United Nations

Don't Shortchange Afghanistan Again

Karl F. Inderfurth, Frederick Starr, Marvin G. Weinbaum — Tue, 24 Jan 2006 12:00:00 -0500

The forthcoming London conference on Afghanistan represents both a milestone and a challenge for the United States and the international community: a milestone because it will mark the completion of the Bonn process, the UN-brokered accord in 2001 to chart Afghanistan's path to a democratically elected government; a challenge because it will signal the beginning of the next critical stage in the country’s rebirth after decades of war and destruction.

Much has been accomplished since the Taliban were overthrown by US-led forces four years ago. President Hamid Karzai is justifiably proud in saying that Afghanistan "now has a constitution, a president, a Parliament and a nation fully participating in its destiny."

It is also true that Afghanistan is still at risk. The insurgency led by elements of the Taliban and Al Qaeda is not going away. Afghanistan remains the world's leading drug supplier of opium. Corruption is on the rise. And many Afghans are beginning to ask, four years after the international community arrived, where are the promised roads, the schools, the health clinics, the electricity, the water?

In London, more than 60 countries and international organizations will gather to adopt a new, post-Bonn framework for cooperation and partnership with Afghanistan. A document known as the Afghanistan Compact will set out benchmarks and timetables to achieve specific goals in security, governance, and development over the next five years.

The conference will also provide the international community another opportunity to match its stated commitment to see Afghanistan rebuild with the resources necessary to accomplish that task. Two previous donors conferences — in Tokyo in 2002 and Berlin in 2004 — fell short.

These conferences generated less than half of the $28 billion that the Afghan government (and the World Bank) believes is required for reconstruction. Moreover, of the $13 billion actually pledged by the international community, to date only about $4 billion has been spent for rebuilding projects. This represents only a fraction of the much larger sums that have gone to reconstruction efforts in Iraq or the Balkans.

Afghanistan is getting shortchanged. The first order of business in London should be to correct this mismatch of Afghan needs and donor funding, and the United States should take the lead.

The US ambassador to Afghanistan, Ronald Neumann, is right in saying that the $623 million in US aid planned for 2006 will not be enough. In London, Washington should announce that it intends to double its reconstruction funding for the next five years, and challenge other donors, especially the Europeans, to follow suit.

There are three other urgent priorities the London conference should recognize.

First, the insurgency. A planned reduction in US troops in Afghanistan (by 13%) is causing concern in Kabul. While their replacement with NATO forces brings a welcome broadening of international responsibility, this should not result in a net loss of military capability. International peacekeepers should adopt rules of engagement that will allow them to conduct aggressive counterinsurgency operations and provide the protection necessary to enable reconstruction.

Second, weak governance. Without competent and honest civil servants at the local level, Kabul cannot hope to deliver the services the population desperately needs. Donors must invest in recruiting and training qualified government workers and police, and help the government build the tax base necessary to pay for them. The judicial system, without which policies will be unenforceable, must be rebuilt.

Third, the drug trade. Afghan farmers must be able to do as well from legal crops as from opium. This means renewing irrigation systems, introducing new plant stocks, developing transport systems and providing short-term credit. Just as the United States accepts moral responsibility for the effect of its drug habits on Colombia, European countries must accept their addictions are destroying Afghan society, and provide the needed investments.

Afghanistan’s ambassador to the United States, Said Tayeb Jawad, says his country clearly remembers its descent into extremism after the United States (and much of the rest of the international community) left at the end of the Soviet occupation in 1989. The biggest concern that Afghans have about the international presence, he says, is that it might be short-lived.

The London conference offers the international community the opportunity to respond affirmatively to that concern, for the next five years and beyond.

Republic or Else?

Joseph C. Wilson — Fri, 14 Feb 2003 14:02:56 -0500

As the senior American diplomat in Baghdad during Desert Shield, I advocated a muscular US response to Saddam's brutal annexation of Kuwait in flagrant violation of the United Nations charter. Only the credible threat of force could hope to reverse his invasion. Our in-your-face strategy secured the release of the 150 American "human shields"-hostages-but ultimately it took war to drive Iraq from Kuwait. I was disconsolate at the failure of diplomacy, but Desert Storm was necessitated by Saddam's intransigence, it was sanctioned by the UN, and it was conducted with a broad international military coalition. The goal was explicit and focused; war was the last resort.

