Political Islam

Lebanon: Back on Track?

Fri, 20 Jun 2008 15:04:03 -0400

The recent agreement in Doha to end Lebanon's 18-month political stalemate begins the process of re-establishing a functioning government and addressing the legitimate concerns of the Lebanese people. It postpones the discussion about the future role of Hizbullah in Lebanese society until after the election of the president, which brings us to the genius of this agreement: it separates the concerns of the Shi'a community from those of Hizbullah.

This is a crucial development because political equilibrium cannot be restored in Lebanon so long as these two issues are treated as one.

The Shi'a community was concerned with the failure of the Lebanese political system to provide adequate representation for the largest faction within Lebanon. Successful governance of Lebanon requires that the three largest confessional groups – Maronites, Sunnis, and Shi'a – have sufficient power within the government to protect their interests. For Lebanon to be governed, a consensus must be reached among these three groups, with each group's allocated political weight playing a determining role.

The redistribution of power that occurred at Taif in 1989 shifted influence from the Maronites to the Sunnis, while Shi'a concerns were left unaddressed. At that time, Hussein Husseini, a Shi'a leader, observed that Shi'a political rights were not protected by the Taif Agreement. He recognised achieving such protection was not then possible and that Shi'a concerns would have to be addressed in the future. They were not.

In November 2006, all Shi'a members of the Lebanese Cabinet submitted their resignations as an attempt to demonstrate their lack of confidence in the government. Thus, the essential consensus required for legitimate governance no longer existed. The Lebanese government chose to govern without Shi'a support.

Even though there were several reasons leading to the resignation of the Shi'a ministers, the government's decision reinforced the perception that Shi'a interests were not taken seriously. Thus, it became essential for the Shi'a community to prove that Lebanon could not be governed without their support. The past 18 months of political impasse has been the result.

The Doha agreement breaks this impasse and restores a governing consensus among Maronites, Sunni, and Shi'a. This objective was accomplished by forming a Cabinet in which the Shi'a and their allies have sufficient representation to assure that their interests are protected.

The second and most difficult accomplishment of the agreement was the drafting of a new election law to replace the Syrian-inspired one under which the current government had been elected. Revision of the law was essential to assure that a governing consensus was sustainable.

The accord achieved through the skilful facilitation of the government of Qatar and the Arab League has halted the sit-in demonstrations in downtown Beirut. Michel Suleiman was elected president on 25 May, and tranquillity is being restored in Lebanon. Political and economic conditions have the prospect of improving for the first time since the 2006 war with Israel.

However, the Hizbullah issue still needs to be addressed. While clearly intertwined with the concerns of the Shi'a community, Hizbullah presents a series of challenges well beyond the concerns of the Lebanese Shi'a. Few will deny that during the last 18 months the influence of Hizbullah increased.

That does not mean that the full array of Hizbullah actions and policies – which alienate much of the world – receive unanimous support among Lebanese Shi'a. They clearly do not. Nevertheless, in the scheme of Lebanese politics, so long as the Shi'a saw their security as being dependent upon Hizbullah, the community had no choice but to support them.

The Doha agreement begins the process of separating the well-being of the Shi'a community from support for Hizbullah. In the long run, this is the only way to confront the challenges posed by Hizbullah. As more and more Shi'a believe their community interests are protected by the government, and as more and more become less comfortable with Hizbullah policies, Hizbullah leadership will either begin to lose popular support or have to change their policies.

The challenge to this eventual reform is that in the short run many will see the recent Doha outcome as a victory for Hizbullah, which is likely to be given credit for the political changes. The objective must be to get beyond this initial perception and see the agreement for what it is: the first step toward establishing a more representative government in Lebanon, and in the long-term, diminishing the influence of radical groups.

Lifting the Headscarf Ban in Turkey: Where do we go from here?

Fri, 15 Feb 2008 15:38:39 -0500

On February 9, 2008 the Turkish Parliament voted to amend the constitution, thus permitting women to wear the headscarf when entering the university- another step in the long-running dispute over secularism in Turkey. Devotees of Turkish secularism, who support the view that expressions of attachment to religion have no place in the public arena, will not quietly accept the change in religious behavior which the Islamic-oriented politicians have now voted to enact.

