Arab-Americans

Studying Arabic Is Not Politics

Shukri Abed — Thu, 3 May 2007 12:00:00 -0400

It has been more than 70 years since President Elect Franklin Delano Roosevelt uttered the sentiment that we have “nothing to fear but fear itself” and yet his admonition still bears repeating.

Recently criticism has been directed at a secondary school that will soon open in New York City. The Khalil Gibran International Academy, set to open in September, has a mandate to “prepare students of diverse backgrounds for success in an increasingly global and interdependent society,” and to equip graduating students “with the skills they need to become empowered independent thinkers who are able to work with cultures beyond their own.” Inclusive in this mission is a curriculum of intensive Arabic language studies.

Some critics somehow see the study of Arabic as akin to political radicalization. Sadly, the refrain is all too familiar. We’d hoped it had been put behind us as our nation strove to overcome the forces of xenophobia and intolerance that threatened to pull us apart after 9/11. When was the last time anyone unleashed such criticism at schools which teach intensive French, Spanish, Mandarin or Hebrew?

It is not unheard of for certain curricula to bear the brunt of criticism by overzealous traditionalists, but it is still extremely disappointing to see unfounded exaggerations about Arabic studies carelessly hurled about in an apparent attempt to generate fear and cause concern. If such rhetoric dissuades even just a few students from studying Arabic then it will be unfortunate. If it succeeds in creating new, or perpetuating existing stereotypes and phobias then it will be a shame.

As technology and travel shrink the distances between us, it is illogical to cut ourselves off from our global neighbors and shut our minds and hearts to learning about and from them.

Such failures will not go unnoticed. The Iraq Study Report reported that the US Embassy in Baghdad, with a staff of 1,000 had just 33 Arabic Speakers with only six of them able to converse fluently. The Report went on to argue that US interests in Iraq suffered because of the lack of Arabic proficiency at all levels of engagement.

The need for Arabic speakers in America should be readily apparent, and the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC, where our language courses attract more than 1,000 students each year, is fortunate to have serious and dedicated students of all ages. Many of our students attend evening classes only after putting in a full-day’s work at their day jobs in business, government, NGOs, or as full-time students. While we offer courses in Arabic, Hebrew, Persian and Turkish, the language in greatest demand is Arabic.

For them learning a language opens a door into another society. Through proficiency in a shared language, enhanced understanding and appreciation of that society and its peoples can be achieved.

While there has been an increase in the number of students studying Arabic in recent years, the numbers are still anemic when compared to the sheer volume of students studying other languages. These numbers need to rise and it is my hope that students and critics embrace with open arms this language while checking their political baggage at the door.

As a native speaker of both Arabic and Hebrew, I have studied the Koran, the Torah and the Talmud, as well as the Bible. I respect all three religions as well as the great thinkers of the civilizations that spawned these sacred works.

It is my hope that my students and anyone willing to expand their knowledge of the world around them will share my reverence for these cultures as they acquire the language skills to engage in person-to-person interactions with those who speak the languages we teach.

Escalation Alone is Doomed to Fail

David L. Mack, Acting President, Middle East Institute — Tue, 16 Jan 2007 12:00:00 -0500

There is no military silver bullet for our dilemma in Iraq.

Unless Iraqi leaders make tough decisions to improve political dialogue and governance, President Bush's proposed increase in US combat forces will be a waste of our precious human resources.

Leading advocates of a surge in US military deployment to Iraq are correct in saying it would be effective only if it were substantial and sustained. But the necessary political accommodations by Iraq's ruling groups and the necessary level of economic assistance to the least-secure areas must also be substantial and sustained. Moreover, the United States would have to be willing to give other governments a stake in stabilizing Iraq, unless it is prepared to maintain the increase in military force and economic assistance indefinitely

Iraqi sectarianism, suppressed under decades of Baathist rule, has polarized political identities during the past few years of extreme personal insecurity, hardship and uncertainty. The leading Shiite politician with a reputation for reaching across the sectarian divide, Ayad Allawi, is unpopular because of his cooperation with forceful US military measures against Sunni insurgents and the Shiite Mahdi Army. No Sunni Arab leader has emerged with the combination of courage, political skills and a loyal constituency necessary to negotiate effectively with the better-organized Kurdish and Shiite leaders. The vast majority of Sunni Arabs no longer aspire to dominate Iraq, but they will fight for their neighborhoods and homes. In the absence of better leaders, they can be tools for extremists.