The upcoming military operation also has one objective, though different from the several offered by the Bush Administration. This war is not about weapons of mass destruction. The intrusive inspections are disrupting Saddam's programs, as even the Administration has acknowledged. Nor is it about terrorism. Virtually all agree war will spawn more terrorism, not less. It is not even about liberation of an oppressed people. Killing innocent Iraqi civilians in a full frontal assault is hardly the only or best way to liberate a people. The underlying objective of this war is the imposition of a Pax Americana on the region and installation of vassal regimes that will control restive populations.

Without the firing of a single cruise missile, the Administration has already established a massive footprint in the Gulf and Southwest Asia from which to project power. US generals, admirals and diplomats have crisscrossed the region like modern day proconsuls, cajoling fragile governments to permit American access and operations from their territories.

Bases have been established as stepping-stones to Afghanistan and Iraq, but also as tripwires in countries that fear their neighbors. Northern Kuwait has been ceded to American forces, and a significant military presence established in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. The over-the-horizon posture of a decade ago has given way to boots on the ground and forward command headquarters. Nations in the region, having contracted with the United States for their security umbrella, will now listen when Washington tells them to tailor policies and curb anti-Western dissent. Hegemony in the Arab nations of the Gulf has been achieved.

Meanwhile, Saddam might well squirm, but even without an invasion, he's finished. He is surrounded, foreigners are swarming through his palaces, and as Colin Powell so compellingly showed at the UN, we are watching and we are listening. International will to disarm Iraq will not wane as it did in the 1990s for the simple reason that George W. Bush keeps challenging the organization to remain relevant by keeping pressure on Saddam. Nations that worry that, as John Le Carre puts it, "America has entered one of it periods of historical madness," will not want to jettison the one institution that, absent a competing military power, might constrain US ambition.

Then what's the point of this new American imperialism? The neoconservatives with a stranglehold on the foreign policy of the Republican Party, a party that traditionally eschewed foreign military adventures, want to go beyond expanding US global influence to force revolutionary change on the region. American preeminence in the Gulf is necessary but not sufficient for the hawks. Nothing short of conquest, occupation and imposition of handpicked leaders on a vanquished population will suffice. Iraq is the linchpin for this broader assault on the region. The new imperialists will not rest until governments that ape our world view are implanted throughout the region, a breathtakingly ambitious undertaking, smacking of hubris in the extreme. Arabs who complain about American-supported antidemocratic regimes today will find us in even more direct control tomorrow. The leader of the future in the Arab world will look a lot more like Pakistan's Pervez Musharraf than Thomas Jefferson.

There is a huge risk of overreach in this tack. The projection of influence and power through the use of force will breed resistance in the Arab world that will sorely test our political will and stamina. Passion for independence is as great in the Arab world as it is elsewhere. The hawks compare this mission to Japan and Germany after World War II. It could easily look like Lebanon, Somalia and Northern Ireland instead.

Our global leadership will be undermined as fear gives way to resentment and strategies to weaken our stranglehold. American businessmen already complain about hostility when overseas, and Arabs speak openly of boycotting American products. Foreign capital is fleeing American stocks and bonds; the United States is no longer a friendly destination for international investors. For a borrow-and-spend Administration, as this one is, the effects on our economic growth will be felt for a long time to come. Essential trust has been seriously damaged and will be difficult to repair.

Even in the unlikely event that war does not come to pass, the would-be imperialists have achieved much of what they sought, some of which is good. It is encouraging that the international community is looking hard at terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. But the upcoming battle for Baghdad and the lengthy occupation of Iraq will utterly undermine any steps forward. And with the costs to our military, our treasury and our international standing, we will be forced to learn whether our republican roots and traditions can accommodate the Administration's imperial ambitions. It may be a bitter lesson.

Crisis in Lebanon: Is Peacekeeping Possible?

Amb Hughes, Mr. Stuebner, Amb Dobbins, LTC Bailey — Wed, 16 Aug 2006 13:00:00 -0400

International efforts to reach a ceasefire resolution by the UN Security Council this week would pave the way for the arrival of international forces in Lebanon. With mounting pressure to insert a peacekeeping force, our panel of seasoned conflict-resolution experts will discuss the prospects and challenges for a successful peacekeeping mission.

Ambassador Arthur Hughes, an Adjunct Scholar at MEI will draw on his experience in the Sinai where he presided as Director General over the Multinational Force and Observers in Egypt-Israel peacekeeping. During his 30-year career in the Foreign Service, Ambassador Hughes worked extensively in Europe and the Middle East. He was the US Ambassador to Yemen from 1991-1994 and served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near East and South Asia from 1989-1991.

