Intelligence

Human Intelligence, Counterterrorism, and National Leadership: A Practical Guide

Fri, 17 Oct 2008 16:40:13 -0400

Note to Listeners: Please help MEI improve our podcast by completing our online survey

MEI is honored to host Gary Berntsen, a 20-year veteran in the CIA's clandestine service, to discuss his new book, "Human Intelligence, Counterterrorism, and National Leadership: A Practical Guide."

Gary Berntsen has written this book as a guide for an incoming president and White House staff so that they may master current human intelligence and counterterrorism operations. After reading its highly specific recommendations and policy prescriptions, the president and his or her staff will be able to draft a First Directive for the leadership of the intelligence and national security communities outlining how the administration wants those communities to proceed and to defend the nation’s interests.

Intelligence Analysis: The Bad News Syndrome

Wayne White, Adjunct Scholar, Middle East Institute — Tue, 21 Feb 2006 12:00:00 -0500

According to an article in the February 13 issue of US News & World Report, President Bush reacted to a darkly pessimistic assessment of the situation in Iraq, written by the CIA's Baghdad station chief in mid-2004, by remarking: "What is he, some kind of defeatist?"

The President's sharply negative reaction to what was one of the most refreshingly frank assessments on the situation in Iraq is notable. It begs the question as to what the President's reaction was to the July 2004 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) addressing the troubled future of governance in Iraq, released at roughly the same time, and on which Paul Pillar (then National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia), myself, and other intelligence analysts from across official Washington and the military worked so hard.

President Bush's comment dramatizes one of the most daunting challenges facing analysts and supervisors throughout the US intelligence community. Although policymakers frequently say they want the most objective analysis they can get (the truth, as best we can see it), in reality, their reaction to assessments that run counter to expectations is all too often shoot the messenger.

One example comes to mind. During the agonizing 1979-1981 Iran-US hostage crisis, a senior official in the State Department's Near East Bureau (NEA) reacted angrily when the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) told him secret talks with Iranian diplomats in Europe would likely fail. INR was correct. Ayatollah Khomeini held the cards, not the Iranian Foreign Ministry, and he was utterly uninterested in such talks. This would become painfully clear later when solutions had to be sought elsewhere. The frustrated, but honorable, NEA official made a point of apologizing to his INR colleagues. Such apologies, however, are relatively rare.

More commonly, such negative reactions produce a snowball effect in which the more the boss gets upset when receiving bad news, the less such painfully realistic judgments are passed up the line or read and taken seriously if they are. The result is often a policymaker who is even more isolated from the basics he or she needs in order to make an informed judgment. And that is the first step down the slippery slope toward mistake and miscalculation.

Indeed, this negativity has become so common among senior officials that it has given rise to yet another problem: the temptation among subordinates within the intelligence community to engage in self-censorship.

When it became clear, for example, during the coordination of an NIE in late 2003 on violence and instability in Iraq that prospects for tamping down the insurgency were unexpectedly grim, the senior official chairing the meeting looked around at his fellow intelligence analysts and exclaimed rhetorically, "How can I take this upstairs?" (to then-CIA Director George Tenet).

Some policymakers, however, provide refreshing surprises to otherwise wary intelligence professionals. In the spring of 2004, INR submitted to Secretary of State Colin Powell an especially pessimistic memorandum warning of the grave situation in Iraq's Sunni heartland. Powell not only took it seriously, he faxed copies of it to Presidential Chief of Staff Andrew Card, Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and CIA Director Tenet as recommended reading. Rumsfeld was still mulling it over a week later.

In January 2005, in Washington, the heads of intelligence agencies (including our British allies) received a particularly pessimistic read-out of the overall Iraq situation. Virtually all these senior intelligence professionals agreed with the thrust of the presentation. Secretary Powell heard about the briefing and asked for a copy of the text. Later, the Secretary of State told the head of INR that he had used some of the contents of the briefing in his last meeting with the President. Only Powell knows what the President's reaction was.

