Asian Middle East Policy

Dragon by the Tail: China's Energy Quandary

Dr. John Calabrese — Tue, 16 Mar 2004 12:00:00 -0500

The breakneck pace of China's economic expansion has the dragon by the tail: oil demand and dependence on foreign sources of supply have skyrocketed. The Chinese leadership recognizes that sustaining economic growth hinges on continued access to large quantities of imported oil. As a result, energy security occupies center stage in China's approach to modernization and in its foreign policy decision-making and conduct.

China's efforts to offset the risks of increasing dependence on foreign oil consist mainly of state-mandated and state-supported energy industry initiatives aimed at secure long-term access to oil supplies through broadening the scope of its energy partnerships and by diversifying energy suppliers both within, and away from, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Yet, these efforts have thus far yielded mixed results. China remains tethered to the Persian Gulf.

Because in recent years China has cast its net ever more widely to meet its energy requirements, Chinese interests have perforce intersected with those of the United States - in the Middle East, in Central Asia, in Russia, and in East Asia. Given its global strategic supremacy and the fact that Sino-American relations have been largely positive and constructive since 9/11, the United States should resist the temptation to undercut China's efforts to satisfy its energy requirements.

DECEPTION: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons

Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark — Tue, 6 Nov 2007 15:41:01 -0500

In conjunction with The PCR Project Prevention – Conflict Analysis – Reconstruction

DECEPTION chronicles the last 30 years in the relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan, and particularly the circumstances under which Pakistan both developed a nuclear weapon and then sold the technology for it to Iran, North Korea, Libya, and others—with the full knowledge of the U.S. government. It is a dramatic story of deception on all sides, not least by four successive U.S. presidents who have proclaimed Pakistan to the American people as our staunch ally, while it has, in fact, been just the opposite. Indeed, the authors—who have built this story over a decade of reporting—make a compelling case that Pakistan is the greatest obstacle to U.S. and world security.

Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark are award-winning investigative journalists who worked for the Sunday Times of London for seven years before joining the Guardian as senior correspondents. They are the authors of two highly acclaimed books, The Amber Room and The Stone of Heaven. They have reported from South Asia for more than a decade, and now live in London and France. Their web site is www.clarkandlevy.com.

Please RSVP to PCRProject@csis.org

For more information on the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project and recent publications, please visit: http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/

Political and Constitutional Developments in Pakistan

Ahmed Raza Kasuri, member of President Pervez Musharraf's legal team — Mon, 5 Nov 2007 17:46:25 -0500

REGISTRATION FOR THIS EVENT IS CLOSED

The Middle East Institute is pleased to host Ahmed Raza Kasuri, a member of President Pervez Musharraf's legal team, to discuss the state-of-emergency declaration in Pakistan.

Ahmed Raza Kasuri is a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the highest professional position a lawyer can attain in Pakistan. He is a graduate of the Government College, Lahore and holds a Law Degree from University Law College, Punjab University, Lahore.

To RSVP for this event, please reply to rsvp@mideasti.org and state your name and affiliation.

From our Library:
Pakistan: A Resource Guide (August, 2007) - A detailed bibliography of the George Camp Keiser Library's Pakistan collection.

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Regional Stability

Mon, 13 Nov 2006 12:00:00 -0500

Moderator Marvin Weinbaum began the panel discussion by highlighting the gravity of the status quo in Afghanistan. He noted that in the past year, reconstruction efforts have become increasingly ineffective, which has contributed to escalating violence. Weinbaum proposed four endeavors that must succeed simultaneously in order to “get it right” in Afghanistan: an increase in security forces; stronger governance; sensible and pragmatic reconstruction; and a decrease in poppy production. The success of these efforts is contingent on Pakistan’s capacity and its will to control the presence of the Taliban in its northern provinces. He finished by stating that the United States must “de-couple” Afghanistan from Iraq.

