Human Rights

Deciding the Fate of the Mujahadin

Trita Parsi — Mon, 6 Oct 2008 15:30:48 -0400

The Bush administration inherited many of Iraq's problems when it invaded that country, including an Iranian terrorist organization funded and armed by Saddam Hussein the Mujahedin-e-Kalq (MKO). Though in the midst of a war on terror, the Bush administration chose in 2003 to protect 3,000 of the organization's militants and house them in a camp given to the group by Saddam — Camp Ashraf just north of Baghdad.

Ever since, the faith of this State Department-listed terrorist organization has been unclear. Hated by Iraqis for its involvement in Saddam's crimes against the Iraqi people, the Baghdad government wants to expel the group. But no country is willing to take them.

Though the Iranian government wants to put the group's leadership on trial in Iran, it seems less interested in the organization's rank and file. The European governments have little interest in taking in 3,000 battle-hardened Muslim militants, fearing that they will use Europe as a base to plan and execute further terrorist attacks.

The U.S., on the other hand, has already contradicted its own principles by giving preferential treatment to an organization on the State Department's terrorist list — even though President Bush himself pointed to the organization's patronage under Saddam Hussein as evidence of Iraq's support for international terrorists in his speech to the United Nations in September 2002.

"Iraq continues to shelter and support terrorist organizations that direct violence against Iran," President Bush said. To complicate matters further, if reports that the U.S. has used MKO terrorists for cross-border raids into Iran are true, then Washington certainly doesn't want these militants to end up in Iranian hands.

Washington seems doomed if it does, doomed if it doesn't.
Members of the terrorist organization have protested outside the White House this past week, angered by the Bush administration's decision to hand over Camp Ashraf to the Iraqi government. The government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki will surrender the MKO members to Tehran, they argue, who in turn will imprison and execute them.

Though approximately 500 MKO fighters have been repatriated to Iran and no reports of abuse have emerged according to the International Committee of the Red Cross, which oversaw their return, sending rank-and-file Mujahedin members to Iran against their will would be irresponsible.

Hated by the Iranian people for having fought on Saddam's side in the Iraq-Iran war, the Iranian Mujahedin is understandably fearful of the fate awaiting them in Iran. After all, the Iranian government systematically violates the human rights of journalists and union leaders alike, let alone anti-Iranian terrorists.
Yet, contrary to the protesters outside the White House, the issue is not a choice between freedom in Camp Ashraf and captivity in Iran.

The Mujahedin is not an effective opposition to the unpopular government in Iran as the organization's defenders in Washington claim, but a politico-religious cult that brainwashes its members, places children of Mujahedin members with other families in order to prevent parents from defecting, and who according to Human Rights Watch, maintains control by torturing its rank and file. "Members who try to leave the Mujahedin pay a very heavy price," according to Joe Stork of Human Rights Watch.

Its involvement in terrorism is undisputed. It assassinated several Americans in Iran in the 1970s. It supported the taking of the U.S. Embassy in Iran and blasted Ayatollah Khomeini for releasing the American diplomats in 1981, arguing instead that the hostages should have been executed. It made a pact with Saddam Hussein in the 1980s and fought alongside his army against their Iranian countrymen. Later in the 1990s, they became Saddam's most trusted henchmen, tasked with quelling Kurdish and Shiite uprisings against the Iraqi dictator.

According to defectors, Mujahedin members in Camp Ashraf celebrated the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

In 2004, French authorities descended upon the Mujahedin headquarters in France, arresting the leader of the cult, Maryam Rajavi. Immediately, zealous Mujahedin members staged hunger strikes and several set themselves ablaze. Hardly the behavior of a democratically oriented opposition group.

But the vast majority of the Camp Ashraf residents are not so much members of a terrorist cult as they are victims of it. The camp is itself a prison. It may have provided Mujahedin militants with protection against ordinary Iraqis who sought to avenge their relatives killed by the Mujahedin at the behest of Saddam Hussein, but the prison has primarily enabled the leaders of the terrorist organization to prevent the rank and file from defecting.

Rather than debating where to expel the Mujahedin terrorists, help should be provided to the rank and file to break with the cult and make free choices about their future. It's the only humanitarian solution to this dilemma - and one that defeats rather than protects this anti-American terrorist group.

Israel Reaching Towards the Wrong Address

Paul Scham — Thu, 13 Jul 2006 12:00:00 -0400

The news from Gaza and the Lebanese-Israeli border is bad and getting worse.

