Reform

Deciding the Fate of the Mujahadin

Trita Parsi — Mon, 6 Oct 2008 15:30:48 -0400

The Bush administration inherited many of Iraq's problems when it invaded that country, including an Iranian terrorist organization funded and armed by Saddam Hussein the Mujahedin-e-Kalq (MKO). Though in the midst of a war on terror, the Bush administration chose in 2003 to protect 3,000 of the organization's militants and house them in a camp given to the group by Saddam — Camp Ashraf just north of Baghdad.

Ever since, the faith of this State Department-listed terrorist organization has been unclear. Hated by Iraqis for its involvement in Saddam's crimes against the Iraqi people, the Baghdad government wants to expel the group. But no country is willing to take them.

Though the Iranian government wants to put the group's leadership on trial in Iran, it seems less interested in the organization's rank and file. The European governments have little interest in taking in 3,000 battle-hardened Muslim militants, fearing that they will use Europe as a base to plan and execute further terrorist attacks.

The U.S., on the other hand, has already contradicted its own principles by giving preferential treatment to an organization on the State Department's terrorist list — even though President Bush himself pointed to the organization's patronage under Saddam Hussein as evidence of Iraq's support for international terrorists in his speech to the United Nations in September 2002.

"Iraq continues to shelter and support terrorist organizations that direct violence against Iran," President Bush said. To complicate matters further, if reports that the U.S. has used MKO terrorists for cross-border raids into Iran are true, then Washington certainly doesn't want these militants to end up in Iranian hands.

Washington seems doomed if it does, doomed if it doesn't.
Members of the terrorist organization have protested outside the White House this past week, angered by the Bush administration's decision to hand over Camp Ashraf to the Iraqi government. The government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki will surrender the MKO members to Tehran, they argue, who in turn will imprison and execute them.

Though approximately 500 MKO fighters have been repatriated to Iran and no reports of abuse have emerged according to the International Committee of the Red Cross, which oversaw their return, sending rank-and-file Mujahedin members to Iran against their will would be irresponsible.

Hated by the Iranian people for having fought on Saddam's side in the Iraq-Iran war, the Iranian Mujahedin is understandably fearful of the fate awaiting them in Iran. After all, the Iranian government systematically violates the human rights of journalists and union leaders alike, let alone anti-Iranian terrorists.
Yet, contrary to the protesters outside the White House, the issue is not a choice between freedom in Camp Ashraf and captivity in Iran.

The Mujahedin is not an effective opposition to the unpopular government in Iran as the organization's defenders in Washington claim, but a politico-religious cult that brainwashes its members, places children of Mujahedin members with other families in order to prevent parents from defecting, and who according to Human Rights Watch, maintains control by torturing its rank and file. "Members who try to leave the Mujahedin pay a very heavy price," according to Joe Stork of Human Rights Watch.

Its involvement in terrorism is undisputed. It assassinated several Americans in Iran in the 1970s. It supported the taking of the U.S. Embassy in Iran and blasted Ayatollah Khomeini for releasing the American diplomats in 1981, arguing instead that the hostages should have been executed. It made a pact with Saddam Hussein in the 1980s and fought alongside his army against their Iranian countrymen. Later in the 1990s, they became Saddam's most trusted henchmen, tasked with quelling Kurdish and Shiite uprisings against the Iraqi dictator.

According to defectors, Mujahedin members in Camp Ashraf celebrated the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

In 2004, French authorities descended upon the Mujahedin headquarters in France, arresting the leader of the cult, Maryam Rajavi. Immediately, zealous Mujahedin members staged hunger strikes and several set themselves ablaze. Hardly the behavior of a democratically oriented opposition group.

But the vast majority of the Camp Ashraf residents are not so much members of a terrorist cult as they are victims of it. The camp is itself a prison. It may have provided Mujahedin militants with protection against ordinary Iraqis who sought to avenge their relatives killed by the Mujahedin at the behest of Saddam Hussein, but the prison has primarily enabled the leaders of the terrorist organization to prevent the rank and file from defecting.

Rather than debating where to expel the Mujahedin terrorists, help should be provided to the rank and file to break with the cult and make free choices about their future. It's the only humanitarian solution to this dilemma - and one that defeats rather than protects this anti-American terrorist group.

Saudi Arabia Opening to Tourists

Tue, 30 Sep 2008 10:56:42 -0400

Many people snickered when Saudi Arabia announced a few years ago that it would create a tourism industry as part of a long-term effort to diversify its oil-dependent economy.

Tourism in Saudi Arabia? The forbidding alcohol-free kingdom where women are veiled, shops close at prayer time, religious enforcers patrol the streets, criminals are beheaded in public and the most important sites are off-limits to non-Muslims? What a joke.

