Terrorism

"How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al-Qaeda"

Wed, 24 Sep 2008 16:44:35 -0400

MEI is honored to host Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, to discuss their new Rand Corp. report,"How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al-Qaeda."

About the Report:

All terrorist groups eventually end. But how do they end? The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ended because (1) they joined the political process (43 percent) or (2) local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members (40 percent). Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups, and few groups within this time frame have achieved victory. This has significant implications for dealing with al Qa'ida and suggests fundamentally rethinking post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy: Policymakers need to understand where to prioritize their efforts with limited resources and attention. The authors report that religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other groups and rarely achieve their objectives. The largest groups achieve their goals more often and last longer than the smallest ones do. Finally, groups from upper-income countries are more likely to be left-wing or nationalist and less likely to have religion as their motivation. The authors conclude that policing and intelligence, rather than military force, should form the backbone of U.S. efforts against al Qa'ida. And U.S. policymakers should end the use of the phrase “war on terrorism” since there is no battlefield solution to defeating al Qa'ida.

Find our more about the report here: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG741/

"Can The Taliban Win In Pakistan?"

Fri, 18 Jul 2008 14:28:34 -0400

Middle East Institute is honored to host Pervez Amirali Hoodbhoy to discuss "Can The Taliban Win In Pakistan?"

Post Iraq War, Jihadists: Where Next?

Wed, 31 Oct 2007 13:03:43 -0400

The panel discussed the prospective legacy of the jihadists fighting in Iraq. The speakers focused on the military and ideological influence of the new generation of jihadists in Iraq. They emphasized the importance of working to undermine the jihadist ideology as much as combating terrorism by military means.

Deciding the Fate of the Mujahadin

Trita Parsi — Mon, 6 Oct 2008 15:30:48 -0400

The Bush administration inherited many of Iraq's problems when it invaded that country, including an Iranian terrorist organization funded and armed by Saddam Hussein the Mujahedin-e-Kalq (MKO). Though in the midst of a war on terror, the Bush administration chose in 2003 to protect 3,000 of the organization's militants and house them in a camp given to the group by Saddam — Camp Ashraf just north of Baghdad.

Ever since, the faith of this State Department-listed terrorist organization has been unclear. Hated by Iraqis for its involvement in Saddam's crimes against the Iraqi people, the Baghdad government wants to expel the group. But no country is willing to take them.

Though the Iranian government wants to put the group's leadership on trial in Iran, it seems less interested in the organization's rank and file. The European governments have little interest in taking in 3,000 battle-hardened Muslim militants, fearing that they will use Europe as a base to plan and execute further terrorist attacks.

The U.S., on the other hand, has already contradicted its own principles by giving preferential treatment to an organization on the State Department's terrorist list — even though President Bush himself pointed to the organization's patronage under Saddam Hussein as evidence of Iraq's support for international terrorists in his speech to the United Nations in September 2002.

"Iraq continues to shelter and support terrorist organizations that direct violence against Iran," President Bush said. To complicate matters further, if reports that the U.S. has used MKO terrorists for cross-border raids into Iran are true, then Washington certainly doesn't want these militants to end up in Iranian hands.

Washington seems doomed if it does, doomed if it doesn't.
Members of the terrorist organization have protested outside the White House this past week, angered by the Bush administration's decision to hand over Camp Ashraf to the Iraqi government. The government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki will surrender the MKO members to Tehran, they argue, who in turn will imprison and execute them.

Though approximately 500 MKO fighters have been repatriated to Iran and no reports of abuse have emerged according to the International Committee of the Red Cross, which oversaw their return, sending rank-and-file Mujahedin members to Iran against their will would be irresponsible.

Hated by the Iranian people for having fought on Saddam's side in the Iraq-Iran war, the Iranian Mujahedin is understandably fearful of the fate awaiting them in Iran. After all, the Iranian government systematically violates the human rights of journalists and union leaders alike, let alone anti-Iranian terrorists.
Yet, contrary to the protesters outside the White House, the issue is not a choice between freedom in Camp Ashraf and captivity in Iran.

