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Russian policy toward the Middle East in the last two years has sought to limit terrorism and Western influence, encourage economic reform, and protect the former Soviet republics that make up Russia's “soft underbelly.”

President Putin took two main steps towards gaining legitimacy and support for his fight against terrorist groups originating from the breakaway Russian republic of Chechnya. Russia sought to gain Saudi legitimization of Russian policy in Chechnya and obtain membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). By defining terrorism in terms that both Saudi Arabia and nations of the OIC could accept, Moscow continued to gain regional support in the form of humanitarian aid and strengthened partnerships. Yet increased international support against terrorism failed to gain Russia membership in the OIC, and Putin’s anti-terrorism strategies have shown limited signs of success because they offer diplomatic cover rather than a solution to the real problem of Chechnya.

As the United States relaxed its initial decision to deny reconstruction contracts to countries that did not support the initial invasion of Iraq, Moscow saw an opportunity to advance Russian policy through three objectives. By what Dr. Freedman called “playing both sides,” Putin planned to first recover as much of the debt Iraq owed to Russia as possible. The second goal was to capitalize on as many trade deals as possible with the post-Saddam Iraqi government, and the third was to internationalize the Iraqi situation so that the United States would not dominate. While Russia has received nothing but promises from Iraqi and EU governments to write off Russian debts, the recent Iraqi elections bring hope that these promises will be fulfilled.

Rising fears of Iran “backing down” on the international nuclear non-proliferation agreements as set out by the IAEA and EU-3 (Germany, France, and Britain) have left Russia with a dilemma. Recently, Putin took a firm stance against Iran’s nuclear weapon aspirations in the hopes that he could continue the Bushehr reactor project while ensuring Iran’s development of nuclear power for peaceful purposes. Yet while Russia has postponed the completion of the Bushehr nuclear reactor, Iran has not been convinced that it is not in their best economic and diplomatic interests to independently produce nuclear fuel. If Russia fails to figure out how to use tepid support for Iran while maintaining its own independence from Western interference, Russia will not accomplish its regional economic goals, and Russia’s “soft underbelly” will be exposed.

Russian relations with Israel “cooled” as Putin’s tilt towards the Arab side became more obvious. Although the bilateral Israeli-Russian relationship has been strengthened by trade and the conditional support of Sharon's plan for unilateral disengagement from Gaza, Russia ignored promises to include Israel’s concerns in the Roadmap to Middle East peace. Disagreements with Israel included Arafat’s role in the peace process, peace efforts with the Quartet (the United States, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations) after Arafat’s death, the construction of Israel’s security fence, and Israel’s anti-terrorism measures in Gaza and the West Bank.

In 2004, Russia and Turkey experienced increased economic cooperation that translated into improved diplomatic relations. Although Russia supported Greece over Turkey in the Cyprus conflict, disagreements over oil and terrorism were resolved. The common business interests and “multi-vectored” policy between Russia and Turkey have proven positive and profitable especially in light of deteriorating U.S.-Turkey relations. As all sides work on transforming old relations into viable policies that do not solely pay lip service to cooperation, Russia may well be on its way to once again becoming a great power.