Perhaps it’s time to stop chuckling. Crystal Cruises, a luxury cruise ship line that caters to affluent Americans, has added the Saudi port city of Jeddah to its ports of call. The Crystal Serenity, a 1,080-passenger liner, is scheduled to make its first stop in Saudi Arabia on March 23, 2010.

This is intriguing news for travelers, but it represents much more for Saudi Arabia. It can be read as a statement from the country’s rulers that they are determined to open up the country and engage with the world, despite what is certain to be outraged opposition from Saudi Arabia’s xenophobic religious and social conservatives.

For decades Saudi Arabia was difficult for non-Muslims to visit, but it mattered little because few people other than pilgrims headed for Mecca wanted to go there anyway, except on business. Now under the leadership of King Abdullah, the country is opening itself more and more to outsiders—issuing multiple-entry visas, creating an international university and hosting regional sports tournaments and even cultural events. The efforts of the Supreme Commission for Tourism are part of that trend, which has been driven mostly by the economic imperatives of creating new jobs and building self-sustaining industries beyond oil and petrochemicals.

The commission, headed by Prince Sultan bin Salman, an American-educated astronaut and grandson of the kingdom’s founder, has focused mostly on domestic tourism. The aim was to persuade Saudis to spend their holidays at home, on the Red Sea beaches or in the mountains of the sparsely-populated southwest. Welcoming boatloads of non-Muslim foreigners is another matter.

The cruise passengers may provide temporary employment for bus drivers and tour guides, but it is likely their presence will agitate the monarchy’s vocal Islamist critics. In Egypt, cruise ship day-trippers travel in armed convoys because of the security threat. What will be the security challenge in Saudi Arabia, where in recent years extremists have killed French travelers and attacked the US consulate in Jeddah?

According to Crystal’s announcement, the Serenity is scheduled to arrive in Jeddah at 8 a.m. and depart at 6 p.m. the same day. This is standard practice for cruise lines, which organize day trips to onshore sites and then sail on to the next destination in the evening.

But how many of the Serenity’s passengers, who on most cruises include many Jews, will want to disembark in Saudi Arabia? The State Department’s most recent travel warning “urges U.S. citizens to consider carefully the risks of traveling to Saudi Arabia” where “there is an ongoing security threat due to the continued presence of terrorist groups...”

For the passengers who do go ashore, there are other questions: What will the women wear? What will there be to see? Mecca is a short drive away but off-limits. The great Nabatean ruins at Midan Saleh and the vistas of Asir National Park are too far away for day trips. And will any passengers be permitted to disembark on their own and visit Jeddah independently of an organized tour, as some routinely do in other ports?

On its Web site, Crystal describes Jeddah as if it were an Arab Barcelona: “Jeddah is a dynamic and cosmopolitan commercial hub. It is also an artistic one, with public art on display on its roundabouts. In fact, the collection, which includes works by Alexander Calder and Joan Miro, makes the city the largest open-air art gallery in the world. For shopaholics, Jeddah is a paradise...And for anyone who appreciates scenic beauty, there are lovely beaches and a picturesque corniche, where locals and visitors alike can be found relaxing and drinking in the views.”

Jeddah is indeed interesting, but also hot, crowded and choked with traffic. The restored old city and its souk would take perhaps an hour to visit. And, while there is good snorkeling in the Red Sea, few beaches permit western-style bathing attire.

Crystal Cruises is Japanese-owned and its ships are registered in the Bahamas, but its offices are in Los Angeles and the great majority of its passengers are Americans. Like most cruise lines, it is always looking for new and offbeat destinations, and its 2010 itinerary in the Middle East reflects that quest. In addition to Jeddah, the Serenity is scheduled to call at Bandar Abbas, Iran; Khasab, Oman, on the Strait of Hormuz; and Ashdod, Israel.

Lifting the Headscarf Ban in Turkey: Where do we go from here?

Fri, 15 Feb 2008 15:38:39 -0500

On February 9, 2008 the Turkish Parliament voted to amend the constitution, thus permitting women to wear the headscarf when entering the university- another step in the long-running dispute over secularism in Turkey. Devotees of Turkish secularism, who support the view that expressions of attachment to religion have no place in the public arena, will not quietly accept the change in religious behavior which the Islamic-oriented politicians have now voted to enact.

The first line of defense for the secularists will be to rely on the opposition Republican Peoples Party. Despite the fact that it lacks enough deputies in Parliament to prevent enacting the amendment, the party has pledged to take the issue to the Constitutional Court. Indeed, the head of the court warned politicians against softening the ban on headscarves in a speech on February 7. The Republican Peoples Party and others will argue that provisions entrenched in the Constitution prohibit changes to the secular nature of Turkey’s political scene. Though the chances of success are unclear, it will at the very least embitter relations between secularists and advocates of outward forms of Islamic piety. And polls have shown that those who favor freedom to wear a headscarf represent more than half the population of Turkey.

