Nuclear Proliferation

Iran: The American Threat

Reza Zia-Ebrahimi — Fri, 14 Mar 2008 09:04:57 -0400

Iranian foreign policy is shaped by two factors: an acute sense of insecurity and a thirst for international recognition. Insecurity is largely the result of the country’s immediate geostrategic situation. Indeed Iran’s natural habitat – characterized by an abnormally high level of interstate tensions and transnational violence – poses major security challenges to the country’s policymakers.

To the east, there is Pakistan, an unstable military dictatorship with nuclear capability, and the failed state of Afghanistan, now home to a hostile American military presence. There is instability to the north with a recently crushed independence struggle in Chechnya, guerrilla warfare in Dagestan, and still unresolved conflicts between Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as between Georgians and Ossetians. The former superpower Russia seems to be on Iran’s side but is ultimately unpredictable and therefore unreliable. Iran’s western border is shared with Iraq, with which it fought one of the longest interstate conflicts of the 20th century and which is now also home to an American military presence. Last but not least is a nuclear capable Israel, which boasts the region’s most powerful military and regularly calls for the Iranian issue to be dealt with ‘by any means’.

This is not intended to dismiss Iran’s responsibility in antagonising some of these nations, particularly Israel. Rather, its purpose is to underscore that the Iranians’ sense of insecurity is real and justified. This is especially true when considering that throughout the 20th century Iran has regularly been the object of incursions or invasions (most notably by the Allies in 1941 and Iraq in 1980).

Iran’s thirst for recognition is a direct consequence of the country’s nationalist posture. This has deep historical roots in past Russo-British interferences into the country’s internal political affairs and exploitation of economic resources. After the United States replaced Russia and Britain as Iran’s main imperialist challenge, it gave its hand to the removal of democratically-minded Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq in 1953 and subsequently supported and armed Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi’s royal dictatorship.
The significance of this traumatic encounter with the West cannot be sufficiently stressed, and its impact on foreign policy cannot be overstated. It is continuously discussed in public and private circles, effectively reopening old wounds. The most radical form of Iranian nationalism can be understood as a collective post-traumatic condition, which is revived by vivid flashbacks and reinforced by fresh evidence of the outside world’s perceived ill-feelings towards Iran.

Iranian nationalism is based on the belief that while Iran is by all standards a powerful country, it is prevented from assuming its place on the world stage by perennial American, British and Israeli opposition. Iran is a populous, culturally sophisticated, nationally cohesive and - by the standards of the developing world – technologically advanced country. How else can a policymaker in Tehran explain why Israel, India and Pakistan have been allowed to develop nuclear arsenals without much international outrage while Iran is ostracized for its own program, so far carried out within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty?

Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weaponry is an obvious response to these concerns. First, it would give Iran some security guarantees and would preclude outside attempts at regime change. Second, the prestige surrounding the possession of nuclear technology is believed in Iran to be a necessary step in the country’s quest for international recognition.

With this in mind, it becomes clear why four years of pressure, isolation, subtle threats and serial embargos have so far failed to weaken the Islamic Republic’s resolve. They have in fact had the opposite effect by intensifying security concerns and reinforcing the belief that Iran is being denied what its neighbours already possess. The need for a nuclear deterrent is thus rendered even more pressing in the Iranian point of view.

The alternative to the current trend of threats and embargoes is engagement by the West. This does not come with a guarantee of success but it must be attempted since isolation and non-engagement have been unsuccessful. The 2006 proposal made by the EU 3 (France, Britain and Germany) gave some vague assurances about regional security schemes and normalisation, which is a start.
However, if viewed from Tehran’s perspective it is difficult to believe in Washington’s good faith when it still refuses to talk unconditionally to Iran. There was some flesh to former President Mohammad Khatami’s opening toward Washington, as it helped provide the Pentagon with crucial intelligence on the Taliban ahead of the invasion of Afghanistan, only to have Iran included in the ‘Axis of Evil’ a few weeks later. This episode confirmed the belief among some Iranians that it is Washington that cannot be engaged.
The gradual and infinitely dangerous empowerment of the Islamic Revolution’s Guards Corps (IRGC), the impunity with which Ahmadinejad acts despite his very poor domestic performance, the retour en force of hard-line rhetoric, and the new repressive measures against dissidents are all justified using the excuse of an ‘American threat’. If the United States is sincere in its wish to see a more moderate regime in Tehran, the best policy would be to eliminate that pretext and throw all its weight into negotiations over Iran’s nuclear file and establish direct negotiation channels. If engagement fails, then the blame can indisputably be laid on Iran’s door. But if it succeeds, apart from the tangible benefits of an improved regional security situation, this could also encourage a more moderate Iranian government. History has shown that engagement can moderate.

Iran: Best to Avoid Another Gulf Crisis

Wayne White — Mon, 12 Feb 2007 12:00:00 -0500

Already bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, it would be sheer folly for the US to take military action against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Such a move could trigger a protracted conflict and have myriad adverse consequences, from destabilizing the Persian Gulf and Iraq to a sizeable spike in world oil prices.

The Administration is no doubt still mulling over preventive military action against Iran’s nuclear industry in order to make sure Tehran does not achieve a nuclear weapons capability. Indeed, leaks in January suggesting Israel was considering the use of nuclear weapons against Iranian nuclear targets may well have been meant to keep pressure on Washington to take this bull by the horns militarily. Recent US moves, such as the deployment of a second carrier battle group to the Gulf are no doubt aimed at intimidating Iran in the hope of minimizing Iranian interference in Iraq at the time of our “surge,” but also perhaps to begin putting in place the elements needed for a robust campaign of air strikes against Iran.