There are few indications that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has the will or capability to engineer the required political changes. Inevitably, they require giving constitutional and power-sharing concessions to Sunni Arab or secular Shiite opponents of the government at the expense of Mr. al-Maliki's sectarian Shiite base. His personal toughness has been found wanting in the past, perhaps because his viability as prime minister depends on satisfying the real political power brokers of his coalition: Abdulaziz Hakim and Muqtada al-Sadr.

Sunni Arabs view his timid and vacillating outreach as the halfhearted result of American pressure. Few Iraqis believe political concessions will be sustained as US involvement and influence ebb. Moreover, the Kurds do not support constitutional revisions and guarantees for equal distribution of oil revenues to Sunni Arabs.

Constitutional reform, oil revenues, political power-sharing and a relaxation of extreme measures against former Baath Party members have been showstoppers in the past for a prime minister who is unable to buck his political base. The Iraq Study Group advised making these issues conditions for continued US support, but President Bush is providing US military backing up front and thereby surrendering the leverage he might have used during the past two years.

At the same time, Iran has gained political influence in Baghdad partly through subversion but also through an Iraqi electoral process that emphasized sectarian identity. Reversing the real and perceived impediments to Sunni participation in future governments would require sustained support from elements of the Shiite majority for painful compromises.

On the economic side, the government has failed to provide adequate reconstruction resources to Sunni Arab areas devastated by fighting. Basic services in such areas are just as essential as security and must be sustained for a long time to be effective.

Mr. Bush says, "The Iraqi government will spend $10 billion of its own money," but Sunni Arabs in Baghdad have only to look at the relatively pacified but economically desolate cities of Fallujah and Tal Afar to imagine what lies ahead for them. A meaningful jobs program must offer more than short-term projects to overcome the purely economic attractions of collusion with the insurgency. Personal insecurity and anti-occupation grievances are additional impediments.

The lack of an international diplomatic framework for stabilizing Iraq, combined with continuing US threats of regime change in Tehran and Damascus, ensures that Iran and Syria see little reason to cooperate. Although both governments have dirty hands, the absence of US backing for a multilateral effort to engage them on issues such as border control is puzzling. The bipartisan Iraq Study Group would require the United States to tone down its messianic goals of victory for democracy in Iraq and regional transformation. Instead, it should embrace the stabilization of Iraq in an international context, emphasizing diplomacy rather than military force.

The United States also should reposition itself on other issues where its long-term agenda is suspect and works against our effective leadership of other nations regarding Iraq. We should clearly announce that we do not seek permanent bases. We need temporary facilities for force protection, not for projecting force outside Iraq. We also need to make clear that controlling Iraqi oil is not a US objective, although we want equal treatment for American oil companies.

Finally, we must give substance to the President's 2003 commitment to work for peace between Israel and the Palestinians. At the time, he said he would be as active on this long-festering issue as he had been on Iraq. To date, this promise rings hollow.

Bolton the Albatross

Wayne White — Tue, 9 Aug 2005 12:00:00 -0400

Developments at the United Nations in the coming months may demonstrate why John Bolton should never have been nominated for the post of UN ambassador in the first place, let alone given a highly controversial recess appointment. In fact, to prevent Bolton from proving his critics right, the administration may get stuck with the chore of seeing that he stays out of trouble—making the White House, in the end, the biggest loser.

By the end of Bolton's nomination hearings, the administration doubtless knew, as did well-informed Americans across the political spectrum, that Bolton clearly was not the best man for the job. While many observers still maintain that Bolton enjoys the president's confidence, this is difficult to believe under the circumstances. His nomination simply became a political football in which dropping it would have been a "defeat" for the White House, something the president instinctively would seek to avoid at all costs.

Bolton's first major challenge in New York could very likely relate to the Middle East, and it could develop fairly quickly. That would involve the long-running dispute over Iran's nuclear program. The Iranian regime, now even more thoroughly dominated by conservative hardliners, is not likely to have either the will or diplomatic skill to resolve its differences with the European Union (and the United States), so the Iranian nuclear impasse may well end up in the UN Security Council.