Unfortunately, Israel’s response follows in the footsteps of the American response to 9/11, that is, purporting to “hold responsible” parties who cannot really control the situation.

According to reports at the time (later confirmed in a July 12 article in The New York Times by Michael Slackman and Souad Mekhennet), Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit’s kidnappers were not connected with the Hamas government of the Palestinian Authority, and likely not even with the “outside leadership” of Khalid Meshal in Damascus. Despite this, Israel has repeatedly announced that it is holding Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh responsible for Shalit’s welfare, and has launched punishing air and ground strikes— many of which succeeded in killing only civilians. At this point, there is little reason to believe that either the mainstream Hamas leadership or the Palestinian Authority President has any real control over Shalit’s fate.

On the contrary, those who are holding Shalit have no interest in a peaceful resolution. They are playing the role that Hamas did until a few years ago, basing their strategy on the assumption that the more violence, the better for them. This is the jihadist, al-Qaeda worldview and indeed the Times article indicates that Arab intelligence services see Shalit’s kidnappers as ideologically embracing this strategy. These groups actively welcome Israeli attacks in the belief that they serve to radicalize the population and to delegitimize the Palestinian Authority.

In the last few days the Lebanese border has also exploded in violence and even there the Israeli response has been equally misguided. Israel, like any sovereign state, cannot tolerate attacks on its territory, but it must recognize that the Lebanese government is not sovereign in various respects—especially with regard to Hizbollah, which is conducting the attacks and is generally considered a proxy for Iran.

If anything, Iranian influence in Lebanon has grown since the formal withdrawal of Syrian forces last year. In the maze of Lebanese politics, some members of the government support Hizbollah, while others oppose it, but it is clear that the Lebanese government is not in a position to suppress Hizbollah’s operations. Attacks on Lebanese cities will not prevent future attacks. On the contrary, with further attacks which kill civilians, Israel will fall into the jihadist trap, in which it is already enmeshed in Gaza.

Israel was apparently willing to agree to the phased withdrawal plan arranged by Egyptian President Mubarak (Mubarak blamed unspecified “pressures” on Hamas for the failure of the prisoner exchange). It would have been in the interest of both Israel and the Palestinian leadership to end the violence as quickly as possible. Israel must recognize that if it does not deal one way or another with the de facto and de jure Palestinian leadership—namely Hamas—it will be strengthening the jihadist forces which are not the same as Hamas, but rather much worse for Israel and for the West. All Islamists are not the same, an inconvenient fact that both Israel and the United States must, in the current climate, learn to deal with. Israel does not have to deal with Hamas face-to-face, but there are ample precedents for using third party intermediaries, such as the Turks or Egyptians.

Israel’s strategy of retaliation dates back to the 1950’s when it was largely conducted by a young officer named Ariel Sharon. Its efficacy has consistently been questioned, but its central assumption rested on the belief that it was in the interest of neighboring governments, whether Jordanian, Egyptian, or Lebanese, to quell terrorist groups in order to prevent disproportionate attacks by Israel. The assumption falls apart when, as in the current case in Gaza and Lebanon, the neighboring government is not in control of significant armed forces operating from its territory.

Israel’s leaders must take a hard look at the current reality and recognize that its own interests, and the interests of the Hamas government in Gaza and of the Lebanese government in Beirut, lie in ending the current violence as quickly as possible. All have strong interests in preventing the emergence and strengthening of jihadist groups, whose strategy is primarily to exacerbate conflict. It is important to note that most Arab governments, especially those of Egypt and Jordan, share this desire to quell the violence as expeditiously as possible.

This means that Israel has to accept mediation, or even covert direct contacts, with the Hamas government based on their immediate shared interest in ending the current crisis. It also has to work with foreign governments to come to an agreement which will return the captured and end the attacks on its territory. Bombing Beirut will not accomplish these goals. Recognition of current realities offers the best chance for the return of the captives and defusing the crisis.

A Plan For Victory

Edward Walker — Tue, 13 Dec 2005 12:00:00 -0500

We should welcome the fact that the Bush Administration has now come up with a relatively comprehensive and somewhat detailed plan for victory in Iraq. For the future, I would only hope that this administration or any of its successors would develop such a strategy before invading another country. The fact that it has taken three years to inform the American people of our goals and strategy in Iraq is at best a dereliction of duty.