Steve Coll affirmed the urgency of the situation in Afghanistan. Coll discussed Pakistan’s long history of appeasement and support for the Taliban and pointed to the potential reemergence of these trends. In addition, he explained the significance of the “interlocking Islamic parties” that exert relative sovereignty in the tribal regions of Pakistan. He argued that addressing this problem requires consideration of two issues: first, Pakistan’s capacity to deter the Taliban should be earnestly considered because the country has a weak record of combating insurgent groups within its own borders; and second, the intentions of the Musharaf government must be formally challenged.

Moreover, Coll explained that the stability of the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan is recurrently informed by the ethnic Pashtuns, who live along the permeable border of both countries and who constitute the majority of the Taliban. “Pashtun politics” are becoming an increasingly severe problem as evidenced by swelling hostilities between the Afghani and Pakistani governments. Coll argued that if the Pashtun people continue to be marginalized and disenfranchised, then neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan will find enduring peace and stability.

James Dobbins began by discounting the prevailing perception among Americans that the US was responsible for the formation of the coalition that expelled the Taliban and installed the Karzai government. The reality, rather, is that the US joined a preexisting international coalition that included Iran, India, Russia, and the Northern Alliance. He argued that the fragmentation of this international coalition and the unwillingness of the US to involve regional neighbors have undermined reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Dobbins asserted that any effort to rebuild a state such as Afghanistan requires the inclusion of its neighbors.

Dobbins examined both internal and external explanations for the failure of reconstruction in Afghanistan. Pakistan has been able to control neither the Taliban within its own country nor its porous border with Afghanistan. Internally, he points to the failure of the international coalition in providing essential services for Afghani citizens, the most important of which is security. He states that US aid in Afghanistan has been pitifully negligible as compared to other nation building efforts the US has undertaken. He concluded by reaffirming Weinbaum’s call for a clear division in action and attitude towards Iraq and Afghanistan. Dobbins declared that the central front in the war on terror is in Pakistan rather than Iraq, requiring a “reconceptualization of the global war on terrorism.”

Colonel Richard Giguère altered the tone of the panel by discussing the progress that has been made in the past five years in Afghanistan. Canada’s mission in Afghanistan has continued to be informed by its interest in contributing to international security. As Canada’s efforts in Afghanistan constitute its largest overseas engagement, it is deeply invested in the long term success of Afghanistan. Giguère noted that Canadian troops in Afghanistan are a part of NATO’s first deployment outside of Europe and if NATO loses control of Afghanistan to the Taliban, NATO could be deemed ineffectual.

The last panelist, Bruce Riedel, demonstrated the deteriorating state of affairs in Afghanistan by stating that in 2002 there were only two suicide bombings, but today there is one every five days. Reidel focused specifically on the significance of Taliban leaders such as Mullah Omar. As early as September of 2001, Omar predicted that there would be no end to the Taliban presence in Afghanistan and that President Bush’s threats to Taliban leaders were largely empty. It is leaders like Omar, Reidel argues, that have consistently delivered on their promises to the Afghani people. And, in fact, it is the US that “took its eye off the ball” by prematurely declaring victory.

Riedel was also fairly optimistic, claiming that as long as NATO is present in Afghanistan the Taliban will not take complete control. However, Riedel maintained that Omar and his followers will survive on a grassroots level, while working towards eroding the resolve of coalition forces. He closed by stating that the world community, led by the United States, needs to powerfully affirm its diplomatic support for Afghanistan, which will require a substantial increase in economic resources.

The Future of Saudi Arabia: Changing Signals and Developing Strategies

Jean-François Seznec, Professor, Georgetown University — Tue, 7 Dec 2004 12:00:00 -0500

The December 6, 2004 attack on the US consulate in Jeddah reminded the world of the enduring presence of Islamic terrorists in Saudi Arabia. This attack was significant for two reasons. First, it showed the desperation of the attackers, an indication that these forces have been considerably weakened. Second, this was the first terrorist violence in the Kingdom in over a year, the last having occurred in May of 2003.