The first line of defense for the secularists will be to rely on the opposition Republican Peoples Party. Despite the fact that it lacks enough deputies in Parliament to prevent enacting the amendment, the party has pledged to take the issue to the Constitutional Court. Indeed, the head of the court warned politicians against softening the ban on headscarves in a speech on February 7. The Republican Peoples Party and others will argue that provisions entrenched in the Constitution prohibit changes to the secular nature of Turkey’s political scene. Though the chances of success are unclear, it will at the very least embitter relations between secularists and advocates of outward forms of Islamic piety. And polls have shown that those who favor freedom to wear a headscarf represent more than half the population of Turkey.

The argument will no doubt reflect clashing legal interpretations. Already we see that the Turkish legal community has held contentious meetings over whether the headscarf ban can legally be circumvented. In the end, the argument may hinge on this amendment’s proposed form of headscarf wearing. According to strict Muslim etiquette, no hair can be visible on a woman’s head. The ruling party in Turkey, on the other hand, is arguing that they instead would oblige those who wanted to cover their hair to wear a kerchief tied under the chin, thus making it difficult or impossible to cover every lock of hair. This is said to be a Turkish style and not necessarily an Islamic display. While its proponents argue that this reasoning could pass muster for secularists, it is unlikely to be accepted by either side. Secularist women in particular fear that this is the first step toward eventually forcing all women to cover their hair.

Although outnumbered, the secularists have several important political forces on their side. In addition to warnings by members of the courts, rectors of some of Turkey’s leading universities have gone so far as to complain that easing the ban would “turn Turkey into a religious state.” In accordance with this view, some university professors and others of the educated elite are determined to frustrate the ruling party. There is talk that they would be ready to expel headscarf wearers from their classes regardless of what the law and Constitution might permit. Were that to happen, it would inevitably entail more bitter legal battles and acrimony on campuses all over Turkey.

Of course, the main question that hangs over this dispute is the behavior of the military. Despite the fact that much of the officer corps has its roots in rural Turkey, normally the bastion of devotion to Islam, the senior generals have purged the ranks of any who do not appear to subscribe to the secularism of modern Turkey’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Accordingly, the military has been among the most extreme opponents of relaxing the ban on headscarves. In witness to this attachment to secularism, the generals called out tens of thousands of secular Turks last year to show solidarity in support of Turkey’s secular regime.

This year, top leaders of the military have been more circumspect. The Chief of the General Staff recently told the press that everyone knew where the military stood and thus it was not necessary to make any new pronouncement. While the military leadership has so far remained on the sidelines, secularists- particularly women- rallied just before the Parliamentary vote in demonstrations against a lifting of the ban on headscarves. It seems likely such demonstrations will continue along with court challenges.

Turkey thus appears to be in the midst of a disorderly process. While the military is likely merely to watch and wait, after their bluff was called when last year’s parliamentary election returned in favor of the Justice and Development Party, its supporters to continue to find ways to resist. To do more, however, would risk disrupting the course of negotiations to enter the European Union, which both Islamic-oriented parties and secularists favor. And the military knows that ruling Turkey is no job for the soldiers.

The Implications of Iraq

Edward Walker — Fri, 20 Oct 2006 12:00:00 -0400

The United States has been a stabilizing and balancing force in the Middle East for many years. But when we broke up the existing balance of power in the region by toppling Saddam Hussein, we broke the Sunni hammer lock on the population of Iraq and opened the way for Shia resurgence as well as for the extension of Iranian influence and power in Iraq and, most recently through Hizbullah in Lebanon. We exposed fault lines in the Middle East centered in Iraq and hidden by the borders of an artificial state. It was the natural fault line between Sunni and Shia that has existed for centuries, as opposed to the borders drawn by the British for the convenience of its colonial empire.

The fault lines are not about terrorism. What we are witnessing is the clash within the Islamic civilization between the Shia and Sunni interpretations of the Koran, of Islamic history, of tradition and of culture. It is also a clash of power and privilege: the result of years of second-class citizenship for the Shiite plurality in Iraq. Now it is pay back time. And finally, it is a clash of nationalism between Persian and Arab nationalities. . In a broader context, it is also a clash between a radical, intolerant version Islam that seeks a purity of faith that has not existed in centuries, if it ever did, and those who believe in a different more tolerant, more modern Islam.

This is not to say al-Qaeda terrorists have not made use of the disintegration of security and stability in Iraq. They have. They have replaced the training grounds of Afghanistan and Sudan with the live-fire experience of Iraq. They have used Iraq to hone their tactics and develop new ways to cause American casualties. They are learning lessons in tactics and weapons that can be applied elsewhere against other targets, like Saudi Arabia, or Jordan or Egypt. They have capitalized on anti-American anger in the region and in expatriate communities in Europe as an effective recruiting tool. The recent NIE report confirms these suspicions.