The Mujahedin is not an effective opposition to the unpopular government in Iran as the organization's defenders in Washington claim, but a politico-religious cult that brainwashes its members, places children of Mujahedin members with other families in order to prevent parents from defecting, and who according to Human Rights Watch, maintains control by torturing its rank and file. "Members who try to leave the Mujahedin pay a very heavy price," according to Joe Stork of Human Rights Watch.

Its involvement in terrorism is undisputed. It assassinated several Americans in Iran in the 1970s. It supported the taking of the U.S. Embassy in Iran and blasted Ayatollah Khomeini for releasing the American diplomats in 1981, arguing instead that the hostages should have been executed. It made a pact with Saddam Hussein in the 1980s and fought alongside his army against their Iranian countrymen. Later in the 1990s, they became Saddam's most trusted henchmen, tasked with quelling Kurdish and Shiite uprisings against the Iraqi dictator.

According to defectors, Mujahedin members in Camp Ashraf celebrated the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

In 2004, French authorities descended upon the Mujahedin headquarters in France, arresting the leader of the cult, Maryam Rajavi. Immediately, zealous Mujahedin members staged hunger strikes and several set themselves ablaze. Hardly the behavior of a democratically oriented opposition group.

But the vast majority of the Camp Ashraf residents are not so much members of a terrorist cult as they are victims of it. The camp is itself a prison. It may have provided Mujahedin militants with protection against ordinary Iraqis who sought to avenge their relatives killed by the Mujahedin at the behest of Saddam Hussein, but the prison has primarily enabled the leaders of the terrorist organization to prevent the rank and file from defecting.

Rather than debating where to expel the Mujahedin terrorists, help should be provided to the rank and file to break with the cult and make free choices about their future. It's the only humanitarian solution to this dilemma - and one that defeats rather than protects this anti-American terrorist group.

Iraq: Security Gains in Jeopardy

Fri, 19 Sep 2008 17:38:11 -0400

The bulk of the improvement in security in much of Iraq over the past two years stems not from the surge, but rather the largely Sunni Arab “Awakening.” Yet, revived Iraqi government hostility toward the Awakening, and provocative moves by Iraq’s Kurds have made those security gains potentially very fragile, raising the risk of a significant rebound in violence.

The surge initiated by President Bush in January 2007 had two main objectives: to stabilize Baghdad during a wave of horrific sectarian violence spanning many mixed areas of the country, pitting Sunni Arab against Shi’a, and to create a period of calm during which there could be sectarian reconciliation. Only a small portion of the roughly 29,000 U.S. soldiers included in the surge was dispatched to predominantly Sunni Arab al-Anbar Governate, the scene of heavy fighting between U.S. forces on the one hand and Sunni Arab insurgents and elements of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) on the other. Virtually all other surge-related U.S. troops were deployed into Baghdad.

The most important element in dramatically reducing violence was not the surge, but rather a deal between U.S. forces and Sunni Arab tribal and insurgent elements in late 2006 that translated the Awakening among many Sunni Arabs into stunning progress in terms of overall security and reduced U.S. casualties. Elements of the Awakening first approached U.S. forces seeking a deal two years earlier.

In summer 2004, Sunni Arab tribal leaders and notables, some with ties to the insurgency and most from al-Anbar Governate, asked that U.S. forces enter into a truce that would allow all concerned to join in an effort to destroy AQI. Many Sunni Arabs had become enraged over excesses on part of AQI’s militant Islamic fighters.

There was, however, one important condition: these Sunni Arabs would not make their peace with the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi government. At a time when elections for a sovereign Iraqi government still lay ahead and the process of putting in place a new constitution was incomplete, Washington declined. The U.S. persuaded some of those who had approached us to meet with then Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi to try to work something out, but the talks failed. As a result, Sunni Arab insurgents and U.S. forces would fight on for two more years, at great cost to both. In addition, AQI remained largely free to continue its reign of terror, particularly anti-Shi’a suicide bombings.

Only when those same bombings triggered massive Sunni Arab-Shi’a sectarian violence following AQI’s bombing of the Shi’a Golden Mosque in north-central Iraq in early 2006 did the U.S. once again consider a separate deal with armed Sunni Arabs aimed at AQI. In the face of bitter objections from Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki, the U.S. finally agreed to a conditional ceasefire with many Sunni Arab insurgent and tribal elements, allowing them to arm and to organize. By late 2007, it was clear that this arrangement, which expanded far beyond al-Anbar Governate, vastly reduced U.S. casualties and allowed both sides to administer crippling blows to AQI.