Clearly, given the continued gravity of the situation in Iraq, with respect to the insurgency, terrorism, governance, and the economy, the Administration must take frank and often pessimistic assessments more seriously. Repeated promises that go unfulfilled, statements of "progress" in the face of sustained violence, repeated delays in reconstruction and continued Iraqi governmental dysfunction, brutality and corruption are partly the result of leaders replacing hardheaded analysis with wishful thinking.

Such was the case this past week during Secretary Condoleezza Rice's testimony in Congress when she offered yet another seemingly indignant reassurance that things were on track in the face of tough questioning by Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE). Despite the smoke screen, recent polling indicates that the American public is gaining a better grasp of reality when it comes to the troubling situation in Iraq than some of their leaders.

Bolton's Problem Goes Beyond Serial Abuse

Wayne White — Wed, 27 Apr 2005 12:00:00 -0400

At a time of continued criticism of the United States abroad, the Bush administration cannot afford to send John Bolton to the United Nations.

Despite all that has been said and done, there is still an opportunity for Republicans on Capitol Hill - and in the administration - to decide not to remain locked into the all-too-familiar Washington spectacle of an administration and its supporters in Congress pressing forward with a flawed nominee as if no others could be found. Continuing allegations relating to Bolton already have had a considerable impact on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (on both sides, it would seem). But the administration so far seems unmoved, doubtless hoping it can nudge wavering Republicans on the Hill back into line, which would allow the White House to ram home Bolton's confirmation come next month.

Sadly, Vice President Dick Cheney, in an apparent effort to sweep aside the derogatory information that has come to light regarding Bolton's past behavior, has reportedly declared, "I have looked at all the charges that have been made. I don't think any of them stand up to scrutiny." Once, some years ago, I was on the receiving end of an attempt by another senior State Department official to suppress intelligence analysis, somewhat similar to what has been described in connection with Bolton. It happens. I also stood my ground, my boss backed me up and in the end we were vindicated.

Former Bureau of Intelligence and Research Assistant Secretary Carl Ford – a conservative who called himself as a "reluctant witness" – has described Bolton as a "serial abuser." I had the great privilege of serving under Ford in the bureau and spending many, many hours working alongside him. Ford is a model of integrity. His word is as good as gold, period.

Meanwhile, to make matters even more difficult to sort out, issues clouding Bolton's confirmation are being framed by many as questions confined solely to "management style." I would be the last to downplay Bolton's reported abuse of subordinates and disruption of proper information flow, but to channel debate into only this one area of behavior ignores and trivializes a far more ominous issue: basic objectivity – perhaps even integrity. How many times has a foreign policy mistake been described as an "intelligence failure" when, in fact, what actually occurred was the insertion of spin into the process that ignored, distorted or reached beyond the intelligence to advance a policy objective. And there is a world of difference between healthy questions concerning intelligence analysis and politicized efforts to alter it or make it go away. Once intelligence analysis is exaggerated or rejected and dissenting analysts waved off, senior officials place us on the slippery slope to policy failure.

I agree with the president that we should "put aside politics." And in that spirit, Bolton's supporters must step back from the political fray and ask exactly how effective he would be in New York at this point if confirmed. One certainly could not expect Bolton, in some future crisis, when the chips were down, to advance effectively the American position at the UN, especially if doing so in any way involved "intelligence." The last thing this country needs is a UN ambassador who many around the world doubtless already believe has tried to cook intelligence or has mistreated, ignored or distanced himself from those who have merely attempted to offer clear-headed judgments that were inconsistent with a certain political agenda.

And that may be the bottom line: Regardless of how the administration feels about Bolton, it is hard to believe that his credibility abroad can ever be restored following the testimony that has been heard, let alone what might lie in the wings. And as the administration moves vigorously on various fronts to improve its international relations, why saddle itself with a significant liability so early in the game?