Some observers might not appreciate that if military action is taken connected to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, there would be nothing surgical about such an operation. The air strikes associated with contingency planning suggests that in addition to hitting a number of widely dispersed nuclear-related targets, much of Iran’s air defenses would have to be taken out to clear paths to the targets. In addition, to eliminate Iran’s ability to retaliate in the Gulf, strikes also probably would be made against Iran’s formidable array of anti-ship missiles near the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian Kilo-Class submarines, and perhaps even Iran’s ballistic and medium-range missile capabilities.

Such an ambitious air campaign could spread out over nearly a week, involving well over 1,000 combat aircraft sorties and hundreds of cruise missile launches. During that period, Iran could strike back with whatever military capabilities escaped destruction in the course of the earliest strikes.

Indeed, a badly wounded Iran would likely do everything it could to retaliate, such as attacking US fleet elements and commercial shipping with any anti-ship missiles escaping the first waves of air strikes. It might also launch whatever ballistic and medium-range missiles that survive the US assault at various targets in the GCC states, countries Tehran would likely view as complicit in such an attack. And Iran has other capabilities as well, such as various types of naval mines and asymmetric military retaliatory options including a Revolutionary Guard speedboat fleet trained to swarm against merchant ships or even enemy combat vessels.

Worst of all, shorn of much of its ability to strike back in the Gulf, a rather chaotic Iraq would doubtless have considerable allure as an ideal venue for payback against the US. This could be carried out by Iran’s allies among various Shi’a militias, (elements that probably would be enraged by such a US attack on Iran in any case) or even by the insertion of hundreds of Iran’s own personnel to carry out attacks on US forces. In such a scenario, the situation in an already seriously destabilized Iraq would become that much worse.

Some in Washington would hope that in the midst of or following such heavy blows, Iranians would turn against the clerical regime, which is so unpopular in many quarters even now. However, if history is any guide, patriotic Iranians of most all political persuasions would likely rally instead to the defense of their country, perhaps even strengthening the current regime.

Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of all this would be the absence of an end game. The last major military move against Iran was initiated by none other than Saddam Hussayn back in 1980. The Ba’thist regime in Baghdad, feeling threatened by revolutionary Iran, lashed out at Iran militarily, assuming that an unprepared Iran would quit the fight to lick its wounds and that a humiliated revolutionary government might well collapse. Instead, Iranians across the political spectrum fought back with grim determination, trapping Iraq in an eight-year war that eventually would cost Iraqis over 150,000 casualties. Americans, ironically also now in Iraq, must be mindful of this great blunder on the part of a bullying and clueless dictator.

Neutralizing Palestine to Better Focus on Iran

Clayton Swisher — Tue, 16 Jan 2007 12:00:00 -0500

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's trip to the Middle East, which begins today, will be aimed at convincing the so-called "moderate Arab states" of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia that the United States is finally ready, after six years of promises, to help Palestinians achieve their state. While good-faith American mediation would be welcomed, many Arabs will greet her visit with well-founded skepticism, questioning why a Bush administration that is seemingly locked at the hip with Israel now wishes to roll up its sleeves and help the Palestinians.

Six years of empty promises have bred considerable skepticism. Calls shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks for a Palestinian state, the pressure applied by President George W. Bush on then-Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to end the first siege of Yasser Arafat's Ramallah compound in 2002, and even the 2002 "road map" for peace were all viewed as no more than attempts to placate the international community, especially moderate Arabs, in order to prepare for war in Iraq. Without Arab cooperation, particularly from Jordan and Saudi Arabia, US plans to depose Saddam Hussein would have ended up in the same jar of formaldehyde as we now know was reserved for the Palestinian issue.

In instances where the Bush administration chose to momentarily focus on Palestine, the international media rushed to applaud the US commitment, hoping hands-on involvement would follow. This was particularly true once the 2004 presidential elections passed. Bush was expected to reward the coalition allies that had confronted Iraq by producing the oft-promised Palestinian state.

Then came Sharon's announcement in 2004 that Israel would unilaterally disengage from the Gaza Strip in 2005 - a move that allowed the Bush administration to keep focused on Iraq while blunting pressures created by virtual peace proposals indigenous to the region, namely the unofficial Geneva Initiative between the Israeli Yossi Beilin and the Palestinian Yasser Abed Rabbo. Although the road map called for at least a provisional Palestinian state by 2005, the administration calculated that Sharon's "generous" gesture would put the onus on Palestinians.

But the Arab world feared that "Gaza first" would be "Gaza last." In November 2005, Rice visited the region to secure the Agreement on Movement and Access to help breathe life into Gaza. The agreement is still unimplemented, the excuse this time being that the 2006 Palestinian election led to a Hamas victory, despite the administration's earlier pledge that the Arab pursuit of democracy would be matched by America's support for freedom.

Moderate Arabs were not opposed to the harsh US-led response to the Hamas victory. By their interpretation, a successful Hamas would spell victory for the Muslim Brotherhood or other Islamists threatening their rule. When depriving the Palestinians to bring Hamas down didn't work, the administration began more aggressive, undemocratic steps. As Fatah-Hamas unity government talks stalled, the US decided if politics would not work then it would arm its side to the teeth. The American channeling of money to and training of President Mahmoud Abbas' Presidential Guard, while Egypt and Jordan provided the weapons, sent the clearest signal that the US expected Fatah to put down Hamas.

Beyond eliminating Hamas and blocking the rise of Sunni Islamic movements lies the rising power of Shiite Islam and Iran's far-reaching tentacles throughout the region - from Iraq to Lebanon to Palestine. As the Bush administration comes to realize that success in Iraq may never be, and with pressure mounting domestically and internationally to build regional credibility through the Palestinian issue, the US has to look for new ways to shape its legacy, and Palestine isn't it. As Vietnam demonstrated, superpowers faced with a defeat tend to make matters worse, broadening the conflict in the name of withdrawing with dignity.

