When the secret US-Libyan negotiations began in 1999, Libya was engaged in an effective campaign in the United Nations to cease the multilateral sanctions imposed on it by the international community. The United States was in a difficult position because it was the only member that refused to lift the sanctions and therefore was in danger of becoming isolated in the Security Council. Had the United States merely vetoed a new UN resolution to lift the sanctions, the international consensus that made the sanctions regime effective would have eroded, and this potentially would have led to the failure of the US objectives regarding Libya: the halting of state sponsorship of terrorism, an admission of responsibility for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, and the payment of compensation to families of Pan Am Flight 103's victims.

A New Strategy. The Unites States' primary short-term goal in the negotiations was to maintain the sanctions. At the same time, the US was pursuing a new strategy that went considerably beyond a policy of containment. The goal of this broader strategy was to try to change the behavior of rogue states and "graduate" them into the international community and normalize relations with the United States. Libya was a good test case for this new strategy because the broad international consensus that Colonel Qadhafi's actions were unacceptable provided the US with more flexibility. As for the Libyan goals, Qadhafi, having abandoned his pan-Arab aspirations, made a deliberate tactical decision to normalize relations with America.

The Negotiations. The negotiations began in May 1999, with Musa Kusa, Colonel Qadhafi's head of intelligence services, leading the Libyan delegation. Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt strongly backed the process and at times even provided logistical support. The US put forth two initial conditions which Colonel Qadhafi fulfilled immediately: first, that Libya halt all efforts in the UN to have the sanctions lifted; and second, that the bilateral dialogue be kept secret. Surprisingly, Libya was prepared to accept subsequent US requirements with little negotiation. Among the additional requirements were the closure of all terrorist camps in the country, acknowledging responsibility for the Pan Am Flight 103 terrorist operation, paying compensation to families of the victims, and disclosing weapons of mass destruction (at the time only consisting of chemical weapons, as Libya had yet to begin a nuclear weapons program).

Ambassador Indyk suggested these negotiations could have proceeded more quickly, possibly concluding prior to the 2000 election season, had the United States not periodically instituted new demands to ensure Colonel Qadhafi's consistency and compliance. Another complicating factor was a strong and vocal anti-Libyan constituency among the families of Pan Am Flight 103 victims who slowed down the reconciliation. The negotiations were also put on hold for the 2000 American presidential elections out of concern that the process would be leaked to the press and result in a scandal. Once elected, although initially wary of the process, the Bush Administration resumed talks in a more public forum and "took them to their natural conclusion," which has led to the recent public US-Libyan rapprochement.

Although this has been a success story for this new strategy, it is not necessarily applicable to all rogue states. There were specific conditions with regard to Libya that made the process work. First, the international community was united in condemning Libya's terrorist actions. Though the United Nations contemplated lifting sanctions, the international consensus against Libya was largely still intact. Second, the United States had shown previously that it was willing to use military force against Libya, after the 1986 West Berlin nightclub bombing. Finally, Qadhafi had a change of heart. He decided that he wanted American companies specifically to develop Libya's oil fields and this strongly influenced his decision-making. The United States was able to use the carrot and the stick effectively throughout the process, and Colonel Qadhafi consistently reinforced his willingness to comply with US demands.

The Ambassadors added that one way to improve this type of strategy in the future would be for the US Administration to articulate from the outset the final goals of the engagement and identify concrete steps for compliance. On a final note, both Indyk and Walker believe that the new approach has been very effective and extend credit to the George W. Bush Administration for seeing this unusual policy to its conclusion.