Dr. Robert O. Freedman, professor at Baltimore Hebrew University and visiting professor at Johns Hopkins University, analyzed Russia's goals in the Middle East vis-a-vis Iran, Turkey, and Iraq. The US, which has recently gone to war in Iraq over weapons of mass destruction (WMD), has called on Russia to encourage Iran to take steps to prevent Iran from developing WMD. Russia meanwhile is working to maintain its influence in the region and regain its status as a superpower.
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the Russian Federation found itself competing with the US for influence in the Middle East. Russia has maintained close ties with Iran, despite concerns over the US and over Iraq because of its oil resources and strategic location.
IRAQ: Vladimir Putin has followed policies towards Iraq similar to those of former president Boris Yeltsin. Prior to the defeat of Iraqi president Saddam Hussien's regime, Russia's goals were to secure the $8 billion owed them by Iraq, protect Russian business interests there with full or partial lifting of the UN sanctions, and pursue future contracts, especially in the oil and gas sector.
Putin's policies have focused on strengthening the Russian economy. Russia has at least one major advantage over the United States in the region: it has maintained diplomatic relations with both Iran and Iraq in recent years. After 9/11, Putin's willingness to cooperate with the United States increased. As war with Iraq approached, Putin faced a clear dilemma: how to maintain good relations with the US while protecting Russia's business interests in Iraq and the rest of the Middle East?
Putin adopted a dual-track strategy. His overt aim was to prevent war by calling for a unified decision to go to war by the United Nations Security Council. Additionally, he sought to prolong the crisis to keep extra income flowing into the Russian economy thanks to higher oil prices, important to the speed with which Russia continues to pay down its international debts. Meanwhile, Putin has worked hard to maintain good relations with the United States and the Iraqi opposition to ensure that Russian oil companies will continue to have access to Iraqi oil.
IRAN: Russia has been Iran's primary supplier of military equipment, including a nuclear reactor, and has resumed arms sales despite the Gore-Chenormydin agreement of 1995 in which Russia had agreed to end all arms sales to Tehran by 1999. Putin has made few concessions to the US over Iran: in fact, Russia has acted as a diplomatic buffer for Iran against the US. The Bush Administration asked Russia to help slow down development of an Iranian nuclear plant at Bushehr, with the aim of such pressure to have the Iranian government return spent nuclear fuel to Russia which could be otherwise used to develop nuclear weapons. The US also wants Iran to sign on to the additional protocol of the IAEA as a prerequisite to receiving nuclear fuel from Russia in the future.
Russian-Iranian relations have been hampered by dispute over oil production in the Caspian Sea, in addition to US pressure following 9/11. President Khatami's election in May 1997 also brought a surprising challenge to the Russian-Iranian relationship, as it signaled a possible rapprochement between Iran and the US and contributed to a new domestic policy for "liberalization and reform" within the Middle East.
TURKEY: With ties to Greece improving and the possibility of joining the European Union looming, Turkey has become an attractive economic partner for the states of Central Asia and thus to Russia. Until the 1998 Russian economic collapse, Turkey was Russia's main economic partner, with trade ranging between $10 - $12 billion a year.
Russia faces several obstacles to improving its relations with Turkey. Close military ties between Russia and Armenia worry Turkey. Turkey wants the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline and is willing to finance this route, which would attract Western oil companies to ship product from the Caspian Sea that way and divert the use of Russian pipelines.
In conclusion, Putin's actions can be read in light of a general goal to maintain (or reclaim) Russia's political status by regaining real economic power.
Assertions and opinions in this policy brief are solely those of the above mentioned speaker(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
Dr. Robert O. Freedman is Peggy Meyerhoff Pearlstone Professor of Political Science at Baltimore Hebrew University, and Visiting Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. He is the author of four books on Soviet foreign policy including Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy Since the Invasion of Afghanistan (Cambridge University Press 1991). He was previously president of the Association for Israel Studies and is also the editor of fourteen books on Israel and the Middle East. Dr. Freedman has served as a commentator on National Public Radio, the BBC and Voice of America, and is a consultant to the U.S. Department of State and the CIA. He has also been a member of the Middle East Institute for the past 33 years.
Pauline Shams, Programs Assistant at MEI, wrote this summary; David Chambers, Programs Director, edited.