William A. Stuebner will draw upon his experiences working with the UN Protective Force (UNPROFOR) in the Balkans throughout the Bosnian War. Mr. Stuebner served as Senior Deputy Head of Mission for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996. Mr. Stuebner currently serves as the Senior Technical Specialist for Conflict Prevention at Agricultural Cooperative Development International/Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance (ACDI/VOCA). He is currently Affiliate Professor, George Mason University Peace Operations Policy Program.

Ambassador James Dobbins is Director of RAND Corporation's International Security and Defense Policy Center. Ambassador Dobbins has held State Department and White House posts including Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, Special Assistant to the President for the Western Hemisphere, Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State for the Balkans, and Ambassador to the European Community. He has handled a variety of crisis management assignments as the Clinton Administration's special envoy for Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and the Bush Administration's first special envoy for Afghanistan.

Lieutenant Colonel Mike Bailey retired from the US Army in Feb 2003. Shortly after retiring he began working for RONCO Consulting Corporation, one of the world leaders in humanitarian demining. His career in the US Army spanned more than 25 years in a variety of challenging and demanding assignments in the US and abroad. LTC Bailey has served on the Department of the Army staff as the Peacekeeping Policy Analyst for the Chief of Staff of the Army. He has also served as one of the military advisors to the Office of Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations.

Moderator:
Ambassador David L. Mack is Acting President of the Middle East Institute. His career with the US Foreign Service includes diplomatic posts in Iraq, Jordan, Jerusalem, Lebanon, Libya and Tunisia. He served as Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates from 1986-1989. As Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs under President George H.W. Bush, Ambassador Mack directed relations between the United States and twelve other governments, including Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.

This event is co-sponsored by the Middle East Institute and the U.S. Institute of Peace.

Libya, Africa and the West: Panel I: Libya’s Relations with Africa and the West

Mon, 5 May 2008 15:46:23 -0400

Opening the panel, Ambassador Charles O. Cecil encouraged all participants to consider the implications of the topic of “Libya’s Relations with Africa and the West.” His remarks were basically three fold. First, he discussed Libya’s deep historical roots in Africa. He noted that Libya had long ties with sub-Saharan Africa, which even predated the arrival of Arabs in North Africa.

Second, he described the two institutions that Libya principally relies on for dialogue with the sub-Saharan region: the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (SIN-SAD) and the World Islamic Call Society. SIN-SAD was created in February of 1998 by Libya, Burkina Paso, Chad, Mali, Niger, and the Sudan to create a framework for integration and promote peace, security, and stability in the region. Economic benefits are key, he noted, in maintaining the interest of the 25 members. Libya mainly uses this institution to support its positions before the African Union. The World Islamic Call Society was founded in 1972, aiming to spread moderate Islam in the world, and in turn, to combat Wahhabi Islam that Libya regards as detrimental to its national interest. The World Islamic Call Society promotes both free education abroad and its own universities. The organization also holds inter-faith dialogue with the Vatican and the World Council of Churches to promote tolerant forms of Islam.

Finally, Ambassador Cecil explored the relationship between Libya and the United States. He asserted that Libya seems to be ambivalent towards cooperation with the US. Despite Libya’s favoritism towards US petroleum and communications technology, he argued that it has not made significant effort to expedite the visa process for US citizens. He closed his remarks by stressing that the desire of both Libya and the United States to deter Islamic fundamentalists should pave the way for greater cooperation between the two countries.

Dr. Ibrahim Aboukhazam, discussed Libya’s world vision. He stated that the ability of Libya and the United States to enter into a constructive dialogue is a prerequisite for any progress in their bilateral relationship. Libya, though a small country, has a clear vision to achieve stability and promote development in Africa, which it sees as also being in the interest of Europe and of the rest of the world. In negotiations or dialogue with other regional entities, Africa should be considered as a single unified body, not a fragmented group of countries. Colonial history, he suggested, still greatly affects relations between African and European countries. European countries approach Africa according to their different national interests — focusing on relations with ex-colonies — and not as a united European entity. Fragmented relations hurt the bargaining power and influence of the African continent and should be remedied. Libya is in constant dialogue with Latin America, China, and Europe, and the country wants to revitalize stalled dialogue with the United States and will cooperate with countries who share its vision for stability and economic development in Africa.