Intel Competition Is Crucial

Phyllis Oakley — Fri, 6 Aug 2004 12:00:00 -0400

You can't talk about a national intelligence director, or intelligence czar, without understanding the structure beneath such a job or where the money for intelligence goes. In my experience in government, people pay attention only to people who control resources with real, not nominal, authority.

Our national intelligence structure was set up to be competitive -- to encourage independent analysis from different agencies in hopes such competition produces better judgments about how to act on the intelligence we have. So, for example, the work of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) would compete with the CIA's or Defense Intelligence Agency's.

Professionals from each agency would note differences in analysis and, by investigating and resolving them, come to a better understanding. When they are not worked out, differences must be highlighted and explained, all the way to the very top, and not papered over. With an intelligence czar and a unified intelligence center, the system would lose the competitiveness that's been an important element of its successes until now.

Not everything about the present situation is bad. On the question of whether Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, INR did better than everyone else. It's just that no one listened. It seems to me that whatever structure is set up, the principle of competitive analysis, as well as a system in which people can argue and disagree, needs to be preserved. And those people need to be heard by the national security adviser or the president.

The relationship between an intelligence czar and a president needs to be a personal one. Look at President Bill Clinton's first CIA director, James Woolsey. He never saw Clinton, which made it difficult for intelligence to inform policy.

It may seem paradoxical, but the only thing we need as much as competitiveness among agencies is coordination, especially if we go along with the commission plan to maintain separate agencies. The 9/11 commission's report made it clear that coordination was strikingly lacking three years ago, and that was at the root of our intelligence failure. For example: Before Sept. 11, 2001, the CIA had information about some of the hijackers, but they weren't on the Immigration and Naturalization Service watch list for visas.

Having a joint coordination center might have helped, but having an overarching czar wouldn't have solved that problem. If the national intelligence director is a member of the Cabinet and has all sorts of other responsibilities, he's not going to have time to run the center. Moreover, the real coordination isn't going to come from the top -- it has to be encouraged at a lower level, among analysts.

All these things need to be thought about -- and urgently. But there ought to be real discussion about how any reconfigured intelligence structure would work. The thought that the president is just going to adopt all these things -- especially in an election year -- is just wacky. You have to look at the total intelligence structure before you can say yea or nay.

"Human Intelligence, Counterterrorism, and National Leadership: A Practical Guide."

Book Launch with Gary Berntsen — Fri, 22 Aug 2008 12:43:14 -0400

MEI is honored to host Gary Berntsen, a 20-year veteran in the CIA's clandestine service, to discuss his new book, "Human Intelligence, Counterterrorism, and National Leadership: A Practical Guide."

About the Book:

The next president of the United States faces innumerable complex problems, from a possible prolonged recession to climate change. An immediate difficulty for the president will be the global conflict between the West and Islamic jihadists and state sponsors of terrorism. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission notwithstanding, the administration needs to be armed and ready to tackle much more in the areas of intelligence and counterterrorism. The president can and must assume a hands-on, informed leadership role if the United States wants to make progress in the war on terror.

Human Intelligence, Counterterrorism, and National Leadership will be of interest to legislators, policymakers, and anyone concerned about intelligence and terrorism policy. With a foreword by Seth G. Jones, a political scientist at the RAND Corporation and Adjunct Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is the author of In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan and The Rise of European Security Cooperation.

About the Author

Gary Berntsen is a retired senior CIA operations officer who has served as a chief of station on three separate occasions. He led the CIA’s most important counterterrorist deployments from 1995 through 2005. Since May 2007 he has been serving as an intelligence and counterinsurgency adviser in eastern Afghanistan. Berntsen is the author of the bestseller Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda (Crown, 2005). He has done more than seventy-five television appearances as well as numerous appearances on CNN, Fox, MSNBC, and NBC. He lives in Forest Hills, New York.

Intelligence in the Wake of the Iraq War

Paul Pillar — Thu, 9 Mar 2006 12:00:00 -0500

The Middle East Institute is pleased to welcome Dr. Paul Pillar to discuss Iraq and intelligence policies after of the war.