When the President says that if we walk away from the problem, Iraq could become an even greater breading ground for international terrorism – he is correct. The President would also be correct if he said the US would lose deterrent power against the terrorists, if we are seen to be “cutting and running” in the President’s terms. In fact, the President has magnified the negative effect of withdrawal by so characterizing it. But even in the absence of withdrawal, the fact that it appears that we have been unsuccessful in achieving our objectives is giving terrorists around the world heart.

What the example of Iraq is doing, thus far is offering encouragement to radical Islamists and other terrorist wanna-bes. Because we have not yet been able to bring the violence under control, meet the challenge of asymmetrical warfare, or defeat the insurgency, we have encouraged the aspirations of other militant groups in the region, like Hizbullah and Hamas.

We will, of course, survive Iraq as our real power is represented by our economy, our technology, our entrepreneurial spirit. And our military will still leave us predominant in the world. But in the process we will have lost a psychological edge.

We may lose an even more important asset than the presumption of our military superiority if people in the world begin to doubt our leadership and our ability to carry out our promises. That is the real risk for America. America’s global image of powerful and rightful leadership is a major asset, , which we cannot afford to squander.

The question we have to ask is where our interests and those of our friends will be most affected. It seems to me that we have two choices: either to find a way to back out of our heavy engagement in Iraq so that we can take on the other, possibly greater challenges in the region, like the Palestinian issue and Iran. Or, we can roll up our sleeves and focus all of our attention on Iraq to accomplish the task the President has set – to build a real democracy there.

If the stakes are as great as the President contends, then it is time to abandon the failed tactics of minimal forces and inadequate investment. These are the questions I hope the administration is asking itself now and the questions we need to be asking ourselves as a nation.

Medical Metaphors and the Middle East

Paul Scham — Fri, 28 Jul 2006 12:00:00 -0400

Numerous pundits – not to mention government officials and generals – talk of “eradicating”, “cauterizing”, or “surgically removing” terrorism in one country as if once the last terrorist is removed, then a healthy polity can rejuvenate. In fact, there is not a single instance in which Islamist-based terrorist groups or ideologies have been eradicated by campaigns of this sort. Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Gaza Strip come quickly and uncomfortably to mind.

These references have proliferated in Israel’s current campaign against Hezbollah, and, incidentally against the people and infrastructure of Lebanon in which it is embedded. Many Israelis have described it as eradicating the “cancer” of Hezbollah (echoing, perhaps unconsciously, the words of Iranian President Ahmadinejad, who refers to Israel as a “cancer” in the Muslim world), and have emphasized the “surgical” nature of Israeli air strikes, despite the hundreds of thousands of refugees they have produced. The strategic tragedy, alongside the human one, is that a campaign reflected in unrealistic metaphors used to describe it, is almost certain to fail.

Presumably the medical metaphors are meant to show that if the terrorist cancer is not completely removed, it will grow back rapidly. Half or 99% measures will not help. Thus, drastic military action is the only kind that will allow a healthy organism to rejuvenate.

Like many organic metaphors referring to political life, this is based on reasoning that is fallacious – often dangerously so. If there is one thing that the twentieth century should have taught us, it is that ideologies cannot be stamped out militarily. This does not mean, of course, that countries cannot be utterly defeated, especially when their ideologies are peculiarly nationalistic. Thus, Germany and Japan were successfully subjugated in World War II and were moved, initially by force, onto the path of democratic development and full participation in the international community. But communism, for example, was a much more widespread ideology that could not be crushed by purely military means, and it finally collapsed primarily through its own contradictions. It was contained and fought with varying degrees of success, but never eradicated until the vast majority of its adherents finally concluded it simply did not work.

Violent Islamism is even more difficult to combat, since it is embedded in a huge, ancient, and legitimate religion. The Islamist strategy also includes various positive political and social facets, especially the provision of desperately needed social services that are rarely provided by corrupt and dictatorial regimes. Apart from these positive aspects, the negative elements of hatred of the west, Jews, and Israel, and a conspiratorial explanation for Islamic and Arab decline and weakness, all provide a worldview that fits the existing perceptions of many Arabs and Muslims. It should also be remembered that Shi’ite Islam – and Hezbollah is a Shi’ite organization – has historically thrived in adversity since its origins in the 7th Century. And Lebanon’s population is estimated as 40% Shi’ite.

