Weapons of Mass Destruction

US and Iran: Drifting Toward Conflict?

Wayne White — Wed, 30 Apr 2008 11:57:58 -0400

The U.S. once again is stepping up its rhetoric aimed at Iran. Renewed charges of nefarious Iranian activities related to Iraq have been surfacing ever since the hearings featuring General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker earlier this month. Diplomacy is stalled on both Iran’s nuclear ambitions and Iraq. It is unclear whether the U.S. and Iran will succeed in avoiding a military confrontation of one sort or another.

Not only have accusations escalated, but also the tone of Administration and U.S. military commentary on Iran has become noticeably more shrill. There has been a focus on Iranian-trained “special groups” operating in Iraq, especially in the context of this month’s bloody confrontation involving radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army.

Late last week, Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, alluded to Iran’s “increasingly lethal and malign influence” (in Iraq). The normally cautious Mullen even went so far as to note that the Pentagon is preparing for “potential military courses of action” against Iran. General Petraeus reportedly is preparing a briefing on Iran’s provision of lethal munitions to anti-U.S. elements in Iraq.

On the nuclear front, Defense Secretary Gates -- also typically reserved -- charged in a speech last week that Iran “is hell bent on acquiring nuclear weapons.”

Tehran probably is guilty of supplying sympathetic militias in Iraq with money, arms, and training. The evidence so far has not made believers of many observers, but the sheer volume of reporting on this is sizeable. Yet, the U.S. does not seem to appreciate that Iraq is in Iran’s backyard and expecting the Iranians to eschew involvement there—especially in the face of a robust U.S. presence--is simply unrealistic.

On the diplomatic front, there is little prospect for meaningful progress. Talks between Ambassador Crocker and the Iranians consist of American accusations against Iran and predictable Iranian denials. The restriction of these exchanges to Iraq blocks any useful trade-offs that might be drawn from other contentious issues dividing the two governments. The dim prospects for useful engagement were underscored when Secretary of State Rice apparently went to a major regional meeting on Iraq this month with explicit instructions not to engage with the Iranians.

A key factor the Administration either does not wish to acknowledge or cannot appreciate is that Iran’s overall responsibility for the mess in Iraq is actually quite limited. In a country shattered by war, looting and violence, saddled with a dysfunctional, sectarian and corrupt government and ethno-sectarian communities with maximalist agendas, the fundamental problems are inherently Iraqi. Indeed, the Administration’s focus on Iran might be, in part, driven by the need to distract attention from the more fundamental reasons for disappointment—even failure--in Iraq.

Regarding Iran’s nuclear intentions, Defense Secretary Gates may be right. However, the main driver for any Iranian nuclear weapons program most likely relates to Iran’s desire for the ultimate defensive deterrent against U.S. interference—not a desire to launch a suicidal nuclear first-strike against Israel.

Gates has noted quite accurately that war with Iran would be “disastrous.” Hostilities between the U.S. and Iran would trigger a major crisis without a clear end game in the Persian Gulf upon which the world depends for a huge slice of its tightening energy supplies.

Something often neglected in American policymaking is the good sense to proceed cautiously in certain highly complex situations. To avoid another massive crisis the U.S. can ill-afford, it would be best to acknowledge an Iranian role in Iraq, engage Tehran in a less one-dimensional fashion, and prepare to live with a nuclear Iran.

Iran: Best to Avoid Another Gulf Crisis

Wayne White — Mon, 12 Feb 2007 12:00:00 -0500

Already bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, it would be sheer folly for the US to take military action against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Such a move could trigger a protracted conflict and have myriad adverse consequences, from destabilizing the Persian Gulf and Iraq to a sizeable spike in world oil prices.

The Administration is no doubt still mulling over preventive military action against Iran’s nuclear industry in order to make sure Tehran does not achieve a nuclear weapons capability. Indeed, leaks in January suggesting Israel was considering the use of nuclear weapons against Iranian nuclear targets may well have been meant to keep pressure on Washington to take this bull by the horns militarily. Recent US moves, such as the deployment of a second carrier battle group to the Gulf are no doubt aimed at intimidating Iran in the hope of minimizing Iranian interference in Iraq at the time of our “surge,” but also perhaps to begin putting in place the elements needed for a robust campaign of air strikes against Iran.