The Iraqi government never signed onto the overall arrangement, despite the nearly 90% reduction in anti-Shi’a AQI suicide bombings and a major shift on the part of those in the Awakening (eventually numbering around 100,000 fighters called “Sons of Iraq” or SOI’s) who now wanted to be incorporated into government security forces. Likewise, despite some measures in that direction, the government has dragged its feet on broader reconciliation with the Sunni Arab community, even though the surge was aimed at tamping down sectarian violence to provide the calm needed for that very purpose.

The government’s attitude became especially problematic when the U.S. turned control of SOI-dominated al-Anbar Governate back to the Iraqi government in recent weeks and made clear that the U.S. could not continue paying SOI’s much longer. The Baghdad government, however, had only agreed to accept a limited number of SOI’s into its security forces, and even doing that had proceeded at a snail’s pace.

Making matters even worse, over the past several weeks, Maliki declared over 600 SOI’s “criminals” subject to immediate arrest and his intent to end the SOI’s this year. That, of course, already has caused some SOI’s to desert and others to return to the residual Sunni Arab insurgency. Talks between SOI leaders and the government to increase the number of SOI’s taken into the security forces last week reportedly ended in stalemate.

If that were not enough, armed Kurdish Peshmerga personnel have gained control of increased areas--some far beyond the boundaries of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) zone--arresting or apparently seeking to displace inhabitants of such areas, many of them Sunni Arabs. Kurdish moves have been so provocative in some locales that even Maliki finally reacted, using non-Kurdish Iraqi army units to force a few Peshmerga withdrawals. Nonetheless, Kurdish flags are flying defiantly in numerous Kurdish areas well beyond the KRG, which contain substantial Sunni Arab populations. This—coupled with arrests and harassment-has infuriated Arab notables and SOI’s elements.

So Sunni Arab elements comprising the Awakening now find themselves assailed on two fronts, with levels of tension rising ominously. It would be sadly ironic if the Awakening (the main driver of improved security in so many areas beyond the more restricted scope of the surge) was to collapse, many SOI’s were to turn against the government, and, now, Iraq’s Kurds (or both).

These risky Iraqi government actions stem, in part, from the Bush Administration’s unconditional support. In late 2006, the Iraq Study Group recommended that U.S. support for the Iraqi government be made conditional, linked to progress on matters like reconciliation, in an effort to make it more likely that Maliki & Co. would avoid these nasty scenarios and to prevent Washington from being viewed as complicit in any government misbehavior. Failure to do so was a mistake, but there do not appear to be indications that the President is contemplating any change in this questionable course.

US and Iran: Drifting Toward Conflict?

Wayne White — Wed, 30 Apr 2008 11:57:58 -0400

The U.S. once again is stepping up its rhetoric aimed at Iran. Renewed charges of nefarious Iranian activities related to Iraq have been surfacing ever since the hearings featuring General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker earlier this month. Diplomacy is stalled on both Iran’s nuclear ambitions and Iraq. It is unclear whether the U.S. and Iran will succeed in avoiding a military confrontation of one sort or another.

Not only have accusations escalated, but also the tone of Administration and U.S. military commentary on Iran has become noticeably more shrill. There has been a focus on Iranian-trained “special groups” operating in Iraq, especially in the context of this month’s bloody confrontation involving radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army.

Late last week, Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, alluded to Iran’s “increasingly lethal and malign influence” (in Iraq). The normally cautious Mullen even went so far as to note that the Pentagon is preparing for “potential military courses of action” against Iran. General Petraeus reportedly is preparing a briefing on Iran’s provision of lethal munitions to anti-U.S. elements in Iraq.

On the nuclear front, Defense Secretary Gates -- also typically reserved -- charged in a speech last week that Iran “is hell bent on acquiring nuclear weapons.”

Tehran probably is guilty of supplying sympathetic militias in Iraq with money, arms, and training. The evidence so far has not made believers of many observers, but the sheer volume of reporting on this is sizeable. Yet, the U.S. does not seem to appreciate that Iraq is in Iran’s backyard and expecting the Iranians to eschew involvement there—especially in the face of a robust U.S. presence--is simply unrealistic.

