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Enderlin began his presentation by accrediting the success of his book to personal experiences and contacts that allowed him to obtain information and insights from secret negotiators, political leaders, military chiefs, and CIA agents, especially given his proficiency in Hebrew, residence in Israel since 1968, and access to primary sources of information.

First, Enderlin challenged the unilateral approach adopted by the Israeli army to manage terrorist attacks and the unfavorable consequences of “Conscience Engraving”— a doctrine of retaliation adopted by the Israeli army to strike back at Palestinians with lethal force so as to leave them in no doubt that they will pay the heaviest price for Palestinian terrorist attacks against the Israelis. This doctrine backfired on the Israelis,which is evidenced by the fact that one million bullets were fired by the Israeli army against the Palestinians after just one month of Intifada.

Enderlin illustrated the negative repercussions of exercising leverage against the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and holding Fatah leadership accountable for all terrorist attacks. Indeed, the outcome of this policy led to bloody inter-Palestinian confrontations between Fatah and Hamas, the weakening of the PLO, and the rise of militant Islamists. For example, the killing of Jamal Salim and Jamal Mansour — two Hamas shaykhs in July 2001 — was followed by Hamas attacks against the Israeli army, and the Israeli army retaliated by striking the PLO.

Enderlin contested the notion that Israeli check points in the West Bank were promoting security. He argued that the check points were crippling Palestinian social and economic development and reducing the Palestinian Authority to an entity that pays salaries offered by the international community, with little to no prospect of improving Palestinian health education and welfare.

Given the total embargo on Gaza, and the illegal construction of the wall, Enderlin explained that Palestinian prospects for development without freedom of movement and trade are very grim.

Enderlin cited two reasons for the failure of the wall to end terrorism: First of all, there were no terrorist attacks by Hamas in 2007, and secondly, the superior Israeli intelligence is more effective than it has ever been before. The author expressed faith in any public statements made by Hamas to end all terrorists’ attacks.

Despite the importance of developing the Israeli army, Enderlin described a booming Israeli economy, strong currency, reduction in unemployment rate, and bilateral treaties with Europe as indicators of an exceptionally good year for Israeli development and growth.

There will be no peace between Israel and Palestine so long as there is no agreement on order, settlements, Jerusalem, and rights of refugees, stated Enderlin. Enderlin held the view that only the Israelis are capable of restoring the Palestinian state.

Enderlin saw a potential role for religious leaders in the Middle East to foster greater understanding between Palestinian youth and Israelis. He expressed discontent with the rising level of extremism among Palestinian youth and attributed this misfortune to poverty, lack of opportunities and isolation from Israelis, explaining that the only contact for Palestinian youth with the Israelis is sadly through army check points.

Enderlin stressed that the window of opportunity is closing in the Middle East. He pointed to the failures of previous peace negotiations to reach a settlement, and concluded by expressing serious doubts about Annapolis.