Some observers might not appreciate that if military action is taken connected to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, there would be nothing surgical about such an operation. The air strikes associated with contingency planning suggests that in addition to hitting a number of widely dispersed nuclear-related targets, much of Iran’s air defenses would have to be taken out to clear paths to the targets. In addition, to eliminate Iran’s ability to retaliate in the Gulf, strikes also probably would be made against Iran’s formidable array of anti-ship missiles near the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian Kilo-Class submarines, and perhaps even Iran’s ballistic and medium-range missile capabilities.

Such an ambitious air campaign could spread out over nearly a week, involving well over 1,000 combat aircraft sorties and hundreds of cruise missile launches. During that period, Iran could strike back with whatever military capabilities escaped destruction in the course of the earliest strikes.

Indeed, a badly wounded Iran would likely do everything it could to retaliate, such as attacking US fleet elements and commercial shipping with any anti-ship missiles escaping the first waves of air strikes. It might also launch whatever ballistic and medium-range missiles that survive the US assault at various targets in the GCC states, countries Tehran would likely view as complicit in such an attack. And Iran has other capabilities as well, such as various types of naval mines and asymmetric military retaliatory options including a Revolutionary Guard speedboat fleet trained to swarm against merchant ships or even enemy combat vessels.

Worst of all, shorn of much of its ability to strike back in the Gulf, a rather chaotic Iraq would doubtless have considerable allure as an ideal venue for payback against the US. This could be carried out by Iran’s allies among various Shi’a militias, (elements that probably would be enraged by such a US attack on Iran in any case) or even by the insertion of hundreds of Iran’s own personnel to carry out attacks on US forces. In such a scenario, the situation in an already seriously destabilized Iraq would become that much worse.

Some in Washington would hope that in the midst of or following such heavy blows, Iranians would turn against the clerical regime, which is so unpopular in many quarters even now. However, if history is any guide, patriotic Iranians of most all political persuasions would likely rally instead to the defense of their country, perhaps even strengthening the current regime.

Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of all this would be the absence of an end game. The last major military move against Iran was initiated by none other than Saddam Hussayn back in 1980. The Ba’thist regime in Baghdad, feeling threatened by revolutionary Iran, lashed out at Iran militarily, assuming that an unprepared Iran would quit the fight to lick its wounds and that a humiliated revolutionary government might well collapse. Instead, Iranians across the political spectrum fought back with grim determination, trapping Iraq in an eight-year war that eventually would cost Iraqis over 150,000 casualties. Americans, ironically also now in Iraq, must be mindful of this great blunder on the part of a bullying and clueless dictator.

UAE Warnings for a Friend

William A. Rugh — Mon, 18 Dec 2006 12:00:00 -0500

There are changes underway in the United Arab Emirates, but most go unnoticed abroad. First, I was struck by the high number of American visitors in town during my recent visit there, when I went to speak at a forum celebrating the second anniversary of Shaikh Khalifa bin Zayid’s accession to the presidency.

Just as I arrived, Karen Hughes, Colin Powell, Madeleine Albright, and the Chief of Staff of the US Air Force arrived with separate delegations and different goals. A large group representing the Guggenheim Museum was also in town to discuss cooperation with the UAE. A major international conference on breast cancer awareness and another one on women in business were just opening, with prominent American representatives in attendance. The best hotels in Abu Dhabi and Dubai were full. UAE newspapers and television provided ample coverage to the American visitors, along with prominent delegations from other countries. Posters displayed prominently on street corners announced future conferences planned for the coming months, including such featured speakers as “the first President Bush.”

