, at least used to choose his minister from those with proven records of experience or among young Ph.D. holders who finished their studies in Europe or the US. In those days there was a certain degree of respect for human rights and the value of the individual. In the mid-1950s, for example, I recall the arrest of a well-known Communist professor, Dr. Safa al-Hafidh, for publishing an article critical of the government in the leftist quarterly, al-Thaqafa-l-Jadida [The New Culture]. This arrest was met with such severe criticism in the Iraqi press and among the opposition in Parliament that the Minister of Interior, Sa’id Qazzaz, had to justify the action by coming to Parliament and reading from the article. The professor was released after a couple of weeks.

These days are almost unimaginable now. Today, Iraq as a whole does not even have a national anthem or a flag that is accepted by all Iraqis. Children feel lucky if they can make it to school and back home without being killed by bombs or sniper bullets. Iraq is facing multiple challenges that include a sectarian civil war, a stalled economy, internal and external migration by millions of Iraqis, rampant corruption and a government so weak that it is unable to assure the safety of its citizens. The Kurds constantly threaten the Iraqi government with separation if their demands are not met, while ethnic, sectarian and even tribal identities have replaced a feeling that individuals are Iraqi before anything else.

The major new political parties established after the fall of Saddam's regime in 2003 have aggravated the crisis of identity in Iraq. These parties and political groups were so eager to hold power in the elections of 2005 that they ran on sectarian platforms (Shi'a versus Sunni) or on the basis of ethnic nationalism in the case of the Kurds. Political party leaders were able to manipulate religious and ethnic feelings in their communities to make political gains. Secular parties, such as that of Ayad Allawi, who campaigned on a non-sectarian basis, were unorganized, intimidated and accused of being pro-American by their religious foes. The Iraqi Left, mainly represented by the Communist Party, which is well known for gathering recruits on a non-ethnic, non-sectarian basis, made a poor showing; they have never recovered from the severe persecution by the short-lived Ba‘th regime which came to power in February 1963, after the Qasim regime.

As a result of these contradictions, the newly established national assembly has been paralyzed by ethnic and sectarian feuds and is unable to make important decisions, such as constitutional reform and a national oil law. Cabinet government is also hampered by the fact that the new Iraqi leaders in the government and the national assembly, after decades of dictatorship, lack experience or even a basic understanding of the parliamentary system. This is not an excuse, however, for their unwillingness to learn or to try to compromise on matters of national interest. As a result of these failures, the Iraqi people have lost confidence in their national leadership. Many Iraqis are also turning their anger towards the American government whom they blame for not doing enough to help solve their problems.

It is difficult to blame any particular sect or ethnic group for these failings — indeed there is more than enough blame to go around, including the United States. The Sunnis have paralyzed the work of the new Iraqi institutions by boycotting the first elections in 2005 and hence excluding themselves from the work of the committee charged with drafting the constitution. Sunnis must also be blamed for their initial support for the insurgents and al-Qa‘ida. The Shi’a were responsible for allowing the militias and death squads to operate freely and almost unsanctioned, while the call of some Shi’a for a weak central government and a federation of the southern and central provinces raises fears of a Shi’a state in southern Iraq. The Kurds have moved relentlessly toward independence, symbolized by their use of a separate flag and slogans such as “Welcome to Kurdistan”— not “Welcome to Iraq” — on the borders of Kurdish controlled areas in the north.

As a result of its travails, Iraq is already a failing state in danger of total collapse. But despite increasing pessimism about its survival, calls for a permanent division of Iraq — especially into ethnic and sectarian zones — are premature and will lead to more problems than they solve. Such a division will be an open invitation for other countries to intervene — even more than they currently are. But preventing such an outcome will require more time and patience than Americans seem to have. There are no quick or magic solutions. National reconciliation will require recognition of shared interests and even values, and will have to come from the hearts of religious, political and tribal leaders of all communities. Iraqi government leaders, like Nuri al-Maliki, must once again feel that they are Iraqis, before they are Shi’a, Sunni or Kurd. And these values must again be instilled in Iraqi society — in the educational system, in civic societies, and in symbols and rituals like those I used to participate in as a youth.

When We Withdraw, Will Saudis Heed a Sunni Call to Arms?