America doesn't necessarily need to take the lead as the argument for Israel's existence gains currency. And make no mistake: No American politician, including the Democrats, will protest Israel's actions once it presents its dossier that Iran is near to building a nuclear weapon.

With two years left in office, the Bush administration wants to see Iran's regime humbled, if not toppled. Neoconservatives who have had their sights set on Iran are buoyed by the new arrangement where Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Israel find themselves on the same page when it comes to confronting Iran's uranium enrichment program. They all want to do business together, including with Israel – which has the motive and means to degrade Iranian targets through air strikes – but moderate Arabs demand progress on the Palestinian issue to retain some measure of legitimacy and avoid public embarrassment.

The question that should be asked now is how low the bar will be set by Arab moderates. Will nominal rhetorical gestures suffice as before the Iraq war? Will the anti-Iran bloc be pacified by pledges to really open the Karni crossing in Gaza this time and "humanize the checkpoints" with a new coat of paint? Will Arab moderates help Rice tube-feed Abbas on the notion of accepting a state with provisional borders and nominal sovereignty along the route of Israel's separation wall?

The difference here will be that Palestinians want and need an end to the conflict and occupation to get on with their lives, while moderate Arabs, Israel, and most significantly the US want the Palestinian problem contained, at least until Iran is taken care of. By then Palestine will be some other administration's mess to sort out.

US and Iran: Circling Warily

Wayne White — Fri, 30 Jun 2006 12:00:00 -0400

There is good reason to remain concerned over the possibility of US military action against Iran. The President’s intense focus on anything remotely posing a so-called “existential” threat to Israel and related US contingency planning strongly suggest that this crisis will not fade away. But, for the time being, the “military option” appears to have been pushed to the back burner. That said, absent timely and meaningful Iranian concessions the military option could once again become the solution of choice -- and despite all the risks associated with an attack on Iran.

Initially, I tended to dismiss Secretary Rice’s May 31 initiative for the US to join the European talks with Iran. A reading of the political body language since then suggests, however, that senior Administration policymakers may have learned enough to realize just how messy military action against Iran would be. Such action would likely involve not only taking out widely dispersed nuclear-related targets and nearby anti-aircraft defenses, but also portions of the Iranian air force assigned to defend these targets. And that’s just for starters.

In order to reduce Iran’s ability to retaliate in the Persian Gulf, such a plan probably would also include taking out Iran’s array of anti-ship missiles along the northern coast of the Gulf, its Kilo-Class submarines, other naval assets and maybe even some targets related to Iran’s long-range missile capabilities.

In other words, the military option could more closely resemble war than a limited package of surgical strikes (although even the latter would, of course, represent an act of war). And if Tehran were to be stripped of much of its ability to strike back militarily in the Gulf, Iraq would beckon that much more as an arena for Iranian payback.

At any time over the next year--and probably well beyond--such Iranian action would occur while Iraq’s first permanent government is seeking to plant solid roots against formidable odds. There would be quite a few Iranian options for punishing the US and its allies in Iraq, either directly or through various surrogates. Moving the necessary arms, people or money across a still porous Iraqi border would be fairly easy.

With crude prices near an all-time high and this fall’s mid-term elections just over the horizon, the Administration is doubtless more sensitive to the likely impact of a major crisis in the Gulf on the world price of crude. Many Republicans in Congress believe the President is insensitive to their plight related to elections in which Iraq and the price of gasoline are sure to be two of the leading issues. Some Republican concern is well placed. The White House also shares some of these concerns, although not with quite the same level of intensity.

On another front, despite the rhetoric, Administration policymakers may now have a more realistic notion of how difficult it would be to effect regime change in Iran. Actions such as the President’s January 2002 “Axis of Evil” speech and continuing threats related to Iran’s nuclear program have thrown many Iranians otherwise weary of clerical rule and eager for improved ties with the US into a more defiant, nationalistic mood antithetical to regime change.

A combination of all these factors probably was the genesis of the Administration’s decision to assume a more active role on the diplomatic front. In this situation, Iran’s actions could have more weight than ever before in determining the ultimate outcome—diplomatic or military. One might, of course, argue that whatever the situation, Iran has certain rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or that a nuclear double standard is being unfairly applied in Iran’s case. But such considerations do not count for much at this stage of the game, in part because of Iran’s own irresponsible actions and rhetoric.

Despite US misgivings concerning the military option, Iran still must concede enough to enable the US to back off. Iran has begun, albeit too slowly, to move toward accommodation and away from bravado and defiance, but significant concessions on the all-important nuclear fuel enrichment issue will be necessary in order to push the US military option definitively off the table.

Iran Initiative Set Up to Fail

Edward Walker — Fri, 2 Jun 2006 12:00:00 -0400

Is Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice engaged in the same kabuki dance that we witnessed in the lead-up to the Iraq war?

Despite the lessons of Iraq, there are still advocates in the administration pushing for regime change in Iran through military action. However, they recognize that unless the United States exhausts the diplomatic course, they will face extraordinary opposition to any attack. When coupled with the obvious downside of military action, which our military has been making clear, then it is not at all a slam dunk that would warrant attacking Iran. However, if diplomatic options are exhausted, then the odds of President Bush giving his assent to avoid a nuclear-armed Iran increase substantially.

From the earliest days of the Bush administration, then Secretary of State Colin Powell tried moving the Iraq problem to the United Nations but faced strong opposition from some in the Pentagon and in Vice President Dick Cheney's office. They were afraid he would succeed, which would make direct military intervention and regime change more difficult, if not impossible.