On the diplomatic front, there is little prospect for meaningful progress. Talks between Ambassador Crocker and the Iranians consist of American accusations against Iran and predictable Iranian denials. The restriction of these exchanges to Iraq blocks any useful trade-offs that might be drawn from other contentious issues dividing the two governments. The dim prospects for useful engagement were underscored when Secretary of State Rice apparently went to a major regional meeting on Iraq this month with explicit instructions not to engage with the Iranians.

A key factor the Administration either does not wish to acknowledge or cannot appreciate is that Iran’s overall responsibility for the mess in Iraq is actually quite limited. In a country shattered by war, looting and violence, saddled with a dysfunctional, sectarian and corrupt government and ethno-sectarian communities with maximalist agendas, the fundamental problems are inherently Iraqi. Indeed, the Administration’s focus on Iran might be, in part, driven by the need to distract attention from the more fundamental reasons for disappointment—even failure--in Iraq.

Regarding Iran’s nuclear intentions, Defense Secretary Gates may be right. However, the main driver for any Iranian nuclear weapons program most likely relates to Iran’s desire for the ultimate defensive deterrent against U.S. interference—not a desire to launch a suicidal nuclear first-strike against Israel.

Gates has noted quite accurately that war with Iran would be “disastrous.” Hostilities between the U.S. and Iran would trigger a major crisis without a clear end game in the Persian Gulf upon which the world depends for a huge slice of its tightening energy supplies.

Something often neglected in American policymaking is the good sense to proceed cautiously in certain highly complex situations. To avoid another massive crisis the U.S. can ill-afford, it would be best to acknowledge an Iranian role in Iraq, engage Tehran in a less one-dimensional fashion, and prepare to live with a nuclear Iran.

Some Reflections on Imad Mughniyya

Fri, 15 Feb 2008 15:33:39 -0500

The death of Imad Mughniyya naturally inspires some reflections among those of us who followed closely the violent era that characterized Beirut in the 1980s. Many had friends among the victims of the Marine barracks attack, the US Embassy attack, the plethora of hostage-takings, and so on. The reflections here are not neutral: at least one friend, the British hostage Lee Douglas, was killed in 1986, possibly by Mughniyya’s hand. Other American and Lebanese friends suffered. This is not a eulogy.

Arguably, Mughniyya was most influential in introducing the suicide car bomb as the assassination weapon of choice in the Middle East, so there is obvious irony in the fact that he himself died in a car bombing. It is still not clear whether it is another irony or a question of deliberate timing that he died two days before the anniversary of Rafiq Hariri’s assassination by car bomb. In fact, Mughniyya’s two brothers, Jihad and Fuad, both predeceased him — through car bombings in 1986 and 1994.

Mughniyya, like others who have lived similar lives in the murky world of international terror, made no shortage of enemies through the years. As a result, any discussion of who finally ended his career takes on a sort of Murder on the Orient Express flavor: just about everybody had a motive. Hezbollah and its allies are blaming Israel, and certainly, it had plenty of reason to want Mughniyya dead. The assassination had a certain Mossad flavor to it, and Israel has few qualms about “targeted killings”. The US considered him a prime target in the Global War on Terror and reportedly had twice failed to capture him, but car bombings are not a method known to be employed by the US. The timing so close to the Hariri anniversary could suggest some connection to Hezbollah’s Lebanese opponents, though the fact he was killed in Damascus may make this less likely.

Of course, he may well have had enemies among his so-called friends. With Hezbollah trying to position itself as an electoral force in Lebanese politics, is it possible that an old-guard plotter like Mughniyya might be more valuable – and less an embarrassment – as a martyr? Hezbollah’s website and TV have been full of praise for Mughniyya and he was given a hero’s funeral, yet he was rarely mentioned while still alive.

That brings us to another characteristic of Mughniyya. He was not a modern, public relations terror chief who gave interviews or sent videotapes to television networks. He was, like “Carlos” (Ilich Ramirez Sanchez) or Abu Nidal (Sabri Khalil al-Banna), a shadowy figure. There were only a few photographs, and one usually did not look much like the next. He moved in the shadows and remained there. He was well known to the world’s security services and to students of Lebanon in the 1980s, but his name never had the kind of public resonance in the West that Bin Laden’s does.