One can quibble with some of the language of a strategy document. Using a loaded word, “rejectionist,” to describe the majority of our opponents in Iraq raises all the red flags in the Middle East of those Palestinians who reject peace with Israel. Is this what we are fighting about? And why did the White House invoke the “8 pillars” of victory when every devout Muslim will be reminded of the “5 pillars” of Islam and will question the implied, albeit possibly unintentional, linkage? While these points may sound like nit picking, part of the reason we are in the mess we are in today is because we did not understand the culture we were engaging or listen to those in the region who may have had a better fix for their next door neighbor than the gurus of our neo-conservative movement.

I also wonder how we can complain, in the President’s strategic pillar number eight, about the successes in Iraq being “overshadowed in the international media, including popular pan-Arab outlets” and then point to the “new independent media outlets” in Iraq being “testament to the vitality of a free press,” when the Los Angeles Times, New York Times, and Washington Post are all reporting that our military is buying articles and Iraqi journalists. What outrageous chutzpah.

What worries me most about the national strategy is what it doesn’t say and what it may imply. We have created a strategy for Iraq and the Iraqi people, but I cannot find in the document the National Security Council released any indication of Iraqis who embrace it or helped develop it. Does the Shiite leader Ali Sistani endorse the President’s concept of “Victory in Iraq?” How about the Kurdish leader Barzani? The strategy calls for international cooperation. Has the President secured the agreement of the international community for this strategy and this definition of victory? The neighboring states are a key component in the strategy for securing Iraq. Did the President discuss his concept of victory with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia? And how are we to deal with Iran when we won’t even talk to the Iranian leadership? The Syrians are currently drumming up a nationalistic fervor among their people to stand up to the United States and the UN. Does this mean that we have to widen the war, a la Cambodia, to secure the Syrian-Iraqi border?

The President’s definition of victory has the ringing vocabulary of a good speechwriter, but I find myself lost when it comes to the details. The strategy defines our objective as “federalism” and declares that it is not a precursor to the breakup of Iraq. The “strong central government” exercising the powers of a sovereign state is all well and good, but what are those powers and who is going to exercise them? The strategy is quiet on that. At the same time, it says “regional bodies” will make the decisions that protect the interests of local populations. Well, it is in the interest of the Kurdish and Shiite “local populations” that they control the oil and gas wealth of the country with crumbs left for the Sunnis. Despite our talk of preserving a unified Iraq, it would seem that the structure we are building incorporates a lot of centripetal force when it comes to the hard realities of religious and economic interests.

The strategy also talks about building an officer corps that will be loyal to the Iraqi government, not a particular group or tribe. But NATO is only now setting up the new military staff college that is supposed to help integrate these forces. What have we been doing for the past three years? Furthermore, according to the strategy, we have recruited nearly 5,000 Sunnis for the military who are “planning to return to their home province and help protect it from terrorists.” That sounds like building a force that is loyal to its local community and religious sect, not a remote central government. I don’t see any plan for getting rid of the local militias that are so important to the Kurds and some Shiite factions.

I welcome the NSC effort. But I want more. I want to know that we are providing the model for rule by law and that our Vice President and the head of the CIA are not advocating interrogation tactics that will be used by the fledgling Iraqi government as an excuse for far harsher tactics. Our press is already reporting that Iraqi government officials want to take off the kid gloves. I want to know that we stand for freedom of the press and that we don’t have to buy it. I want to know that the President does not believe, as the British press alleged, that we could bomb Al Jazeera into submission just because it reports things we don’t like. And I want to know that when the President talks about debate, he means genuine debate and not the disparagement of opponents like Congressman John Murtha.

Western Sahara: The Conflict Lingers

Jacques Roussellier — Fri, 26 Aug 2005 12:00:00 -0400

Self-congratulatory statements could be heard reverberating from Washington after the release of 404 Moroccan prisoners-of-war held by the Algerian-backed Polisario separatist rebels fighting for the independence of the Western Sahara region. The release is a fitting tribute to the tenacious, yet discreet, bipartisan American diplomacy that spanned the Clinton and Bush administrations. Still, the release does not fundamentally shift the political dynamics of one of Africa’s longest conflicts.

More than 2,100 Polisario-held POWs, captured between 1978 and 1991, were counted in 1995. Their piecemeal release started in 1996 and intensified after 1999. It was part of efforts to find a political solution to the Western Sahara dispute that for 30 years has pitted pro-annexation Morocco against pro-independence Algeria. The newest prisoners have been detained for fifteen years, others for more than 20 years.

The POW release was followed by calls to seize the opportunity to restart negotiations. But, it is hard to see how a new climate of confidence can overcome past failures, particularly the failed UN-brokered efforts at holding a referendum on self-determination between 1991 and 2000 and the current deadlock over a five-year autonomy plan.