It was only as these individuals grew to believe that Powell didn't have a chance of succeeding that they agreed to let him try and fail, thus setting the stage for military action.

If this is true, then Rice's initiative presumes failure. There is a poison pill in the condition Rice set that "as soon as Iran fully and verifiably suspends its enrichment and reprocessing activities, the United States will come to the table."

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran, having staked out a position of defiance and strength, must now recant if he is to sit down with the Americans. Who will take bets that Ahmadinejad will comply?

What Threat Does Iran Really Pose to Israel?

Tom Lippman and Juan Cole — Fri, 19 May 2006 12:00:00 -0400

There are many good reasons why it is desirable to prevent Iran from acquiring the capability to develop nuclear weapons. But in assessing the Iranian threat and deciding what to do about it, the United States and its allies should take care to sort out the real strategic issues from the spurious ones that are filling up so much airtime and so many magazine columns. In particular, decisions should not be driven by the idea that Iran — even an Iran with a handful of nuclear warheads — presents a strategic or existential threat to Israel. It does not.

Israelis are understandably apprehensive about the bellicose statements emanating from Iran’s odious president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and it may be that the Iranian’s hateful rhetoric foments anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish statement around the Middle East. In military terms, however, Iran presents no credible conventional military threat to Israel.

Let us assume the loudmouthed Ahmadinejad really means what he has been saying about Israel. And let us assume that when he calls for Israel to be wiped off the map he is not offering an abstract concept, as if the partition of Palestine in 1948 could be revisited, but that he means it is literally Iran's duty to do something about it. And let us assume that he has some support in the Iranian armed forces, among the people who would actually have to deliver any strikes against Israel upon which the Iranian leadership might agree.

His rhetoric cannot change the balance of military power.

Iran is a weak, developing country with an annual per capita income about one-eighth that of Israel. Iran has a much larger population, but its advantage in manpower is roughly similar to that which Egypt had in 1967. Israel is a rich, sophisticated first-world country with an extremely powerful military and a highly advanced technology sector.

Israel's air force is probably the best in the world, and can fly more missions in the same time than can the US air force. Iran in contrast has a small, poorly trained air force with obsolescent equipment that would be instantly devastated in any encounter with Israel's. And, it strains credulity to imagine that Iran could attack Israel overland or from the sea, unless everyone in the Israeli military went to sleep for weeks and failed to notice the movements of troops or ships. No credible Iranian force could get within striking distance.

But what if, five or ten years from now, Iran has nuclear warheads and the means to deliver them against Israel?

Even if we assume that some people in Iran would then truly plan and intend to fire those warheads at Israel, are we also to assume that the entire Iranian leadership — military, political and clerical — would acquiesce in such a plan? And are we to assume that these people in the leadership, whoever they may be five years or a decade from now, are collectively insane and suicidal, in ways that Stalin and Khrushchev never were? Are we to believe that they would initiate a nuclear catastrophe, a step no other nation has taken in the 60 years of the nuclear era? Do we think Iran is unaware that Israel has nuclear weapons and multiple means of delivering them? Do we believe the Iranians are prepared to shrug that off and plunge ahead to their own doom? Do we think the people and leaders of Iran are willing to give this whole new meaning to the term “suicide bomber?”

It is true that Iran menaces Israel, mostly through its support of terrorism. But the reason Iran resorts to terrorism is that it has no other way of inflicting real harm on the Jewish state, which is capable of defending itself and has the full support of the United States.

Some Israeli commentators say that it is easy for Americans to take comfort from the Cold War experience, in which Mutual Assured Destruction deterred the United States and the Soviet Union from attacking each other. The Israelis say they don’t have the luxury of that gamble. Given Israel’s history, their apprehension is not surprising. But American decision-makers would be well advised to proceed on the basis of realistic evaluations, not emotions.

Iran & the US: Dangerous Stalemate or 'Multitude of Possibilities'?

John Calabrese, Book Review Editor, The Middle East Journal — Fri, 19 May 2006 12:00:00 -0400

Recently, tension over the Iranian nuclear program reached new heights. A US-backed resolution was circulated at the United Nations warning of "further measures as may be necessary" if Iranian enrichment and reprocessing activities are not halted. And the Iranian Parliament warned that if the UN Security Council does not resolve the dispute "peacefully" they might review of Article 10 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which outlines the procedures for withdrawal from the treaty.

Last week, Russia and China, despite growing impatient with Iran's recalcitrance, led an effort to delay the resolution's consideration. And the United States and Europeans agreed to draft an incentives package to induce Tehran's cooperation.

Amid this tension lies the tantalizing possibility that Tehran and Washington could yet find a way out of this dangerous stalemate. On May 9 President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sent a letter to President Bush proposing "new solutions" to the country's problems. It was the first personal communication by an Iranian president to his American counterpart since 1979.

US officials must not dismiss this overture as just another eleventh-hour Iranian ruse designed to avert a showdown. Instead, he Bush administration should treat the letter as an opportunity for both countries to step back from the brink.

For several years, the United States has focused on preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons by exercising incremental coercive diplomacy. This approach resulted in a stern censure from the IAEA Governing Board, referral to the UN Security Council, and a nonbinding council statement urging Iran to cease uranium enrichment within 30 days. But these are triumphs of process, not policy.

Meanwhile, Tehran has suspended short-notice IAEA inspections, manipulated Iranian public sentiment in favor of a nuclear program, and produced reactor-grade uranium. Thus, the United States today confronts an Iran whose nuclear program continues to advance, whose nuclear activities are walled off from international scrutiny, whose coffers are flush with cash with which to weather sanctions, and whose leadership seems united in refusing to capitulate to Western specifically American demands.