Dr. Ronald Bruce St John briefly traced Libya’s ideological revolution since 1969 and how the country has evolved into its current geopolitical landscape. He also explored the common interest of Libya and the US. Arab nationalism and unity were the two initial focuses of Mu‘amar Qadhafi’s revolution. Qadhafi’s drive for positive neutrality and socialism was misunderstood at a time when geopolitics of the world, and the only superpower, was moving towards liberal democratic ideals. Considerable transformations have occurred since, reaching the current Libyan ideological position. While there is noticeable change in Libya’s shift towards a free-market-economy, there has been no progress in the political sector in moving towards democratic values. This is in large part due to Qadhafi’s apathy for any systematic political transformation.

Second, Dr. St John explored the six core areas of bilateral relations between Libya and the United States. The first is hydrocarbons. On the one hand, Libya has abundant oil deposits in excess of 39 billion barrels, and gas reserves of over 51 billion cubic feet total. On the other hand, the United States is the first consumer of energy in the world. Thus, there is ample room for energy trade between the two countries. Second, Libya and the US have common goals in terms of regional politics, namely for AFRICOM, the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership and others. US interest in engaging with Libya and solving long-lasting disputes will eventually reap benefits for both parties. Third, dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is at the heart of US interest in Libya, both to eradicate current weapons and to reduce the possibility of obtaining more. Fourth, maintaining strategic military balance between Libya and the region is crucial for peace and stability on the continent as a whole. Libya has a strong interest in Saharan and Sahelian affairs, and the US should encourage a positive role for Libya in the region. Fifth, the United States should increase dialogue in the area of democracy and human rights. Finally, the United States should work on the peaceful resolution of legal cases against Libya pending in US courts.

However, the main reason why bilateral relations between Libya and the US have not improved is due to US unwillingness to treat Libya as a fair and equal partner. In contrast with European leaders who visited Libya multiple times, the US has not made real effort to bridge differences with Libya by sending senior representative to the country. More effort on the part of the United States is required to revive ties with Libya.

Dr. Bashir al-Kut discussed the efficacy of Libya’s role in resolving disputes in Africa. Despite the 40 years of determined effort by the African Union to settle disputes, most of African countries are reluctant to domestically solve problems. Instead, they usually depend on international organizations such as the United Nations (UN). The main reason is that Africa lacks the financial means to resolve conflicts. Libya’s role as a mediator in those situation is subject to doubt considering that it is a small, developing country. Also, Libya is falling short of utilizing diplomacy and logistical support it can gather from the region as a moderator. Moreover, the African states’ tendency to rely on organizations such as International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other non-local mediator plays an important role in their ability to deal with issues domestically. Only through mutual cooperation with the world’s major powers can there be sustained and long lasting independent peace and stability in Africa.

Dr. Daniel Yergin discussed the oil and gas industry. Recent changes in oil and gas prices have come from unfolding geopolitical issues in Basra, as well as the latest upsurge in the costs of developing the oil and gas industry, which doubled over the last three years. The shortage of people, equipment, and skills, and tensions among the states and companies are undeniable realities that both Libya, and the world at large, face today. Recent downturn in the US economy further suggests the need for diversification in moderating these prices in Europe, Asia, and North America. Furthermore, considering its location and abundant resources, Libya has tremendous potential for exporting, particularly to European markets. Libya’s ambition to use its oil and gas resources to transform its economy critically depends on facilitating decision-making and on timing. It is thus essential for Libya to foster more dialogue with existing and potential trading partners, whether through bilateral, regional, or multilateral negotiations. If Libya recognizes these factors, it will achieve both economic and social development in the future.

Crisis in Lebanon: Is Peacekeeping Possible?

Michael Bailey, James Dobbins, Arthur Hughes, David Mack, William Steubner — Wed, 16 Aug 2006 12:00:00 -0400