Wayne White, Adjunct Scholar, Middle East Institute — Fri, 8 Dec 2006 12:00:00 -0500

If Iraq descends into a full-blown civil war during or following the withdrawal of American-led coalition forces, would Saudi Arabia be compelled to intervene?

The Saudis have come under mounting pressure to give Iraqi Sunni Arabs the wherewithal to stand up against Iraq’s Shi’ites and Kurds, especially the former. Riyadh has so far resisted this pressure. But it also has signaled its alarm over the deteriorating situation in Iraq, especially should events move toward a more clear-cut threat against Iraq’s Sunni Arab community in the context of a more generalized civil war.

In a civil war scenario, tens of thousands of Iraqi Sunni Arabs not yet involved in the violence would almost certainly step forward to defend their cities, towns and neighborhoods, probably transforming the Sunni Arab insurgency into something more like a popular militia, a process already underway in certain hard-pressed Sunni Arab communities.

Increasingly aggressive Shi’ite militias, and much of the Iraqi police so often affiliated with them, are viewed by Iraq’s Sunni Arabs — and probably also by Sunni Arab governments nearby — as violently anti-Sunni and backed by Iran. And the Iraqi army, predominantly Shi’ite and Kurdish, though relatively better behaved to date, could pose a similar problem for Sunni Arabs should a full-blown civil war take shape.

The Saudi leadership has been alarmed by the spiraling violence in Iraq and very much fears a withdrawal of coalition forces. In an effort to shield itself from the increasingly dangerous Iraqi maelstrom to the north, the kingdom has already begun work on an elaborate defensive barrier along its border with Iraq. But beyond the fear of spillover, Riyadh is deeply concerned over the potential emergence of an Iranian-dominated, Shi’ite-led state inside Iraq.

Saudi assistance in a civil war scenario would most likely come in the form of robust financial aid, not actual Saudi military forces. And perhaps never before has the kingdom been better positioned to come forward with substantial amounts of money for such an effort. The high price of oil has swelled the kingdom’s coffers to a degree that could not have been imagined only several years ago.

That said, Riyadh would have to be very careful in funneling such aid to Iraq’s Sunni Arabs. It would have to be done in a manner that would best ensure the money reached the more nationalist and less militant Islamist Iraqi insurgents, not groups like Al Qaeda in Iraq. Should fanatical Sunni Islamic elements gain still more strength in the course of a civil war, they could eventually pose as significant a threat to Saudi Arabia as they do now to Iraq’s Shi’ite population.

The Saudis are surely not alone in their concerns about the implications of the emerging struggle inside Iraq and the likelihood of a major, post-American withdrawal civil war. Jordan also would come under intense pressure to aid the Sunni Arab cause in Iraq under such circumstances. The king had his lines out to figures close to the insurgency as early as 2004 (primarily to see if they could be persuaded to peacefully join the mainstream Iraqi political process), and Jordan’s top military brass has close ties to Iraq’s former Sunni Arab military elite, some of whom already play major roles in the insurgency.

Consequently, despite occasional tensions between the two monarchies, outside assistance to Iraq’s Sunni Arabs could become, to some extent, a Saudi-Jordanian affair. The Jordanians would be of considerable use to Riyadh in the movement of munitions into western Iraq and in helping to steer Saudi financial aid into the hands of less irresponsible and more familiar elements associated with the former Iraqi military.

Egypt, the Arab world’s most important producer of military hardware and ammunition, also could become a significant player. Although more distant, Cairo shares the concerns of Amman and Riyadh with respect to the expansion of Shiite and Iranian power in the region. In addition, Egypt’s military industrial complex is always on the prowl for lucrative contracts. And Egyptian military industry can produce basic Soviet-era weaponry, with which Iraqis are most familiar.

A major canard heard frequently with respect to a struggle among Iraq’s Kurds, Shi’ite and Sunni Arabs is that the Sunnis would be unable to hold their own militarily because they have no oil. As noted here, it is quite possible that the Sunni Arabs would get just what they need to pose a formidable challenge regardless.

Iraq’s Sunni Arab community also contains the bulk of Iraq’s pre-war officer corps, as well as tens of thousands of former soldiers from elite formations of the old army such as Special Forces units and the Republican Guard. To the extent they could be provided with the hardware and munitions needed to confront Iraq’s Shi’ites and Kurds, these former military cadres would likely perform with great skill and tenacity.