Yet to move through the Council a sufficiently tough resolution on Iran would require Bolton to excel in two areas that would appear to be his weakest: marketing US intelligence and building consensus.

That would be a rather tall order considering what his colleagues on the Council already know about his past. Of course some other UN representatives are putting the best face possible on the Bolton appointment, but it will take time and effort to convince them that Bolton is someone with whom they can work. Until then, on issues involving intelligence, senior US officials may have to be sent from Washington to carry Bolton's water because without help, behind closed doors, and on his own, Bolton lacks all credibility. If such assistance is, in fact, required to work important issues involving intelligence, one returns to the original question as to why Bolton has been sent to New York in the first place.

Iraq promises to be the other major Middle East challenge for the weakened US ambassador to the United Nations. By mid-2006, Bolton might face the need for some manner of UN action related to a Coalition withdrawal from Iraq. But Iraq is perhaps the most difficult issue on which to engage the United Nations after the series of diplomatic and literal disasters the world body has suffered over Iraq.

In the wake of the 2003 UN headquarters bombing in Baghdad and the Oil for Food scandal, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and other senior UN officials have been reluctant to become involved in Iraq, especially if that were to mean putting boots or suits on the ground. Should UN assistance be needed in lending more legitimacy to next year's permanent Iraqi government and the beginning of a phased Coalition withdrawal, how useful would Bolton be in persuading the Secretariat or the Security Council to take risks and re-engage, tarnished as he is by his attempt to cook intelligence directly linked to the United States' invasion of Iraq?

Both of these major Middle East issues demonstrate that tampering with intelligence is a very serious matter and not something in which a senior member of this nation's foreign policy team, like Bolton is now, can afford to engage. Once such a policymaker fails to keep an open mind, becomes narrowly focused on simply ramming home certain policies, and regards dissenting views as merely unhelpful and disruptive, he or she crosses the line into the strategic danger zone.

I am familiar with such dangers. Back in 1982, one senior State Department official tried to persuade me to help suppress intelligence analysis warning that the 1982 US Marine deployment to Lebanon would be dangerous. When I refused to cooperate and stood my ground, he simply chose to ignore the warning.

Of course, the diplomatically-challenged John Bolton will not only be facing issues emerging from the troubled Middle East. He will also have to complete the more front-burner issue of UN reform. Secretary General Annan remarked on Monday that it would be fine for one representative to "push," but he (Bolton) would have to be mindful that there are 190 others. Despite reports that much of what the administration wants in the way of UN reform is already underway, Washington may still press hard to show that Bolton has a real mission of reform in New York. But whatever battles he can find to wage on this front, he will discover rather quickly that this requires our ambassador to be a team player, not a confrontational crusader.

At a time when the United States suffers from lack of credibility, Bolton is a liability that the administration can ill-afford. Just as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice works hard to repair the damage of the past few years, the White House must seek to ensure that Bolton does not become the source of still more resentment.

With that in mind, regardless of Bolton's instincts one way or the other, he must be kept on a very tight leash by the White House and Secretary Rice. In the past, there have been other relatively weak American UN envoys who have labored under sometimes galling limitations. In this case, the administration must do all it can to prevent Bolton from proving his critics right, especially during his first months on the job. Left to his own devices, Bolton appears capable of doing just that.

US-Saudi Bond Grew Under Fahd

Wyche Fowler — Wed, 3 Aug 2005 12:00:00 -0400

The death of Saudi Arabia's King Fahd is another step in the leadership transition taking place throughout the Middle East, as one long-serving monarch after another, from Morocco to Jordan to Syria to the United Arab Emirates, has passed from the scene.

Like his counterparts in other Arab countries, Fahd played a pivotal role as a nation-builder and in regional and global politics.

As US ambassador to Saudi Arabia from l996 until March 2001, I had a unique opportunity to observe firsthand and appreciate Fahd's leadership before his declining health incapacitated him. The sad occasion of his death allows us to reflect anew on how much the strong US-Saudi relationship and Saudi political stability grew out of his initiatives and policies.

From the US perspective, the late king should be remembered gratefully as a steadfast ally who played an important role against communism, for Arab-Israeli peace and for stability in the Gulf. Fahd should be remembered as a modernizer who pushed his subjects to abandon their insularity and join the modern world — and as an institution builder.