Dr. Pillar is a Visiting Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. In his twenty-eight year career with the U.S. intelligence community, he served in a variety of analytical and managerial positions, including as chief of analytic units covering portions of the Near East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. His most recent position was that of National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Dr. Pillar is also the author of Negotiating Peace and Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy.

“Your Government Failed You: Breaking the Cycle of National Security Disasters”

Richard ClarkeRichard Clarke — Thu, 3 Jul 2008 09:43:56 -0400

Richard Clarke first remarked that he was motivated to write his book after encountering today’s youth who are often disillusioned with the political process. Previous generations have witnessed several government-led successes, from triumph in World War II to the creation of the Internet. Many of today’s young people, however, have witnessed several successive failures of the US government in the realm of national security, from the inability to defeat al-Qaeda to inadequately addressing the pressing issue of climate change. According to Clarke, not only has the government failed in properly addressing these challenges, but in some cases it has established even greater hindrances to achieving national security through the creation of overwhelming bureaucracy, as exemplified in the Department of Homeland Security.

After outlining the current situation, Clarke attributed the recent trend of government failures to two particular phenomena: the politicization of national security and the de-emphasis on professionalization in government.

First, Richard Clarke stated that national security has too often been used as a divisive, partisan issue when it should instead be a matter of national unity. Clarke noted that there are over 9,000 political appointees within the government who deal with national security, and the Department of Homeland Security houses more political appointees that any other department in US history. While Clarke conceded that there is a place for political appointees in government, he stated that this role should be dramatically curtailed with respect to national security. The pervasiveness of partisan appointees today starkly contrasts with the past, when the National Security Council was deliberately established in 1947 with nonpartisan appointees to avoid politicization of national security decision-making.

Second, Richard Clarke described how the level of expertise within the government has markedly declined. Instead of fostering a culture that rewards excellence, the government has outsourced many of its critical responsibilities to the private sector. The growing proximity of the government to the private sector is exemplified by the fact that CIA reports are as frequently written by for-profit contractors as they are by the government. Clarke noted that several billions of dollars are devoted to the intelligence community per year, even though little of this money is directed to the vital task of intelligence analysis. He believes that the next administration has the ability and the responsibility to reverse this trend. An influential executive could serve as inspiration for reform by highlighting the nobility of government service. Also, he advocated for both the establishment of high qualifications and the periodic recertification of government employees to ensure they are capable in their positions. He further stated that Congress has a role to play in restoring government accountability and that the media has an obligation to report government failures not as isolated episodes but rather as part of a larger systemic trend.

Looking towards the next administration, Clarke stressed the importance of separating national security from partisan politics and the importance of cultivating a renewed appreciation for professionalism in government. According to Clarke, there are simply too many challenges facing the United States to ignore these issues. The future of the nation is contingent upon the government’s ability to execute the aforementioned reforms in order to succeed in upholding the nation’s security.

The Man Who Pushed America To War: The Extraordinary Life, Adventures and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi

Aram Roston — Thu, 10 Apr 2008 14:03:39 -0400

Roston began with a description of the complicated financial history of Chalabi and his family. Among these companies to collapse was Petra Bank in Jordan, from which Chalabi took money to give to his other companies. It was this in-trading and alleged embezzling that got Chalabi in trouble with the Jordanian government. Chalabi claimed the collapse of his bank and his conviction was a result of a conspiracy between Saddam Husayn and the Jordanian government to defame him and his company; however, there was little evidence to support that claim.

Around $59 million in US taxpayer funds went to Chalabi through Congress as well as the Department of State and Department of Defense. The visible result, he said, was the propaganda that resulted from it. The money ended up, unintentionally, buying dubious and fabricated stories that were carried by most major US news outlets that served a significant role in altering American public opinion leading up to the Iraq War. In retrospect, it is easy to see the unlikelihood of stories featuring such unlikely topics as a Husayn-sponsored hijacker training camp, a WMD hidden in a Baghdad underground well, and a personal meeting between Husayn and Usama bin Laden that involved an exchange of money.