The argument will no doubt reflect clashing legal interpretations. Already we see that the Turkish legal community has held contentious meetings over whether the headscarf ban can legally be circumvented. In the end, the argument may hinge on this amendment’s proposed form of headscarf wearing. According to strict Muslim etiquette, no hair can be visible on a woman’s head. The ruling party in Turkey, on the other hand, is arguing that they instead would oblige those who wanted to cover their hair to wear a kerchief tied under the chin, thus making it difficult or impossible to cover every lock of hair. This is said to be a Turkish style and not necessarily an Islamic display. While its proponents argue that this reasoning could pass muster for secularists, it is unlikely to be accepted by either side. Secularist women in particular fear that this is the first step toward eventually forcing all women to cover their hair.

Although outnumbered, the secularists have several important political forces on their side. In addition to warnings by members of the courts, rectors of some of Turkey’s leading universities have gone so far as to complain that easing the ban would “turn Turkey into a religious state.” In accordance with this view, some university professors and others of the educated elite are determined to frustrate the ruling party. There is talk that they would be ready to expel headscarf wearers from their classes regardless of what the law and Constitution might permit. Were that to happen, it would inevitably entail more bitter legal battles and acrimony on campuses all over Turkey.

Of course, the main question that hangs over this dispute is the behavior of the military. Despite the fact that much of the officer corps has its roots in rural Turkey, normally the bastion of devotion to Islam, the senior generals have purged the ranks of any who do not appear to subscribe to the secularism of modern Turkey’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Accordingly, the military has been among the most extreme opponents of relaxing the ban on headscarves. In witness to this attachment to secularism, the generals called out tens of thousands of secular Turks last year to show solidarity in support of Turkey’s secular regime.

This year, top leaders of the military have been more circumspect. The Chief of the General Staff recently told the press that everyone knew where the military stood and thus it was not necessary to make any new pronouncement. While the military leadership has so far remained on the sidelines, secularists- particularly women- rallied just before the Parliamentary vote in demonstrations against a lifting of the ban on headscarves. It seems likely such demonstrations will continue along with court challenges.

Turkey thus appears to be in the midst of a disorderly process. While the military is likely merely to watch and wait, after their bluff was called when last year’s parliamentary election returned in favor of the Justice and Development Party, its supporters to continue to find ways to resist. To do more, however, would risk disrupting the course of negotiations to enter the European Union, which both Islamic-oriented parties and secularists favor. And the military knows that ruling Turkey is no job for the soldiers.

Pakistan at a Crossroad

Wed, 13 Feb 2008 15:39:52 -0500

Over the next several years, Pakistan will either become the nation that the clear majority of its people want – a modern democracy based on constitutional law – or, it will implode under extreme pressures and fall under autocratic rule by Islamist extremists. The general elections on February 18 are an important but not the only step in determining that outcome.

American analysts often simplify the struggle in Pakistan as a battle between moderates and extremists, but Pakistanis understand that it is really about law. Is the nation to be governed by laws based on a constitution, or on God’s law -- Sharia law?

Most Pakistanis view their country as the constitutional democracy their founding father, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, envisioned it to be. They have respect for their constitution and rule of law in the western tradition, and only welcomed Pervez Musharraf’s bloodless military coup in 1999 because he promised to end corruption and then restore civilian democracy.

But Musharraf balked at taking off his uniform and undermined the rule of law by declaring Emergency rule, jailing democratic activists and sacking the independent Supreme Court. Pakistani political elites criticize the United States for tenaciously supporting Musharraf’s military regime. They believe we value counter- terrorism before democracy.

The US has been respected in Pakistan and throughout the world for the righteousness of our core values of democracy, fairness, and justice. We must act on those values. The most compelling gesture our President could make to win the support of Pakistani people would be to firmly call for the reinstatement of the former Supreme Court Justices, including Iftikar Chaudhry. The US should continue to support the rule of law, protection of people, clean and fair elections contested on a level playing field.

It is true we both fear extremism as the most dangerous threat to Pakistan. The impatient response to the threat is with bullets and bombs. Perhaps a more enduring and ultimately successful strategy is through the ballet box and pocket book.

The United States has provided Pakistan over $11 billion in aid since 2002. But over 90% was security related assistance. It had little impact on the poorest civilian sectors of the society. It is time to shift US assistance from defense to development o foster programs that support job creation, education and health. In the long run, a shift in US aid priorities would do much to calm dissent, and stifle the attraction of militant jihadism than bombs and bullets.

Pakistan has in its midst an active militant jihadist element that threatens to ignite a young and frustrated population. To be successful our policies need to be based on a clear understanding of the needs and aspirations of the Pakistani people, and not just our own interests.