Morocco’s reaction did not augur well for future talks. Rabat still holds Algiers accountable for a breach of international humanitarian law on its territory and denies that the POW's release was the Polisario’s gesture of good will. Instead, it has lavished praise on the US for bringing about the release and hailed the positive impact of international pressure

There is concern that a political vacuum in the strategic south-western Algeria, northern Mauritania and Western Sahara triangle could play into the hands of terrorist groups operating in the Sahara's vast expanses. New US counter-terrorism efforts, such as the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative that prepares training military units in Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger for security cooperation and support for democratic governance, have revived interest in securing a lasting solution for Western Sahara. The recent coup d’état in Mauritania and attacks by a terrorist group based in Algeria’s Saharan desert only underscore the overall fragility of US counter-terrorism engagement in the Sahara and the endless deadlock in peace negotiations on the Western Sahara conflict.

Sadly, the POW issue is not the only remaining obstacle to improving relations between Morocco and Algeria. Disagreement over the Western Sahara is only the symptom of a deeper rivalry between two competing national identities and developmental approaches. Above all, the search for a political solution should consider that both sides perceive a settlement as a draw, in terms of national security and regional ambitions.

In the age of globalization, free trade and regional integration, there is little room or understanding for an old-fashioned territorial dispute over a piece of the Sahara desert that does not boast any really significant natural resources. Successful negotiations that pave the way for a lasting solution to the Western Sahara dispute will stand as a powerful signal of a much-needed rapprochement between Rabat and Algiers. They also would boost US-backed counter-terrorism efforts, which would be weakened without regional integration of programs in North Africa and the Sahel.

Morocco and Algeria stand to gain from successful counter-terrorism exercises in the region as long as signals from Washington are not misconstrued as meaning progress on the Western Sahara dispute can take a back seat to bilateral cooperation on counter-terrorism with the US. There is a historical opportunity now to link the two issues in a long-term approach that will require simultaneously seeking a peaceful solution in Western Sahara and pursuing counter-terrorism initiatives in the Sahara desert as a whole.

The release of the Moroccan POWs is about the only progress that has been made recently toward a negotiated solution on Western Sahara. Rabat and Algiers have been playing a tiresome game of predictable statements, political liturgies and empty words that barely serve their own domestic political agenda at the expense of a mature and farsighted search for cooperative approaches.

As long as the United States and the Europeans turn a blind eye to Moroccan and Algerian prevarications in Western Sahara and allow the opportunity for peace to pass by, nations gathering for the 60th anniversary of the United Nations next month will continue to face the unresolved dilemma of Africa’s last colony.

The Darfur Tragedy

Mohamed I. Khalil, Scholar-in-Residence — Wed, 22 Sep 2004 12:00:00 -0400

Media concern about the human tragedy in Darfur has evoked more confrontational, punitive writing than constructive suggestions aimed at bringing the human suffering, loss of life, and displacement to a speedy end. Sanctions, stigmatizing the Sudanese Government as genocidal, dispatching military forces, and regime change have all been suggested. Some of these measures would be ineffective; others would require diplomatic and logistical action that would require more time than should be tolerated for the continuation of a human tragedy of such gigantic proportions.

Congress declared that the events occurring in the vast region of Western Sudan constitute genocide. When the Secretary of State followed suit on September 9, several current members of the United Nations Security Council, including France, Germany, China, and Pakistan, hastened to say that this would only complicate matters. The government may well be, deliberately or unwittingly, implicated in genocide. However, short of swift, massive military intervention, the government's cooperation, or at least acquiescence, in any immediate or future action is indispensable. Without the active and generous cooperation of the international community, a speedy solution is unlikely. The international community will have to reach an objective consensus on the nature of the crimes and violations of humanitarian law and track down offenders in order to bring them to justice. At the present juncture, however, more attention should be given to the provision of security and desperately needed humanitarian relief for victims. The unilateral judgment passed by the US government may well delay securing cooperation to achieve this end.

The three primary causes of the current conflict in Darfur are the drought of the 1980s, the disruption of the tribal administrative system, and the use of militias as an instrument of war by proxy. The drought decreased the amount of life-sustaining land and also increased the number and gravity of disputes among the mostly Arab herders and African cultivators. Meanwhile, the current government altered local administrations by replacing the legislative, judicial, and tax-collecting powers of traditional tribal chiefs with emirs, or governors, usually chosen for their faithfulness to the regime. The traditional tribal councils were far more successful in dealing with disputes and maintaining order throughout the region than the current, local administrations. Lastly, and most importantly, the government’s use of janjaweed militias in order to quickly and quietly stamp out rebellions led by the two main opposition groups, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), has resulted in massive human rights violations and a complete lack of security in the Darfur region.