None of this is meant to imply that violent Islamism is not dangerous or cannot be fought. It is dangerous and must be combated. But the idea that a “surgical” operation based primarily on military force can have a significant effect on it, even in one country, is simply wrong. There is no successful example that can be adduced.

Thus, the Israeli campaign is likely to backfire.

Presumably, it will significantly reduce the number of Iranian-supplied Hezbollah rockets aimed at Israel, which is not bad. But the cost – of making Hezbollah and similar Islamist groups an even more important force in the Islamic world - may vitiate much of this. Given the weakness of the Lebanese government and its army, it is hard to imagine that the borders of Lebanon can be hermetically sealed against a new flood of weapons coming through Syria, whether or not Israel eventually accepts an international force as part of an eventual cease-fire.

What Israel did not do before launching its campaign was to try to make common cause with the majority of Lebanese who are vehemently opposed to Hezbollah. Of course, there was no guarantee that this would have succeeded, but it would have created much more understanding, had a military campaign followed. Instead, however, Israeli actions have made the ideological fight against Hezbollah and its sister organizations much more problematic and difficult in the long run.

Delayed Democracy in Qatar?

Louay Bahry — Mon, 24 Apr 2006 12:00:00 -0400

Parliamentary elections in Qatar have been postponed until 2007. This is the third delay since 1995 but it should not be a surprise. It follows the strategy of Qatar’s ruler, Hamid bin Khalifa Al-Thani, to transform Qatar without political and social shocks into a vibrant regional and international economic and financial center. Qatar hopes the transformation will help it compete with neighboring Dubai, which is famous for its wealth, economic development, and political stability.

Qatar’s Emir is moving cautiously with his political, social and economic reforms despite internal hurdles. In 1995, he announced his desire to have an elected municipal council in Doha. He encountered strong opposition from Islamic leaders after he announced in 1997 that women would be permitted to vote and run in elections. Dr. Abd al-Rahman Bin Umair al-Nu’aimi, a professor of history at the University of Qatar and a strong opponent of the move, was jailed for 100 days.

Qatar’s leader later announced his desire to write a permanent constitution and hold general elections for a parliament. Men and women would be allowed to vote and run for office. The permanent constitution was written and approved by referendum in 2004. Now the Emir appears to be waiting for an auspicious moment to hold the promised general elections. Apparently he calculates the time has not yet arrived.

Why such caution? There are several factors: Similar general elections in the region have produced strong showings for Islamist movements. In Egypt in 2005, and Iraq and the Palestinian territories in 2006, elections have produced parliamentary majorities with strong conservative religious elements, creating new problems for these countries and the region.

Qatari society is conservative and deeply Islamic. The population would most likely vote Islamist elements into office in the parliament. Qatar is also very much a tribal society and many tribal leaders, themselves conservative, would probably do well too. The result most likely would be a new parliament dominated by Islamic and tribal leaders who would probably reject many of the Emir’s social and political reforms The Emir already is having problems with some tribes. Last year he ordered the deportation to Saudi Arabia of some 5,000 individuals of the important al Murrah tribe, a significant number for a population of only 180,000. The last thing the Emir wants to face is a tribal or Islamist-dominated parliament that is hostile to his reforms.

For now, Qatar’s leader is focusing on modernizing Qatar’s economy, raising standards of living, and improving the infrastructure, including health services, roads, housing, water, and electricity. These projects are in full swing, thanks to Qatar’s natural gas reserves, which should make it one of the leading gas exporters over the next five years. In 2005 Qatar had a per capita income of $46,000, one of the highest in the world. In the last five years, Qatar has drastically improved its educational system — bringing in foreign institutions to set up college and university courses. The government is also opening up a path for civil society organizations. A liberal law for professional organizations was adopted in 2004. A human rights group opened its doors two years ago. Women’s organizations also are permitted.

Qatar’s leader appears to have concluded that elections will not provide the framework for democracy without first providing the proper institutions and liberalized environment to build on.

Beyond the Cartoons

Kenneth Audroue — Fri, 17 Feb 2006 12:00:00 -0500

Many in the West find it hard to understand the degree of outrage throughout the Muslim world over caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad that have been published in the US and European press. Some assert it shows the Muslim world’s lack of respect for freedom of expression, its intolerance, or even its hypocrisy.

We all like to be confirmed in our assumptions or predilections, but there are lessons in this affair that go deeper than issues of freedom of speech or cynical manipulation. One is the ever-present danger of such cultural clashes in our shrinking, globalized world. Another is perhaps the inevitability of such conflict, given our ignorance in the West of foreign values and our missionary tendency to propound our own as “universal.”