Pakistan is struggling through a volatile period of transition. We must adjust our policies to best serve the Pakistani people and their struggle for a stable democracy. No matter the outcome, the election this month may create new uncertainties and we must be prepared to deal with them in a way that can benefit both our nations.

Can Iraqis Beat the Ticking Clock?

Tue, 27 Nov 2007 14:59:03 -0500

Violence finally has declined enough so that an atmosphere more conducive to deal-making has emerged for Iraq’s rival ethno-sectarian groups. However, so far the tenor of politics in Baghdad does not appear to have changed much. Washington must make clear to the Iraqi government that as the surge begins to wind down, the opportunity to set in place durable stability must not be squandered. Otherwise, all involved will pay the consequences.

Violence certainly persists, but much of Iraq is safer than it was a year ago. Outside Baghdad, this has had relatively little to do with the surge. The main driver has been a Sunni Arab uprising against brutal and abusive Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) cadres that had been operating out of many Sunni Arab communities.

However, the alliance of convenience between many Sunni Arab tribal and insurgent elements on the one hand and US forces on the other against AQI reportedly has permitted 60,000 to 70,000 Sunni Arabs, with considerable hostility toward the Iraqi government, to arm and organize themselves as never before. Most of these Sunni Arabs in fact only agreed to this arrangement with US forces when Washington dropped its condition that there could be no such cooperation unless these elements also made their peace with the government in Baghdad.

Meanwhile, in stabilizing much of Baghdad, US forces did not succeed in crushing the Shi’a militias and their death squads, most notably Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army. In the face of the surge, such militias largely refused battle, either keeping a low profile in their Baghdad strongholds or fleeing to southern Iraq, generally beyond the reach of US forces.

Nonetheless, since their organization remains intact, these armed Shi’a militiamen would be free to return to Baghdad and resume their grisly activities once the surge winds down. In the meantime, Sadr has reined in his forces, but such a move could merely represent a clever tactical pause.

The first withdrawals aimed at bringing overall US troop levels down to pre-surge levels are going to come from Sunni Arab areas from which AQI has been driven. To the extent this becomes a trend, more and more Sunni Arab areas would fall under the control of what Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki recently called “illegal militias” - the armed Sunni Arab forces organized locally with US encouragement since late 2006.

If Sunni Arabs, Shi’a and Iraqi Kurds have not worked out the bulk of their differences by the time the surge winds down next summer, there would not be enough US forces to prevent tens of thousands of Sunni Arab fighters from coming into direct contact with government security forces and Shi’a militias, possibly resulting in a bloodbath.

Unfortunately, the only real political progress to date in Iraq has been the submission of legislation to Parliament that would allow hundreds of thousands of former Ba’th Party members to return to Iraqi political life. This proposed measure has, however, already reportedly run into considerable resistance.

Some argue that achieving certain formal political goals related to reconciliation, such as a revenue-sharing agreement, is unimportant because some ad hoc progress along such lines has been made. This is misleading. If such cooperation is not formalized, deep suspicions would persist, especially among Iraq’s alienated Sunni Arabs, who probably fear that such cooperation could be ended later rather arbitrarily.

A sense of urgency must be impressed upon Iraq’s Shi’a and Kurds. These two groups dominate the current political process and should offer meaningful concessions to Iraq’s increasingly formidable Sunni Arabs in order to break out of this dangerous pattern of gridlock regarding the building blocks for trust and reconciliation.

The current downturn in violence is fragile. It is very risky to crush one insurgency (AQI) by allowing another far more deeply-rooted insurgency to arm and organize. Iraq’s Sunni Arabs must be drawn into the political mainstream before the surge runs its course. If not, violence could rebound, even closer to levels akin to civil war than that seen in 2006. Only by including all of Iraq's ethno-sectarian communities in their country's future can there be a promising future for a united Iraq.

Lack of National Iraqi Loyalty Confounding Surge

Wayne White — Thu, 3 May 2007 12:00:00 -0400

The irony surrounding the current surge is that it might not be a surge at all. Prior to the bombing of Samara’s golden mosque in February 2006, the primary mission of US forces in Iraq had been defeating or containing the Sunni Arab insurgency and related terrorism. The outbreak of massive, Shi‘a militia violence, like widespread death squad activity, opened another front. Given this new challenge, do the 30,000 troops comprising the surge give US forces much additional combat power relative to these two major threats? Or do they merely help fill a deficit in military strength created by the emergence of the new second front?

Observers should beware of claims of progress at this stage of the game. The fall-off in civilian casualties in Baghdad is mainly the result of the decision on the part of the most active Shi‘a militia, Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, to either lay low in the face of the surge or take refuge in southern Iraq, largely beyond the reach of US forces.