In order to end the current crisis, short-term and long-term measures must be taken. The Sudanese government must disarm the janjaweed, fully cooperate with and facilitate the work of relief workers, contribute to the provision of relief aid, and withdraw its regular and irregular forces from the region. Moreover, the African Union’s (AU) mission must be expanded with US and EU logistical and financial support to include disarming the janjaweed, providing security around the camps, and ensuring the safe return of displaced persons. The international community must increase pressure on the Sudanese government and rebel parties to reach a political agreement based upon broad principles. In addition, the Sudanese government and opposition parties should participate in a national conference with international observers in order to understand the root causes of the Darfur crisis and avoid future catastrophes.

Gaza Withdrawal

Edward S. Walker, Jr. — Mon, 16 Aug 2004 12:00:00 -0400

The Administration wants to find a way to accommodate Prime Minister Sharon’s unilateral program of withdrawal from parts of Gaza and the West Bank and, at the same time, to hold fast to the Presidents concept of a two state solution for the Palestinian problem. The Administration does not want to be drawn into a confrontation or even a public dispute with Sharon in this election year. On the other hand, the Administration does not want to appear to be abandoning the Middle East Peace Process or the President’s own publicly declared positions for fear of giving Senator Kerry ammunition in the campaign.

The reality is that Prime Minister Sharon has long since managed the situation in such a way as to make declared US policies virtually irrelevant. Sharon has gradually imposed his own vision, which he has described as an extended interim arrangement of some fifteen years before it will be possible to deal with final status issues. This vision of a protracted interim period would seem to be incompatible with the agreements previously reached under Oslo and is only marginally compatible with the concepts outlined in the Road Map. Indeed, Sharon has exhibited a distinct lack of enthusiasm for the Road Map and outright opposition to the results of Oslo.

In this regard, Sharon has consistently undermined the reach and authority of the core Palestinian elements of Oslo; the Palestinian Authority, its security services, and its national leadership. He has established the principle that Israel has the right at any time or place to intervene militarily in the West Bank and Gaza. Even the Europeans have given up protesting Israeli interventions, attacks, and assassinations, while the White House long since stopped protesting such actions. As a result, the Palestinian Authority exists more in name than in practice. It is increasingly fragmented into localized remnants of governance and security.

Meanwhile, Sharon seems to be in the process of isolating the Palestinians from the outside world and from each other. While it is still too early to see exactly where Israel is headed with regard to the Palestinians, what seems to be taking shape is a situation in which Israel will be able to deal with relatively disparate, weak local leaders in a number of non contiguous parcels of the West Bank which are linked by an easily controlled road network. At this point, I do not see any plans to give Palestinians the independent access to the outside world through air, sea and land routes as contemplated in the Oslo process. Gaza would be sealed on all sides by Israel or Israeli forces. The West Bank would be removed from access to Jordan. And it is not even clear that there would be free movement possible between Gaza and the West Bank – as also contemplated in Oslo.

Clearly, the wall is a key element in Sharon’s plan. And while it may have a legitimate security rationale - the fencing of Gaza has worked - it could only be effective if it actually fully encloses the Palestinian population. Just as the world has become accustomed to Israeli military intervention at will in the West Bank and Gaza, it is now also becoming used to the idea of the wall.

Sharon’s idea of eliminating some settlements in Gaza and the West Bank is hardly the “breakthrough.” Sharon has never supported the isolated island settlements in the center of Gaza or the West Bank. They complicate the security situation for the Israeli Defense Forces and are continuing points of vulnerability. By putting the bulk of the Palestinian population behind barbed wire and Israelis on the other side, security for the average Israeli will in theory be enhanced.

By all accounts, the Administration seems to be willing to buy into these plans with a few cosmetic changes. Putting this problem in the pending file for the next decade may seem attractive to some. And so the Administration may be willing to make a trade with Sharon. They will acquiesce in the growth of settlements he intends to keep and incorporate in expanded Israeli borders in return for the elimination of outposts, illegal even under Israeli law, in the West Bank and some of the more troublesome isolated settlements in Gaza and the West Bank. Certainly the idea of eliminating some settlements is attractive, but we should be cautious about assuming that such a move would either create a precedent or lead to further concessions on either side.