But the most telling aspect of this incident is what it reveals about the sheer depth and extent of Muslim anger toward the West, an anger waiting to be tapped by such a random, unpremeditated incident.

We cannot say we have not been warned. Poll after poll has in recent years charted the rise of Muslim anti-Americanism, usually explained by objections to US foreign policies as aggressive, biased, or unjust. This theme is long familiar to those of us with overseas experience but is usually ignored at home. Given the lack of interest of most Americans in foreign affairs, this warning has perhaps never struck home, either before or even after September 11, 2001.

Some might argue that a serious discussion of a possible relation between policy and terrorism has been deliberately avoided or suppressed. Although we dismiss hostility to United States policies at our own risk, Muslim anger may have even deeper roots. I recall hearing hostile remarks about the US on the streets of Fez, Morocco more than 30 years ago. Intriguingly, at that time I found Americans were most welcome in Soviet-aligned Syria. Meanwhile, in Saudi Arabia the status of Westerners and especially of Americans, once regarded there as super-humans, has steadily declined since the 1950’s.

Before we dismiss this latest incident as one more proof of Islamic extremism and take comfort in the fact that it is not directed against the US, let us ask ourselves whether Muslim rage, which has been percolating below the surface for decades and anger over perceived insults, humiliation, and impotence to influence events, is not also a real motivating factor for acts of terrorism.

In view of the above, perhaps we should be less dismayed and instead welcome the recent victories of Islamist political parties in increasingly free Middle East elections. After all, empowerment might create responsibility. Today we find groups such as Hamas condemning acts of kidnapping and calling for calm in the cartoon uproar.

Now is the testing time for Islamist parties that have gained power through peaceful means to transform that anger and rage into responsible governance for those who have chosen to channel their energies into a democratic solution.

A Dose of Palestinian Reality

Wayne White — Fri, 27 Jan 2006 12:00:00 -0500

There are times when one does not wish to be vindicated. Anticipating the strengthening of Hamas, I winced when the Administration greeted with unseemly satisfaction the death of Yasir Arafat, which was characterized as a major breakthrough in a campaign for Middle East democratization.

On the eve of the Iraq war, I warned the Administration in an intelligence assessment (leaked by someone to the Los Angeles Times) that the establishment of thoroughgoing and enduring democracies in the Middle East would be a tough slog, for a variety of reasons, even if the Administration’s overly-optimistic goals in Iraq were successfully realized.

I was not alone. Such a conclusion was not difficult to reach: polling from a variety of sources proved beyond a shadow of a doubt some years ago that populations in the Middle East region generally had become more anti-American, more anti-Israeli, more Islamist, and less interested in the Western concept of women’s rights than most governments then in power, despite the other failings of many such governments.

It was fairly easy to surmise that new governments reflecting these attitudes would not be compatible with the Administration’s vision of democracy.

Now, we have the stunning triumph of Hamas, even more dramatic than the largely predictable success of Islamist Shi’a parties in Iraq’s recent elections. The Administration and Israel have again denounced Hamas as a terrorist group and an entity that could not be a partner, as is, in a process of engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian political arena.

We cannot and should not ignore the violent track record of Hamas and its militant charter. But Hamas in power is a reality on the Israeli-Palestinian stage, pure and simple. Efforts to sort out a way to work with Hamas must now be a top priority.

Whether it is Hamas on the Palestinian front or militant Sunni Arabs in Iraq, such powerful forces must, if possible, be drawn into the political mainstream. Exclusion is no longer a realistic option. In the face of this new reality, which stems in part from US efforts to promote democratization in the first place, Washington should lead the way in devising new strategies for engaging those formerly confined to the political fringe.

Many politicians and observers have argued (and will likely continue to do so) that negotiating with such groups is unacceptable because of their violent track records. Yet, all conflicts usually end because two warring parties sit down and talk.

Sometimes that engagement-- as with the conclusion of titanic struggles like the 20th Century’s two world wars-- occurs only because one side has been defeated, finds itself in a hopeless position, and is prepared to “surrender” or accept dictated terms. But beware: such terms often lead to more conflict down the road.

In less conventional and sometimes more prolonged scenarios, it is not surprising that some parties finally recognize the need to talk as relative equals. Yasir Arafat began as a “terrorist,” only to be embraced later as a partner. Others have swallowed hard and taken this route. It is now time for Israel and the international community to begin seriously exploring the possibility of usefully engaging Hamas. Early polling reportedly indicates that there is considerable popular support in Israel for moving in this direction.