Meanwhile, however, the Mahdi Army is unable to man its extensive system of checkpoints shielding Baghdad’s largest Shi‘a neighborhoods. This has allowed Sunni Arab fanatics to increase their suicide attacks against Shi’a Baghdadis. While it waits out the US surge, one can be sure the Mahdi Army is tallying up the gruesome Shi’a death toll in the Iraqi capital since the surge. The likely response will be renewed death squad rampages and sectarian cleansing whenever the surge has run its course.

With still too few boots on the ground, the US surge remains a gamble, regardless of its eventual duration, so long as Iraq’s overall political situation remains so fragile.

While an advisor to the Iraq Study Group, I prepared a surge proposal. It called for more than double the troops involved in the existing surge. Yet, I judged the probability of success of even this more robust effort as “substantially less than 50/50.” I was not alone. As a result, I also suggested that the US transition to withdrawal should that more ambitious surge fail to produce meaningful progress in its first year.

The current surge appears set to continue at least through early 2008. It may well last longer. No matter. The Mahdi Army, other Shi‘a militias, and their legions of allies in the Iraqi security forces unfortunately have the patience to wait out the surge and will almost certainly resume their bloody sectarian agenda whenever the surge winds down. In fact, some Shi‘a security elements operating alongside US forces apparently have been warning Shi‘a residents prior to US security sweeps to hide weapons and militia-related paraphernalia.

The reported desertion of many Kurdish soldiers who were sent to Baghdad for the surge draws attention to the greatest challenge facing US forces in Iraq: the creation of a truly national Iraqi security structure to which authority can be turned over if and when Baghdad (and the country writ large) can be stabilized. Much attention has been placed on adequate training and equipment, but the principal problem has been loyalty: a failure, in many cases, to perform duties reflecting loyalty to a shaky Iraqi central government rather than to one’s ethnic or sectarian community.

One bright spot may be a reported change in the situation in the Sunni Arab stronghold of al-Anbar province, where some tribal elements apparently have been moving against Sunni Arab terrorists and jihadists. Sunni Arabs also are said to be joining local Iraqi security forces in numbers not seen before.

These are positive trends, to be sure. But we must bear in mind that eliminating Sunni Arab terrorists as a major challenge would eventually re-focus the attention of their erstwhile Sunni Arab enemies on other dangerous goals: the struggle to end “occupation” and squaring off in a more organized fashion against the Shi‘a militias and Kurdish Peshmerga that have driven Sunni Arabs from mixed areas of the country from Baghdad to Kirkuk.

Indeed, with little loyalty toward a government so often at odds with Sunni Arab politicians, Sunni Arab recruits joining the security forces, like so many Kurds and Shi‘a, could put their training to use in the post-US withdrawal civil war scenario so feared by all.

Success or failure, the surge probably will leave the US facing the hard choice of whether or not to sacrifice still more lives and treasure to keep the lid on a boiling kettle of centuries-old ethno-sectarian strife that outside intervention has so far aggravated, not resolved.

How to Save the Pakistan Relationship

Marvin Weinbaum — Mon, 23 Oct 2006 12:00:00 -0400

Pakistan and the United States are increasingly questioning the benefits of their strategic partnership. Officially Washington continues to lavish praise on President Musharraf for aligning his country against global terrorism. But many of Pakistan’s extremist groups and associated Islamic institutions appear to be operating with near impunity and fueling the insurgency in Afghanistan. Musharraf’s commitment to a peace process with New Delhi has earned him high approval in Washington; yet Pakistan’s security services are blamed for complicity in terrorist acts against India. The Pakistan President is applauded for his vision of an enlightened, moderate Pakistan in the face of reported violations of civil liberties and denials of women’s rights, and a federal government powerless to enact reforms.

US policy makers may believe that Musharraf is indispensable at Pakistan’s helm, but many critics balk at continuing to give him a virtual pass to perpetuate his country’s military ascendance and resist a full probe of its past nuclear-related transfers. Even if many in Washington are willing to accept that his assurances to the US are sincere, they believe Musharraf’s domestic constraints make it doubtful he can deliver on his promises.

In Pakistan, Musharraf’s cooperation with the United States has become a growing liability. The expectations are gone that by deserting the Taliban in 2001 Pakistan would reap handsome rewards. Aside from American relief efforts following last year’s earthquake, US assistance, most of it dedicated to the military and for budgetary support, is barely noticed by the public. Washington’s offer of nuclear cooperation with India and its denial to Pakistan are seen as testimony that the US has cast its lot economically and strategically with India. This is underscored by the failure to reach an investment agreement with Pakistan during President Bush’s March visit, and refusal to amend US textile policies that hinder Pakistan’s industry.

Largely because Washington indiscriminately labels most conflicts across the Middle East and Afghanistan as part of the war on terrorism, most Pakistanis see it as a war against Islam, and thus not their war. The Musharraf government’s unpopular, failed militarization of the tribal agencies is generally seen as undertaken at the behest of the US. The public seems prepared to accept intelligence sharing, but sovereignty-sensitive Pakistanis are deeply offended by Washington’s declaration that the American military would enter Pakistani territory, even if uninvited, to apprehend a high value Al Qaeda figure.