In response, the United States seems to be on a path toward sanctions, but sanctions are unlikely to persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions and may damage relations between and among major powers.

Can we do better? Yes, not by abandoning diplomacy, but by modifying and augmenting it.

First, the Bush administration should focus on de-escalation. It can start by using alternative language in the draft resolution, language that will bring Security Council members together. The Bush administration should also communicate to the EU-3, Russia, China, and separately to Iran through the Swiss channel, that it is willing to seriously consider a diplomatic opening.

Second, the United States should broaden and deepen nuclear diplomacy. Until now, the West has focused narrowly on the Iranian case. Yet the problematic aspects of the Iranian nuclear program are part and parcel of the deficiencies of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. Targeting Iran in this way has fed the perception in Tehran that the campaign in the IAEA and Security Council is simply window dressing, necessary groundwork for pursuing regime change. In turn, this has only caused Iranian leaders to close ranks.

Finally, the United States must pay the price of cooperation. Statements designed to convey resoluteness often prove counter-productive: loose talk about resorting to "other coalitions"; runs the risk of undermining the very coalition that Washington has worked so assiduously to build. Offhand remarks about sanctions or military force are as likely to cause opponents to dig in their heels as to quake in their boots. The United States must do a much better job managing the message.

The administration should also tackle the issue of who is, or isn't, communicating to whom. Though the EU-3 has spearheaded the West's diplomatic efforts, the political conflict between the United States and Iran is at the core of the nuclear stalemate. To have expected the nuclear issue to be resolved without some progress toward settling the political differences between Washington and Tehran was unrealistic three years ago and remains so today. That is why in recent weeks UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and prominent American leaders from both sides of the aisle have called on the United States to open a direct dialogue with Iran.

Here the Ahmadinejad letter becomes important — not for what it did or did not contain, or even for the insight it provided into the mindset of its author, but rather because it creates an opportunity for Washington respond in a self-confident and constructive manner, so as to allow the less strident and intractable voices in the Iranian clerical establishment, if not Ahmadinejad himself some room to maneuver.

Iran's ambassador to the United Nations, Javan Zarif, striking a conciliatory tone, recently stated that "there are a multitude of possibilities" to resolving the nuclear dispute. The United States would be foolish not to explore them. Let's hope the Bush administration uses this opportunity to pause, de-escalate and adjust course.

Can America Prevent a Nuclear Iran?

R.K. Ramazani — Fri, 4 Feb 2005 12:00:00 -0500

Both President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney managed on Inauguration Day to focus world attention on Iran.

Bush appeared to have Iran, among other countries, in mind when he said he was committed to "the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world," and Cheney publicly raised the possibility that Israel "might well decide to act first" to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Yet neither clarified America’s Iran policy, partly because of the division of opinion within and outside the Bush administration.

The hawks favor the invasion of Iran, arguing that logistically it would be easier to pull off than the invasion of Iraq because the US could launch land-based attacks on Iran from adjacent Afghanistan, Iraq and Central Asia. They also allege that Iran is a "rogue" state that has sponsored terrorist bombings in Beirut and in Saudi Arabia, and is sheltering al-Qaida terrorists.

In contrast, the doves see tremendous difficulties in attacking Iran as compared with Iraq. Iran, they point out, is four times the size of Iraq and has a population three times that of Iraq. It has missiles capable of reaching Israeli and European targets as well as American interests in the Middle East, and the capacity to instigate Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Israeli-occupied territories against both American and Israeli interests.

Facing the American and Israeli threat of military action, Iranian hawks and doves have closed ranks. They mock the threats as scare tactics, invoke their millennial history of resistance to foreign invasions from Alexander of Macedonia to Saddam Hussein of Iraq, consider obtaining nuclear weapons to be un-Islamic, insist on their right under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, point out their ongoing cooperation with International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, who testify that so far there is no sign of Iranian militarization of nuclear facilities, and warn Israel of dire consequences if it attempts to strike Iranian nuclear facilities, as it did Iraq’s Osirak in 1981.

The Bush administration’s gross misunderstanding of the Iraqi political culture got us involved in the intractable Iraqi situation in which we find ourselves today. This should not be repeated. Iran and the United States must stop demonizing each other, as must Iran and Israel.

The United States should recognize the dynamic social and political changes in Iran that eschew religious extremism, favor a pragmatic approach to international relations, aspire to democracy and opt for relations with America.

Besides acknowledging this, Israel should realize that, contrary to public perception, Iranian leaders do not seek to destroy Israel. I know first-hand from on-site interviews that the Iranians would accept a two-state solution that would provide for the creation of a viable Palestinian state living side-by-side with Israel.

The Bush administration should join the European efforts to deal with the Iranian nuclear situation. Perhaps this is more feasible now that both Bush and Cheney have begun to focus on diplomacy.

Bush has already acknowledged that we do not have "leverage" with Iran and that "diplomacy must be the first choice" in resolving international issues, including "nuclear armament."

Despite Dick Cheney’s apparent concern with possible Israeli military action against Iran, he said clearly, "We don’t want a war in the Middle East, if we can avoid it. In the case of the Iranian situation, I think everybody would be best suited or best treated and dealt with if we could deal with it diplomatically."

If this apparent retreat from the previous focus on military action goes beyond rhetoric, then there is some hope for resolving the Iranian nuclear situation peacefully.

A real test for this would be whether the Bush administration will get off the sidelines and join the Europeans in dealing with Iran, a move which Britain, France, Germany and the European Union have urged. They say their diplomatic efforts could become more effective if America were to join them. Mohammad ElBaradei, the head of IAEA, as well as such ranking senators as John McCain, call for joint US-EU diplomacy.