Additionally, in a struggle of considerable magnitude, Shi’ite and Kurdish oil exports would come under attack by Sunni Arab saboteurs in any case. In fact, Iraq’s oil infrastructure already has suffered considerably as a result of repeated attacks on pipelines and other facilities by Sunni Arab insurgents.

Ironically, robust outside assistance to Iraq’s Sunni Arabs probably would, in turn, compel Iraq’s Shi’ites to turn increasingly to Tehran for similar assistance. Consequently, the very tendency most feared by Iraq’s Sunni Arab neighbors would likely be reinforced by their intervention.

There would, of course, be vigorous efforts, especially on the part of the United States, United Kingdom and United Nations, to pressure outside parties like the Saudis to refrain from contributing to such a bloody showdown in Iraq. The Saudis and other nearby Sunni Arab governments, however, could prove highly resistant to such entreaties.

If the United States were to lead a withdrawal of coalition forces from a destabilized Iraq, leaving Iraq’s minority Sunni Arabs particularly exposed, some Sunni Arab states would probably feel that Washington had abrogated its responsibilities concerning Iraq and left them little choice but to take measures to defend their own perceived interests accordingly.

Iraqi Democracy: A Work in Progress

David Mack — Mon, 24 Oct 2005 12:00:00 -0400

As expected, the Iraqi constitution appears to have been approved. A majority of Iraqis showed themselves to be both courageous and optimistic about the political process. The ruling coalition and the Bush Administration are calling it a major victory for democracy. As President Bush may repeat any minute now, “freedom is on the march” in Iraq.

But the referendum approving a constitution does not end the bloodshed nor give a green light for a speedy US withdrawal.

What’s the point of having a written constitution? The process of developing a constitution can provide a means for hammering out a consensus among disparate groups. A negotiated struggle for power can avoid a bloody battle for power. But meaningful negotiations leading to a consensus that will survive in Iraq’s shattered political life are likely to be prolonged and bitter. And the democracy that emerges may bear little resemblance to the American model.

So why are we pressing so hard for speedy results? Let us not forget the time it took the 13 newly independent colonies of our own country to iron out their differences. It took nine years after we declared our independence in 1776 to come up with a constitution that enabled us to begin an orderly federal union. We also deferred lots of problems (slavery and women’s rights to name just two). It took another 80 years and one of the world’s bloodiest civil wars to come to a conclusion about the balance of powers between the central government and the individual states.

It takes real arrogance for Americans now to lecture Iraqis on how to do a terribly difficult job in a tolerable manner. We pressure Iraqis to meet a timetable that enables us to declare another victorious milestone. There is a poisonous perception among many Iraqis that the US government’s views about their constitution and the timetable are dictated by US domestic policies. The perception may be only partly true, but it counts in a big way. It goes along with the notion also dear to the rhetoric of President Bush and other US leaders that fighting terrorism in Iraq means we don’t have to fight it here in the US. This sounds good in Peoria but it strikes a sour note in Baghdad.

We also cannot ignore that a large part of the Sunni Arab minority that did cast a ballot have voted against the referendum. Others failed to vote under conditions that were both life threatening and, in their view, did not offer a real chance for their vote to be meaningful. Sunni Arabs feel disenfranchised, cut out of the system. The probability of more insurgent violence is evident.

We also must remember that beyond elections and constitutions, what Iraqis are clamoring for most are basic services and security, which the neither the US nor the Iraqi government have delivered.

The new Iraqi government needs help to reconstruct the economy, generate employment, deliver basic services and put Iraqi oil production on a sound basis for gradual, steady growth. During the first year of the occupation, the US used Iraqi funds for major infrastructure projects, usually awarding contracts to American firms and creating few Iraqi jobs. Now we are moving some $18 billion into the aid pipeline. We need to do better. Regrettably, the lack of basic security and a culture of corruption on the part of some Iraqi officials and some American contractors, diminishes what could be a demonstration of US generosity and concern for the basic needs of the Iraqi people.

It is time for the US to embrace a few modest but achievable expectations for Iraq. Two dangers face us if we walk away without that.