Hamas also has obligations. Hamas must recognize that if engagement is to have any real value, it must reassess its past rejectionism. It has to be prepared to cast aside provocative and violent aspects of its program and transform itself into a tough advocate of Palestinian rights, not a source of or inspiration for suicide bombings. Arafat made the serious mistake of launching the second Intifada back in 2000, which devastated Palestinian infrastructure and shattered emerging Israeli-Palestinian trust. Hamas must avoid making the same mistake.

There may be opportunity in all this. The US and Israel cannot afford to wallow in recrimination and pessimism following the Hamas victory or adopt their own form of rejectionism in its wake. Hamas must be offered a real chance to prove that it can be an acceptable political partner for a way forward. If the US and Israel cannot demonstrate such flexibility, matters will likely deteriorate into a situation even more dangerous than the one for which they frequently blamed the late Yasir Arafat.

Syria: From Authoritarianism to Benevolence

Murhaf Jouejati — Tue, 6 Sep 2005 12:00:00 -0400

Conventional wisdom holds that economic and political reforms are directly linked. With regard to sequencing, the debate within the development community has been dominated by two schools of thought: The first argues that economic reforms ought to precede political liberalization on the grounds that authoritarian regimes are better equipped to carry out economic reform. The second insists that only by altering the political logic that sustains authoritarian regimes — moving from a base built on the discretionary distribution of patronage to one grounded in the legitimacy that comes with procedural legality and political accountability — will political elites ever be persuaded to undertake economic reform.

In the Syrian context, that debate is heavily skewed in favor of those pushing for economic reform first — the political will to redistribute power, or at least to share it, being absent. The recommendations that the tenth Ba‘th Party Congress advanced this summer reaffirmed the Syrian political elite's determination to maintain the political status quo. Some examples: The idea of a constitutional amendment to level the political playing field was ruled out; and the Ba‘th Party is to remain the vanguard party, in accordance with Article 8 of the constitution. Among the political parties that will soon be licensed, only those that appear to be the least threatening to Baathi dominance will be allowed to organize. Emergency laws, in effect since 1963, will not be lifted; they will be relaxed. What the term relaxation means, according to the "can do" list put out by the authorities, is that Syrian citizens will now be allowed to, among other things, erect falafel stands and open hair salons without the prior approval of the dreaded secret police, the mukhabarat. In these circumstances, it is safe to assume that those in Syria who stress the need to prioritize political liberalization must be very lonely people.

Bashar Assad and his reformist cohorts, on the other hand, are of the view that economic reforms must precede political reform. Assad's reasoning is that Syrian citizens are more in need of jobs and higher incomes than they are of new political arrangements. In this, the young Syrian leader may be right: when over a fifth of Syria's labor force is unemployed and per capita income is as low as $1,000, only a handful of citizens would give Lockean liberalism the priority. The problem is that Syria's political elite has not yet engaged in the kinds of painful economic reforms that are requisite to restoring the Syrian economy to even its pre-Ba‘th levels. Privatization of the bloated and highly inefficient public sector remains a taboo subject, and talk of a shift to a market economy was deliberately diluted during the Ba‘th Congress to "social market economy" — a catch phrase intended to appease the powerful labor unions and the bureaucracy, the regime's power base.

This is not to say that Syria has not experienced change during the past five years. Assad introduced private banking, drafted more business-friendly investment laws to create jobs, reinvigorated the private sector, and overhauled an important segment of the public sector, giving its managers greater say in day-to-day operations. Moreover, in order to reduce market distortions, Assad eliminated some subsidies and reduced others.

Nor were his reforms limited to the economy. Assad allowed the establishment of private universities. He promoted the demilitarization of society by reducing the length of military conscription and by lifting mandatory high school military uniforms. In administration, Assad replaced hundreds of Ba‘th apparatchiki with younger, more educated and reform-minded elements. Moreover, senior appointments were made according to merit, not to Ba‘th affiliation. Syria's ambassadors to Washington and to London and its deputy premier for economic affairs are cases in point. Finally, Assad freed hundreds of political prisoners and, in an effort to promote national reconciliation, allowed the return of a number of exiled pre-1963 politicians, including a former Syrian president. In short, five years into his rule, Bashar Assad made positive changes.

