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Panelists discussed the limited use of US military power to achieve political ends, focusing on the interplay between diplomatic and military actions and specifically how in many instances the latter corrodes the former.

Michael O’Hanlon, discussing the security situation in Iraq, stated that while he originally thought that the US did a relatively good job at maintaining stability during the summer, increased instability during September, which not only had the second-highest monthly casualty rate since the beginning of the war, but also a four-fold increase in the number of insurgents, has caused him to change his opinion. O’Hanlon asserted that this lack of security contributed to Iraq’s many economic woes, including 30 % unemployment and stagnant infrastructure. While he claimed that there was some good news, including the transfer of sovereignty and the creation of a capable training program for the Iraqi Security Force, he concluded that the war is indeed unwinnable. Growing anti-Americanism, fed by the continued US troop presence, will ultimately necessitate a gradual but steady shift in authority and troop commitment to the Iraqi forces so that, by 2007, US presence would be minimal at most.

Paul Schwartz addressed the challenges of both the use of force and the creation of multilateral coalitions. September 11, the war in Afghanistan, defense restructuring, and the intensity of the current US presidential election have, in his opinion, made discussion of the use of force more complex. A number of factors, including democratic ideals and commercial interests, continue to affect the use of force, but debates about force--whether it be multilateral or unilateral use of hard or soft power--have moved from whether to use it to the question of when to use it. Military coalitions, Schwartz contended, have increasingly become dependent on prominent personalities and take on an ad-hoc characteristic. Such coalitions face many challenges, including differing viewpoints on what constitutes threats, political interests, and training and equipment standards--all of which often lead to positions that lend themselves to a certain amount of prejudice and xenophobia. Despite these challenges, Schwartz argued that multinational coalitions are unavoidable due to the global nature of current conflicts. Benefits offered by coalitions include their intrinsic tendency to distribute costs, strengthen domestic will, weaken allegations of imperialism, and aid in recovery efforts, as well as providing human, cultural, and linguistic contributions. Schwartz closed by asserting that, unlike “ideological unilateralism,” multinational coalitions are consistent with both the history and capabilities of the United States.

Differing from the other panelists, Robert Oakley argued that Iraq does not accurately represent the concept of gunboat diplomacy because it has involved a limited application of force rather than a total application. Oakley used three case studies--Lebanon, Libya, and Somalia--to describe what he considered gunboat diplomacy: Lebanon (1982)--where an escalation of US forces led to the US marine barrack bombing and ultimate withdrawal of forces from the country Libya (1985)--where UN sanctions proved more effective than US bombing attacks Somalia (1993)--which resulted in US withdrawal after a disconnect between political and military objectives eroded political support at home and abroad.

In the question and answer section, panelists covered issues such as troop deployment, how to avoid a “Vietnamization” of Iraq, and whether to use gunboat diplomacy against Iran.