The question was then asked, how was the media seemingly so easily taken in by essentially a glorified con man? Roston understood that it was Chalabi’s flattery. For instance, British journalist David Rhodes was someone Roston praised highly as a journalist but was also someone who printed and wrote on nearly every Chalabi fabrication that was released. According to Roston, Rhodes has since realized his mistakes, but at the time it was so easy to be taken in by Chalabi’s description of a moral and progressive cause, his praise of Rhodes as a “moral man” for helping him out, and his appeals to the naturally competitive nature of reporters by offering exclusive interviews and playing reporters against each other for them.

Now, Roston said, Chalabi is working his way back up the political ladder as the chair of the extragovernmental “services committee” in Iraq, which was put in charge of major reconstruction of utilities and hospitals in Baghdad — a process that has not gone very well despite the significant amount of money provided to the committee. This followed a failed attempt by Chalabi to secure $64 million to form a committee (Roston noted his fondness of forming committees) to liaise between US forces and Iraqi people after the invasion. This request, Roston said, was one for which Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki laughed in his face.

In the end, Roston viewed Chalabi as being motivated by a desire to see Shi‘a empowerment in Iraq as well as an obsession with revenge against Saddam Husayn in his plan to fool the US government into attacking Iraq. His promises that the Iraqi people would rise up and that the Iraqi army would join the US forces in marching on Baghdad were as much tools as the fabricated and distorted stories he fed the American media to deceive a country to which he had no patriotic ties. By fooling America, Roston said, he got what he wanted.

Book Launch - Roy Gutman: How We Missed the Story; Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban, and the Hijacking of Afghanistan

Roy Gutman — Tue, 19 Feb 2008 09:49:27 -0500

How the US government missed the story:

Underlying the US failed policy towards Afghanistan was, in Gutman’s view, a failed understanding of the realities on the ground. Specifically, Gutman thinks the US gravely underestimated the threat posed by the sanctuary Al-Qa‘ida enjoyed in Afghanistan. As Gutman puts it, the US government missed the story in Afghanistan because it failed to understand the consequences of Bin Laden and Al-Qa‘ida’s “hijacking” of the Afghan regime. No one in the government was aware of the extent to which Bin Laden was whispering instructions in Mullah Omar’s ear. After the Taliban’s big setback in May of 1997 when it unsuccessfully tried to capture the Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif, Bin Laden stepped up his assistance of weapons, money and equipment to the Taliban and earned Mullah Omar’s gratitude. The US pleaded again and again for Mullah Omar to hand over Bin Laden despite clear signals that he would not do so. In the light of this stalemate, a change in US policy was, according to Gutman, long overdue.

Gutman went on to assert that when the grasp of reality is wrong, policy is also likely to be wrong. Gutman thinks US policy towards Afghanistan in the 1990s was a failure. Gutman called the Clinton Administration’s remedy to the increasing threat perception from Al-Qa‘ida a “quick-fix”. This quick-fix was an attempt to neutralize Al-Qa‘ida with covert operations planned and executed by the intelligence community instead of creating the wider diplomatic approach Gutman thinks was needed.

How the media missed the story:

Gutman himself got interested in the story because of what appeared to him as a media that largely ignored what was going on in Afghanistan. Stationed in Europe covering the Balkans, Gutman said he was following Afghanistan from a distance and felt guilty that South-Asia was neglected by his colleagues. Gutman pointed to several instances when the media should have picked up on the increasing threat posed by Al-Qa‘ida. The first instance appeared when Bin Laden landed in Afghanistan in 1996. According to Gutman, this important event received minimal media coverage. Two years later another big event was also largely neglected by the media. After successfully capturing the city of Mazar-e-Sharif in August 1998, the Taliban sought revenge for its losses the previous year and massacred thousands of civilians. This was not reported by the US media, which was then preoccupied with covering the US embassy bombings in East Arica and the subsequent US air strikes in Afghanistan.