These measures, welcome as they are, do not amount to much, however. As the noted expert on democratization Marina Ottaway warns, it is important not to confuse positive change with democratization. The transition from an authoritarian to a democratic system, Ottaway notes, requires a political paradigm shift — an abandoning by those controlling the government of old assumptions about the fundamental organization of the polity, the relation between the government and the citizens, and thus the source, distribution and exercise of political power. As long as changes are benevolent acts of the ruler rather than the recognition of inalienable rights of the citizens, no paradigm change has taken place. In this context, the reforms that Assad made in the past five years appear to be more benevolence than paradigmatic shifts.

In the final analysis, some measure of economic reform seems necessary, even though it does not point a clear-cut path to rapid success. After all, democratization is not an event but a process, and democratization may start with seemingly insignificant changes.

Mauritania: A Future Rogue State in Africa

Jacques Roussellier — Tue, 16 Aug 2005 12:00:00 -0400

The August 3 coup d’état that brought to power a military junta in Mauritania was predictably met with perfunctory condemnations by the UN, EU and the African Union, joined by the United States and France, Nouakchott’s key partners. But at the same time, while the streets of the capital were mostly peaceful, even joyful, ambassadors were lining up to shake hands with the new strongman in town. Colonel Vall was a co-putschist back in 1984. Now he’s in charge. Vall’s first move was to keep the government in place and release from prison popular Islamist opponents to the previous regime.

Apparent popular support for the junta and concern for stability are leading the international community to replace its initial constitutionalist rhetoric with a more cautious realpolitik.

The deposed Mauritanian president, Ould Taya, was widely unpopular and known for his deftness at using the Islamist threat to root out his few remaining opponents and present himself as the best protection against religious extremism. In a country still deeply divided between Arabs and black Africans, with not much of a sense of shared identity let alone democratic experience, economic reforms have been undermined by growing corruption and an entrenched patronage system.

Those who have been left out from the spoils, chief among them the security forces, may have had no other way to vent their frustration than staging coups, as they did in 2003 and 2004. The coup on August 3 succeeded.

The threat of Islamist terrorism has been mostly a diversion aimed to strengthen Nouakchott’s hand in securing US political and financial support, not to mention shoring up its credentials as NATO’s key strategic partner in the fight against terrorism in the region. But Ould Taya had few friends left. He alienated many Arab allies by establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, switching sides in Iraq and taking his cue from the United States. With no outside political leverage, it is hard to see how the situation can be reversed to a semblance of constitutionality.

Mauritania remains a key US ally in fighting terrorism in the Sahel region. Granted, the Sahel is not the hotbed of Islamist terrorist extremism that some in the US and the sub-region would like to think. But there are legitimate concerns that the vast and largely ungoverned Sahara Desert could be used by terrorist organizations to train or shuttle fighters and weapons to targeted areas farther north. In this context, a broad, well-balanced and sustained strategy in the Sahel could prove a most effective counter-terrorism engagement.

The initial US response to the potential threat, known as the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), was supposed to train military units from the four partner countries, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. It also included US operating bases to strengthen surveillance capacity and create combined rapid reaction capability. However, a perceived US heavy-handedness may backfire, especially if a stabilizing US presence is exploited by authoritarian regimes in the region to further crack down on opposition parties and stall democratization processes by alleging links with Islamist extremists.

Broadening PSI – through the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative – into a joint US interagency effort that will cover security issues and promote democratic governance is a step in the right direction. (The TSCTI will also include Algeria, Morocco, Senegal, Nigeria and Tunisia, and perhaps Libya at a later stage.)

It stops short, however, of addressing the root causes of both terrorism and instability in the region: poverty, disease, illiteracy and widespread corruption. With over 60 percent of Niger's population currently threatened by famine, and now Mauritania heading for uncertain times, there is urgency for the United States to think bigger and more multilaterally because even its modest yet constructive involvement in the Sahel is at stake.

The greatest threat in the region does not come from ideologically driven motivations but rather from failed or “rogue” states, a category to which Mauritania may just have graduated. An unusually blunt International Monetary Fund last June warned that its three-year program was “irretrievably off-track” and “serious fiscal and monetary policy slippages in 2003 and the first half of 2004 undermined achievement of Mauritania's ambitious macroeconomic objectives and progress in implementing the poverty reduction strategy.” Furthermore, Mauritania is slated to become an oil-producing country next year. With 75,000 barrels of crude oil a day expected from its offshore Chinguetti field early next year, hopes of finding more reserves onshore could bring production to 165,000 barrels per day in 2009. At current prices of well over US $50 per barrel, oil revenue could reach $300 million a year, well above the 2003 foreign direct investment level (US$214.1 million) and the equivalent of roughly 38 percent of its 2003 external debt.