From the late l970s until the fall of the Soviet Union, under his guidance Saudi Arabia was a staunch ally against the spread of communism, witnessed most clearly in the Saudi-US cooperation with the Mujahiddin fighting the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan.

The support that Saudi Arabia now extends to the Middle East peace process relies on initiatives that Fahd proposed almost 25 years ago. Although the hard-line Arab consensus at the Baghdad conference in l979 pushed the Saudis to reject the Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel, the king persuaded the conference not to apply economic sanctions against Egypt in retaliation. In l981, he proposed a settlement for the conflict with Israel (known as the "Fahd plan," it was presented to the Arab Summit in Morocco in l982) that provided at least a psychological basis for the Arabs to support the current peace process.

More recently, Abdullah, as crown prince, building on the king's earlier initiatives, delivered a peace plan to President Bush that recognized Israel and promised normal relations in return for Israel's withdrawal from Palestinian territories.

After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, in what must stand as one of his most courageous decisions, Fahd invited US forces into Saudi Arabia to help defend the kingdom and liberate Kuwait — against the advice of members of senior leadership and in the face of vehement opposition from many religious leaders.

The war effort cost the Saudi government $60 billion and served as a catalyst to unleash an Islamic opposition movement, murdering Americans and Saudi soldiers and civilians in both our countries and around the world.

The Kingdom's battle against terrorists on its own soil, aided by strong cooperation between US and Saudi intelligence services, has reinvigorated the historic cooperation between our countries.

Looking back over the nearly 30 years during which Fahd ruled Saudi Arabia, first as regent, then as king, perhaps his most important achievement has been the seamless transition of power to Abdullah when his health declined, ensuring that the kingdom would have its new king experienced and prepared to govern the country at Fahd's death. With his passing the United States loses a friend but gains in Abdullah a leader of integrity, experience, and wisdom — and a king committed to continued reforms in his country and expanded friendship with the United States.

What We Don't Know About the World: The Danger of Ignorance in US-Arab Relations

Edward S. Walker, Jr. — Mon, 11 Apr 2005 12:00:00 -0400

For two years, scholars and experts from the Middle East Institute in Washington and the Al Ahram Center in Cairo worked together to examine the crisis in relations that divides us. We found significant common ground in our personal values and national goals.

Yet the anger, frustration and disappointment that often marked our dialogue provided ample evidence of the stress that has developed between our societies. Our Arab friends said, "It's the policy, stupid." There is no doubt that our way was complicated by our active policy in Iraq and our passive policy on the Palestinian issue. But while policies play a part in the estrangement, they are only a part of the problem and not really the most important part.

What we found was that because of our different histories, our exaggerated expectations of one another, the stereotypes we have developed of one another, our different cultural heritage and our ignorance of each other, we are hard wired into mutual mistrust. We come at problems from different perspectives, and that leads to misunderstanding. If a negative interpretation of the motivation for our respective policies is possible, that will too often be the interpretation that is adopted.

This is particularly true of U.S. efforts to support democracy in the region. We think we are the "good guys." Arabs, however, often interpret our true agenda as nothing more than an effort to expand U.S. and Israeli hegemony over the region. It is hardly encouraging when our Arab friends accuse us of actually impeding local efforts to expand democracy because those efforts are often suspected of being dictated by Washington. In every area of U.S. policy, whether it is success in Iraq, the war on terrorism, the peace process or our commitment to regional economic and democratic political development, the air of suspicion that acts as a fog, obscuring our true intentions, hamstrings our efforts.

These are issues that demand broad cooperation between the United States and the Arab world. But that will not happen as long as Arabs see us as being deaf to their concerns and aspirations and we see them as dwelling on the past and blaming others for their problems. "Get over it," the Americans said when confronted for the umpteenth time with the sins of colonialism. The Arabs told us, "You never listen." Unfortunately, there is an element of truth in each of these charges.

As a people, we are endowed with energy, impatience and the basic confidence that all problems can be solved. Based on their past history, the Arabs are endowed with reflection, caution and fear of chaos. While we see reform and democracy as critical requirements for attacking radicalism and terrorism, our friends in the region see undue haste as a prescription for instability and the rise of radicalism.