William Stuebner began by discussing his experiences in Bosnia. While working both with the State Department and The Hague for the investigation of war crimes, he observed that the 1990s were not a good time for peacekeeping and cited the UN-sponsored Brahimi Report that called operations in Bosnia a “qualified failure.” As a result of this experience, Stuebner identified five key principles necessary for a successful peacekeeping mission. First, national interest must trump international interests. Recurring conflicts between the nations involved in the peacekeeping effort are liable to interfere with the important mission at hand if their interests are neglected. Second, the peacekeeping mandate must be unambiguous. The absence of a clear mandate creates confusion over what is and is not allowed under the terms of the agreement, thus running the risk of making empty promises and creating false hopes. Third, there must be unity of command. In Bosnia, air strikes were called in under a “dual key” approach, requiring approval from both NATO and UN higher-ups. This ineffective structure negated the usefulness of the forces on the ground. Fourth, the force must have sufficient resources to complete its mission, as the absence of necessary equipment results in a totally ineffective force. Finally, and most importantly, there must be a mutual desire for continued, long-lasting peace. Stuebner stressed that without commitment on the side of the warring parties, there will be no peace to keep, and without commitment on the part of the peacekeeping forces, they will not accomplish their mission.

Turning to the situation in Lebanon, he indicated that peacekeeping operations are nearly always “mission impossible.” He cautioned, however, against undue pessimism, saying that it would be easy to write off the UN’s efforts before they can make an attempt. International parties should encourage a political solution, and give motivation to interested non-warring parties, such as Syria, to assist in creating a sustainable peace.

LTC Bailey followed with a discussion of Disarming, Demobilizing and Re-integrating (DDR) Hezbollah. Referring to his background in disarming soldiers in both Cambodia and Iraq, he listed a number of factors that are conducive to properly conducting DDR: creating an integrated effort, having effective supervisory structures, and establishing tracking mechanisms for demobilization, flexibility and transparency. So far he sees good signs in the tasking of the Secretary General with the development of UNIFIL’s mission of disarming Hezbollah.

Bailey strongly reiterated the need for transparency, saying that although DDR operations are complex, they serve to create breathing room between the two sides of the conflict. Without such operations, Hezbollah will be left as a powerful force, a lack of trust will perpetuate, human rights organizations will have difficulty conducting their work, and the way will open for hostilities to resume.

Ambassador Dobbins sought to clarify the role of the peacekeeping force, arguing that UNIFIL will have neither a peace-enforcement role nor a counter-insurgency role. The UN mandate authorizes the use of force only in self-defense or at the behest of the Lebanese government. Dobbins indicated that UNIFIL will not be able to keep an unwanted peace and will not succeed in doing what the Israeli army could not in fighting Hezbollah.

Dobbins was optimistic about the general success rate of peacekeeping operations, providing the examples of successful missions in Cyprus and the Sinai. He said, however, that peacekeeping forces can only work if the warring parties cooperate. The goal of a peacekeeping force is to prevent mistakes and misunderstandings, not to put a stop to intentional violations. Dobbins noted that UNIFIL will probably be able to halt raids from taking place by acting as an “early warning” to the opposing side. However, UNIFIL will not have the means nor the mandate to intercept missile attacks. Dobbins concluded by examining the overall situation, arguing that Hezbollah won by “not losing.” The US, as an ally of Israel, “lost,” thus placing the Bush Administration’s policy at a crossroads. Either the Administration must adopt a new approach and seek broad dialogue with the region, or hold fast to the idea that the original strategy of isolating Syria and Iran would have worked had only it been pursued more vigorously.

Ambassador Hughes spoke from his experience working with the Multinational Force of Observers (MFO) in between Egypt and Israel in the Sinai. In many ways, Hughes pointed out, the MFO clearly illustrates certain formulae for a successful operation. As a separate institution created outside of the UN system, there was little question of the MFO’s mandate and no complications in the chain of command. The MFO could do what it felt was necessary, on its own accord, with the approval of the two sides.

Much of its success rested on the basic elements of good peacekeeping: it established high-level liaison officers and mandated constant communication between the two sides. In addition, there was a strong will on both sides not to resume the conflict. Israel was given the strategic depth it needed to feel secure, and a strong system of inspections helped build confidence. The MFO had plenty of resources to do its job and both Egypt and Israel wanted the operation to succeed.

Hughes recognized that Israel and Egypt in the case of the MFO pose a very different problem from that of Israel and Lebanon. The MFO operated in a benign environment with no conflict between the two sides. However, for any operation, Hughes emphasized the need for commitment, a strong mandate and an allowed flexibility to deal with problems as they arise.

Ambassador David Mack concluded the panel presentations by offering a look at the governance of Lebanon. According to Mack, Lebanon’s relatively free elections, history of constitutionalism and robust civil society all bode well for a successful democracy. However, negative signs also abound in a history of political instability, intrusive neighbors and weak borders. Although President Bush claimed that the Lebanese Army backed by international peacekeepers would be a “new force” in the South, Ambassador Mack doubts that such a situation will be sustainable without political agreements that reinforce Lebanon’s government institutions.