How then do the two countries shore up an increasingly problematic but critical relationship? If Washington must alter some policies, so too must Pakistan. For starters, the US should revise its assistance priorities, show greater sensitivity in its public diplomacy, and take a more pro-active role in facilitating resolution of Pakistan’s differences with India.

For Pakistan, only significant changes in the domestic political landscape offer any hope for a sustainable partnership. Musharraf cannot satisfy his allies or realize the aspirations of most Pakistanis with his jerrybuilt political party and ultimate dependency on the loyalties of his generals. He must move quickly to build a more inclusive constituency that includes those progressive political elements he has shunned and tried to cripple. Otherwise, he can only win next year’s legislative elections by aligning his opportunistic party followers with one of the larger jihadi-supporting Islamic parties. Even then Musharraf and his backers will have to resort to large-scale electoral manipulation in order to ensure a parliamentary majority. Legitimacy will also be an issue should President Musharraf decide, as expected, to seek reelection from lame duck national and provincial assemblies and insist on remaining army chief too.

The US has too much at stake to remain as passive as it has. Washington refrained from cautioning or criticizing Musharraf when he claimed the presidency through a stacked referendum, arbitrarily enhanced his constitutional powers, pre-cooked national elections, and then reneged on a pledge to take off his uniform. The US thereby managed to reinforce the impression it prefers military governments to democratic ones.

A failure now to encourage Musharraf to open the political system will doom hopes for progressive policies. It will only produce a coalition inclined to be more confrontational with India and Afghanistan. For many in Pakistan it would also confirm the US as a fickle ally that will once again desert Pakistan if it should succeed against Al Qaeda. For an alliance that endures, Washington must counter the widely held view that the American partnership is with Musharraf and the army, not with the people of Pakistan.

Israel Reaching Towards the Wrong Address

Paul Scham — Thu, 13 Jul 2006 12:00:00 -0400

The news from Gaza and the Lebanese-Israeli border is bad and getting worse.

Unfortunately, Israel’s response follows in the footsteps of the American response to 9/11, that is, purporting to “hold responsible” parties who cannot really control the situation.

According to reports at the time (later confirmed in a July 12 article in The New York Times by Michael Slackman and Souad Mekhennet), Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit’s kidnappers were not connected with the Hamas government of the Palestinian Authority, and likely not even with the “outside leadership” of Khalid Meshal in Damascus. Despite this, Israel has repeatedly announced that it is holding Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh responsible for Shalit’s welfare, and has launched punishing air and ground strikes— many of which succeeded in killing only civilians. At this point, there is little reason to believe that either the mainstream Hamas leadership or the Palestinian Authority President has any real control over Shalit’s fate.

On the contrary, those who are holding Shalit have no interest in a peaceful resolution. They are playing the role that Hamas did until a few years ago, basing their strategy on the assumption that the more violence, the better for them. This is the jihadist, al-Qaeda worldview and indeed the Times article indicates that Arab intelligence services see Shalit’s kidnappers as ideologically embracing this strategy. These groups actively welcome Israeli attacks in the belief that they serve to radicalize the population and to delegitimize the Palestinian Authority.

In the last few days the Lebanese border has also exploded in violence and even there the Israeli response has been equally misguided. Israel, like any sovereign state, cannot tolerate attacks on its territory, but it must recognize that the Lebanese government is not sovereign in various respects—especially with regard to Hizbollah, which is conducting the attacks and is generally considered a proxy for Iran.

If anything, Iranian influence in Lebanon has grown since the formal withdrawal of Syrian forces last year. In the maze of Lebanese politics, some members of the government support Hizbollah, while others oppose it, but it is clear that the Lebanese government is not in a position to suppress Hizbollah’s operations. Attacks on Lebanese cities will not prevent future attacks. On the contrary, with further attacks which kill civilians, Israel will fall into the jihadist trap, in which it is already enmeshed in Gaza.

Israel was apparently willing to agree to the phased withdrawal plan arranged by Egyptian President Mubarak (Mubarak blamed unspecified “pressures” on Hamas for the failure of the prisoner exchange). It would have been in the interest of both Israel and the Palestinian leadership to end the violence as quickly as possible. Israel must recognize that if it does not deal one way or another with the de facto and de jure Palestinian leadership—namely Hamas—it will be strengthening the jihadist forces which are not the same as Hamas, but rather much worse for Israel and for the West. All Islamists are not the same, an inconvenient fact that both Israel and the United States must, in the current climate, learn to deal with. Israel does not have to deal with Hamas face-to-face, but there are ample precedents for using third party intermediaries, such as the Turks or Egyptians.