A Shi‘ite from a village near Tyre, he became a liaison among the radical Shi‘ite groups that eventually became Hezbollah, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and reportedly in more recent years, the Mahdi Army in Iraq. But he was not merely part of a radical Shi‘ite International; he is said to have begun his career in the PLO’s Force 17 in Lebanon and later spent time in Khartoum, where he may have had links to Bin Laden.

His presumed victims – presumed because he did not usually claim public credit – included not only Lebanese, Israelis, Americans and French, but also Argentines and Russians. He was certainly on the most-wanted list of quite a few security services. Yet, compared to Bin Laden, he was able to more or less hide in plain sight. It is said he had plastic surgery so he was not recognizable and that he had spent most of his time in recent years in Tehran, Damascus, and even Beirut. He has been reported in Khartoum and even in Iraq since the US occupation. It has been claimed that he accompanied Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad in a meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, among other high-profile travels.

Until February 12, he had somehow avoided those who sought him even during such open travels. But no more.

Recognizing Realities for Israel and Hamas

Wed, 13 Feb 2008 15:50:48 -0500

Knowing when to recognize unpleasant realities is perhaps the most significant hallmark of a statesman.

Israel’s leadership cannot ignore the growing citizen anger at the continuing Qassem rocket attacks on the southern town of Sderot. But it also has to decide how to deal with the Islamist organization Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip.

Its choices boil down to three: maintain the current policy of retaliation and targeted killings of Hamas leaders and those responsible for the attacks; unleash a major ground attack on Gaza to “clean out” terrorists and return control to the Palestinian Authority; or move towards a truce with Hamas – most probably out of public view through diplomatic signaling, second track diplomacy or third party mediation.

The US administration would look askance at a truce, as would PA President Mahmoud Abbas’ Fatah Party. Encouraged by the US, Israel has been building up Fatah as a moderate alternative, hoping to chip away at Hamas’s popular support.

It is time for both Israel and the US to acknowledge this policy is failing. Targeting the perpetrators of the rocket attacks will not stop them. An attack on Gaza would cause massive Israeli and Palestinian casualties, end the Annapolis peace process -- already on life support -- and further discredit the Fatah government, which most Palestinians view as a weak tool of Israel. It would also be likely to unleash violence elsewhere in the Muslim world.

Most important, it is unlikely to fatally weaken Hamas. The party is now a part of the Palestinian political landscape as the only effective opposition to Fatah and as a representative of the Islamist currents now prominent in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Hamas has gone to great lengths to differentiate itself from al Quaeda and similar groups. Destroying Hamas’s current leadership could well result in a much more radicalized Palestinian Islamism.

So, is a cease-fire with Hamas possible? And what would be the likely effects?

In fact, Hamas has “signaled” numerous times its desire for a truce. Actually implementing it would be tricky and would require an awareness of Islamic tradition, a degree of trust, and a clear-eyed understanding of what is possible on both sides. Still, a number of mainstream Israeli leaders believe it is essential to try, including a former chief of the Mossad, Ephraim Halevy, not known as a dove.

Hamas’s official ideology is embedded in its founding charter, a bloodcurdling document, which offers no compromise with Zionism. And there is no doubt that those who composed it in 1988 meant what they said.

Founding documents are important but their significance can change over time. For revolutionary movements like Hamas, they serve as a base of theoretical agreement even as different factions develop. Twenty years later, Hamas has garnered more power more quickly than it probably expected. Its leadership would never break away from the Islamist framework in which it is embedded, but nevertheless gives strong signs of desire to face the reality that is today’s Israel. It is in Israel’s interest to encourage this.

Hamas’s leadership understands that Israel is more powerful than ever, with strong US support. It realizes that most neighboring Arab governments have no use for it, but must behave circumspectly because their own populations see it as heroic. Hamas is now a maturing revolutionary movement and beginning to see the virtue of stability. It appears ready for a truce.

Israelis believe that Hamas wants a truce to strengthen itself so as to eventually destroy Israel. But so what? Israel will never turn a blind eye to Hamas, whether the truce lasts for weeks, years or decades. Hamas’s religiously-founded belief that Israel must disappear is not all that relevant any more. Its actions are what count. A truce must certainly limit Hamas’s access to weapons, difficult but not impossible to enforce. With both parties still enemies, the threat of force against any violation is a given.