What is very clear about the direction that things seem to be going is that taken to its likely conclusion, there could be no viable economic or political basis for building an independent state. The territory that the world thought was open for discussion only a few years ago will be far more limited under the extended transitional period than the proposals discussed at Camp David under President Clinton. We were talking about a Palestinian state on some 90 plus percent of the West Bank. Now what we seem to be talking about is localized and fragmented Palestinian home rule for an extended period on some 40 plus percent of the land.

Much as many people would like to believe differently, the Oslo process seems already to be dead, the December 2000 Clinton parameters that so many believe is the inevitable solution is on life support, the roadmap is road kill, and the two state solution is a disappearing dream, at least for the foreseeable future. Given the chaos that is rapidly developing in the West Bank and Gaza, the disinterest of the Administration, growing apathy in the Arab world, and the lack of courageous leadership among the Palestinians, perhaps Sharon is right and the only thing we can hope for is some kind of extended transition where Palestinians are walled off. It is hard to believe, however, that such a solution will stop terrorism. In fact, it is more likely that people without hope of freedom and national expression will only be more inclined to join as recruits for terror attacks. And while a wall may offer temporary respite, walls have proven in the past to be notoriously vulnerable. Even if they work in Israel, we still have the problem of Palestinian and Muslim frustration reinforcing the ranks of international terrorism. And while Israelis might have a safer life at home for a temporary respite, we all would face an even greater threat abroad. So it is worth thinking long and hard about the direction we are taking with our friends in Israel.

American Values

Edward S. Walker, Jr. — Mon, 16 Aug 2004 12:00:00 -0400

America has been a beacon for people of the Middle East because of what we stand for. The greatest test for our policy is that it exemplifies the behavior we expect of others. But we are in danger of failing that test. As an Ambassador, on instructions from our government, I repeatedly lectured the leaders of Arab governments about their practices of indefinite detention of prisoners without trial, torturing prisoners during interrogation, denying prisoners legal council, maintaining secret military courts and trials, stifling dissent, and compromising freedom of the press.

Now, people in the region believe the United States is embracing many of these same policies. In their eyes this justifies the behavior of states in the region that engage in such practices. One Arab friend told me: “We wanted to follow your example, not to have you follow ours!”

We don’t see ourselves this way, but how do we explain to the Arab world the practices at Guantanamo, or in our immigration system – indefinite detention without trial, detention without the right to counsel, military courts, etc? How do we advocate a free press in the region while we are taking steps to pressure Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya into censoring their reporting from Iraq? How do we explain the graphic pictures of Iraqi prisoners being humiliated and the allegations of abuse in Justice Department detention centers?

We can say that the abuses are limited to a few individuals. We must hope that is correct, although senior military officers and political figures also must be held accountable for inadequate training and supervision. Moreover, abuses are taking place in an environment in which civil liberties are being curtailed in the United States itself. Some consider it acceptable behavior to demean Arabs and Muslims or to limit their freedoms in the name of homeland security. The excesses of individuals are only possible in the absence of strong leadership. The President began well after September 11, but in the intervening period his record has become garbled. He is relying on the courts and investigations to provide our moral compass. And that absence of leadership has its impact on an environment that is permissive to the old Goldwater slogan: “Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice.” Is that what we stand for today? We are paying a price for this environment and it may come back to haunt us. When I worked for the US government in the region, I was instructed to speak to Arab leaders on issues such as these. Now, our image is being used to justify negative practices by others.

Thirty-eight years ago, then Sen. J.W. Fulbright wrote a passage which applies equally well now to the challenges we face in dealing with the Saudis and the broader Islamic world. He wrote of “two Americas.”

“One is generous and humane, the other narrowly egotistical; one is self-critical, the other self-righteous; one is sensible, the other is romantic; one is good-humored, the other solemn; one is inquiring, the other pontificating; one is moderate; the other filled with passionate intensity; one is judicious, the other arrogant in the use of great power….”

“There has been a tendency through the years for reason and moderation to prevail as long as things are going tolerably well or as long as our problems seem clear and finite and manageable. But when things have gone badly for any length of time, or when the reasons for adversity have seemed obscure, or simply when some event or leader of opinion has aroused the people to a state of high emotion, our puritan spirit has tended to break through, leading us to look at the world through the distorting prism of a harsh and angry moralism.”

The American example is critical to the hopes of many in the region that their countries can move toward democracy and fair treatment for all. If we appear to be hypocritical in our approach to civil liberties and our preaching of democracy to others, we will fail in the President’s efforts to change the region. I do not suggest for a minute that we should relax our security posture. But I wonder if what we are doing and the way we are doing it actually helps?