After the May 2003 terrorist attacks in Riyadh, Prince ‘Abdullah entered into an agreement with leaders of the conservative Salafi movement: the regime agreed to clamp down on proponents of social and political reform and in return, Salafi leaders have agreed to help curb fundamentalist violence in the kingdom. This deal rekindled an alliance between the Salafis and the royal family dating back to 1744, which was reinforced in 1979 by deal between the royal family and the Salafis to ensure peace following the attack on the Main Mosque in Mecca. In the current agreement, the government arrested 13 dissidents in March of 2003. This has silenced the hopes of reformers in the kingdom, many of whom raised their voices during the “Spring of Riyadh” in early 2003 when the government entertained public dialogue on issues such as greater political freedom, a reevaluation of the rights of women, and educational reform.

Dr. Seznec noted that while the recent reform efforts and the return to Salafi-approved conservatism are important indicators of Saudi plans for dealing with terrorism, the most important challenge to Saudi Arabia’s future is the state of its economy. The main problem facing the kingdom is its burgeoning population under age 30, coupled with high unemployment (currently 30% of men under age 30). In a country of 23 million people, Saudi companies still import workers despite this widespread unemployment.

Foreign and private investment might improve the economic and employment situation, however, political conditions prevent it from doing so. King Fahd’s decision in the late 1970’s to divide government responsibilities between the royal family and a powerful civil service was mainly aimed at preventing future generations of royalty from abusing power and weakening the state. Under this arrangement, the royal family has only titular control of the oil industry, banking, and commerce regulation (although it still maintains control of defense forces). Civil servants, who benefit from the status quo, dominate the economy and consequently do not encourage the type of innovation and reform that encourages investors.

In order to address their current population’s needs, Saudis would have to create at least 200,000 jobs per year. The $40 billion necessary to do this could come from private Saudi funding, especially funds currently maintained outside of the Kingdom. The government has made efforts to create more jobs without changing the current system, such as establishing the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) to encourage foreigners to invest where Saudis themselves are disinterested. However, until the civil service loosens it control of the economy and there are greater limitations on the ability of royals to seize investments, privatization and investment efforts will continue to falter. It will take strong executive authority to change this environment. Although Prince ‘Abdullah is charismatic, he does not appear prepared to make such radical changes.

Dr. Seznec explained that the US is becoming increasingly irrelevant to Saudi Arabia. The invasion of Iraq, the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, the questionable treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo bay, and recent legal wrangling with Saudi merchants in New York City have contributed to Saudi disillusionment with US policy. As a result, Saudi Arabia has worked to establish a base of regional security in the Middle East. It has strengthened ties with its neighbors, including Syria, Iran, Yemen and Qatar. Additionally, the Kingdom is planning for future regional and global dominance in certain industrial sectors, namely the petrochemical industry.

The increasing importance of Asian interests in the Middle East is the salient factor guiding Saudi Arabia’s security and its economic strategy. At the same time, there has been a steady decline of US sales to Saudi Arabia, with sales of $10 billion in 1998 now ebbing to $3 billion for 2004. Ironically, the developing paradigm situates the older capitalist system of the US as increasingly bent on military and ideological empire, while China – the old ideological empire – is increasingly viewed as a lucrative capitalist presence.

US-Pakistan Relations: The Ambassador's Perspective

Honorable Ashraf Qazi, Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States — Wed, 14 Jan 2004 12:00:00 -0500

Ambassador Qazi opened his talk emphasizing Pakistan's long relationship with the United States, citing cooperation during the Cold War, the liberation of Afghanistan, and post-September 11 anti-terrorism activity. He explained that in the post-September 11 alliance, the dynamism of the US-Pakistan relationship has been revived. However, Ambassador Qazi cautioned, many Pakistanis wonder whether the US will cool toward Pakistan once American interests have been served. He sees good reason to be optimistic that the inconstancy of the past between the US and Pakistan will not be repeated. His optimism is based on Pakistani progress and US support in key areas such as security, economics, politics, and the peace process with India.

