Related Resources

Until the 1980s, the Iraqi polity was not subject to ethnic, tribal, nor confessional barriers; rather, a sense of national unity prevailed. This was demonstrated during the Iran-Iraq War during which the Iraqi Shi‘ites, despite invitations from the Iranian clergy to join their troops, fought against Tehran. Three decades of Ba’ath rule changed this political landscape. Saddam Hussein made deliberate attempts to create uniformity in an effort to destroy the diverse, yet unified, nature of the Iraqi society. Now, after the fall of Saddam, a backlash has taken place largely because each community shares the fear of being excluded from the reconstruction process. In addition to Saddam’s tactics, the UN sanctions and the two Gulf Wars were also causes of the fragmentation of the Iraqi national polity. These factors weakened Iraqi national unity, undermined the role of the state, demoralized the population, and created deep chasms within the Iraqi political environment along ethnic, tribal, and confessional lines.

The absence of an Iraqi national movement highlights the degree to which Iraqi society is fragmented today. Although new political players are emerging, there is an entire generation of Iraqis that no longer identifies with traditional political parties. Rather, the new players are loyal to religious sub-identities or to their tribes. Both are groups that are clearly pursuing their own interests, above a single national interest.

The Shi‘ites

The socio-economic conditions of the Shi‘ites are crucial in the analysis of their political culture. The Shi‘ites are the poorest and most deprived segment of the Iraqi population, having been persecuted and humiliated throughout Saddam’s reign. Consequently, Shi‘ite political culture and attitudes are influenced by a combination of several issues and feelings: a common and diffused sense of victimization, marginalization, and unfair treatment.

New and Old Shi‘ite Actors

There are old and new political actors shaping Shi‘ite politics since the fall of Saddam. Among the more established groups are the IDP (Iraqi Dawa Party), the oldest fundamentalist Shi‘ite group; the ICP (Iraqi Communist Party), the oldest political party among the Shi‘ites; and the ex-state Ba’ath party. The new actors include the politicized clergy— namely Grand Ayatollah Sistani and Sheikh Muqtada Al-Sadr— and some factions dependent on foreign support, such as Iranian-supported Hizbullah.

Despite the wide range of political actors and affiliations, Shi‘ite movements share the need for leadership and cohesiveness but they refuse to allow a new authoritarian regime to take power. A fundamental step in integrating these characteristics will be consensus building because this is the only way to aspire, on a long-term agenda, towards democracy and an open society. The new political actors have not yet had the chance to consult on the future shape of a sovereign Iraq, nor have they decided on a specific agenda. However, they have reached some important points of consensus. For instance, the Shi‘ites believe that a solution is needed for the Kurdish issue, but they do not share with the Kurds a common vision of federalism. As far as the state structure is concerned, Sunnis and Shi‘ites advocate a reformed, centralized government, while Kurds promote the need for decentralization. The Kurds seek foreign support and are willing to accept foreign influences, but the Sunnis and the Shi‘ites are against significant foreign presence. Not surprisingly, the different factions differ on the appropriate distribution of power, but all seem to support civil and minority rights in some form.

The Shi‘ites have neither a clear political agenda nor a clear leadership. The most likely scenario will be that the traditional religious leadership will lead the community for a short period, after which a weak political structure will emerge. Sistani will likely be in a ruling position for a short period of time while the IDP and the ICP will compete and cooperate with other actors. The tribal leaders will have an important role in this transition period in building connections with the Sunni tribes in the South. Alkebsi concluded that in the long term the Shi‘ites will find out that it is in their best interest to reform the state and cooperate at a national level.