A joint American-European diplomatic approach would make it far more difficult for Iran to renege on its commitment to Europe. Iran has promised to refrain temporarily from uranium enrichment while discussions for European technological, economic and commercial aid to, and political and security cooperation with, Iran make steady progress.

More important, such a joint approach would redound to the benefit of reformist and secular nationalist forces within Iran. It would deprive the hard-line conservatives of the opportunity to exploit American and Israeli threats to repress pro-democracy forces.

If President Bush is true to his commitment to expand freedom worldwide through diplomacy, support for democratic transition should go beyond Iraq to neighboring Iran, where centuries-old aspirations for democracy have been transformed into a relentless grassroots democratic movement, despite mounting repression.

Finding the Fulcrum? Euro-Atlantic Relations and Iran

John Calabrese — Wed, 21 Jul 2004 12:00:00 -0400

Over the past year, the Bush administration has prodded the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Tehran to clarify the details of the Iranian nuclear program. The fact that the United States chose a multilateral approach to address this issue was welcomed by European officials, who, like their American counterparts, are concerned about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as they are about the deficiencies of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. European officials, like their US counterparts, also desire a non-nuclear Iran, and hope to avoid yet another traumatic Euro-Atlantic policy dispute. These shared concerns have led to an unprecedented degree of US/EU policy coordination with respect to Iran as well as to an uncharacteristically unified and assertive European diplomacy.

Yet, the IAEA investigative process has yielded troubling discoveries and omissions about the nature and extensiveness of the Iranian nuclear program, casting doubt on the veracity of Iranian claims that their nuclear activities are dedicated exclusively to civilian purposes. With each successive turn of the IAEA reporting and Board of Governors deliberation cycle, frustration on all three sides – US, European, and Iranian – has been mounting. With the next round of IAEA reports and negotiations just weeks away, observers are pondering doomsday scenarios and idealized eleventh-hour outcomes. Both are plausible, but neither seems likely. Unless either Washington or Tehran stumble into a confrontation, the three sides will probably find it in their interests to defer the issue to a second Bush administration or its successor.

In the meantime, it may be useful to explore both where we are and how we got here. This paper develops three arguments. First, the EU has made substantial progress in building an institutionalized framework for relations with Iran that, in its current form, addresses some of the key concerns voiced by critics of engagement. Second, the US and EU approaches to Iran, specifically regarding the nuclear issue, have narrowed significantly, mainly as a consequence of a European course adjustment. Third, despite this convergence, it appears that Washington and Brussels have yet to find the fulcrum – Iran remains immovable.

Iran's Nuclear Program and the IAEA Compromise: A Bridge to a Better Bargain?

John Calabrese — Mon, 15 Dec 2003 12:00:00 -0500

On November 26, 2003 the Governing Board of the 35-member International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) voted unanimously on a compromise version of a draft resolution, censuring Iran for failures and breaches of its nuclear safeguards while welcoming Iran's offer of active cooperation and openness. According to IAEA Director General Mohammed El Baradei, the resolution conveys an ominous message that failures in the future will not be tolerated. Exclaiming that "[this] is a good day for peace ... and non-proliferation," El Baradei added that the resolution strengthens my hand in ensuring that Iran's program is for peaceful purposes. Though in reality, the resolution does not in itself constitute a breakthrough, it might eventually prove to have been the crucial first step in resolving the problem of Iran's nuclear program and thus to have served as a bridge to a better bargain.

Iran's Nuclear Profile: Unambiguous but Incomplete

Until recently, the story of Iran's nuclear ambitions had been longer on rumors than on facts. Among the few well-established facts were these: First, that as a signatory of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is duty-bound to observe its strictures. Second, that the NPT creates a distinction between civilian (permissible) and military (proscribed) nuclear activities that is maintained by a system of voluntary disclosure bolstered by monitoring and verification mechanisms. Third, that Iran's nuclear program was launched by Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi with the purchase from the United States of a small research reactor for Amirabad Technical College in 1967, the establishment of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in 1974, and the subsequent announcement of an ambitious plan to build 23 nuclear power plants by 1994. Fourth, that in 1979 the revolutionary government of Iran suspended construction of the Bushehr power plant (the centerpiece of the Shah's nuclear program), and later tried unsuccessfully to get Germany to resume its involvement in the project. Finally, that Iran announced in March 1983, at the same time of the unveiling of the first Five-Year Development Plan, its intention to restart the nuclear program.

Iran spent much of the 1980s waging war with Iraq and battling international isolation. And much of theUS concern about Iran during that time focused on the course and outcome of the Gulf conflict, on Iranian-supported terrorism, and on Iran's determined effort to procure and develop ballistic missiles. In the early 1990s, however, a series of disclosures heightened Washington's concern about Iran's nuclear activities: the official announcement of a nuclear technology cooperation agreement between Iran and the Soviet Union (1989), press accounts that Iran had purchased a calutron from China (1991), the signing by Iran of two nuclear agreements with the Russian Federation (1992), and media reports that in 1992 Iranian officials had visited the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in Kazakhstan (a plant which, perhaps not coincidentally, had a surplus inventory of more than 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium).

Nevertheless, the 1991 US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) described the Iranian nuclear program as disorganized and in an initial stage of development. Following unofficial visits to Iran in February 1992 and November 1993, IAEA officials declared that Iran's nuclear activities were consistent with peaceful uses. Still, many US officials and policy analysts remained skeptical. Fueling their skepticism were fresh clues about the nature and extent of Iran's nuclear program: a mining contract with China to develop indigenous uranium resources, a contract with Russia to complete the Bushehr plant, and intermittent reports of Iranian officials abroad shopping for heavy water reactors of the type that had been used by India and Israel to produce their first fission bombs.