Since the crackdown on al-Qaida and the Taliban began, Pakistan's security efforts have improved, in part through progress in its relationship with Afghanistan. Ambassador Qazi stated that despite assertions to the contrary, Pakistan has been tough on the Taliban as well as al-Qaida. He added that cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan on the issue of their shared porous border is increasingly institutionalized. In addition, while in the past the tribal regions of Pakistan constituted a "no-go" area, Pakistan is now working with tribal elders to make them aware of efforts to stop the Taliban and al-Qaida. Pakistan has also been dismantling al-Qaida outposts, and as technology and equipment have improved, so has Pakistan's prevention of terrorist activity.

Ambassador Qazi also addressed the ongoing India-Pakistan peace process. He highlighted movement toward a Kashmir settlement as an essential component for improved bilateral relations between the two countries. Better relations between the two countries is divided into three phases going forward: 1) resumption of dialogue, scheduled to begin next month; 2) discussion of issues that have historically kept the two nations apart; and 3) scrutiny of all feasible solutions for the Kashmir issue that are fair to not only India and Pakistan, but also to the Kashmiri people themselves.

Ambassador Qazi also addressed economic and political issues within Pakistan, emphasizing that the current administration has achieved a decrease in the rate of the rise of poverty, hoping to achieve a plateau and eventually, a decline. The recent assistance package from the US will help both economic and security efforts because once ordinary Pakistanis experience the economic benefits of Pakistan's relationship with the US, their criticisms will decrease. Similarly, Pakistan is working to convince the US that greater market access would help Pakistan achieve its aim of 5% economic growth per year, creating jobs among the disenfranchised sectors of the population. Politically, the parliament passed a constitutional bill and elected Pervez Musharraf as president. In addition, the government is moving toward overcoming past perceptions of politicians and greater institutionalization of democracy in Pakistan. Ambassador Qazi also stated that Pakistan is aware of its obligations in the realm of nuclear nonproliferation and takes these responsibilities very seriously.

Economic Stagnation and Political Instability in Pakistan: An Overview

Dr. Parvez Hasan — Wed, 19 Nov 2003 12:00:00 -0500

Dr. Hasan first emphasized Pakistan’s geopolitical significance and set the context for its economic growth through history and within the subcontinent. As one of the most populated Muslim nations, Pakistan will provide an important test case for modernization. Additionally, Pakistan’s nuclear capacity and geographical location underscore the country’s role in international security. Over the past 50 years Pakistan achieved a number of successes in the social and economic spheres. Despite periods of economic mismanagement, Pakistan has enjoyed an average annual per capita GDP growth (2%) similar to India and greater than Bangladesh for the past fifty years. Female enrollment at the primary education level still lags at 60%, but the absolute number of females in primary education increased 50-fold in as many years. The rise of a middle and professional class also provided tremendous opportunities for social and economic advancement. Hedging his optimism, Dr. Hasan noted that Pakistan’s poor public image is not without merit. The last decade was rife with political instability, slow economic growth, rising poverty, abysmal social indicators, sectarian violence, weak public institutions, and a steadily waning confidence in the government.

Stressing the great promise of Pakistan’s economy during the 1960s, Dr. Hasan outlined the factors contributing to a failed take off into self sustained and equitable growth. Poor leadership failed to stress the rule of law and the necessity of strong, yet transparent, public institutions. Democratic leaders were particularly unsuccessful in implementing the fiscal policy adjustments required to make the country more self- reliant. While military rulers were reluctant to open the political process, they were far less arbitrary in governance and generally pursued economic reforms more forcefully. Tensions with India and the resulting increase in defense spending also contributed to Pakistan’s economic woes. In strict economic terms, Pakistan’s history of meager savings and its dependence on external financing stifled development and was reflected in a large public savings deficit. The protracted government protections offered to Pakistani industries prevented the modernization of an industrial and export infrastructure.