On the 4th of February this year, at the Library of Congress, President Bush shared his concept of a new Middle East where our system of values could prevail. He said: “We are the heirs of the tradition of liberty, defenders of the freedom, the conscience and the dignity of every person.” He added: “We seek the advance of democracy for the most practical of reasons: because democracies do not support terrorists or threaten the world with weapons of mass murder.”

If the perception grows in the region that we do not respect our own values, then we will sell out every moderate and reformer in the Arab World and we can kiss the hopes for democracy goodbye.

Observations on the Or Commission Report

Dr. Yitzhak Reiter — Wed, 10 Sep 2003 12:00:00 -0400

The Report of the Or Commission, the special government body appointed to investigate the killing by Israeli police of 13 Israeli Palestinian protesters in October 2000, will not change the relationship between the State of Israel and its Palestinian minority.

The commission concluded that the police had wrongfully fired at the protesters and recommended measures be taken against those policemen involved. Furthermore, the report highlighted the state's continued exclusionary policy toward its Palestinian citizens and their leadership. However, so many, more violent actions have transpired since October 2000 that the report is unlikely to have much impact on either the Israeli or the Palestinian public.

A few days before the commission submitted its report, the Israeli cabinet instituted a new policy to integrate Palestinians into Israeli society. This policy could have been a landmark in Israeli-Palestinian relations had it not been for the policy’s vague terminology and lack of benchmarks. The policy resembles the first Rabin Cabinet’s resolution after the Land Day protest of 1976 – from which nothing was implemented nor did anything materialize.

The riots of October 2000 in the Israeli Arab sector, which erupted in the wake of the violent Al-Aqsa Mosque clashes following Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount compound, underscore the extent of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Discriminated against and excluded from important public spheres, the one million Israeli-Arab citizens stress their Palestinian identity, express solidarity with the Palestinian struggle, and view terrorist actions against Israel as legitimate “resistance.”

Since the Al-Aqsa Intifada there have been a growing number of Israeli Arabs involved in terrorist actions toward the Israelis (68 between January and October 2002 compared to 2 in 1999 according to Haaretz on June 11, 2002). Threatened by demographics that favor the Arab citizens and by their political and intellectual elites who opt for changing Israel into a bi-national state, it should come as no surprise that many Israeli Jews view their Palestinian counterparts as “the enemy.” Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak contributed to this perception and even inflamed it when, after the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace talks, he further dampened an atmosphere of desperation by saying, “There is no partner for peace among the Palestinians.” During his three years, he neglected the Palestinian leadership and humiliated them – despite the fact that he received 97% of the Israeli-Arab vote.

Many scholars and analysts dwell only on the Israeli government’s policy of exclusion as the most important explanation for current mutual alienation, but the affect of the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict on internal relations is an additional, important factor. Today, this internal conflict may also be hampering the ability to achieve peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Palestinian leaders are attempting to redefine Israel from a “Jewish and democratic state” to a “state of its citizens” or even a bi-national state. They are also aiming to repatriate Palestinian refugees to their original villages and homes, which diminishes the Israeli public’s readiness for compromise with the Palestinians.

Algeria's Parliamentary Elections: Lessons for US Policy in the Arab World

Bradford Dillman — Tue, 11 Jun 2002 18:11:17 -0400

The results of Algeria’s May 30th parliamentary elections should be cause for concern in Washington. Not only do the elections provide an example of the dire state of Arab domestic politics, they also pose important challenges for American policy in the war on terrorism.

Violence and Boycotts Hamper Polling

Last week’s parliamentary elections took place in the context of violence and public apathy. The two main Berber opposition parties, the Front of Socialist Forces (FFS) and the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), along with a number of prominent opposition leaders, called for an election boycott. Berbers staged civil disobedience, intifada-style, which prevented almost all voting in the Kabylie region. Turnout at the polls nationally was only 47%, the lowest in Algeria’s history. Turnout in the capital, Algiers, was officially only 32%.

The elections took place after ten years of severe civil conflict that has left some 150,000 dead. A nascent democratization process, marked by the dramatic success of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in fair elections in 1990 and 1991, was halted by a 1992 coup. By 1998, the army had turned the tide militarily against violent Islamists, although the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) were far from being eradicated. Abdelaziz Bouteflika became president in 1999, following a controversial election in which all his opponents withdrew their candidacies. He instituted an amnesty program and took well-intentioned steps to reform the state. Yet in April 2001, a Berber uprising erupted over demands for cultural rights and accountability for human rights violations.