This is not a problem of "public diplomacy" although that may provide part of the solution. It is a much deeper problem of understanding. We did not pretend to have the answers to all the problems we faced. But we did feel that the kind of honest-no-holds-barred dialogue we held over time did help us in understanding one another, and we considered how we could institutionalize such a dialogue: We proposed a continuing "Leaders Forum" made up of academics, politicians and nongovernmental personalities from the United States and the region to work together, report to our leaders and look for ways to reduce misunderstandings. We suggested that governments, ours included, engage a mix of our own citizens who could question our actions and provide a reality check on the policies we were following. We thought that the student and cultural exchanges and the funding for them that were so useful and plentiful in the Cold War could be re-established in this new war against terror. A large fund could be set up to combine government and private money to support these efforts. We believed that each of our societies' think tanks, which are so used to flying solo, should establish agreements with one another for joint projects across national boundaries. We suggested that media organizations might develop practical exchange agreements to publish high-quality articles from other societies and cultures and develop exchange programs for reporters and editors. We felt there was a place in our entertainment industries for an exchange of ideas to help sensitize one another. Finally, we called for interfaith dialogue, something that is given more lip service than practical expression.

In sum, we felt that the greatest enemy of democracy and the greatest asset for terrorism was our relative ignorance of one another, an ignorance that sustains suspicion and feeds our prejudices. We must set aside stereotypes and suppositions, practicing instead the act of engaging one another to face the issues that challenge us.

The Costs of US Policy Towards the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Edward S. Walker, Jr. President, The Middle East Institute — Tue, 12 Feb 2002 12:00:00 -0500

In the immediate aftermath of September 11, there was strong aversion in Washington to identifying the causes of this terrorist attack and, in particular, to making any linkage between the World Trade Center atrocity and the violence that dominates the Palestinian-Israeli issue. Even the mention of the term “root causes” was anathema to policymakers.

What concerned Washington most was the fear that an examination of root causes immediately after 9/11 would have served as a vehicle for the master manipulators of the region -- Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein and their ilk -- who are determined to blame our policies for all that ails the Middle East. In the weeks and months that followed, the Bush Administration was right to steer clear of addressing anything but the military and security aspects of the war on terrorism. Our focus and our goals were clear. Pursue the enemy and reinstate a legitimate, representative government in Afghanistan.

Now, however, the question is how to take this fight further, and that raises several problems with potentially severe consequences for US interests in the region. First of all, as we continue to pursue the war on terrorism, we are making demands of regional leaders. We expect 100% effort and results. We need the cooperation of intelligence, law enforcement and financial authorities in sovereign states in the region. Yet, enthusiasm for cooperation in these areas could well be constrained by our perceived indifference to the plight of the Palestinian people and our failure to apply any breaks on Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.

At the beginning of this Administration, the fear in the Arab world was that President Bush would disengage from the problems of the Palestinians. Now the fear is that he will stay engaged on the side of Sharon. The pressure on our friends in the region is intense and the feeling is that we are not only ignoring their problems but we are attacking them at the same time. There is a sense of injury in Saudi Arabia and Egypt over the press campaign against them. This is coupled with frustration at the apparent inability or unwillingness of the White House to hear the message that Arab leaders have been sending since well before September 11.

The Saudi Crown Prince, in particular, has been trying for almost a year to point out the risks of a U.S. policy of passive disengagement from the Palestinian issue and the dangers of over identification with Sharon. Both he and President Mubarak have been deeply concerned that continued violence in the occupied territories would generate growth of fundamentalism in the area and, with it, terrorism against the moderate governments associated with the United States. King Abdullah of Jordan has echoed this sentiment on a number of occasions as well.

It is more than fear for the survival of their respective regimes that motivates our friends: they firmly believe that our policy is wrong – that we are ignoring the causes of Palestinian terrorism. Even the most charitable Arab observer places much of the blame for the violence in the occupied territories on Israeli policies and what appears to be unwavering U.S. support for those policies.

The appearance of U.S. identification with Israel is by no means a new phenomenon. During the Clinton Administration, our relations with any number of Arab states were in a manner of speaking scored on the basis of their relations with Israel. Countries that maintained Israeli offices gained access to U.S. leaders – those that did not, did not. Egypt’s cold peace lost them points, but their participation in the peace process gained them credit – unless of course they were seen to be working at cross-purposes with our negotiators.