When I was ambassador in the UAE 11 years ago, we had occasional visits from prominent Americans but nothing on this scale. The UAE has become a popular destination for Americans interested in commercial or humanitarian projects. The US ambassador says official bilateral relations are excellent and broad-based. Nobody mentioned the Dubai Ports flap of a few months ago. It does not appear to have discouraged people in the UAE from doing business with Americans.

Paradoxically, there is deep anxiety about the direction of US policy in the region despite the apparent desire of UAE officials and private organizations to work with the US in a wide range of activities. UAE nationals made clear to me their dismay over the US involvement in Iraq, Iran, and Palestine and their apprehension about what would happen next. Palestine was as usual part of their list of complaints, but their immediate concerns focused on Iraq and Iran.

On Iraq, the anger and disappointment over US policies is stronger than I have ever seen it. The UAE nationals I spoke with privately, (former and current officials, academics, businessmen, journalists) who are basically pro-American, want desperately for us to change some of the things we are doing.

First, they very strongly recommend the US declare loudly and clearly that we support the unity and integrity of Iraq. Everyone I spoke with insisted that supporting partition or leaving the impression that we would accept partition would be a disaster for Iraq and for the United States. They said Arabs would forever remember that decision the way they remember the Sykes-Picot agreement and blame us if Iraq disintegrated. They said that if Iraq falls apart and we do not support partition, the Iraqis will be blamed, but if it falls apart and we favored it, we will be seen as the party responsible for it. Moreover, if we favor partition, most Iraqis will assume it is inevitable and they will sit back and wait for it to happen. So, we would influence the outcome and then be blamed for it.

Second, my UAE interlocutors argued that we should find other countries to send troops to replace Americans – any others. Several suggested sending the UN – with Arab troops as part of the blue-helmet force – but not with a US contingent. Send Muslim troops. Almost anyone will do, just get the US troops out of there as fast as possible because, they said, we are the problem not the solution. When I pointed out that it would be tough to get the UN to send troops at this point, they understood but they believe it is essential to remove the irritant of American soldiers as soon as possible. When I asked if this would not lead to more bloodshed, they told me the US presence has not stopped the bloodshed, it has increased the bloodshed and we should have realized by now that we need a radical change of policy.

Finally, everyone agreed that we should declare we don’t want to keep bases in Iraq nor control Iraqi oil. People in the UAE and elsewhere in the region still believe we went to Iraq for those aims, and would be very relieved if we dispelled that idea.

On Iran, my UAE interlocutors asked anxiously whether President Bush would launch a military strike on Iranian nuclear sites before he left office, as they had heard he was thinking of doing. When I said I didn’t know and could not reassure them on that score, they expressed their conviction that a US attack would be a huge disaster for the UAE and the region. It would, they argued, provoke Iran to retaliate against American interests. There would probably be a negative spillover on America’s friends like the UAE. An attack would solidify Iranian public support behind the Iranian regime and it would not stop Iran from its nuclear program.

We have many friends in the UAE who want to continue doing business with us and continue sending their children to study here. But, they are deeply worried about the course our Middle East policy has taken under the Bush administration, especially on Iraq and Iran. As friends of America, they are sincerely hoping we will soon find better ways to approach the region. As friends of America, before it is too late to prevent more conflict.

Ties with Libya Send the Right Signal

David Mack — Wed, 24 May 2006 12:00:00 -0400

Restoration of diplomatic relations with Libya ends more than three decades of hostility. It sends a strong signal to Iran and other countries that abandoning terrorism and weapons of mass destruction can lead to similar benefits. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the US has shown how we would respond to governments we perceived as uncooperative in the war on terrorism. Absent a clear example how a country with a bad past could change course and stand with the US, some governments might have concluded that the best strategy was to follow the North Korean example of covertly developing a weapon to gain concessions at the negotiating table. Not the lesson we want to send.

Removing Libya from the State Department terrorism list is overdue. Libya has long met the requirements to be removed from the terrorism list. Its cooperation on weapons of mass destruction has been a model of compliance and a huge intelligence bonanza for us.