Such an arrangement between enemies certainly is not new. The US and the Soviet Union uneasily lived in a Cold War for almost half a century. It was not an ideal arrangement but it provided considerable incentives for restraint. And, it prevented nuclear war.

Creating a truce with Hamas is neither a reward nor diplomatic recognition. Nor should it be burdened with any moral implications. It should be seen for what it is, basically a tactical move for both sides.

But it would also constitute a recognition of realities. Hamas is not an aberration or an incidental factor. It and other Islamist organizations are now part of the Middle East reality. We must develop an arsenal of diplomatic tools to deal with them. Otherwise, our tactics will continue to backfire and create more violence and more jihadists.

If Hamas will not accede to a truce, or violates it, Israel will have strengthened its moral and political stance if and when hostilities are resumed. Hamas’s strength can never be a match for Israel. It is time to for both sides to recognize and build on these realities.

Can Iraqis Beat the Ticking Clock?

Tue, 27 Nov 2007 14:59:03 -0500

Violence finally has declined enough so that an atmosphere more conducive to deal-making has emerged for Iraq’s rival ethno-sectarian groups. However, so far the tenor of politics in Baghdad does not appear to have changed much. Washington must make clear to the Iraqi government that as the surge begins to wind down, the opportunity to set in place durable stability must not be squandered. Otherwise, all involved will pay the consequences.

Violence certainly persists, but much of Iraq is safer than it was a year ago. Outside Baghdad, this has had relatively little to do with the surge. The main driver has been a Sunni Arab uprising against brutal and abusive Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) cadres that had been operating out of many Sunni Arab communities.

However, the alliance of convenience between many Sunni Arab tribal and insurgent elements on the one hand and US forces on the other against AQI reportedly has permitted 60,000 to 70,000 Sunni Arabs, with considerable hostility toward the Iraqi government, to arm and organize themselves as never before. Most of these Sunni Arabs in fact only agreed to this arrangement with US forces when Washington dropped its condition that there could be no such cooperation unless these elements also made their peace with the government in Baghdad.

Meanwhile, in stabilizing much of Baghdad, US forces did not succeed in crushing the Shi’a militias and their death squads, most notably Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army. In the face of the surge, such militias largely refused battle, either keeping a low profile in their Baghdad strongholds or fleeing to southern Iraq, generally beyond the reach of US forces.

Nonetheless, since their organization remains intact, these armed Shi’a militiamen would be free to return to Baghdad and resume their grisly activities once the surge winds down. In the meantime, Sadr has reined in his forces, but such a move could merely represent a clever tactical pause.

The first withdrawals aimed at bringing overall US troop levels down to pre-surge levels are going to come from Sunni Arab areas from which AQI has been driven. To the extent this becomes a trend, more and more Sunni Arab areas would fall under the control of what Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki recently called “illegal militias” - the armed Sunni Arab forces organized locally with US encouragement since late 2006.

If Sunni Arabs, Shi’a and Iraqi Kurds have not worked out the bulk of their differences by the time the surge winds down next summer, there would not be enough US forces to prevent tens of thousands of Sunni Arab fighters from coming into direct contact with government security forces and Shi’a militias, possibly resulting in a bloodbath.

Unfortunately, the only real political progress to date in Iraq has been the submission of legislation to Parliament that would allow hundreds of thousands of former Ba’th Party members to return to Iraqi political life. This proposed measure has, however, already reportedly run into considerable resistance.

Some argue that achieving certain formal political goals related to reconciliation, such as a revenue-sharing agreement, is unimportant because some ad hoc progress along such lines has been made. This is misleading. If such cooperation is not formalized, deep suspicions would persist, especially among Iraq’s alienated Sunni Arabs, who probably fear that such cooperation could be ended later rather arbitrarily.

A sense of urgency must be impressed upon Iraq’s Shi’a and Kurds. These two groups dominate the current political process and should offer meaningful concessions to Iraq’s increasingly formidable Sunni Arabs in order to break out of this dangerous pattern of gridlock regarding the building blocks for trust and reconciliation.

