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Gary Berntsen’s 20-year career in the CIA paralleled the emergence of international terrorism as the most serious threat to global peace and security. After various postings in Sri Lanka, the Persian Gulf, and the Balkans, and after learning Spanish for work in Latin America, Berntsen was sent to Afghanistan to lead the CIA’s ground operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban after the attack on September 11, 2001. He explained that the Department of Defense did not have sufficient “basing rights” to conduct an exclusively military offensive in Afghanistan, so the CIA was called upon to assume the “leading role” in the first phase of the conflict.

Berntsen called the close collaboration between the CIA and the US military in Afghanistan unprecedented. The CIA “opened their books” with total “transparency” to military officers during their joint-effort to track Al Qaeda. Berntsen described how officials had told them to sort out chain-of-command issues on the ground. In fact, his teams were often composed of both CIA and military, with several Afghans “folded in” to provide tactical support.

Airstrikes were the most effective military tactic used against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, which ran contrary to his assumption that US forces would be engaged in trench-warfare. It also surprised him that the Taliban were so easy to topple, since he had expected the regime would “dig in.” Al Qaeda was portrayed as more formidable fighters because of their ideological commitment to sacrifice their lives for a cause.

Berntsen said that the US did not adequately “pressure” the Pakistani government to monitor their Northwest province, which serves as a refuge for escaped Al Qaeda and Taliban forces, and possibly a harbor for Osama Bin Laden. He said that killing Bin Laden is essential since he continues to be a threat to the US.

The primary reason the US failed to capture or kill Bin Laden, according to Berntsen, was the lack of ground troops in Afghanistan, and the premature withdrawal of his teams from the country. Berntsen explained that he had requested 600-800 Rangers to be sent to the country to assist in fighting Al Qaeda. However, his request for support was not granted. There was also the added difficulty of operating in the complex tribal network of Afghanistan, since tribal loyalties and codes of honor sometimes interfered with the Afghans’ willingness to cooperate with Americans.

Berntsen punctuated his recollections of fighting in Afghanistan with insights into the broader, institutional efforts to combat terrorism. He defended the CIA against criticism, remarking that “it was a great place to work” and that “for every intelligence failure there are 100 successes.” In response to those who might question the CIA’s ability to identify credible threats to the US, Berntsen reiterated that the sheer volume of terrorist activity vastly complicates intelligence gathering and analysis.

Berntsen emphasized that there are practical difficulties in discerning good intelligence, such as the ability to trust sources who often provide fabrications along with good information. Berntsen implied that this stretches the CIA’s capabilities thin, since they have to take all threats seriously.

Berntsen challenged the view that there is discordance and infighting between US bureaucracies in conducting the war on terrorism, saying instead that there is constructive cooperation between the CIA and the FBI. Berntsen cited the prevalence of FBI agents serving in CIA posts, and vice versa, as an example. He sought to debunk the view that State Department officials are out of touch with reality, remarking that they are just as likely to be wearing “Kevlar” and “helmets” as “top hats.” Berntsen described the State Department officials he knows as dynamic and dedicated individuals, who are working closely with the CIA to confront the terrorist threats to our nation.