When Muammar Qadhafi renounced terrorism and abandoned his WMD program, he recognized that Libya’s security is best assured by peaceful relations with the US and other major governments. Britain, France, Germany, and Italy renewed relations after the United Nations sanctions were lifted in 1999. They have even had summit meetings with Qadhafi. Once a target for retaliations, Libya is reintegrating itself into the global community.

The Bush administration moved very cautiously. President Bush and some of his advisors saw renewing relations as a tricky political decision, given the Libyan leader’s history of reckless words and unpredictable actions that could embarrass the White House. The administration’s rhetoric about democracy as the standard for relations with other countries of the world also made it difficult to embrace the Qadhafi regime.

Slow resolution of a medical tragedy involving Libyan children who were victims of HIV and sentences of death against a Palestinian doctor and Bulgarian nurses were additional complications. Bulgaria had sent forces as part of the coalition in Iraq, a factor that Secretary Rice had to bear in mind. The death sentences have now been quashed and procedures to compensate the children’s families and release the medical personnel are well advanced.

The lack of personal contact between Libyans and Americans for several decades has fostered animosity and mutual stereotyping. Getting Libya off the terrorism list will open the door to better trade and economic relations by easing visa restrictions and export procedures. Libya’s oil and gas reserves are increasingly important for our European allies. By participating in their redevelopment, US companies help diversify the world’s energy sources.

US companies will never dominate the Libyan petroleum sector as they once did. But other countries must now face American competition, a matter of great potential benefit to Libya. Other areas of US-Libyan commercial activity are also opening up to our mutual benefits.

The strategic gains as well as the benefits for business are self-evident. Less obvious, but important in the longer term is the potential for ordinary Libyans to achieve economic and political reforms as a result of the country’s new openness to the global community. The number of Libyan students seeking educational opportunities in the US and Libyan trainees seeking positions in US companies should soar. This will give our society an opportunity to interact with a new generation of Libyans anxious to introduce political and economic reforms at home.

All this did not happen overnight. The normalization of relations is the result of a steady build-up of positive developments, reflecting change in Libya’s policy toward the world. UN sanctions were very important. They helped change Libya’s behavior because they were well crafted and truly multilateral.

The record also shows that diplomacy works. It helps to have a stick in the closet, but brandishing the stick while refusing to talk with a potential adversary is unproductive. There are lessons here for governments like that in Tehran about how to come in from the cold and become a respectable member of the international community. Equally, there are lessons for Washington in how to assure that potential adversaries learn through negotiations how to chose a wiser course.

The ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu taught that military power is most impressive when you achieve your objective without using it. The purpose of sanctions and great military power should be to achieve positive results that endure. For this to happen, a sound diplomatic strategy is essential.

A Plan For Victory

Edward Walker — Tue, 13 Dec 2005 12:00:00 -0500

We should welcome the fact that the Bush Administration has now come up with a relatively comprehensive and somewhat detailed plan for victory in Iraq. For the future, I would only hope that this administration or any of its successors would develop such a strategy before invading another country. The fact that it has taken three years to inform the American people of our goals and strategy in Iraq is at best a dereliction of duty.

One can quibble with some of the language of a strategy document. Using a loaded word, “rejectionist,” to describe the majority of our opponents in Iraq raises all the red flags in the Middle East of those Palestinians who reject peace with Israel. Is this what we are fighting about? And why did the White House invoke the “8 pillars” of victory when every devout Muslim will be reminded of the “5 pillars” of Islam and will question the implied, albeit possibly unintentional, linkage? While these points may sound like nit picking, part of the reason we are in the mess we are in today is because we did not understand the culture we were engaging or listen to those in the region who may have had a better fix for their next door neighbor than the gurus of our neo-conservative movement.

I also wonder how we can complain, in the President’s strategic pillar number eight, about the successes in Iraq being “overshadowed in the international media, including popular pan-Arab outlets” and then point to the “new independent media outlets” in Iraq being “testament to the vitality of a free press,” when the Los Angeles Times, New York Times, and Washington Post are all reporting that our military is buying articles and Iraqi journalists. What outrageous chutzpah.