First, Iraq may become a failed state, plunged into civil war, offering safe havens to international terrorists and a vast pool of embittered, desperate recruits from among the Iraqi population. Think of Afghanistan following the withdrawal of Soviet forces. But Iraq’s strategic location and its superior resources, educated population, and knowledge of advanced weaponry make it vastly more dangerous.

Second, a dominant, conservative Shia government in Iraq could fall under the overbearing influence of neighboring Iran, a country hostile to US interests. Iraqis, including the majority Shia population, tend to be highly nationalistic. With a modicum of stability and prosperity they would strongly resist Iranian hegemony. But faced with a committed and incessant insurgency, the potential secession of Kurdistan and an abrupt withdrawal of US forces, the demands of survival would greatly increase the influence of Tehran.

There are no silver bullets or failsafe parachutes. We only mislead Iraqis and ourselves by placing too much weight on timetables and milestones. Democracy is a much bigger challenge than a referendum. The political leaders in the Bush Administration may be slowly learning this reality.

Why Is Federalism Rare in the Middle East?

Michael C. Dunn — Fri, 12 Aug 2005 12:00:00 -0400

The completion of an Iraqi constitution has been delayed in large part because of a debate over whether the state should be a federal one, as the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) had defined it, or a unitary one. Kurdistan has enjoyed autonomy since 1991 and remains insistent on a federal system. But, many Sunni Arabs fear that too much federalism would undermine the unity of the state and exclude them from sharing the oil revenues from the fields located in Shi‘ite and Kurdish regions.

The quarrel over federalism is larger than just Iraq. The Middle East is a mosaic of minorities and ethnicities. Many minorities are small or geographically dispersed, such as the Christian populations of the Arab world, or the groups of ethnic Circassians found in the Levant. But many others are significant communities with geographical cohesion -- the Berbers in North Africa, the Kurds in the Middle East and the non-Arab populations of southern Sudan.

The presence of substantial ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities in many countries has long been a problem. A federal system granting a reasonable amount of regional autonomy would seem the natural solution. And yet, only a handful of federal experiments have succeeded.

The United Arab Emirates, in fact, is the one truly federal experiment in the Arab world that has worked over a reasonable period of time. It is something of a special case. Of the seven emirates, only Abu Dhabi and Dubai might be able to make it on their own as independent states. The others are too small and in many cases too poor, but in a loose confederation with Abu Dhabi and Dubai they have become part of one of the world’s most prosperous states.

Sudan now is experimenting with a new federal system. Sudan's earlier attempt at federalism, from 1972-1983, collapsed after the central government essentially reneged on the deal. Sudan’s new federal arrangements are still untested. The fierce rioting that followed the recent death in a helicopter crash of Southern President (and national First Vice President) John Garang is not encouraging. Besides, the peace plan gives the south the right to secede entirely in six years if the federal system does not work. The Sudanese experiment is a daring one but it is far too early to proclaim it a success.

Other attempts at federal systems have usually been linked to the chimeric efforts at Arab unity in the 1960s and 1970s. To give one example, Egyptian domination of the Syrians was so thorough under the United Arab Republic (1958-1961) that it led to the union’s break-up.

Why have federal systems mostly failed in the Middle East? The answer may be found in the tradition of centralized authority and, perhaps to a lesser extent, in past Arab nationalist ideologies.

Centralized authority has been the rule. Traditional governance in the Middle East has long centered on the major cities. When local regions did enjoy a certain autonomy, it was usually because of the inability of the central government to enforce its rules. In some of the region’s more mountainous terrain, autonomy was often the result of natural defenses that aided local resistance.

In much of the Arab world, the tradition has been reinforced in more modern times by autocratic regimes and systems under which provincial governors are appointed by the capital, not by local authorities. Autocrats worldwide tend to favor centralized authority over local autonomy. Consider the refusal of Spain under Francisco Franco to even acknowledge the linguistic rights of Catalans, Basques or Galicians, all of whom today enjoy regional autonomy. Consider too the fact that all of China, despite its size, has only one time zone: Beijing’s.

Federalism also has to confront the role of Arab nationalism and identification with a perceived al-watan al-‘arabi or Arab nation. Arab nationalism in its various forms — Nasserism, Ba‘athism, and other variants — emphasized ‘uruba, Arabism, as a national identity transcending the individual Arab nation-states. But, by emphasizing Arab identity, it left the substantial non-Arabic-speaking populations — Kurds, Berbers, southern Sudanese, and others — out of the national fabric of identity.