The current downturn in violence is fragile. It is very risky to crush one insurgency (AQI) by allowing another far more deeply-rooted insurgency to arm and organize. Iraq’s Sunni Arabs must be drawn into the political mainstream before the surge runs its course. If not, violence could rebound, even closer to levels akin to civil war than that seen in 2006. Only by including all of Iraq's ethno-sectarian communities in their country's future can there be a promising future for a united Iraq.

Middle East Agenda for Tomorrow

Wed, 31 Oct 2007 16:44:44 -0400

The next President will inherit a daunting Middle East agenda. It is tempting for candidates of both parties to run away from the unfinished business, blunders and damage of recent years. But responsible presidential candidates and members of Congress should not indulge the luxury of blaming the incumbent without considering alternatives. They cannot ignore or abandon the Arab-Israeli conflict, the awful but real dilemmas of Iraq and the dangers of either appeasing or unwisely confronting Iran.

There is no higher moral imperative for US policy than to work for peace in the Middle East, particularly peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The most urgent challenge is achieving peace between Israel and the Palestinian people. Not only is it right to do so, it is essential if the US is to protect a whole range of vital national interests.

With the single exception of Jimmy Carter, no President and very few members of Congress come to office with this mission. In US politics today, to deal with the Arab-Israeli peace process is to plunge into turbulent waters. Newcomers to Washington put it into the too-hard-to-do pile. But before they leave office, they often find that they need to confront this reality. It is very late in the day for George Bush and Condoleeza Rice. Their chances of more than a cosmetic and transitory success are not great.

Iraq is already lost, if losing is defined as not achieving ‘victory.’ Thankfully, triumphalist terms are rapidly disappearing from the lips of the president and other senior officials. There are better ways to measure success. Downsizing and transforming our presence in Iraq is challenge enough. Doing so in a manner that does not make a very bad situation worse and does not transform a quagmire into a sinkhole for any efforts of regional stabilization, counterterrorism and energy security would earn the gratitude of the American public.

The giddy predictions in 2003 of the Bush administration, neo-cons and aggressive Wilsonians were based on illusions that the US was the new Rome and could transform Iraq into a version of a peaceful, prosperous and allied Norway in the Middle East with a minimum of sacrifice. And thereby convert the region to democracy and free markets. Equally illusory is the notion that there is an obvious way out.

Our current strategy and presence in Iraq is not sustainable for much longer, either in Iraqi or US political terms. Like it or not, US political leaders and Americans at large must consider and understand what long-term interests are at stake here.

We cannot ignore the possibility that Iraq could become a safe haven for terrorists, as happened in Afghanistan at the end of the Cold War when we walked away from that country. But Iraq would be a failed state with vast stores of really nasty weapons and people trained to use them, an educated and energetic populace with real or perceived grievances against the US, massive economic potential and a central strategic location.

Alternatively, Iraq or large parts of Iraq could fall under hegemony of some of the more hostile elements in Iran.

Humanitarian disasters in Iraq, including ethnic cleansing and massive dislocation of refugees, primarily affect Iraqis today. Continuation will lead to implosion and fragmentation of Iraq into multiple sectarian militias, tribal bullies and criminal gangs contending for turf. Think Somalia with oil. Inevitably, this will continue to spill over and draw in Iraq’s neighbors, including NATO ally Turkey and Arab countries with which we share extensive economic and political interests. It is already beginning.

In the long term, the US needs to aim at less dependence on the oil and gas reserves of this region. But that is long term. For the coming decade at least, there does not appear to be a realistic alternative to heavy reliance on the energy resources of the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq, Iran and the Gulf region. They are now at jeopardy

The hard goal is and will be to stabilize Iraq in a regional context. That effort should include states like Iran and Syria, where our relations are either negligible or awful, and other states like Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan, with autocratic regimes and cultures distasteful to many Americans. The prospect of dialogue between Washington and Tehran is equally upsetting to many Americans and many Iranians, but we both need it.

Making democratic change the core of our foreign policy, rather than one goal among others, does not encourage pragmatic cooperation against non-state terrorists who seek change through violence and threaten the existing order in all Muslim countries and US security. In practice, it has inevitably appeared to be hypocritical. A new President must advance a more sophisticated over arching strategy to embrace both American values and our national interests.