When President Bush was elected, Arab leaders were elated by the prospect of a change in a Clinton Administration policy that seemed to use Israel as the litmus of our relations with others. And while the Administration came with good intentions to walk away from Clinton’s policies, in fact, in practical terms, the Administration is moving in the opposite direction. We no longer have dual containment for Iran and Iraq – instead we have the evil axis. It is the same policy – with the obvious curious addition of North Korea to the mix. We no longer hold countries in the region to the litmus of their relations with Israel, instead we hold them to a standard on terrorism that is seen to be supporting Prime Minister Sharon’s very broad definition of who is a terrorist and his aggressive policy of response.

What we don’t have now and Clinton did, however, is the saving prospect of a viable peace process. We were given great latitude during the Clinton years because there was genuine hope that Clinton’s policies would lead to peace and because the Administration was constant in its aggressive engagement with the parties, including the President with Yasser Arafat.

Now we have no clear commitment to the process, very few obvious prospects, and no discernable policy to seize leadership on the issue. Instead, the Administration has chosen to send the Vice President to the region on a trip whose focus seems to be designed to find or force the alliances necessary to overthrow Saddam Hussein, notwithstanding the fact that the trip itself is raising red flags throughout the region and Europe and will be seen to undercut the position of the Secretary of State.

In fact, what we may be witnessing is the passing of the torch from the State Department and its diplomacy of coalition building, to the Vice President’s office and some, as yet, unclear policy approach for the future more closely attuned to the President’s very popular verbiage of the Sate of the Union message. We also may be seeing a shift in priorities away from the nitty-gritty of the war on terrorism, which would largely be invisible to the American people, towards a much more aggressive and visible policy directed toward a few identified rogue states. If this is, indeed, the direction we are going, we can expect serious policy differences with our European, Russian and Arab partners.

In reality, the Administration has not been handed any easy choices in the Middle East. In the aftermath of Camp David II and the Intifada that followed shortly thereafter, President Bush has been left with two partners in the region who clearly despise each other: Sharon, who offers virtually no prospect of a remotely acceptable deal for the Palestinians; and Arafat, who has managed to do alienate Bush at every turn. Arafat does exercise 100% effort and results when it comes to infuriating the Administration. He gives new meaning to the overworked phrase, “Snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.” Some are even joking that he might be a Mossad agent.

It is a fact that Arafat has managed at every turn to thwart the Administration’s most promising efforts to move forward on peace. The President was willing to vote affirmatively for the most forthcoming UNSC Resolution on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in ten years. Yet Arafat persisted in his demand for a killer amendment that forced the President to veto. Then the President publicly called for a Palestinian state. In return, Arafat gave him vacillation and rhetoric. The Secretary of State gave Arafat the premises of Camp David and Taba as a point of entry for negotiations and reestablished “occupation” as the legal premise for Israel’s position in the West Bank. Arafat reciprocated with more talk of Palestinian “martyrs”. Above all else, Arafat still seems to be equivocating on the fundamental question of terrorism against innocents. He pays lip service and then encourages the opposite among his people.

One has to wonder if Arafat has not lost his edge – his ability to play the game he used to master. It is not an idle question now to wonder if it is not time for a change. He was an elected leader but his term has long since expired. This is a question that only the Palestinian people can answer, but at the very minimum it is a question they should be asking themselves.

Most Americans and Israelis believe firmly that a precondition for pursuing peace between Palestinians and Israelis should be an end to terrorism, to the indiscriminate killing of civilians on both sides. At the same time an increasing number of Israelis are raising questions about the Sharon policy of all stick and no carrot. Several senior serving and retired Israeli security officials have recently pointed out that they cannot solve the terrorist problem through military means alone. They need a meaningful political process in order to curtail terrorism.

The Administration needs to heed what the Israeli security authorities are saying – it also needs to listen to the IDF reservists who are refusing service in the occupied territories based on what they claim are illegal orders issued by their commanders against the Palestinian people. We should be drawing conclusions from this evidence.

The need for hope among Palestinians and in the region as whole is almost palpable. The Administration cannot afford to stand by and do nothing. If we are prepared to be strong and exercise our considerable political and military will when it comes to defeating Saddam Hussein, what about engaging our full political muscle in our discussions with Arafat and Sharon.