Israel’s strategy of retaliation dates back to the 1950’s when it was largely conducted by a young officer named Ariel Sharon. Its efficacy has consistently been questioned, but its central assumption rested on the belief that it was in the interest of neighboring governments, whether Jordanian, Egyptian, or Lebanese, to quell terrorist groups in order to prevent disproportionate attacks by Israel. The assumption falls apart when, as in the current case in Gaza and Lebanon, the neighboring government is not in control of significant armed forces operating from its territory.

Israel’s leaders must take a hard look at the current reality and recognize that its own interests, and the interests of the Hamas government in Gaza and of the Lebanese government in Beirut, lie in ending the current violence as quickly as possible. All have strong interests in preventing the emergence and strengthening of jihadist groups, whose strategy is primarily to exacerbate conflict. It is important to note that most Arab governments, especially those of Egypt and Jordan, share this desire to quell the violence as expeditiously as possible.

This means that Israel has to accept mediation, or even covert direct contacts, with the Hamas government based on their immediate shared interest in ending the current crisis. It also has to work with foreign governments to come to an agreement which will return the captured and end the attacks on its territory. Bombing Beirut will not accomplish these goals. Recognition of current realities offers the best chance for the return of the captives and defusing the crisis.

Kuwaiti Elections: New Voices

Jennifer McElhinny — Fri, 9 Jun 2006 12:00:00 -0400

Kuwait is in the midst of a political transformation. The past month has showcased the first youth movement demanding political reform and more backbone from their political representatives. Parliament has been dissolved. The new election, now set for the end of June, will reveal more registered women voters than men and promises to further the reform process. Eligible Kuwaiti female voters outnumber Kuwaiti men four to three.

Yes, Kuwait’s executive still wields undue influence over its democratically-elected parliament, but the latest developments clearly indicate radical change is underway. Democratic practices are entrenched and expanding.

Kuwait’s Emir exercised his constitutional authority to dissolve parliament on May 22 in response to increasing criticism within parliament and society over the number of constituencies in legislative elections. Kuwaitis currently vote in 25 constituencies, or electoral districts. Liberal, Islamist, Shia and centrist parliamentarians in Kuwait found common cause, arguing that the high number of electoral districts encourages corruption by making vote buying easier. It also privileges smaller constituencies and enables candidates to run on tribal affiliation rather than broad national platforms.

When the government appeared to back away from a reform proposal initiated in May, more than half the 50 members of parliament walked out in protest. This dramatic move was preceded by an unprecedented public pressure campaign from a customarily powerless sector of Kuwaiti society.

Debate over the constituencies sparked the birth of a youth campaign for reform that labeled itself the “Orange Movement” for the color its activists wore. The Orange Movement represented diverse groups of Kuwaiti youth, conservatives and liberals, women and men, who gathered and slept in front of the National Assembly and in the gallery and organized rallies using the internet and cell phone text messaging. They distributed materials lobbying the government to address corruption in the political system by reducing the number of electoral constituencies to five.

The mobilization of Kuwait’s youth around this reformist agenda startled the government as well as society. Kuwaiti youth, well versed in electoral politics from active campaigns for student representatives in university, are no longer content to sit on the sidelines. Their political influence is demonstrated by their numbers and will only grow. Nearly 40 percent of the population is under 25. The voting age in Kuwait is 21.

It was pressure from youth groups that prevented efforts to soften the reform process through a government-backed proposal to consolidate the districts into ten. The government was charged with flip-flopping on reform, and facing a legislative deadlock, the Emir chose to dissolve parliament and schedule elections for June 29.

The acceleration of Kuwait’s next legislative election by more than a year brings to the forefront another major transformation within the political system. A year ago, Kuwaiti women were given the right to vote and run for office. Women are already well integrated into the economic, educational and civic spheres, and had begun to develop political platforms for the July 2007 legislative elections immediately after receiving the right to vote. After the parliament was dissolved and, with only two weeks to declare candidacy, Kuwaiti women quickly answered those who questioned if their enfranchisement could affect the domestic political scene.

Thirty-two Kuwaiti women have declared their candidacy for parliament. Women have rented large tents to campaign in traditional Kuwaiti style, host prospective voters and speak to mixed groups about their platforms. The most striking effect of their participation has been the immediate transformation of political platforms of both male and female candidates to reflect long-neglected political concerns of Kuwaiti women.

It is premature to suggest that Kuwaiti women will vote for different candidates than their husbands, fathers and brothers did in the past. Evidence from Kuwait University, where women make up around 67 percent of the voting student body, indicates Kuwaiti women routinely elect male and Islamist candidates. Still, it is clear that all political candidates have quickly learned to respect the power Kuwaiti women now wield.

Both male and female candidates show a new commitment to reforming laws that have left Kuwaiti women as second-class citizens. One law getting a lot of attention in campaign speeches is the nationality law that prevents Kuwaiti women who have non-citizen husbands from passing Kuwaiti citizenship to their children.