Gutman’s conclusions:

Gutman offered a mixed assessment as to whether the government and media have learned from their pre 9/11 failures. He criticized the government for letting the intelligence community take a majority of the blame for the failures to foresee 9/11 and also the media for jumping on that bandwagon and not scrutinizing the politicians more closely. However, Gutman did say that he thought the US policy making community has started to debate foreign policy more thoroughly and that a revamped foreign policy approach is in the making. Gutman said he hoped his book can be a contribution to this change. For Gutman, this change entails that even if the intelligence community should continue to play an important role in the shaping and execution of US foreign policy, it must be incorporated into a broader policy agenda that includes a diplomatic presence even in far-flung areas of the world. As for his own colleagues’ role, Gutman called for the media to pick up the thread if the government or the public does not pay attention to certain issues or regional areas. Moreover, he asserted that if the government is restricting the media’s access to an issue, the media should see it as a sign that there is a story there worth digging up. For Gutman, that has to be the media’s ultimate responsibility.

Iran on the Horizon: Panel II: Iran and the Gulf

Wahid Hashim, Ebtisam al-Kitbi, Sami al-Faraj, and Barbara Slavin — Wed, 13 Feb 2008 12:48:51 -0500

Opening the panel, Barbara Slavin, spoke briefly about the current goal of US policy in the region to isolate Iran and its allies. She noted that Gulf Arab states have been increasingly reluctant to buy into the current US policy agenda, hedging their bets against Iran's growth as a regional hegemon. Hamas' recent performance and public relations victory in Gaza coupled with Hizbullah's success in delaying the Lebanese presidential election has added to the perception that Iran and regional allies are doing well. This signifies to GCC states the imminent emergence of a new power order in the region. Due in part to this and to the sense that the US is struggling in its role as a regional power, Slavin stated that Iran has received a warmer reception from GCC states. President Mahmud Ahmedinejad was the first Iranian president to be invited to a Gulf Cooperation Council summit which recently took place in Qatar, where he called for the establishment of economic and security pacts among Persian Gulf states. Also, King ‘Abdullah of Saudi Arabia invited President Ahmedinejad to perform the Hajj, which as been seen by many as a reconciliatory gesture.

Dr. Wahid Hashim, the first panelist to address the audience, focused on relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, with particular emphasis on the history of the Shi‘a-Sunni conflict. The Gulf region has been defined by the continuity of the struggle between Shi‘a and Sunni Muslims, and since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Shi‘a Muslims, Persian or otherwise, have increasingly turned to Iran and its clergy for leadership. He argued that prior to the Revolution, a pan-Shi‘ite identity did not exist to unify Arab and Persian Shi‘a under a singular national identity. Following the events of 1979, Iran was able to create such an identity and gather a strong following of Shi‘ite supporters, Dr. Hashim asserted, by exporting their ideology of revolution mainly along Shi‘a lines. Iran was able to garner such support from the non-Iranian Shi‘ite community since Shi‘a Muslims felt they were not being adequately represented in governments dominated by Sunnis, causing Arab Shi‘a in the Gulf to turn elsewhere for ideological leadership, which they found in Iran.

The tensions that once existed along Arab and Persian lines, Hashim declared, have shifted and now divide the Gulf region along Shi‘a and Sunni lines. Iran sees itself as being surrounded by Sunni states, namely and because of this, Dr. Hashim claimed, Iran is seeking to build what he termed as “the Shi‘a bomb” in order to balance its Sunni counterpart and to discourage Sunni interference in Iranian affairs.
Dr. Hashim followed this statement expressing his view that the future of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia is not without hope. The antipathy and suspicion that exist between the two states is present at the level of government, but not on the street, pointing to the warm reception that Shi‘a on pilgrimage receive in Mecca. He concluded that beginning a new era of bilateral relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, despite their storied history, would be beneficial to both parties and is contingent upon the cooperation of the two countries' respective governments.