If the Administration continues to stand aside on this issue and engage in military action in Iraq or elsewhere in the Arab world, or if it continues to appear as Sharon‘s clone, then I am afraid I can predict a massive deterioration of our position in the region with consequences for our strategic posture, our economy, the stability of our friends, and the rise of the very fundamentalism we seek to defeat.

Improving Understanding between Americans and the Arab and Muslim Peoples: Lessons from a Career Intelligence Professional

John O. Brennan — Tue, 6 Feb 2007 12:00:00 -0500

The Middle East Institute is pleased to welcome John O. Brennan, an expert on counterterrorism and the Middle East, to discuss the current status and ways of improving the relationship between Americans and the Muslim World.

Currently President and chief executive of the Analysis Corp., Mr. Brennan will draw on his extensive experience in the intelligence field. During the course of a distinguished 25-year career with the Central Intelligence Agency, he served in a variety of senior positions throughout the intelligence community, especially in the Middle East. His last assignment was (interim) Director of The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).

Pakistan's Politics and its American Partnership

Dennis Kux and William Milam, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars — Wed, 31 Jan 2007 12:00:00 -0500

Ambassador Kux described the relationship between the United States and Pakistan as a “ride on a roller coaster over time,” characterized by numerous ups and downs. He defined eight distinct periods in the history of US-Pakistan relations that represent its changing status, and questioned whether the United States was heading for a ninth. The first eight periods were characterized by shifting American perceptions of Pakistan’s strategic importance. According to Ambassador Kux, most significant were the last three shifts that occurred — one under the Reagan presidency when an anti-Soviet alliance was made with Pakistan, another during the G.H.W. Bush and Clinton presidencies when the removal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan shifted focus negatively onto Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation, and finally under G.W. Bush, where Pakistani participation in the War on Terror has ushered in a new era of cooperation.

Ambassador Kux noted that while the American and Pakistani governments verbally express many of the same interests, they approach them from different vantage points, which often leads to divergent courses of action. Many of these discrepancies revolve around Afghanistan. According to Ambassador Kux, the Pakistanis doubt US intentions to stay the course in Afghanistan and are concerned with the prospect of facing a hostile neighbor on their western border. This concern is amplified by fears of Iran, India, and Russia playing a prominent role there. Ambassador Kux likened the deterioration of American ties with Pakistan following the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan as that of an old, used Kleenex being tossed aside, and that Pakistanis are wary of placing too much trust in an alliance with the United States given historical precedence. Additionally, they doubt the staying power of President Karzai’s government and resent the strong ties it has developed with India.

It appears to many Pakistanis that their nation’s current relationship with the United States is entirely contingent on cooperation in the War on Terror. Should the Taliban threat cease to exist, so too would American interest in a close alliance, and a scrutinizing gaze would once again be cast on Pakistan. Therefore, holding onto the “Taliban card” seems prudent and the annihilation of this group, contrary to Pakistani interests. Based on the continuously shifting dynamics of US-Pakistan relations over the past 50 years, Ambassador Kux concluded that a new, tragic degeneration seems likely. He stated that the current American approach of threatening to cut aid and trade to Pakistan is putting the two countries on a collision course, and that the best way to slow, if not stop, this is to tone down the rhetoric on both sides and confine criticism and coercion to the private domain.

The majority of Ambassador Milam’s discussion focused on the domestic political situation in Pakistan, and how this might affect relations with the United States. According to Ambassador Milam, the idea that President Musharraf will form an alliance with the PPP and Benazir Bhutto is little more than a liberal fantasy, as he simply does not require this group’s support to stay in power. Ms. Bhutto’s support would come at too high a price, as she demands help with foreign court cases, a free hand to run for Prime Minister, and the removal of the President’s military affiliation. In contrast, President Musharraf does need the backing of the popular PMLQ, a party staunchly opposed to the enlightened moderation of the PPP given its religious pretensions and conservative support base. The PMLQ has no qualms with President Musharraf’s military affiliation, which he has no desire to eschew. Ambassador Milam noted that the President has “bigger fish to fry” than domestic political reform, and that any American attempt to press the issue will most likely be completely ineffective.

Ambassador Milam also discussed the growing sectarian violence in Pakistan, stating that it can be attributed to more than just the increased presence of the Shi‘ite minority in the streets recently during the Ashura holiday. He referenced the growing involvement of Al-Qa‘ida in these attacks and posited that while the short-term implications of this are negligible for President Musharraf, in the long term he may have to address the jihadists in his midst, as domestic attacks might erode confidence in the military’s ability to provide security. It is therefore possible that President Musharraf will have to end his support for jihadist militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir in order to suppress domestic threats to the legitimacy of military rule.