Yet, throughout the 1990s Tehran held fast to the official position that its nuclear program was intended exclusively for civilian purposes and was therefore in compliance with NPT obligations; and that it was firmly committed to the principle of transparency embodied in the treaty and thus to cooperating fully with the IAEA. However, even then many nuclear experts considered the civilian purposes rationale electricity generation to be highly dubious. They cited the exorbitant cost ($800 million merely for the completion of the Bushehr plant), given the amount of electricity this facility could conceivably produce. They also cited the steadily advancing state of the Iranian missile program as casting further doubt on the veracity of Tehran's civilian purposes argument. Thus, by the time the Bush Administration entered office in 2001, the conventional wisdom among a growing number of experts was that Iran was following a dual-track approach: buying civilian reactors while seeking clandestinely the means to acquire nuclear capability for military purposes.

Beginning in mid-2002, increasingly disturbing details of Iran's activities came to light. Much of the accumulating evidence against Iran was gathered by IAEA investigations, with key tips provided by the National Council for Iranian Resistance (NCIR). With rather remarkable rapidity, a much clearer, though incomplete picture of Iran's nuclear program began to take shape: In August 2002, the NCIR disclosed the location of a pilot uranium enrichment plant, which Iranian officials had previously passed off as a de-desertification facility. A month later, the Iranian government informed the IAEA Secretariat of the existence of the enrichment facility. In December 2002, CNN reported that satellite images had revealed construction of two secret nuclear fuel-cycle facilities, one in Arak and the other in Natanz. In February 2003, IAEA Director General El Baradei met with officials in Tehran, armed with results from environmental sampling of various locations in Iran that showed trace elements of enriched uranium. In short, by the time Operation Iraqi Freedom had commenced (March 2003), it was possible to sketch a rough outline of Iran's nuclear program. That program appeared to be more extensive and to have progressed faster than most analysts had suspected, or had even thought possible.

In a June 2003 report, the IAEA declared that Iran had violated its safeguards agreement. In another report three months later, the IAEA highlighted inconsistencies in previous Iranian statements and delays in granting access to inspectors. The reports detailed suspicious and disturbing gaps: undeclared uranium imports, undeclared uranium metal production, missing uranium hexafluoride. As a result, all of Iran's previous claims about its nuclear activities were called into question. All the signs now point to a multifaceted effort by Iran, at an advanced stage of development, to attain the ability to produce significant quantities of fissile material on its own by both uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.

Those who have long been convinced that Iran does have, and those who are now at least willing to concede that Iran might have, a nuclear weapons program remain divided in their thinking about what motivates these activities. One school of thought essentially regards Iran as a status quo state whose principal aim in pursuing a nuclear option is deterrence. The other school, which views Iran as a revanchist state bent on dominating the region and implacably hostile to the United States, holds that once Iran possesses nuclear weapons it will brandish them in an effort to neutralize the American military presence in the area and to intimidate its neighbors.

Though opinion on Iranian intentions with respect to nuclear weapons is thus divided, there now appears to be broad agreement in the policy communities in Washington and in Europe (including Russia) that adding yet another nuclear state to the already combustible strategic equation in the Middle East and South Asia is destabilizing; and that, given the mature stage of development of the Iranian nuclear program, the window of potentially effective preventive action is exceedingly narrow.

US Iran Policy in Limbo: Nonproliferation Policy in Crisis?

Upon taking the oath of office in January 2001, President George W. Bush inherited from his predecessor a policy of isolating Iran that consisted mainly of economic sanctions which had for the most part been mandated by the US Congress. For well over a decade, many US officials had viewed Iran's quest for nuclear energy as a threat both to American interests in the Middle East and to the effectiveness of the existing nonproliferation regime. Thus, when President Bush assumed office, there were already in place a number of proliferation sanctions in place, two of which are unique to Iran (i.e., The Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act and The Iran Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178). The Bush Administration also inherited the traditional international nonproliferation framework, that is, the NPT and the associated IAEA monitoring/reporting system a nonproliferation regime with demonstrable weaknesses, a regime in which at least some senior US officials had long before lost confidence.

Though during the first year of the Bush Administration — including after the September 11th terrorist attacks there seemed to be some interest in engaging Iran, voices in favor of a rapprochement began to give way those advocating a more confrontational approach. The first salvo was fired by President Bush himself during the January 29, 2002 State of the Union speech. In that address, the President classified Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, as part of an axis of evil. It was partly because of Iran's alleged efforts to acquire nuclear weapons capability that it was assigned this dubious distinction. Bush Administration concern specifically about the Iranian nuclear program was registered by DCI George Tenet, who just several days after the President's State of the Union Address, in testimony before the US Congress warned that Iran might be able to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon by late this decade, and sooner if it gets such material from outside.

Accompanying the new label, axis of evil, was a new round of bellicose rhetoric from Washington. And adding substance to the language of vague threats was new strategic thinking, anchored in the belief that the nexus between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction constitute the gravest security threat of our time, and subsequently elaborated in the November 2002 National Security Doctrine (NSD). Revelations about Iran's nuclear activities undoubtedly strengthened the hand of proponents of a tougher US policy towards Iran. Yet, apart from expressing in the most general terms its solidarity with democratic forces in Iraq, the Bush Administration has yet to articulate a coherent policy toward Iran.

