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Ambassador Ross began his remarks by explaining the title of his book. Many take it for granted that states are adept at statecraft, but few people understand all the elements that go into the practice. According to Ambassador Ross, statecraft is about matching the right objectives with the appropriate means. If you do not have sensible objectives, your statecraft will not be successful, even if you use the tools of the trade well. Conversely, if your objectives are right, but your tools are wrong or inadequate, your statecraft will also suffer.

According to Ambassador Ross, the current Bush administration has pursued statecraft very poorly, particularly in the Middle East. Using the conflict in Iraq as an example, he pointed to a significant gap between objectives and means. If the mission’s initial objective was to disarm Iraq and prevent the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the US did not deploy enough forces to be able to secure the potential sites. Ironically, the lack of WMDs in Iraq was fortunate for the US, as poorly guarded weapons facilities could have easily fallen into the wrong hands during the post-invasion disarray.

Ambassador Ross asserted that the Bush administration often makes its assessments based on faith and ideals rather than facts. Reality-based assessments are key to developing the right objectives and means. While planning the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Department of Defense did not include in their simulations of a post-war Iraq the points of view of the regional experts from the State Department and the CIA who disagreed with the invasion. To Ambassador Ross, this illustrates two of the major reasons why the operation in Iraq failed. First, excluding critical voices is an example of what not to do when trying to make reality-based assessments. Second, creating or deepening the fissures between the different arms of the administration is also a major impediment to successful statecraft.

Nations engaging in statecraft have to be aware of the interests and concerns of their partners and frame issues in ways that will make their partners more likely to cooperate in greater endeavors. Ambassador Ross cited the striking difference in intensity between the American diplomatic efforts made in 1990 and 2003 in order to persuade Turkey to join the coalition against Iraq. In 1990, then-Secretary of State James Baker visited Turkey in person, and President George H.W. Bush made well over 50 phone calls to Prime Minister Ozal. By contrast, in 2003, the most senior government official to travel to Turkey was the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The decision to join the coalition was turned down by three votes in the Turkish parliament; more intensive diplomacy might have been able to make a difference.

Ambassador Ross then turned to the case of Iran, stating that America’s ultimate policy objective is to prevent the nation from obtaining nuclear weapons. In order to achieve this objective, he advised the United States to strike a deal that would make Iran feel secure. To pressure the Iranians, the US should persuade the Europeans to withdraw economic investment from Iran. Ambassador Ross recommended that the US frame the issue to convey the message that a nuclear Iran would mean the breakdown of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Towards this end the US could work with Saudi Arabia and Israel to help persuade the Europeans.

Ambassador Ross concluded his remarks by underlining the necessity of the restoration of statecraft into the workings of American foreign policy. The public, the politicians and the future foreign policy practitioners currently working in the Bush administration have been accustomed to the poor statecraft of the past six years, and Ambassador Ross’s ambition with his new book is to remind all these audiences of the value of proper statecraft.