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Ambassador Kux described the relationship between the United States and Pakistan as a “ride on a roller coaster over time,” characterized by numerous ups and downs. He defined eight distinct periods in the history of US-Pakistan relations that represent its changing status, and questioned whether the United States was heading for a ninth. The first eight periods were characterized by shifting American perceptions of Pakistan’s strategic importance. According to Ambassador Kux, most significant were the last three shifts that occurred — one under the Reagan presidency when an anti-Soviet alliance was made with Pakistan, another during the G.H.W. Bush and Clinton presidencies when the removal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan shifted focus negatively onto Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation, and finally under G.W. Bush, where Pakistani participation in the War on Terror has ushered in a new era of cooperation.

Ambassador Kux noted that while the American and Pakistani governments verbally express many of the same interests, they approach them from different vantage points, which often leads to divergent courses of action. Many of these discrepancies revolve around Afghanistan. According to Ambassador Kux, the Pakistanis doubt US intentions to stay the course in Afghanistan and are concerned with the prospect of facing a hostile neighbor on their western border. This concern is amplified by fears of Iran, India, and Russia playing a prominent role there. Ambassador Kux likened the deterioration of American ties with Pakistan following the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan as that of an old, used Kleenex being tossed aside, and that Pakistanis are wary of placing too much trust in an alliance with the United States given historical precedence. Additionally, they doubt the staying power of President Karzai’s government and resent the strong ties it has developed with India.

It appears to many Pakistanis that their nation’s current relationship with the United States is entirely contingent on cooperation in the War on Terror. Should the Taliban threat cease to exist, so too would American interest in a close alliance, and a scrutinizing gaze would once again be cast on Pakistan. Therefore, holding onto the “Taliban card” seems prudent and the annihilation of this group, contrary to Pakistani interests. Based on the continuously shifting dynamics of US-Pakistan relations over the past 50 years, Ambassador Kux concluded that a new, tragic degeneration seems likely. He stated that the current American approach of threatening to cut aid and trade to Pakistan is putting the two countries on a collision course, and that the best way to slow, if not stop, this is to tone down the rhetoric on both sides and confine criticism and coercion to the private domain.

The majority of Ambassador Milam’s discussion focused on the domestic political situation in Pakistan, and how this might affect relations with the United States. According to Ambassador Milam, the idea that President Musharraf will form an alliance with the PPP and Benazir Bhutto is little more than a liberal fantasy, as he simply does not require this group’s support to stay in power. Ms. Bhutto’s support would come at too high a price, as she demands help with foreign court cases, a free hand to run for Prime Minister, and the removal of the President’s military affiliation. In contrast, President Musharraf does need the backing of the popular PMLQ, a party staunchly opposed to the enlightened moderation of the PPP given its religious pretensions and conservative support base. The PMLQ has no qualms with President Musharraf’s military affiliation, which he has no desire to eschew. Ambassador Milam noted that the President has “bigger fish to fry” than domestic political reform, and that any American attempt to press the issue will most likely be completely ineffective.

Ambassador Milam also discussed the growing sectarian violence in Pakistan, stating that it can be attributed to more than just the increased presence of the Shi‘ite minority in the streets recently during the Ashura holiday. He referenced the growing involvement of Al-Qa‘ida in these attacks and posited that while the short-term implications of this are negligible for President Musharraf, in the long term he may have to address the jihadists in his midst, as domestic attacks might erode confidence in the military’s ability to provide security. It is therefore possible that President Musharraf will have to end his support for jihadist militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir in order to suppress domestic threats to the legitimacy of military rule.

Ambassador Milam concluded his presentation with a brief discussion of the proposed Iranian Gas pipeline that would pass directly through Pakistan, the construction of which would force President Musharraf to build a cordon of security through Baluchistan. In order to secure the pipeline, the President might be forced to clear the Taliban out of Baluchistan and possibly Waziristan as well, indirectly satisfying American strategic policy objectives.