What worries me most about the national strategy is what it doesn’t say and what it may imply. We have created a strategy for Iraq and the Iraqi people, but I cannot find in the document the National Security Council released any indication of Iraqis who embrace it or helped develop it. Does the Shiite leader Ali Sistani endorse the President’s concept of “Victory in Iraq?” How about the Kurdish leader Barzani? The strategy calls for international cooperation. Has the President secured the agreement of the international community for this strategy and this definition of victory? The neighboring states are a key component in the strategy for securing Iraq. Did the President discuss his concept of victory with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia? And how are we to deal with Iran when we won’t even talk to the Iranian leadership? The Syrians are currently drumming up a nationalistic fervor among their people to stand up to the United States and the UN. Does this mean that we have to widen the war, a la Cambodia, to secure the Syrian-Iraqi border?

The President’s definition of victory has the ringing vocabulary of a good speechwriter, but I find myself lost when it comes to the details. The strategy defines our objective as “federalism” and declares that it is not a precursor to the breakup of Iraq. The “strong central government” exercising the powers of a sovereign state is all well and good, but what are those powers and who is going to exercise them? The strategy is quiet on that. At the same time, it says “regional bodies” will make the decisions that protect the interests of local populations. Well, it is in the interest of the Kurdish and Shiite “local populations” that they control the oil and gas wealth of the country with crumbs left for the Sunnis. Despite our talk of preserving a unified Iraq, it would seem that the structure we are building incorporates a lot of centripetal force when it comes to the hard realities of religious and economic interests.

The strategy also talks about building an officer corps that will be loyal to the Iraqi government, not a particular group or tribe. But NATO is only now setting up the new military staff college that is supposed to help integrate these forces. What have we been doing for the past three years? Furthermore, according to the strategy, we have recruited nearly 5,000 Sunnis for the military who are “planning to return to their home province and help protect it from terrorists.” That sounds like building a force that is loyal to its local community and religious sect, not a remote central government. I don’t see any plan for getting rid of the local militias that are so important to the Kurds and some Shiite factions.

I welcome the NSC effort. But I want more. I want to know that we are providing the model for rule by law and that our Vice President and the head of the CIA are not advocating interrogation tactics that will be used by the fledgling Iraqi government as an excuse for far harsher tactics. Our press is already reporting that Iraqi government officials want to take off the kid gloves. I want to know that we stand for freedom of the press and that we don’t have to buy it. I want to know that the President does not believe, as the British press alleged, that we could bomb Al Jazeera into submission just because it reports things we don’t like. And I want to know that when the President talks about debate, he means genuine debate and not the disparagement of opponents like Congressman John Murtha.

The Politics of Truth: From Yellow to White

Ambassador Joseph C. Wilson — Thu, 13 May 2004 12:00:00 -0400

After a distinguished career as a Foreign Service Officer -- including as the last chief of mission in Baghdad before the first Gulf War -- Ambassador Joseph C. Wilson undertook an assignment in 2002 on behalf of the US government to investigate reports concerning Niger's alleged export of uranium yellow cake to Iraq. He reported back that there was no substance to the charges, only to hear the opposite stated in President Bush's State of the Union address in 2003 to justify war on Iraq. Insisting on correction, Wilson published an article in The New York Times in July 2003 detailing his trip; within a few days, the name of Ambassador Wilson's wife leaked into the press as a CIA operative. Now, Ambassador Wilson will discuss events leading up to the latest war in Iraq and thereafter, with readings from his newly published book, The Politics of Truth (copies of which will be available for purchase and signing).

What Does Libya's Disarmament Teach About Rogue States?