In the 1990s, economic reforms aimed at strongly promoting the private sector were initiated but failed because there was no strict adherence to financial discipline. In the last few years, Pakistan has pursued macro-economic adjustment as well as structural reforms to put the economy and the society on a sounder footing. Budget deficits continually decreased and are currently averaging 3% of the GDP. Tax revenues continue to increase as the mechanism behind tax collection improves. Public savings that were a negative 3% to 4% of the GDP just a few years ago have now turned positive and can remain positive without foreign grants. Technocrats are curbing corruption throughout the government as a result of a refined selection process based on merit rather than nepotism. Economic institutions such as the State Bank of Pakistan and the Securities and Exchange Commission have garnered greater autonomy and regulatory authority. Finally, Dr. Hasan cited the devolution of the central government’s authority as a positive step towards a stable and modern Pakistani economy.

Ultimately, the most significant steps in Pakistan’s economic development will center on non-economic issues. Reigning in terrorist organizations and sectarian violence, improving relations with India, and devolving central power to the provinces will foster an investor-friendly environment ripe for economic progress. As a compliment to these recommendations, Dr. Hasan suggested that the West assist Pakistan in reducing tensions with India, open their markets to Pakistani goods, and encourage direct private investment within Pakistan.

Pakistan Series: Keeping a Lid on Pakistan's Taliban

Husain Haqqani — Wed, 16 Jul 2003 12:00:00 -0400

The passing of the Sharia law by the MMA-dominated provincial legislature in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan is an alarming new step in the direction of a possible overall 'Talibanization' of the Pakistani political machinery. As other provincial assemblies and the National Assembly find themselves in political deadlock and unable to pass legislation, the MMA has been able to present itself as a strong political and social force.

The two actors who have been most responsible for initiating the 'Talibanization' process in Pakistan are the Islamist parties and the military-intelligence establishment. The Islamist parties are closely tied with the armed religious groups and jihadis from Afghanistan. The joint military-intelligence establishment has aided and exploited the religious right for its own security ends and in the process empowered them greatly.

The Taliban presence in Afghanistan was aided by the joint Pakistan military-intelligence establishment to create stability in Afghanistan on terms beneficial to Pakistan. Under the regime of Zia-ul-Haq, the religious right in Pakistan was armed and empowered to help fight the Soviets in Afghanistan (with the eventual aim of unleashing its force on India). Due to such support, many religious groups were able to have strong, armed groups associated with them.

The leaders of the mainstream secular parties, who had historically shared the vast majority of votes in elections, were outlawed following Pervez Musharraf's rise to power in 1999 through military coup. This political vacuum brought the Islamists more power as they organized to form the MMA. The result has been that 'Pakistan's Taliban,' possessing newfound political momentum and militant strength, may well be capable of challenging the political structure of Pakistan without relying on their historic alliance with the army. Mr. Haqqani asserted that while the Islamists were still not capable of directly confronting the establishment, they are capable of challenging the state.

Mr. Haqqani pointed out three elements that are most worrisome in the Talibanization process in Pakistan. First, the independence of Islamist armed groups and their ability to function without state and military sanction. Second, the political strength of the religious parties is disproportionate to their popularity and challenge the democratic system. Finally, the ongoing alliance between the military-intelligence community and the religious right threatens to radicalize the armed forces.

Mr. Haqqani proposed that the most important steps to dealing with this lingering threat are to restore the natural balance of political forces within Pakistan by recalling the main political leaders from exile and creating a countervailing political force to the Islamists. The military must break its ties with Islamists voluntarily or due to international pressure in order to weaken the Islamists in the country. Finally, Mr. Haqqani asserted that a lasting solution to the Kashmir issue with India would dissipate the support and legitimacy that the Islamists find from within Pakistan.

Greg Myre

Tue, 18 Dec 2007 14:02:56 -0500

Dr. John Calabrese

Mon, 25 Jun 2007 13:04:48 -0400