Interpreting the Results

In the final balloting last week, the National Liberation Front (FLN) emerged as the big winner, taking 199 seats in the 389-seat National Assembly. The party, which ruled Algeria for thirty years after 1962, has been rejuvenated by its leader, Prime Minister Ali Benflis. Two legal Islamist-oriented parties, the Movement for National Reform (MRN) and the Movement for a Society of Peace (MSP), earned 43 and 38 seats respectively. The biggest loser was the National Democratic Rally (RND), a nationalist party that received only 47 seats, compared to 156 in the 1997 elections.

With an absolute majority in the legislature, the FLN has an opportunity to push forward a number of reforms. Prime Minister Benflis has the will to bring a younger generation to the forefront of policy making. Yet the FLN, like President Bouteflika, faces enormous resistance from the military (the real powerholders) to real reform.

Economic Dysfunction and Social Dislocation

The economic and social problems facing the new parliament are daunting. From 1985 to 1995, the country had negative growth of per capita GDP. Despite some GDP growth and lower external debt since 1995, the cost to society of incomplete economic reform has been great. Unemployment is officially 30%, and at least 40% of the population lives on less than $2 a day.

Socially, the country has been torn apart. The violence of the last decade diminished after 1998, but is still endemic. At least 600 people have died in civil violence since the beginning of 2002. Rape, extortion, and murder still plague pockets of the country. The 1998 census revealed that the average number of people living in a single apartment is more than seven. One of the world’s worst housing crises, coupled with water shortages, has fueled social tensions. Educational spending as a percentage of GDP has fallen by half since the mid-1980s. Equally alarming, Algeria’s earlier gains in public health were lost in the 1990s due to declining per capita health expenditures.

Algeria’s Import for the US War on Terror

The election results that are the product of these troubling developments have relevance for the United States as it seeks to fight terrorism, promote reform, and insure the stability of friendly Arab regimes.

Algeria’s government is not threatening neighbors, harboring terrorists, or building weapons of mass destruction. But the country does suffer from many of the factors that have been identified as root causes of extremism: failed economic development, a poor educational system, and endemic corruption. Most importantly, it has one of the more repressive regimes in the Arab world, elections notwithstanding. In its 2001 human rights report on Algeria, the State Department characterized the human rights situation as “generally poor” and stated that, despite some recent improvements, security forces continued to commit serious human rights abuses.

The May 30th elections suggest the deep antipathy that many Algerians have for their leaders, and thus reveal some challenges for US policy towards the Arab world. While the United States has an interest in seeing that Algerian leaders defeat armed Islamists and cooperate in the war against terrorism, the failure of Algeria to make strides toward democracy is undermining the country’s long-term stability.

US security cooperation with the Algerian military, already in evidence since the late 1990s, has expanded since September 11th. Good economic relations were given a boost by President Bouteflika’s two visits to the White House in 2001. American oil companies have large investments in the oil and gas sector, and US companies are expanding investments in pharmaceuticals and telecommunications.

At the same time, the recent elections failed to resolve the question of how to rehabilitate the Islamic Salvation Front and establish a rule of law. The near-silence of US officials concerning the parliamentary elections, like the silence when Tunisia’s May 26th constitutional referendum was supposedly approved by 99.5% of voters, sends a clear message about American lack of resolve concerning political reform in authoritarian Arab regimes that are partners in the war against terrorism.

Conclusion

Algeria’s Berbers, mainstream Islamists, and civil society are desperate for political change, without which sustainable policies to address socio-economic problems are unlikely to emerge. American public diplomacy could make significant inroads in the “street” and amongst government reformers with a renewed emphasis on promoting democratization and civil rights. A new generation of Algerians – and Arabs as a whole – would likely find inspiration in an American policy that speaks more forcefully about one of the issues they care about most: making their government representative and accountable to the voters through fair elections. The short-term risks for the United States in such a policy may be high, but the long-term payoff for Algerians and American interests could be quite substantial.

Carnival of Justice: Military Commissions & Guantanamo Bay

Keith Petty — Fri, 23 May 2008 09:42:29 -0400

Every trip to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) brings with it a strange cocktail of emotions. The excitement of prosecuting before a historic military tribunal, the nervous energy when delivering an oral argument before the judge, and the dread of reading the inevitably negative headlines the following day are all part of the experience. But it seems that the commissions’ proceedings are merely a sideshow in this carnival-like atmosphere. As famously described by Binyam Mohammed at his arraignment in 2005, the second iteration of the military commissions were simply the “same circus, different clowns.”