Related Resources

With the war on terrorism impacting US foreign policy, panelists analyzed and discussed the role of soft power—which they defined as “co-opting people rather than coercing them”—in shaping US policy and their effects on relations in the Middle East.

One of the benefits of soft power, Anatol Lieven argued, is that it is a variable concept that can be shaped as needed. Diplomacy, he concluded, needs to involve listening as well as persuading in order to be effective in brokering deals. Comparing current foreign policy with policy during the Cold War—which he believes has shaped much of current policy—Lieven pinpointed three Cold War uses of soft power: promoting US ideology; strengthening other countries from outside threats; and geopolitical and diplomatic efforts. The Bush administration, Lieven contended, has focused its policy efforts—albeit at a reduced level from the Cold War--on the first two areas. However, he believed the Administration has hindered itself by failing to fully define the ideology it uses to shape foreign policy. The US, he asserted, has failed in the third area by uniting factions that are working against US interests despite the presence of divided factions. Citing the Cold War example of the Sino-Soviet divide, Lieven concluded that a form of détente, particularly with Iran, is necessary to change US relations with the Middle East.

John Hulsman believed that failures in state building--from Haiti onward-- are more appropriate in describing the direction of US policy. The challenge of soft power, he stated, is that it lacks a concrete nature and is hard to define the goal. Diplomacy, he stated, involves engaging nations—such as Iran—that the US does not always agree with. Unless the US can utilize the full arsenal of carrots and sticks, which can only occur through engagement with both Iran and the European Union, US policy cannot affect events in Iran. In Iraq, Hulsman argued that soft power is only effective when leaders are not imposed on the people, situations are honestly addressed, and humility toward what can be accomplished is present. Engaging countries the US does not view favorably, however, does not mean the US must remain silent on unethical situations or actions that run contrary to US values. Effective US policy toward the Middle East, he concluded, cannot simply dictate US plans for the region, but should involve engaging regional governments in the discussion and Washington listening to their ideas and viewpoints.

Contending that US security does not depend solely on the strength of its military or intelligence services, Theodore Kattouf stated that it is necessary to ideologically isolate terrorist groups in order to win the war on terror. To do this, the US must present its own ideas and values to contrast with terrorist groups. International students, Kattouf believed, provide an opportunity for soft power—through exposure to a US liberal education--to be effectively used. According to Kattouf, thousands of former students who studied in the US have returned to positions of leadership in their home countries, and now act as “cultural interpreters” who have a better understanding, respect, and interpretation of US values.

Isam al-Khafaji, the final panelist, focused on US relations and actions in Iraq. Al- Khafaji questioned the ability of global processes to continue if superpowers continue acting in a nationalistic manner. In the modern era, victory only begins the struggle to present alternatives to old regimes, and it is important for the US to present a plan for Iraq that looks beyond US interests to what is needed for the furthering of Iraq’s interests. US troop pullout—albeit an easy answer--is not a desirable answer to the situation, al-Khafaji concluded. It is necessary, however, to empower Iraqis to better address issues they are facing. Even if empowerment involves accepting outcomes that may not be pleasing in the short term, he believes the long-term benefits would outweigh the setback.