Preoccupied with building support for, preparing and launching the war in Iraq, the Bush foreign policy team focused its nonproliferation efforts with respect to Iran on the supply side, for example applying pressure to Russia. After the war ended, US officials again began to ratchet up the pressure on Iran. The case for challenging Iran on the nuclear issue was enhanced by Tehran's own loss of credibility with the major powers European countries, Japan, and Russia that had previously been reluctant to hold Iran's feet to the fire. The case for action with respect to Iran was also enhanced by the military action against Iraq, the results of which made both US officials and their European counterparts, though for different reasons, inclined to pursue a multilateral diplomatic approach.

The diplomatic intervention spearheaded by Britain, France, and Germany was designed to engender cooperation from the Iranian side. Meanwhile, on the IAEA front, the Agency issued a demand for Iran to take steps to open its program to full inspections by signing the Additional Protocol, and explain past infractions. The September 12th resolution had in the sense that it set October 31 as a deadline for Iran to cooperate fully to resolve concerns about its nuclear activities. Following several weeks of mixed signals from Tehran, and ten days before the appointed deadline, these initiatives yielded fruit in the form of a Foreign Ministers Joint Statement, in which Iran agreed to IAEA demands that it cooperate with the agency's efforts to allay fears that Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program.

An Historic Breakthrough or Simply Muddling Through?

As stated at the outset, in their November 26 resolution, the 35 members of the IAEA Governing Board balance the statement that they strongly deplore Iran's past breaches and infractions, with the statement that they welcome Iran's cooperation. The resolution also contains a trigger mechanism in the form of a warning that Iran's failure to cooperate fully will engender serious consequences.” Though not spelled out in detail, such consequences are generally understood to mean referral to the UN Security Council with the possibility of the subsequent imposition of sanctions.

The diplomatic process that culminated in the November 26th resolution was one in which each and every party had its particular interest: For Prime Minister Tony Blair, it was a vehicle for rebuilding bridges with France and Germany, repositioning Britain so as to strike a better balance between the European and Atlanticist aspects of its foreign policy, and regaining some political support both for the Labor Party and for himself within that party. his own party. For the three European powers which launched the diplomatic intervention, it was an occasion to demonstrate collective leadership and policy coordination withinn the European context, to breathe new life into a moribund, largely discredited policy of constructive engagement with Iran, and to avoid an even deeper rift in the Transatlantic relationship. With respect to the Iranian clerical establishment, it created an opening for a tactical alliance between elements within the conservative faction and the reformists each of which could, and did, claim credit for the most appealing aspects of the final IAEA resolution. For Mohammed El Baradei and the IAEA, it was an opportunity to advance the argument in favor of continued commitment to, and patience with, the technical and operational aspects of NPT adherence/compliance. For the United States, it was a way to reengage multilaterally while retaining the prerogative to insist on, define, and mete out (unilaterally, in the last resort) serious consequences in the event of future breaches by Iran of its nuclear obligations.

All of the parties, then, could draw some satisfaction from, claim credit for, and trumpet the November 26th resolution as a success. But much uncertainty remains. Iran pledged to sign the Additional Protocol of the NPT. When exactly will Iran sign and ratify the Protocol? Iran agreed to full disclosure and full access to its nuclear facilities. But what precisely will the IAEA demand? More to the point, what will Tehran choose to, and be able to, withhold or conceal from IAEA authorities? Iran has agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities, but for how long? On this last question, Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, offered this answer, though it might not be the definitive one: The suspension of enrichment is provisional and voluntary, to build confidence. There is no question of halting our enrichment activities.

In agreeing to the compromise language of the November 26th IAEA reslution, the United States and the Europeans merely papered over their differences; they did not resolve them. The American side remains fixated on the past on mounting evidence of systematic Iranian concealment and deception and low confidence in inspections processes, both of which tend to be viewed through the prism of the UN-Iraq experience. The European side is focused on the future, on the possibility that the process itself through rewards for cooperation — might engender sufficient confidence by Iran that Tehran will dedicate its nuclear program exclusively to civilian purposes and sufficient confidence in Iran that Tehran is indeed doing so.

In spite of these differences, the US and European sides match up well in terms of their leverage over Iran in working the nuclear issue. With the European Union having become Iran’s leading trade partner two-way trade in 2002 having surpassed 13 billion euros and the fate of the EU-Iran trade and economic cooperation agreement hanging in the balance European opinions and policies matter a great deal to Tehran. This is equally the case with the United States, where the Bush Administration has already demonstrated that it is willing to use military force preemptively, has knowledge certain of the location of at least some of Iran's nuclear installations, and has until now not ruled out the military option.

Today, as prior to the November 26th resolution, Iran has before it three options: continue to develop its nuclear infrastructure, seek to develop clandestinely a small number of nuclear weapons, or strive for a nuclear breakout. Though it is clear which of these options the United States and much of the rest of the international community prefers, it is far from clear which one Iran will ultimately choose to exercise, even in the face of the current unprecedented degree of international scrutiny and pressure. For the time being, Iran is likely to honor its agreement to cooperate with the IAEA and its moratorium on uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. So, too, for the time being, the 35 members of the IAEA are likely to hold firm in solidarity.

The next test comes with the IAEA report due in February 2004, followed by the next IAEA governing board meeting scheduled for March. Between now and then, the United States and its allies can ill afford to stand idle. For the November 26th resolution to serve as a bridge to a better bargain, and not the prelude to another full-blown international crisis, American, European, and Japanese officials will have to work energetically together to fashion a set of common objectives with respect to Iran policy in general and a package of incentives that are linked specifically to clear evidence of Iranian cooperation with IAEA authorities. For, realistically, achieving a high level of confidence that Iran has abandoned its quest for nuclear weapons depends not only on maintaining strong pressure to ensure that Iran does not bend the rules but on building confidence that Iran's legitimate security concerns are being addressed and that its prospects for economic and political reintegration into the world community are improving.