Following Dr. Hashim's presentation on the dynamic of Saudi Arabian relations with Iran, Dr. Ebtisam al-Kitbi addressed the conference on the subject of the Gulf Cooperation Countries' changing stance toward Iran and the United States, focusing on that of the United Arab Emirates. The invasion of Iraq and the US failures there, she said, have contributed to the image that the US administration has lost its credibility and is more the cause of regional instability, rather than its cure. As such the US can no longer expect to impress its policies on Gulf states, adding that the US has yet to come to terms with this reality. As a result, the UAE and GCC countries are beginning to define their own national interests outside of the need for US military support and protection in exchange for a stable oil supply.

With US power declining in the Gulf region, Dr. al-Kitbi explained that GCC states have decided it is a better long-term strategy to engage with an emergent Iran now. This comment sheds light on why President Ahmedinejad was invited to attend the recent GCC summit in Qatar. In light of an expected reduction of US influence in the Gulf region, a trade agreement between Iran and any GCC state could be useful. Improving economic relations between Iran and GCC countries, al-Kitbi stated, would also serve as a vessel to lessen overall political tensions in addition to the economic benefits each country would reap. She added that Iran is eager to engage GCC countries economically because it provides a way for Iran to counter US moves to strangle the Iranian economy.

Dr. al-Kitbi focused the rest of her remarks on the stance of the UAE toward Iran and the crucial factors it would have to consider before making future policy decisions. She listed geographical proximity, Iranian military power, and religious influence, among several other factors, as important considerations the UAE must make in its future dealings with Iran. Of primary interest was her exploration of the economic relations between the two countries. She stated that 8,050 Iranian companies were listed in the Dubai Chamber of Commerce, the worth of Iranian assets in the UAE totaled around 66 billion USD, and that the 2006 volume of trade between the countries stood at around 11 billion USD. The UAE stands to gain a great deal from establishing a free trade agreement with Iran, she said, which would allow Iran a window through which to access the international market.

Concluding her remarks, she noted that the UAE is weighing its options to enhance its ties with the West in the face of Iran's rise to power in the region.

Dr. Sami al-Faraj, the final panelist, spoke about the threats that a nuclear Iran would pose to GCC states, focusing his remarks on Kuwait. Throughout his presentation, he presented the issues facing Kuwait and GCC states concerning the rise of Iran using an extended metaphor of Iran as the ex-girlfriend of the man of the house, a role played by the US, and the impact that letting her back into the household would have for the wives, GCC states, and the neighborhood. Iran sitting down with the US to solve regional problems, he argued, would only erode US influence, a consequence which the GCC states must come to terms with as members of the household under US protection.

Iran as the ex-girlfriend, now an object of interest for the husband despite the fact she poses a danger to the other wives, wants to become the primary power in the region, effectively eclipsing the current wives. One of the problems, al-Faraj noted, is that Iran will not go away. As appealing as eliminating the ex-girlfriend would seem because she is troublesome, it would create havoc for the entire region and pose dire consequences for GCC states. That being said, al-Faraj stated that the GCC outlook toward Iran is that it will certainly become a source of trouble in the future and that GCC states must be prepared to face that eventuality.

Iran, he said, wants to become a hegemonic power on the cheap and could resort to terrorism, war, the antagonism of Shi‘a in GCC states, or even mishaps in Iraq to launch Iran into that position. Given that Iran is likely to obtain nuclear capabilities, GCC states must be prepared to cope with disasters of national proportions. Therefore, the GCC must band together to ensure mutual survival stressing that he spoke not of economic survival, but material survival, as humans regardless of extant religious and/or ethnic divides. There is no way that any of the GCC states could protect themselves without real cooperation, nor without Iran as a partner. He pointed to the fact that Iran's lack of transparency concerning its uranium enrichment program worries GCC states as they are unsure of the security measures set in place on Iran's part to prevent nuclear disaster.

Dr. Sami al-Faraj concluded by suggesting that the US does not need to marry Iran and bring her back into the household. Rather, Iran must have a special status and be aware of its borders and barriers.