Ambassadors Martin S. Indyk and Edward S. Walker — Wed, 7 Apr 2004 12:00:00 -0400

On December 19, 2003, the story broke that Libya had been secretly engaged with the US and Britain over its WMD. What motivated Libya's leader Mu'ammar Qaddhafi to acquiesce? President George W. Bush accorded Libya’s about face to his foreign policy; According to two top negotiators from the Clinton Administration, however, the case is different. Ambassadors Martin S. Indyk and Edward S. Walker will share their observations about negotiations with Libya during their consecutive tenures as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs and speculate on what may come to pass in Libya and in the region, particularly in this presidential election year.

The Man Who Pushed America To War: The Extraordinary Life, Adventures and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi

Aram Roston — Thu, 10 Apr 2008 14:03:39 -0400

Roston began with a description of the complicated financial history of Chalabi and his family. Among these companies to collapse was Petra Bank in Jordan, from which Chalabi took money to give to his other companies. It was this in-trading and alleged embezzling that got Chalabi in trouble with the Jordanian government. Chalabi claimed the collapse of his bank and his conviction was a result of a conspiracy between Saddam Husayn and the Jordanian government to defame him and his company; however, there was little evidence to support that claim.

Around $59 million in US taxpayer funds went to Chalabi through Congress as well as the Department of State and Department of Defense. The visible result, he said, was the propaganda that resulted from it. The money ended up, unintentionally, buying dubious and fabricated stories that were carried by most major US news outlets that served a significant role in altering American public opinion leading up to the Iraq War. In retrospect, it is easy to see the unlikelihood of stories featuring such unlikely topics as a Husayn-sponsored hijacker training camp, a WMD hidden in a Baghdad underground well, and a personal meeting between Husayn and Usama bin Laden that involved an exchange of money.

The question was then asked, how was the media seemingly so easily taken in by essentially a glorified con man? Roston understood that it was Chalabi’s flattery. For instance, British journalist David Rhodes was someone Roston praised highly as a journalist but was also someone who printed and wrote on nearly every Chalabi fabrication that was released. According to Roston, Rhodes has since realized his mistakes, but at the time it was so easy to be taken in by Chalabi’s description of a moral and progressive cause, his praise of Rhodes as a “moral man” for helping him out, and his appeals to the naturally competitive nature of reporters by offering exclusive interviews and playing reporters against each other for them.

Now, Roston said, Chalabi is working his way back up the political ladder as the chair of the extragovernmental “services committee” in Iraq, which was put in charge of major reconstruction of utilities and hospitals in Baghdad — a process that has not gone very well despite the significant amount of money provided to the committee. This followed a failed attempt by Chalabi to secure $64 million to form a committee (Roston noted his fondness of forming committees) to liaise between US forces and Iraqi people after the invasion. This request, Roston said, was one for which Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki laughed in his face.

In the end, Roston viewed Chalabi as being motivated by a desire to see Shi‘a empowerment in Iraq as well as an obsession with revenge against Saddam Husayn in his plan to fool the US government into attacking Iraq. His promises that the Iraqi people would rise up and that the Iraqi army would join the US forces in marching on Baghdad were as much tools as the fabricated and distorted stories he fed the American media to deceive a country to which he had no patriotic ties. By fooling America, Roston said, he got what he wanted.

The Situation in Iraq

Ambassador David Satterfield — Wed, 13 Feb 2008 16:04:42 -0500

Ambassador Satterfield focused on security, politics, and economy as the three main areas of concern. He said security has improved greatly in recent times among the Iraqi citizens and throughout the provinces.

In 2007 there was a progressive decline in casualties and attacks among citizens and US troops. Satterfield attributed this to three factors, the surge of US forces, additional Iraqi forces, and fragmentation. According to Satterfield, the Operation Anbar Awakening succeeded in removing attacks by Sunni insurgents. The Awakening also limited Al Qaeda forces, although he stressed that Al Qaeda remains a lethal force in Iraq despite current constraints on mobility. Overall, he said the current security gains would remain tenuous unless there is political reconciliation.

Satterfield remained optimistic about Iraq’s economic progress. He said central government has made significant progress in creating a capital budget, identifying local needs, and providing essential public services. Overall, the economic growth in Iraq is contingent on the security of the region, he added, since the country is in great need of foreign investment.

