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Diana Buttu expressed surprise at the speed with which a Palestinian unity government agreement was reached in Mecca, given the political complexities leading up to the summit. Ms. Buttu described the push toward unity government as a dynamic and complex process that had been underway for quite some time. She explained that in the months leading up to the January 2006 elections, Fatah unsuccessfully pushed for a unity government arrangement. Hamas rejected Fatah’s overtures, deciding instead to test the election waters and improve their political standing by way of the vote. Unity with Fatah was undesirable for Hamas prior to the elections in 2006, given Hamas’ role as an opposition movement. Joining the government would have eroded the group’s credibility as a viable alternative.

Ms. Buttu went on to discuss Hamas’ changing stance toward unity with Fatah following the group’s victory in the 2006 Palestinian Authority (PA) election. The new government indicated a desire for unity with Fatah so as to govern smoothly during the transition to their rule. This was met with skepticism and disdain from members of Fatah, who were genuinely shocked at their fall from power and viewed the election results as the voting out of their party, rather than the voting in of their rivals. These factional tensions were presumed to be mitigated by the united platform presented in the so-called “Prisoner’s Document,” but this agreement was followed by PA President Mahmoud Abbas calling for a referendum, which Hamas regarded as a direct and existential threat to their legitimacy. This fear that Abbas and Fatah were working to get rid of the Hamas government by eroding their legitimacy further limited any prospects for unity that may have existed.

By the summer of 2006, opinions had shifted among Fatah members toward favoring the formation of a unity government. However, as Ms. Buttu explained, they did not have Palestinian unity in mind. Instead, Fatah sought to lift the economic boycott crippling the Palestinian economy. At this juncture, national unity government was a term masking Fatah’s goal of supplanting Hamas’ rule. According to Ms. Buttu, by December 2006 major stumbling blocks to this strategy became clear, as the constitutionality of Abbas’ calls for new elections were questioned, and he became viewed increasingly as an agent of American policy. Additionally, Fatah’s stance fed Hamas’ worst existential fears and drove the two factions still further apart.

Buttu concluded with an analysis of the Mecca agreement, discussing possible sticking points that could potentially scuttle the formation of a national unity government in the Palestinian Authority. According to the agreement, the new government would feature nine ministers appointed by Hamas, six by Fatah, and five independents. The Prime Minister would come from Hamas, the Deputy Prime Minister would be from Fatah, and the interior minister would be nominated by Hamas, but subject to a Fatah veto. The veto powers accorded to both parties over the ministerial lists could undermine the whole process if unacceptable names are put forward. Furthermore, Ms. Buttu discussed the importance of the economic boycott on the success of this agreement. While Fatah’s primary objective in seeking national unity is to restore calm amid increasing Palestinian factional violence, Ms. Buttu explained that Hamas views this agreement as a vehicle through which the boycott might be lifted and international legitimacy acquired.

Robert Malley described the arrangement reached between Fatah and Hamas in Mecca as an agreement to agree on what had already been agreed, and pointed out two key questions that remain unresolved: who will represent the Palestinian national movement, and who will police the Palestinian Territories? While these and other issues still remain, Mr. Malley argued that presently the formation of a national unity government is more important for furthering Palestinian interests than a comprehensive solution.

Mr. Malley discussed the extent to which the national unity government agreement contradicts American objectives regarding the Palestinians. Since the ascension of Hamas to power in January 2006, the United States has tried its best to isolate Hamas and strengthen Fatah. The new agreement blurs the lines between the two parties, undermining American strategy. At the same time, the United States has no choice but to support the agreement, as it is the product of Saudi brokerage, is supported by Fatah, and is a prime example of an inter-Arab conflict being resolved without direct Western influence. Additionally, Mr. Malley points out that breaking ties with the new national unity government would be tantamount to abandoning the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. While the boycott regime will not be lifted as a result of this agreement, America has no choice but to support its signing, and it has yet to be seen how tough the US stance will be toward countries that begin supporting the PA.

Mr. Malley recommended that the US give the PA national unity government a chance. According to him, the quartet conditions for lifting the economic sanctions seem odd and rhetorical, based in ideology rather than on actions. In reality, a ceasefire agreement is a far more realistic goal for Abbas to attain than an ideological shift from Hamas. Mr. Malley also raised questions regarding America’s commitment to Israeli-Palestinian peace, noting that the pursuit of peace has recently appeared to be a misguided tool used to weaken Hamas. He questioned whether peace initiatives would continue now that Hamas and Fatah were no longer at war with one another. Mr. Malley concluded by stating that if peace is indeed the United States’ primary objective, then it must welcome the Palestinian national unity agreement signed in Mecca.