Mauritanian Foreign Minister Sid' Ahmed on Democratic Transition

H.E. Ahmed Ould Sid' Ahmed, Foreign Minister of Mauritania — Tue, 31 Jan 2006 12:00:00 -0500

In August 2005, the military took over in a coup d'état that ousted sitting President Maaouya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya, who had been reigning for 21 years. The Foreign Minister maintained that the coup was seen as the only option after more than a decade of instability, poverty, and failed attempts at democracy.

The Foreign Minister acknowledged that Mauritania’s political and economic problems are not unusual on the African continent, and that there have been many coups whose leaders promise reform but end up retaining dictatorial power. However, he reassured the audience that this coup would not end in the same fashion. Within weeks after the military council seized power they passed a constitutional decree that disqualified members of the military council and provisional government from running in the elections; this measure was taken to guarantee that the military would not stay in power and that the subsequent elections would be considered legitimate.

Despite this measure, Sid’ Ahmed acknowledged that many are still skeptical of a positive outcome and therefore emphasized a number of steps that the military council is undertaking to help Mauritania make a peaceful transition to democracy. The council has scheduled a gradual election program, starting with a vote on a constitutional amendment that would restrict the presidency to five years and allow only one subsequent re-election. This vote is scheduled for June 24, followed by local and district elections in November 2006, Senate elections in January 2007 and the presidential election in March 2007. The council is establishing an independent electoral convention that will create a network of committees and independent groups to oversee the election processes, along with international observers provided by the UN. The Foreign Minister said that these measures would lead to fair and transparent elections while demonstrating that the military council’s rhetoric is sincere.

Sid’ Ahmed also emphasized the importance of achieving transparency in management, especially with the advent of Mauritania’s oil exploitation. Mauritania is now undertaking a transparency initiative with the World Bank, which will be public knowledge and will help create a framework that will limit corruption. The Foreign Minister signaled that this action was just one of the ways in which Mauritania is seeking to achieve legitimacy in the international community.

Sid’ Ahmed also noted that the military council has increased communication with Mauritania’s neighboring countries in efforts to gain support for this transition and quell any former disputes. The Foreign Minister reminded the audience about Mauritania’s cooperation with the US in the War on Terror, and offered assurance that Mauritania’s strategic relationship with Israel would continue.

Foreign Minster Sid’ Ahmed's message culminated with optimism about what democracy and the new positive changes would bring for the people of Mauritania. He concluded his speech by saying: “by the end of May [2007] we will have an elected president and government, and the military and I will step down.”

Trita Parsi

Fri, 3 Oct 2008 16:18:01 -0400

Author of Treacherous Alliance - The Secret Dealings of Iran, Israel and the United States (Yale University Press, 2007), and 2008 Silver Medal Recipient of the Council on Foreign Relations Arthur Ross Book Award.

Adjunct professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

Advisor to Congressman Bob Ney (R-OH18) on Middle East issues.

Co-founder and current President of the National Iranian American Council, a non-partisan, non-profit organization promoting Iranian-American participation in American civic life.

Worked for the Swedish Permanent Mission to the UN in New York where he served in the Security Council handling the affairs of Afghanistan, Iraq, Tajikistan and Western Sahara, and the General Assembly's Third Committee addressing human rights in Iran, Afghanistan, Myanmar and Iraq.

Molly Williamson

Wed, 20 Aug 2008 12:11:57 -0400

Molly Williamson was the Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to the Secretary of Energy from 2005 to 2008. Prior to that position, she served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for the Middle East, South Asia, Oceania and Africa from 1999 to 2004.

Ms. Williamson served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations from 1996 to 1999, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia from 1993 to 1995. She held numerous postings in the Middle East and the United Nations, including Chief of Mission and Council General in Jerusalem during the Madrid Peace process from 1991 to 1993. Williamson retired in 2007 from the Foreign Service with the rank of Career Minister.

Ms. Williamson has been awarded two Presidential Service awards, fourteen awards from the Department of State, and numerous awards from the Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, and Energy.

Amb. Edward S. Walker, Jr.

Mon, 25 Jun 2007 14:19:41 -0400

Jacques E. Roussellier

Mon, 25 Jun 2007 13:55:20 -0400