There are concerns that Mauritania is unlikely to meet its stated intention to adopt sound principles for oil revenue management and transparency. Quoting diplomatic sources in Nouakchott, the International Crisis Group reports corruption is running at 20 to 25 percent of the government budget. Given the crucial lack of independent oversight mechanisms to enforce politically sound and socially fair revenue management, this new oil money will only encourage corruption and ultimately fuel civil conflict.

It is time for the international community, particularly the United States and France, to join efforts at constructive engagement to prevent what sadly looks like a textbook case of the birth of another rogue state in a continent that has had more than its fair share and needs no more.

Storm Over Qatar?

Louay Bahry, Adjunct Scholar, The Middle East Institute — Wed, 6 Apr 2005 12:00:00 -0400

The Egyptian bomber who bombed the Player’s Theater in Doha on March 19, killing one person and wounding several others, gave a wake-up call to a country that seemed untouched by the cycle of terror that has racked its neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The terrorist incident outside the theater happened despite exceptional security measures taken by Qatar in the last two years to ensure its inhabitants a normal, peaceful life.

Qatari authorities have taken extra security measures to screen people and their belongings as they come into or leave Qatar. Qatari police cars roam the streets of Doha. Many of them are stationed--quite noticeably-- at the numerous traffic circles that define the city’s road system. Also noticeable are security patrols on foot in the fashionable shopping centers where Qataris and foreigners shop, pass their time or relax in a staggering number of Western-style cafes and restaurants.

This act of terrorism could not have come at a more inopportune moment in the country’s development. With its emphasis on economic investment and educational planning, the last thing Qatar needs is a shock, which could scare both Qataris and foreigners and cast doubt on its ambitious plans for the next few years.

Qatar should soon boast one of the highest per capita incomes in the world, due in part to its oil exports, but even more to its natural gas. (Qatar’s goal is to raise the current per capita income of $32,000 to $40,000 by 2008). Qatar is expected to be one of the leading exporters of natural gas in the world in the next few years. Qatar also has grandiose plans to turn itself into an international center for banking, trade and finance, competing with Dubai. To achieve this status, Qatar has eased restrictions on foreign banks interested in working in Qatar.

Today, Qatar resembles a huge construction site. Qatar is building a bridge to connect Qatar to Bahrain, facilitating the flow of people and merchandise from Saudi Arabia and Qatar to Bahrain and vice versa. Qataris have eased restrictions preventing foreigners from buying property in Qatar and are allowing foreigners to invest in their stock exchange. The national carrier, Qatar Airlines, is expanding rapidly, transforming Qatar into a tourist stop between Europe and places like the Maldives and East Asia. Qatar also wants to become an education center in the Persian Gulf with doors open to all. It is building an impressive “Education City” to host a number of newly-established international universities.

Qatar is also undertaking political reforms. Amir Shaikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani has issued a new constitution. General elections are planned for the first Shura Council--or parliament. The reforms should provide a political framework for Qatar’s renaissance.

Nonetheless, while this development and reform is going on, some segments of Qatari society show anger and bitterness toward the United States and the West that is typical of other parts of the region. During the time I taught in Qatar from 2001 to 2002, I came in contact with many young students and professors, educated Qataris and even expatriates working in Qatar who expressed sympathy for Usama Bin Ladin and the Afghan regime that supported him. Many expressed anger toward the Americans for toppling the Afghan regime.

A number of Qataris are still angry over the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. They sympathize with the insurgents fighting against the new Iraqi government. These groups could provide recruits for underground terrorists. The Arabic language press is full of articles and stories that exhibit a deep anti-Western and anti-American spirit, often fueled by news coverage and talk shows on Al Jazeera, which is widely watched in Qatar. There is also a considerable amount of anti-American talk in mosques and among religious figures in the country.

The US administration needs to be aware of these simmering sentiments even while Qatari officials give statements and public announcements that are reassuring to the United States. Qatar is critical to US posture in the Gulf region.

What can the Americans do? There is no simple answer. Much of the problem is found beyond Qatar’s borders. But the US administration should support and encourage the political and educational reforms in Qatar, which are precisely the kind of undertakings envisioned in the State Department’s Greater Middle East Initiative.

The US should also encourage better and broader education for mosque preachers to nurture a more moderate Islam. Americans also need to mount a successful campaign to win the hearts and minds of Qataris by showing them US support for positive change in the region. A successful democratic experiment by a popular government in Iraq also will help. So will US attempts to move Israelis and Palestinians toward an end to their conflict.