Satterfield appeared less optimistic about the political situation in Iraq. Currently, Iraq is in the process of political change and reconciliation. He considered reconciliation a long-term generational process. However, he suggested that building the foundations for peace should be a present objective. He cited the pensions bill, and the recent debathification bill as successful steps toward stabilizing the Iraqi government. On the other hand, he listed distrust between the parties and the absence of a modern hydrocarbon law as hindering Iraq’s growth.

Satterfield concluded by stressing the importance of a long-term partnership between the US and Iraq, that would provide the next administration with a more stable Iraq by promoting moderates within the country. He also emphasized that Iraq’s neighbors have a crucial role in assisting Iraq in the reconstruction process and criticized their ambiguous attitude toward Iraq. Overall, he described the biggest obstacle as distrust among the parties, but he suggested that with the proper policy implementation the US can promote reconciliation and establish an inclusive government.

MEI's 61st Annual Conference 2007 - Luncheon Remarks

Frances Fragos Townsend — Mon, 26 Nov 2007 15:37:56 -0500

Townsend reiterated the words of President Bush regarding the United States’ vital and enduring interests in the Middle East and in good relationships with our partners based on common interests of faith, education and commerce. She reminded the audience that the Middle East history as a key source of trade dates well before oil and that it is a vital US interest to promote stability in the Middle East.

From her vantage point, the primary goals in the region are the effective use of all tools of national power and influence, the killing and capture of terrorists, denying them safe haven, preventing access of terrorists to weapons of mass destruction, cutting off funding to terrorists and their organizations, and eradicating state-based terrorism.

She discussed the persistent, evolving terrorist threat in the United States posed by violent extreme Islamic groups, the most prominent of which is al-Qa‘ida, and its state and non-state supporters. She noted that the mission of terrorists is not based on Islam, but rather a violent ideology based on hate, fear and oppression, and that terrorists pose a threat to both Muslims and non-Muslims worldwide. Indeed, she noted, most of the terrorist attacks since 9/11 have occurred in Muslim countries and many victims have been Muslims.

The US is fighting back against its enemies, she said, but needs strong partners and allies to win the war on terror. She outlined effective partnerships as the foundation to winning the War on Terror in order to cooperatively prevent attacks by denying essential funding, travel, and communications of terrorist networks.

She identified countries in North Africa and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as particularly strong partners working towards regional and sub-regional cooperation with the US in the war on terror.

Ms. Townsend said the biggest threat in the war on terror is the presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of rogue states and terrorist organizations. She discussed the global initiative against nuclear terrorism launched in 2006 by Russia and the US, which currently encompasses 64 countries. She also discussed the urgency of denying support and sanctuary of rogue states for terrorism, identifying Iran, Syria, Sudan, North Korea and Cuba as state sponsors of terrorism. More optimistically, she discussed the removal of some states from the list of rogue states including Iraq and Libya.

She underscored the importance of denying terrorists control of any nation and addressed Iraq as a central front in the war on terror. It is urgent, she emphasized, that partners in the war on terror prevent terrorists from exploiting ungoverned and under-governed areas of the world. Lastly, she placed priority in the long-term on the advancement of freedom and liberty as alternatives to the hatred and oppression of terrorism, encouraging countries to open their political systems to provide citizens with greater voice and participation. She ensures that the imposition of US-style democracy is not the goal, but rather a strict adherence to universal human rights, as political freedoms and human rights are not western values, but universal.

During the question-and-answer period, Townsend responded to an array of questions critical of US policies. Responding to question about a potential confrontation with Iran, she identified it as the largest state sponsor of terrorism and used the example of Iran-based funding for Hizbollah that is disabling Lebanon to outline the threat Iran currently poses in the region. In response to another question on the use of torture by the US, Townsend reiterated that the US does not torture. She discussed the US’s unwillingness to disclose information about specific interrogation techniques on the basis that it would enable enemies to train against them. She stated that the interrogation techniques are tough, but emphasized that they do not constitute torture.