Ironically, the passing of the vogue of Arab nationalism may have eased some of the problems of dealing with non-Arab identities but the rise of political Islam has created similar problems of handling non-Muslim minorities in a Muslim state. Christians, Jews, Mandaeans, Zoroastrians, Yazidis and other religious minorities find themselves in an awkward position in countries that identify the state with Islam.

In Iraq today, some sort of federal solution seems inevitable, since the Kurds will obviously not settle for anything that reduces the autonomy they already enjoy. But, the provision in the Transitional Administrative Law that would allow similar autonomous regions elsewhere might not make it into the new constitution.

Iraq’s Sunni Arabs, who were the primary support group for the former nationalist Ba‘ath rule, are the least comfortable with a federal system that gives more authority to Kurds and Shi‘ite Arabs. But they are not alone in opposing it. Many Shi‘ites also worry about any arrangement that would weaken Iraq’s national identity or seem to encourage separatism.

Iraq: What Now?

David L. Mack — Thu, 3 Feb 2005 12:00:00 -0500

Americans of good will who care about both the Iraqi people and U.S. national interests should celebrate the fact that the elections took place under difficult circumstances. Iraqi candidates, election officials and voters showed determination and, in many cases, breathtaking courage. The Iraqi police and others charged with the heavy security burden served with distinction.

But my sense of realism and experience with Iraq’s troubled history tell me to reserve judgment about the election results. Even at this early stage, it appears that those elected to the National Assembly are heavily weighted in favor of religiously guided Shi'ites and Kurds. Both groups suffered greatly under the Saddam regime, and both are strongly motivated to assure that there is no return to his style of rule. However, both groups are probably represented out of proportion to their share of the population.

The elections to the National Assembly proceeded under circumstances open to challenge on various grounds, but they were preferable to continuing with an appointed interim government. The victors may demand the spoils and usher in new forms of tyranny. Or, they may choose to reach out to other elements in the population -- secular Shi'ites, Sunni Arabs and Turkmen. The potential is there for national reconciliation. Will they follow a course of statesmanship?

We shall see.

It is possible to craft some measures to assure more equitable Sunni and secular Shi’ite representation in institutions resulting from the election. A three person presidential council must be elected by the National Assembly to represent Iraqi sovereignty and to name a prime minister. The next steps would be selecting a new cabinet to replace the Iraqi Interim Government and a committee to draft a permanent constitution. Members of those bodies can be drawn from qualified persons who did not go through the electoral process. Fortunately, there are still moderate and pragmatic Iraqis who seem willing to make the necessary compromises. For the Sunni Arabs especially, but for other Iraqis as well, this requires great courage.

In the short term, at least, the Iraqi people will judge the success of the elections by indicators that have little to do with the rhetoric of democracy. Will the resulting government be better able than Iyad Allawi’s government to expedite training of the Iraqi police, National Guard and army and to provide more hours of electricity, more jobs and clean water?

We shall see.

In short, elections are only a starting point for rebuilding the Iraqi state and keeping the Iraqi nation intact.

In another time and another part of the world, the U.S. government hailed the results of another election in a country in the midst of turmoil.

On September 3, 1967, the New York Times reported that “U.S. officials were surprised and heartened at the size of the turnout in South Vietnam’s presidential election despite a Vietcong terrorist campaign to disrupt the voting. According to reports from Saigon, 83 percent of 5.85 million registered voters cast their ballots yesterday. Many of them risked reprisals threatened by the Vietcong.”

The New York Times concluded, “[T]he size of the popular vote and the inability of the Vietcong to destroy the election machinery were the two salient facts in a preliminary assessment of the nation's election based on the incomplete returns…”

The burden in Iraq is also heavy for the U.S. and other foreign military forces, diplomatic establishments, and workers in the reconstruction effort. They are supporting a political process that marks an uncertain start on the road to greater political legitimacy and stability. At worst, Iraq’s elections could bring a new tyranny to power and greatly complicate U.S. efforts to fight terror in Iraq and elsewhere. We only mislead Iraqis and ourselves by placing too much weight on individual events.

We must hope that this time, the Iraqi people with our help will do much better than the people of Vietnam.