Ambassador Milam concluded his presentation with a brief discussion of the proposed Iranian Gas pipeline that would pass directly through Pakistan, the construction of which would force President Musharraf to build a cordon of security through Baluchistan. In order to secure the pipeline, the President might be forced to clear the Taliban out of Baluchistan and possibly Waziristan as well, indirectly satisfying American strategic policy objectives.

Middle East and the 2004 Presidential Elections

Philip Wilcox, Frank Gaffney, M. J. Rosenberg, Joseph Wilson, James Zogby. — Thu, 23 Oct 2003 12:00:00 -0400

Frank Gaffney focused his presentation on a theory of “building peace through truth” arguing that US policy makers must come to terms with the scope of the terrorist threat to this country. He asserted that the 2004 elections will mainly revolve around the candidates’ declared ability to uproot both domestic and foreign Islamist terrorist cells in addition to their policy proposals for the future of reconstruction in Iraq -- or the avoidance of a “cut and run” plan.

M.J. Rosenberg devoted his lecture to confronting the myths and realities of the Jewish vote in past presidential elections. He explained that as a result of the desperate situation in Israel, the allocation of Jewish-American votes—overwhelmingly favoring the Democratic party since 1928—will be up for grabs depending on the candidate’s guarantee of proactive involvement in the peace process. He asserted that American Jews want Israel to find a solution to the current situation and reaffirmed the need for Bush to be diplomatically engaged.

Joseph Wilson focused on the current war in Iraq, arguing that this will be the deciding factor in the elections. Wilson argued that he supported the basic premise of invading Iraq, however, he deeply disagrees with the Administration’s unilateralist approach during the war and throughout the reconstruction process. In the 2004 election, he asserted that most Democrats will focus on the current administration’s failure to truly internationalize the reconstruction efforts as well as our inability to provide either public security or humanitarian needs and services.

Finally, James Zogby discussed the growing realization in the United States of an Arab-American vote. He described how a candidate’s capacity (and willingness) to pursue a multilateral and even-handed, comprehensive policy toward the Middle East—particularly with regards to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—has now become an issue presidential candidates can not avoid.

The Impact of 9/11 on the Arab-American Community and Civil Liberties

Jean AbiNader, Arab-American Institute — Tue, 8 Jul 2003 12:00:00 -0400

Since the inception of the Arab-American Institute in 1985, the organization has faced challenges on two fronts: unifying the Arab-American community, and promoting political activism within that community.

To successfully build unity, organizers must bridge the gap between established Arab-American elected officials and community mobilization supporters. The Arab-American agenda must be distinguished from that of American Muslims. However, a collective Arab-American identity is difficult to create within a community where individuals tend to identify themselves according to the national origin of their families, as opposed to referring to themselves as “Arab”.

There are further challenges with regard to political action. It is difficult to create a political culture within a population that has little previous experience with the American democratic process. It is also hard to reconcile the Arab-American community with its status as a minority group.

The prevalence of television has provided Arab-Americans with a stronger connection to the Arab World, whereas previously the community was more detached from political and social events in the Middle East. Mass communication has helped both define the community’s political agenda and build support for it within the community. On the other hand, since 9/11 Arab-Americans also find themselves described in the Media as “people of color” and associated with the Third World. Singled out by the press as a group, the community has gravitated toward acceptance of collective identity and development of political consciousness.

Mr. AbiNader asserted that the US foreign policy of pre-emption has had implications for domestic civil liberties. He cited recent changes, including the selective application of the Entrance/ Exit Program and the rolling back of the 1974 Privacy Act. Rather than utilizing the rising political consciousness of Arab-Americans advantageously, some government agencies have implemented discriminatory practices, including racial profiling. Mr. AbiNader proposed that US agencies could benefit from the involvement of Arab-Americans in government, particularly in security and military affairs. For example, government staff training and field administration by Arab-Americans could strengthen the US position in Iraq. US initiatives such as the “Road Map,” the Middle East Free Trade Agreement, and the Middle East Partnership Initiative also have the potential to benefit from Arab-American participation.