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In his briefing, Henry Precht identified important failures in how the United States dealt politically with the Iranian Revolution of 1979, as well as the problems that persist today. A major error on the part of the Carter Administration was its incomplete sociopolitical understanding of Iran.

Today, misunderstanding and ignorance of Iran continues to stress relations, revolving chiefly around just one of the many stubborn US-Iranian friction points: Iran’s perceived nuclear ambitions. According to Precht, Iran feels the need to keep up and compete effectively with states like India, China and Pakistan on the grounds of national pride and regional security. Nuclear power is seen as an essential component to achieving this goal. Precht believes that Iran does not want nuclear weapons in the immediate future; that the US government has “jumped the gun” regarding Iran’s posture; and that under the existing guidelines of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran maintains the right to enrich uranium.

Beneath American concern over Iran’s nuclear program is continuing US government ignorance with respect to Iran, based in deeper ideological rifts between the State Department and the White House and, in Precht's words, “the ascendancy of ideology over realism.” According to Precht, this is further exacerbated by the passage of time; the inability of US diplomats to access Iran (due to the absence of diplomatic relations); and the failure to draw on those diplomats, retired or nearing retirement, who possess invaluable expertise and still have important experiences and understandings to share.

Another major, initial mistake was the impression on the part of the Carter Administration that it could reverse the course of the Iranian Revolution. The US government was incorrectly convinced it was possible to “adjust the dial” on the political course taken by Iran. Two different points of view emerged as to how the US should deal with the revolution: 1) the US should try to take charge of the course of history; 2) the US should “go with the flow” and let natural progression and evolution take its course.

US-Iranian relations have been further set back by what Precht calls “policy inertia.” He describes this phenomenon as the inability to think outside the box on the part of policymakers in the US government and bureaucrats’ automatic use of specific long-standing policies to address crises, adding that policy inertia in the State Department throughout consecutive US administrations has seriously impeded creative thinking.

Precht affirms that while there is no real chance for change in the US-Iranian relationship at present, the maintenance of communications channels between Washington and Tehran is critical. With respect to how the United States should engage Iran, Precht recommends that the United States encourage political reform, but cautions against unrealistic expectations, such as a future Iran that abandons its nuclear ambitions, ends its support for Hezbollah or changes its stance toward Israel. He also adds that the United States should not join Great Britain, France, and Germany (the so-called “EU3”) in discussions with Iran on the recent agreement to suspend and freeze Iran’s uranium enrichment program. Instead, Precht believes in the future it will be easier and more productive to engage Iran directly. He describes the current political situation as stalemate, though better developments might occur should the EU3 offer enough economic and technological incentives, coupled with tougher IAEA inspections.