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In the post-September 11 landscape, the issues of democratization and human rights in the Middle East have followed two main tracks: discussion of policies that the United States and Europe can adopt to make these principles more attractive in the region and efforts to democratize and improve the situation in Iraq. Dalacoura argues that in order to determine whether Western policies will be successful in the Middle East, an examination of the successes and failures of democratization and human rights policies during the 1990s is necessary.

Western policy toward the Middle East during the 1990s involved a mixture of engagement and coercion approaches to bring about desired changes. Western engagement policies, which meant maintaining diplomatic and economic relations while raising human rights and democratization issues in a consistent but low-key manner, differed sharply from coercion policies, which used economic sanctions and conditional aid to bring about change through pressure. Using Turkey, Iran, and Egypt as examples, Dalacoura concluded the impact of Western democracy and human rights promotion was extremely limited, but that engagement policies proved much more effective than coercion, particularly when domestic trends in the countries were moving toward reform.

Turkey. During the 1990s, pressure from the United States and the European Union proved most effective when diplomatic relations were close and during discussions of Turkey’s accession into the EU. Turkey did implement reforms to improve human rights and strengthen democracy, but its efforts proved only to be surface changes implemented to improve its chances of EU membership. Despite this, the situation in Turkey actually deteriorated during the decade. Dalacoura believes that domestic concerns, particularly with regard to the Kurdish issue and the rise of Islamism, compounded by an erratic and inconsistent policy toward Turkish EU candidacy, brought about the failure of European pressure to achieve results. The United States, on the other hand, used the close relationship between the two nations to discuss human rights and democratization concerns during the period consistently. Following the Helsinki Conference of 1999, Turkey worked to implement reforms on the legal level, but Western influence was not the only factor that made change possible; the Kurdish and Islamist issues were no longer a pressing threat and the Turkish people were more supportive of reform.

Iran. US and European policies toward Iran in the 1990s were sharply different from their policies towards Turkey. With Iran, the US used economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation in an attempt to force change. According to Dalacoura, US coercion policies did not benefit the reformist movement, but had the opposite effect and instead assisted the conservatives. Although the rise of Khatami came about, in large part, because of economic problems within Iran, domestic mismanagement—not US sanctions—was the catalyst. European governments used a less coercive approach toward Iran and continuously discussed human rights concerns such as Iranian persecution of the Baha’i, but in the end achieved only limited results.

Egypt. US and European policies toward the Mubarak government did not differ significantly during the 1990s; both parties overlooked anti-democratic and human rights violations. At the same time, however, the US and Europe have been in Egypt pioneering policies that are now framing the debate over democratization in the Middle East and the Greater Middle East Initiative. The outcome of US and European efforts has been ambiguous, with Western influence having positive benefits in the 1998 al-Kushh case involving Coptic persecution but a negative impact in instances such as the Saad Eddin Ibrahim situation and the Religious Persecution Act of 1998.

The legacy of Western engagement and coercion policies in Turkey, Iran, and Egypt during the 1990s, Dalacoura believes, provides important lessons for future US and European policy in the Middle East. To achieve progress in human rights and democratization, Western policy does not have to be tough to achieve positive results, and governments must set realistic goals for progress from the outset. Genuine reform can only come from internal structural changes that are outside of the control of Western actors. However, Western policy has the potential to aid the process, and in doing so, engagement is more effective than coercion. With regard to Iraq, Dalacoura argued that democracy can only be established and maintained if the United States and Great Britain do not pull out prematurely from the country. Premature disengagement would not only create problems within Iraq but would make it more difficult for Western policy to produce future results on human rights and democratization elsewhere in the region.