Kuwait’s political system is in flux. Gone are the days when the Emir could dissolve parliament without declaring elections within the constitutionally-mandated two months, as the former Emir did in 1986. Some analysts suggest the move to dissolve parliament allows the powerful executive to shrink the political space for debate and reform. This may be true, but it overlooks just how far Kuwaitis have come in transforming their political system.

Kuwaiti women and youth are flexing their newfound political muscle with dramatic results. The Orange Movement has taught Kuwait’s youth they can successfully voice their political views and gain public support. Kuwaiti women have shown they can and will vote and run for office, despite death threats against some female candidates. These new voices appear determined to make sure Kuwait’s democratic reforms endure.

A Plan For Victory

Edward Walker — Tue, 13 Dec 2005 12:00:00 -0500

We should welcome the fact that the Bush Administration has now come up with a relatively comprehensive and somewhat detailed plan for victory in Iraq. For the future, I would only hope that this administration or any of its successors would develop such a strategy before invading another country. The fact that it has taken three years to inform the American people of our goals and strategy in Iraq is at best a dereliction of duty.

One can quibble with some of the language of a strategy document. Using a loaded word, “rejectionist,” to describe the majority of our opponents in Iraq raises all the red flags in the Middle East of those Palestinians who reject peace with Israel. Is this what we are fighting about? And why did the White House invoke the “8 pillars” of victory when every devout Muslim will be reminded of the “5 pillars” of Islam and will question the implied, albeit possibly unintentional, linkage? While these points may sound like nit picking, part of the reason we are in the mess we are in today is because we did not understand the culture we were engaging or listen to those in the region who may have had a better fix for their next door neighbor than the gurus of our neo-conservative movement.

I also wonder how we can complain, in the President’s strategic pillar number eight, about the successes in Iraq being “overshadowed in the international media, including popular pan-Arab outlets” and then point to the “new independent media outlets” in Iraq being “testament to the vitality of a free press,” when the Los Angeles Times, New York Times, and Washington Post are all reporting that our military is buying articles and Iraqi journalists. What outrageous chutzpah.

What worries me most about the national strategy is what it doesn’t say and what it may imply. We have created a strategy for Iraq and the Iraqi people, but I cannot find in the document the National Security Council released any indication of Iraqis who embrace it or helped develop it. Does the Shiite leader Ali Sistani endorse the President’s concept of “Victory in Iraq?” How about the Kurdish leader Barzani? The strategy calls for international cooperation. Has the President secured the agreement of the international community for this strategy and this definition of victory? The neighboring states are a key component in the strategy for securing Iraq. Did the President discuss his concept of victory with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia? And how are we to deal with Iran when we won’t even talk to the Iranian leadership? The Syrians are currently drumming up a nationalistic fervor among their people to stand up to the United States and the UN. Does this mean that we have to widen the war, a la Cambodia, to secure the Syrian-Iraqi border?

The President’s definition of victory has the ringing vocabulary of a good speechwriter, but I find myself lost when it comes to the details. The strategy defines our objective as “federalism” and declares that it is not a precursor to the breakup of Iraq. The “strong central government” exercising the powers of a sovereign state is all well and good, but what are those powers and who is going to exercise them? The strategy is quiet on that. At the same time, it says “regional bodies” will make the decisions that protect the interests of local populations. Well, it is in the interest of the Kurdish and Shiite “local populations” that they control the oil and gas wealth of the country with crumbs left for the Sunnis. Despite our talk of preserving a unified Iraq, it would seem that the structure we are building incorporates a lot of centripetal force when it comes to the hard realities of religious and economic interests.

The strategy also talks about building an officer corps that will be loyal to the Iraqi government, not a particular group or tribe. But NATO is only now setting up the new military staff college that is supposed to help integrate these forces. What have we been doing for the past three years? Furthermore, according to the strategy, we have recruited nearly 5,000 Sunnis for the military who are “planning to return to their home province and help protect it from terrorists.” That sounds like building a force that is loyal to its local community and religious sect, not a remote central government. I don’t see any plan for getting rid of the local militias that are so important to the Kurds and some Shiite factions.

I welcome the NSC effort. But I want more. I want to know that we are providing the model for rule by law and that our Vice President and the head of the CIA are not advocating interrogation tactics that will be used by the fledgling Iraqi government as an excuse for far harsher tactics. Our press is already reporting that Iraqi government officials want to take off the kid gloves. I want to know that we stand for freedom of the press and that we don’t have to buy it. I want to know that the President does not believe, as the British press alleged, that we could bomb Al Jazeera into submission just because it reports things we don’t like. And I want to know that when the President talks about debate, he means genuine debate and not the disparagement of opponents like Congressman John Murtha.